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introduction
The year 2000 was the 400th anniversary of the founding of the 
English East India Company. It was also the year that I came to work 
in the City of London, where the Company had been headquartered 
throughout its 275-year existence. Then and now, the City forms one 
of the major hubs of international finance. As the new millennium 
opened, market euphoria was still in the air, though with hindsight 
the crazed dot.com bubble had already peaked on the last day of 
1999. I was entering the world of socially responsible investment as 
this speculative surge started to implode, revealing malpractice on 
a scale not seen since 1929. Once started, the slide in share values 
kept going for three full years until prices had halved. Momentarily, 
there were signs of humility on the trading floors. Across the world, 
inquiries got under way to discover if it was just a few ‘bad apples’ 
at Enron, Worldcom and Tyco who were to blame, or whether 
the entire ‘barrel’ of corporate capitalism was at fault. A decade 
on, and a far-deeper and still unresolved crisis wracks the world’s 
financial markets, one that goes to the heart of the current model 
of globalization, exposing businesses that are ‘too big to fail’ and 
challenging the unequal gains of corporate executives.
What are often seen as entirely novel problems are, in fact, 
enduring facets of global economic history, a history that the English 
East India Company did so much to shape. No stranger to stock 
market bubbles, eye-watering corruption and government bail-outs, 
the Company actually outstripped the excesses of the contemporary 
corporation by conquering nations and ruling over millions with 
its private army. Yet – until recently – this pivotal role was absent 
from the public memory of post-imperial Britain. I discovered this 
perplexing gap when I first decided to visit the site of the Company’s 
headquarters, East India House, more than a decade ago. The 
building was located in the heart of the Square Mile, near Exchange 
Alley where jobbers had first gathered in the coffee houses to swap 
rumour and trade the Company’s shares. From Bank, I headed east, 
and when I reached the corner of Leadenhall and Lime Street, where 
East India House had stood for over two hundred years, there was 
nothing – no sign, no plaque, nothing to mark the fact that this 
was the location where the world’s most powerful corporation had 
xi
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once been based. In a country that is so drenched in the culture of 
heritage, this absence puzzled me: why had this historic Company 
been so completely erased from the face of London?
This book is an attempt to answer this question and, more 
importantly, to re-examine the meaning of the Company’s legacy for 
the global economy of the twenty-first century. As I delved deeper 
into this corporation from the Age of Enlightenment, it became 
clear that this was not just a thing of the past, a simple commercial 
story of merchants bringing spices, textiles and tea from Asia to 
consumers in Europe. Rather it was a tale of institutional innovation 
and global transformation. The Company pioneered the shareholder 
model of corporate ownership and built the foundations for modern 
business administration. With a single-minded pursuit of personal 
and corporate gain, the Company and its executives eventually 
achieved market dominance in Asia, ruling over large swathes of 
India for a profit. But the Company also shocked its age with the 
scale of its executive malpractice, stock market excess and human 
oppression, which stimulated increasing levels of state intervention 
in part to remedy its failings, in the process extending Britain’s 
empire. For me, the parallels with today’s corporate leviathans soon 
became overpowering, with the Company outstripping Enron for 
corruption and Wal-Mart for market power, and pre-empting by 
more than 200 years the government bail-outs of banks such as 
Lloyds and the Royal Bank of Scotland. 
As I pursued this enquiry, a powerful tension emerged, however. 
Unlike Britain, in India, the Company’s legacy has always been 
close to the surface. The Company that ‘came to trade and stayed 
to rule’ remains a central part of the country’s national identity, 
informing popular responses to the resurgent role of foreign 
corporations in liberalized India. Whether it is mining companies 
venturing into tribal areas or multinational retailers seeking a slice 
of India’s booming market, the East India Company is still deployed 
as a universal motif to inspire caution. And as India rises to global 
economic prominence, a new assertiveness is being added to this 
storyline, symbolized by the relaunch of the East India Company 
in 2010, this time by an Indian entrepreneur, an act which for 
some marks the end of the freedom struggle. In China, where the 
Company’s imprint was left not by armed conquest but by a flood 
of smuggled narcotics, it also plays a central role in the narrative of 
liberation. Indeed, the Company opened China’s ‘century of national 
humiliation’ with its unrelenting export of Indian-grown opium, a 
contraband trade which when stopped by the Chinese authorities 
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sparked two wars that prised open the Qing Empire’s markets for 
British free trade. The Company’s rise and fall is therefore a global 
story that links the peoples of three river valleys – the Thames, the 
Ganges and the Pearl – and defines an imperial past as well as the 
corporate present. 
There are countless histories of the East India Company, yet 
none address its social record as a corporation. This is a gap that 
this book seeks to fill, examining the four fundamental forces 
that defined its impacts on society – its financing model, its use 
of technology, its size and scale and its regulation at home and 
abroad. The book tries to recover a sense of the ferocious struggles 
over corporate accountability that the Company generated in the 
eighteenth century. Importantly, this is not an exercise in applying 
twenty-first-century values to an earlier age. Those who lived with 
the Company saw the corporation as a fundamentally problematic 
institution. Leading lights of its own times examined its practices 
and found them wanting. Adam Smith, Edmund Burke and 
Karl Marx were all united in their critique of this domineering, 
overbearing corporation, but for quite different reasons. For Smith, 
the corporation was one of the great enemies of the open market, 
‘a nuisance in every respect’.1 Burke’s concern was that it posed a 
revolutionary threat to the established order in both Britain and 
India. It also exhibited ethical failings of a structural nature. ‘Every 
rupee of profit made by an Englishman’, Burke told Parliament, 
‘is lost forever to India.’2 And for Marx, writing 70 years later as 
the Company was on its last legs, it was the standard-bearer of 
Britain’s ‘moneyocracy’, a more terrible creation than ‘any of the 
divine monsters startling us in the Temple of Salsette’ near Mumbai.3 
Yet, what makes the Company’s story so inspirational is the way 
that its bid for unbounded economic power was repeatedly met by 
individuals such as these struggling to make it accountable. As a 
result, the Company provides timeless lessons on how (and how 
not) to confront corporate excess through reform, protest, litigation, 
regulation, and, ultimately, through corporate redesign.
To recover a sense of the Company’s physical presence, I decided to 
take the investigation out of academia and encounter the Company’s 
heartlands in Britain, India and China. By revisiting its headquarters 
and its warehouses, its mansions and its docks, I hoped to gain a 
much fuller understanding of the Company’s character. The book 
has a narrative structure, but moves between past and present. To 
aid the reader, a chronology of milestones in the Company history 
is provided on page xvi. The first chapter then delves deeper into 
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its contested legacy, and explores the very different ways it is 
remembered in Europe and Asia. This is followed in Chapter 2 by 
an analysis of the Company’s metabolism, examining its systems 
of governance and finance, as well as the inherent tensions that 
led to its downfall. Its initial trajectory as a seventeenth-century 
‘spice trader’ is laid out in Chapter 3, along with the catastrophic 
consequences of its first bid for market supremacy in the 1690s. 
Eventually, the Company managed to engineer the takeover of 
Bengal in the middle of the eighteenth century: the causes and 
consequences of this momentous event are discussed in Chapter 4. 
But like so many corporations in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, the East India Company over-reached itself. Chapter 5 
describes how incompetence and negligence combined to produce 
a stock market crash and one of India’s worst famines. Many in 
Britain feared that the Company would use its new-found wealth to 
end England’s hard-won liberties. Chapter 6 reviews Adam Smith’s 
ferocious critique of the corporation and places it in the context 
of the wider movement of public protest, parliamentary activism 
and outright rebellion that sought to end the Company’s abuses in 
the 1770s. Yet, justice was still not done, and Chapter 7 examines 
how Edmund Burke tried to place responsibility at the heart of the 
Company’s charter. But the imperatives of empire and not ethics 
won the day. Its commercial swansong would come further East 
in China, where opium was identified as the one commodity that 
could dispense with the mounting exports of silver bullion to pay 
for Britain’s growing thirst for tea. Chapter 8 delves into multiple 
roles the Company played to promote this illegal and lucrative 
trade. Yet by the time the second opium war was over, the Company 
itself was no more. Chapter 9 traces the road to the great rebellion 
against Company rule in 1857, showing how it progressively shed 
its commercial functions and became the profit-making agent of 
the British Crown in India, all the while paying dividends to its 
shareholders. 1857 signalled the end of the Company’s anachronistic 
position in India, placing it in a twilight zone before it was finally 
wound up in 1874.
The enduring lessons of the Company’s history for the management 
of the corporation are then laid out in Chapter 10, looking at the 
measures that could combine private benefit with public good. The 
book then closes by suggesting how a more honest encounter with 
the Company’s legacy can be achieved.
A peculiar amnesia continues to hang over the role that 
corporations such as the East India Company have had in the 
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creation of the modern world. My hope is that this book will go 
some way to revealing how much just one company shaped the 
global past, and how we can use this knowledge to make today’s 
corporate sector more fully accountable in the present. 
a noTe on The TeXT
As the spelling of Indian place names has changed over time, the 
wording used in the past is generally preferred in historical contexts 
(thus Calcutta), and current spelling applied for references to the 
present (thus Kolkata).
To give the Company’s affairs greater immediacy, I have also 
converted some of the key financial statistics into current values. For 
this, I have used the online service provided by Economic History 
Resources, <www.eh.net>. 
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Chronology
1498 Portuguese fleet led by Vasco da Gama arrives off the 
Malabar coast
1595 Dutch Compagnie Van Verre established to take the 
ocean route to the East
1600 31 December: English East India Company (EIC) 
established 
1602  Formation of the Dutch Verenigde Oostindische 
Compagnie (VOC) 
1618 English Company negotiates first trade agreement with 
the Mughal Empire
1623 EIC merchants executed at Amboina (Indonesia) by 
VOC forces
1639 Fort St George at Madras established by the English 
Company
1648 The EIC moves headquarters to East India House at 
Leadenhall Street
1657 The EIC becomes a permanent joint stock corporation
1668 Bombay transferred to the EIC by King Charles II
1681 Josiah Child first elected as EIC governor (chairman)
1686–89 Child launches war with Mughal Empire 
1690 Company establishes new base in Bengal at Calcutta
1695 First parliamentary investigation into Company 
corruption
1698 Parliament awards monopoly of Asia trade to the New 
Company
1709 Merger of New and Old Companies finalised
1717 Company receives comprehensive trade privileges 
(firman) in Mughal India
1721 Bubble in South Sea Company shareprices implodes
1729  Qing Empire bans import of opium except for 
medicinal purposes
1751–52 Robert Clive wins siege of Arcot
1756 Calcutta captured by Nawab of Bengal and ‘black 
hole’ incident
1757  February: Recapture of Calcutta by EIC
 23 June: EIC troops under Clive defeat the Nawab at 
Plassey
xvi
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1764 EIC defeats an alliance of Mughals, Bengal and Awadh 
at Buxar 
1765 Clive acquires the management of the Bengal treasury 
(diwani) for the EIC
1769 Peak of ‘Bengal Bubble’ in the Company’s shares
1770 Bengal Famine: between 1 and 10 million die of 
starvation
1772 Company appeals to government for financial 
assistance
1773 Regulating Act passed to reform EIC governance, and 
Warren Hastings becomes first Governor-General of 
India. Tea Act passed to encourage sale of EIC tea in 
the Americas; in December, American patriots dump 
EIC tea in Boston harbour
1776 Publication of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations
1778 Spiridione Roma’s Offering installed at East India 
House 
1780 Duel between Philip Francis and Warren Hastings in 
Calcutta
1781 Hastings sends shipments of opium to China
1783 Failure of Charles James Fox and Edmund Burke’s East 
India Bill
1784 William Pitt’s India Act passed, increasing state powers 
over the EIC
1788 Start of impeachment trial of Warren Hastings in the 
House of Lords
1793 ‘Permanent Settlement’ of Bengal’s finances and new 
Charter Act, breaching Company trade monopoly for 
first time
1795 Warren Hastings acquitted at impeachment trial
1799 Dissolution of Dutch VOC, and conquest of Mysore by 
EIC
1806 Opening of new East India Dock
1813 Company loses monopoly of trade with India 
1833 Parliament ends the Company’s commercial operations; 
remains as territorial administrator in India
1839–42 First Opium War between Britain and China
1856–60 Second Opium War, resulting in legalisation of opium 
in China
1857 Outbreak of Indian Mutiny or First War of 
Independence in northern India
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1858 Parliament replaces Company with direct British rule 
in India
1861 East India House demolished
1874 1 June: Dissolution of the East India Company
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In 1778, the directors of the Honourable East India Company 
installed an extravagant new painting in their London headquarters, 
East India House. Like much corporate art before and since, the 
quality of the painting was generally regarded as poor, with one 
commentator describing it as ‘a work too feeble to confer any credit 
either on the artist or his employers’.1 But the directors were not 
seeking applause for the artistic merit of their commission. Ten feet 
across and over eight feet high, Spiridione Roma’s giant allegory of 
The East Offering Her Riches to Britannia was designed to impress 
(see Illustration 1.1). Fixed to the ceiling of the Company’s revenue 
committee room, where the directors monitored the flow of profit 
and loss, the purpose of The Offering was simple: to convey the 
commercial domination that the Company had now achieved 
in Asia. 
At the heart of the painting is the relationship of three women, 
each representing their country. The scene is an Asian shoreline. 
Sitting high on a rock to the left, a fair Britannia looks down on 
a kneeling India who offers her crown surrounded by rubies and 
pearls. Beside her, China presents her own tribute of porcelain and 
tea. From a grove of palm trees to the right comes a convoy of 
labourers carrying bales of cloth, along with an elephant and a 
camel, all directed westward by a stern Mercury, the classical god of 
commerce. The British lion sits at Britannia’s feet, as does Old Father 
Thames, a sign that it was to London that much of this wealth would 
flow.2 Far off, beyond the figures, one of the Company’s famous 
merchant ships sails into the distance, laden with the treasure of 
the East, its striped ensign fluttering in the wind. 
For The Offering, Spiridione drew on a long line of similar 
depictions of European trading supremacy. The early success of 
the Honourable Company’s main rival, the Dutch United East 
India Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie – VOC), had 
provided Pieter Isaacsz with the inspiration he needed for his 1606 
painting symbolising Amsterdam as the centre of world trade.3 
1
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In Isaacsz’s allegory, Amsterdam holds a horn of plenty in her 
right hand, and with her left controls the globe. Servants offer her 
pearls, while three VOC ships command the centre of the painting. 
A century later, in 1729, the English Company had enlisted the 
fashionable Dutch sculptor Michael Rysbrack to create a grand 
marble chimney piece for its new headquarters. On the left of the 
carving sits Britannia, receiving a treasure chest from a woman 
representing Asia, escorted by two other women, one leading a 
camel, the other a lion; two Company ships frame the piece on 
the right. Importantly, Britannia and Asia look each other in the 
eye, as if to symbolise that this was still an age when the Company 
based its wealth on exchange. The English Company had certainly 
gained ground, but still lagged its Dutch rival, and was also starting 
to face tough competition from new French Compagnie des Indes.
By 1778, however, there was little doubt that ‘John Company’, 
as it has become known, had replaced ‘Jan Compagnie’ as master 
of Europe’s trade with Asia. Years of argument over trading rights 
with local rulers in India had culminated two decades earlier in the 
takeover of Bengal in 1757. Combining economic muscle with its 
small but effective private army, the Company’s forces under Robert 
Illustration 1.1 Spiridione Roma, The East Offering Her Riches to Britannia, 1778
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Clive had defeated the Nawab of Bengal at Plassey (Palashi), 90 
miles north of its trading base of Calcutta (Kolkata). The Company 
quickly installed Mir Jafar – a general who had betrayed the defeated 
Nawab – as the first of a series of puppet rulers of Bengal. More of 
a commercial transaction than a real battle, Plassey was followed 
by the systematic looting of Bengal’s treasury. In a powerful symbol 
of the transfer of wealth that had begun, the Company loaded the 
treasury’s gold and silver onto a fleet of over a hundred boats and 
sent them downriver to Calcutta. In one stroke, Clive had netted 
£2.5 million for the Company and £234,000 for himself.4 Today 
this would be equivalent to a £262 million corporate windfall and 
a cool £24.5 million success fee for Clive. Historical convention 
views Plassey as the first step in the creation of the British Empire in 
India. It is perhaps better understood as the East India Company’s 
most successful business deal. 
In the decade that followed, the Company used its dominant 
position to monopolise the foreign and internal trade of Bengal, 
driving out Asian, Dutch and French merchants in the process. In 
August 1765, the Company’s supremacy was formally recognised 
by the impoverished Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II with the grant 
of Bengal’s diwani. This office of state gave the Company control 
over tax collection for more than 10 million people. For a stock 
market-listed company with profit as its primary motive, this 
acquisition of a country’s public finances was truly revolutionary. 
Not surprisingly, the Company’s share price boomed when news of 
the acquisition reached London’s financial markets in April 1766.
Just as Spiridione portrayed, the wealth of the East began to pour 
into England. This represented an extraordinary turnaround. Before 
Plassey, the ‘balance of trade was against all nations in favour of 
Bengal’, wrote Alexander Dow in his 1773 History of Hindostan.5 
Bengal had been ‘the sink where gold and silver disappeared without 
the least prospect of return’. Now that flow was reversed. Monopoly 
power and windfall revenues combined to create unrivalled 
purchasing power that bought ever-increasing quantities of Eastern 
goods to European markets. In spite of tough trade barriers against 
cheap Indian calicoes, Bengal’s textiles, notably the soft Dhaka 
muslins, were still an essential fashion item for Britain’s female 
elite. Indeed, Spiridione’s Britannia seems swathed in muslin. But 
tea was now the Company’s prize commodity, and the riches of 
Bengal helped to boost shipments from the Company’s Chinese 
subsidiary in Canton (Guangzhou) three-fold in the five years 
following 1768. The annual consumption of tea rose to some one 
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pound for each man, woman and child in England. On the streets 
of London, the Company also made its presence felt, not least at its 
imposing headquarters on Leadenhall Street, the huge dock complex 
in Blackwall and the fine merchant houses around Stepney Green. 
For a Parliamentary Select Committee investigating the Company’s 
affairs five years later, 1778 – the year of Spiridione’s triumphal 
portrayal of commercial success – would be seen as ‘the high flood 
tide’ of its exports from Asia.6
MISSING ElEMENTS
The East Offering Her Riches to Britannia provides us with a 
fascinating window onto the ways in which the Company wished 
to see itself – and be seen – at the peak of its commercial powers. 
Its mix of classical imagery and oriental exoticism – Mercury in a 
palm grove – captures well the sense of unlimited opulence that the 
Company’s success in the East had made possible. 
Yet much is missing from this vast tableau. Like so many 
high-profile corporate ventures since, the takeover of Bengal proved 
to be an acquisition too far for the East India Company. Initial 
stock market euphoria quickly gave way to excess, mismanagement 
and collapse. As the Company transformed itself from a modest 
trading venture into a powerful corporate machine, its systems of 
governance completely failed to cope with the new responsibili-
ties it faced. Oppression of local weavers and peasants became the 
norm. Military spending spiralled out of control as adventurers took 
over from traders. Corruption assumed epidemic proportions and 
speculation overtook its shares, stoked up by Clive and others. Then, 
in 1769, conflict in south India rattled nervy investors, sending its 
share price into free fall. Financial crisis stalked Europe and the 
Company faced bankruptcy. Across the world in Bengal, drought 
turned to famine as Company executives profiteered from rising 
grain prices. Plays, pamphlets and poems poured from the presses 
back in Britain to pillory the Company and its executives. Company 
executives became caricatured as grasping Nabobs (or Nobs), the 
Yuppies of Georgian England. Like many of his contemporaries, 
the Glasgow Professor of Moral Philosophy, Adam Smith, was 
horrified at the way that the Company ‘oppresses and domineers’ 
in the East Indies.7 Parliament was forced to intervene, while over 
the Atlantic in Britain’s American colonies, patriots focused on 
the Company’s tea as a symbol of oppression. For one ‘Mechanic’ 
appealing to the tradesmen of Pennsylvania, America was faced with 
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‘the most powerful Trading Company in the Universe’, an institution 
‘well-versed in tyranny, plunder, oppression and bloodshed’.8 On the 
night of 16 December 1773, patriots dressed as ‘Indians’ dumped 
East India Company tea into Boston harbour, the symbolic start to 
the American War of Independence. 
War still raged in the Americas when The Offering was first 
unveiled in the Company’s headquarters. In London, the Company’s 
share price continued to languish at half the level it had reached 
during the 1760s. To the east in India, the Company’s most senior 
executive, Governor-General Warren Hastings, had taken a 
succession of desperate measures to restore the Company’s financial 
health. Looking back on this era as Parliament once more sought to 
bring the Company to account in the early 1780s, the philosopher/
politician Edmund Burke was savage in his criticism. For him, India 
had been ‘radically and irretrievably ruined’ through the Company’s 
‘continual Drain’ of wealth – a phrase that would haunt the next 
150 years of British presence in India.9 
Yet, none of this – the speculation, wars and corruption – could be 
allowed to disturb the expression of supreme corporate confidence 
that the Company’s 24 directors had commissioned Spiridione 
Roma to portray. Then, as now, some things are always hidden.
a STRaNGE INVISIBIlITY
Established on a cold New Year’s Eve, 1600, England’s East 
India Company is the mother of the modern corporation. In its 
more than two and a half centuries of existence, it bridged the 
mercantilist world of chartered monopolies and the industrial age 
of corporations accountable solely to shareholders. The Company’s 
establishment by royal charter, its monopoly of all trade between 
Britain and Asia and its semi-sovereign privileges to rule territories 
and raise armies certainly mark it out as a corporate institution 
from another time. Yet in its financing, structures of governance 
and business dynamics, the Company was undeniably modern. It 
may have referred to its staff as servants rather than executives, and 
communicated by quill pen rather than email, but the key features 
of the shareholder-owned corporation are there for all to see.
Beyond its status as a corporate pioneer, the sheer size of its 
operations makes the Company historically significant on a global 
scale. At its height, the Company’s empire of commerce stretched 
from Britain across the Atlantic and around the Cape to the Gulf 
and on to India. Trading posts were established at St Helena in 
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the mid-Atlantic, where Napoleon drank Company coffee in exile; 
‘factories’ were also established at Basra and Gombroon (Bandar 
Abbas) in the Middle East. But it was in India that the Company’s 
impacts were most profound. Some of the country’s major cities grew 
on the back of the Company’s trade, not least Bombay (Mumbai), 
Calcutta (Kolkata) and Madras (Chennai). Beyond these coastal 
ports, the Company established a huge land empire, first as an 
opportunistic quest for extra revenues and later as an end in itself, 
eventually ruling most of the subcontinent. Yet, the Company’s 
footprint did not stop there, but stretched to South-East Asia and 
beyond to China and Japan. Penang and Singapore were both ports 
purchased by the Company in an age when territories could be 
bought and sold like commodities. And if India was the site of 
the Company’s first commercial triumphs, it was in China that it 
made its second fortune. The Company’s ‘factory’ at Canton was 
the funnel through which millions of pounds of Bohea, Congou, 
Souchon and Pekoe teas flowed west to Britain and beyond. In the 
other direction came first silver and later a flood of Patna opium, 
smuggled in chests proudly bearing the Company chop (or logo).
Throughout its existence the Company was in a state of almost 
constant metamorphosis. Its end would come following the uprising 
against Company rule in 1857–58, a contest generally known as 
the Indian Mutiny in Britain and the First War of Independence in 
India. By then, the Company had lost almost all connection with 
the band of merchants who set out in four tiny ships to break into 
the Indonesian pepper market at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century. It no longer traded, and it administered its conquests in 
India as a licensed agent on behalf of the British Crown. But one 
abiding link remained: its ultimate purpose as a profit-making 
agency, always with an eye to its shareholders and the annual 
dividend. Following the suppression of the great rebellion, there was 
a fierce public backlash against the Company’s anachronistic status. 
In the India Act of 1858, the Company was effectively nationalised, 
with all its rights and responsibilities taken over by the British state; 
the British Raj had begun. Yet, the Company lingered on, ‘a shadow 
of a shade’, according to one observer. It may have lost its purpose, 
but its directors were insistent that its capital should be protected 
for the remaining years of its last charter. Eventually, time ran out, 
its shares were exchanged for government bonds, and on 1 June 
1874, the Company ceased to exist. 
Colonial rule was certainly the final outcome of the Company’s 
adventurism in Asia. But it was the hunt for personal and corporate 
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profit that had drawn the Company inexorably on. The results of 
this enduring dynamic were world-shattering. By the time of its 
demise, the Company had changed the course of economic history, 
reversing the centuries’ old flow of wealth from west to east. 
From Roman times, Europe had always been Asia’s commercial 
supplicant, shipping out gold and silver in return for spices, textiles 
and other luxury goods. European traders were attracted to the 
East for its wealth and sophistication at a time when the western 
economy was a fraction the size of Asia’s. And for its first 150 
years, the Company had to repeat this practice, as there was almost 
nothing that England could export that the East wanted to buy. 
Then first in Bengal in the decades that followed Plassey, and 
then in China through the opium trade, the Company broke this 
longstanding pattern of trade and wealth. By the time of its demise, 
Europe’s economy was double the size of those of China and 
India, a complete reversal of the situation in 1600 (see Table 1.1). 
There are many elements in this turnaround, but the East India 
Company was certainly one of the chief agents that engineered 
the great switch in global development that marked the birth of 
the modern age. 
Table 1.1 The changing share of world Gdp 1600–1870 (in million 1990 international $) 
 1600 % of total 1700 % of total 1870 % of total
Britain 6,007 1.80 10,709 2.88 100,179 9.10
Western Europe 65,955 20.02 83,395 22.46 370,223 33.61
China 96,000 29.14 82,800 22.30 189,740 17.23
India 74,250 22.54 90,750 24.44 134,882 12.25
World 329,417  371,369  1,101,369
Source: Angus Maddison, The World Economy, Paris: OECD, 2001, p. 261, Table B-18.
Yet, if you walk to the site of East India House as I did, you 
will see that nothing marks the tumultuous impact of this once 
mighty corporation. Today Richard Rogers’s glass and steel Lloyds 
Building stands in its place. It was here that the Company’s board 
of directors guided its global operations, and where its famous 
quarterly auctions were held. Sometimes lasting for days, such was 
the ferment generated by these auctions that the noise of ‘howling 
and yelling’ from the Sale Room could be heard through the thick 
stone walls on the street outside. Lawrence Norfolk’s wonderful 
1991 novel Lemprière’s Dictionary captures some of these passions, 
with his tale of how a secret society manipulates the Company from 
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caverns deep beneath the streets of London. As the hero approaches 
East India House, he finds ‘a stone hulk stretched down Leadenhall 
Street like a petrified carcass’.10 
Leadenhall Street was not the Company’s first headquarters. 
When it was newly established by Elizabeth I as ‘The Governor 
and Company of Merchants of London Trading to the East Indies’, 
its business was done at the City mansion of its first Governor (or 
Chairman), Sir Thomas Smythe. His house was situated on the 
narrow Philpot Lane, where an echo remains in the appropriately 
named ‘Spice Trader’ curry restaurant. The Company then 
shifted a few hundred yards to the north and occupied Crosby 
Hall. Long after the Company had moved on, this magnificent 
Jacobean structure remained in the financial heart of London. When 
property developers threatened it with demolition at the turn of the 
twentieth century, a public campaign paid for it to be dismantled 
and re-erected brick by brick on the riverfront at Chelsea. The 
hall remained in public use as a college until it was sold off by the 
Conservative Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, after her abolition 
of the Greater London Council in 1986. It was then purchased by 
a financier who had recently left the insurance giant, Lloyds – itself 
the site for the next phase of the Honourable Company’s rise.
First occupied by the Company in 1648, East India House 
went through numerous incarnations during its 200-year life. In 
the 1690s it was known as ‘the house belonging to the East India 
Company which are a corporation of men with long heads and deep 
purposes’.11 By the early eighteenth century, it had become one of 
the landmarks of the City of London, and along with the South Sea 
Company and the Bank of England formed the corporate trinity 
of the age. Topped with a statue of a sailor and two dolphins, East 
India House had a distinctly maritime feel to it, and conveyed its 
importance to the passer-by in having both the royal and its own 
corporate crests emblazoned on its façade. With the collapse of 
the South Sea Company following its infamous bubble in 1721, 
the Company and its headquarters achieved a new ascendancy 
in Walpole’s England. In his Tour Through the Whole Island of 
Great Britain, published in the 1720s, Daniel Defoe describes 
the first East India House as ‘an old, but spacious building, very 
convenient, though not beautiful’.12 Yet the size of the Company’s 
operations meant that new warehouses and cellars were needed, 
and a purpose-built stone headquarters was opened in 1729. Plain 
on the outside, the new East India House conveyed its global reach 
within through a series of oil paintings depicting its key trading 
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posts from the Atlantic (St Helena) to Africa (Cape Town) to the 
west coast of India (Bombay and Tellicherry) and round to Madras 
and Calcutta. A new fireplace was also installed in the boardroom 
portraying Britannia exchanging gifts with the East. 
After Plassey, these emblems of commercial prowess were joined 
by statues of the Company’s military heroes, first Clive and then 
Stringer Lawrence. But as the Company’s power grew, so the solid 
building of the 1720s no longer matched the grandeur of its global 
operations. James Noorthouck in his New History of London, 
published in 1773, observed that ‘the appearance of the building 
is nowise suited to the opulence of the Company, whose servants 
exercise sovereign authority in the Indian territories’.13 So, between 
1796 and 1799, an immense 200-foot long classical building 
was constructed. Above the six-columned portico, the triangular 
tympanum displayed George III defending the commerce of the 
East, once again with three allegorical ladies: Britannia on a lion, 
Europe riding a horse and Asia following on a camel.
Behind this imposing edifice sat the Company’s headquarters’ 
staff of around 200 clerks in the early nineteenth century. The 
attractions of a steady income and a good pension attracted some 
whose memory lives on for their literary connections. Author of the 
Essays of Elia and friend of Romantic poets, Charles Lamb worked 
in the Company’s accounts department from 1792. Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge dedicated his 1797 poem, ‘This Lime Tree Bower’, to 
‘my gentle-hearted Charles’, ‘who had “pined and hunger’d after 
Nature, many a year, in the great City pent!”’. For 33 years Lamb 
would alternately bless the steady income that his job provided 
and curse the boredom of office life. ‘Confusion blast all mercantile 
transactions, all traffick, exchange of commodities, intercourse 
between nations…’ he wrote to his friend William Wordsworth in 
1815.14 Wordsworth’s own brother, John, would die in the wreck 
of the Company’s ship, the Earl of Abergavenny, in February 
1805. In 1819, Lamb was joined at East India House by the gothic 
novelist Thomas Love Peacock, who took up the position as one 
of three assistant examiners. Amused by Peacock’s new job, Leigh 
Hunt wrote to the poet Percy Bysshe Shelley that ‘we joke upon 
his oriental grandeur, his Brahminical learning and his inevitable 
tendencies to become one of the corrupt’.15 The utilitarian activist 
James Mill entered the Company’s service in the same year, and 
was joined in 1823 by his son, John Stuart, and in 1835 by another 
son, James Bentham (who took up a position in Bengal). After the 
father’s death, George Grote Mill would follow in his footsteps, 
Robins T02502 01 text   9 30/08/2012   09:22
10 THE CORpORaTION THaT CHaNGEd THE WORld
becoming a clerk in 1844. One way or another, whether through 
direct employment, family connections or the consumption of its 
products, almost everyone in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
England was connected to the East India Company.
This third and final incarnation of East India House is now long 
gone, torn down in 1861, just three years after the Company’s 
possessions had been absorbed into Queen Victoria’s empire. 
Spiridione’s allegory of Britannia was one of the many objects 
that made the short but symbolic journey across London from 
the commercial east to the political west. Many of the Company’s 
artefacts now fill the Victoria and Albert Musuem, most memorably 
the clockwork tiger of Tipu Sahib, Sultan of Mysore. The Offering, 
however, was used to decorate first the India Office, and then its 
successor, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in Whitehall, 
where it still stands above the Gurkha staircase. The Company’s 
statues of Clive, Hastings and Cornwallis litter the building. 
Elsewhere in London, the rest of the Company’s physical legacy is 
scant, but, this being Britain, there is a pub – the East India Arms on 
Fenchurch Street – a mere fragment of a huge warehouse complex 
that stretched towards Aldgate. 
The City of London is full of monuments, but none record the 
existence of the East India Company. This absence is particularly 
strange given the fact that the Company was a London institution 
par excellence, its charter explicitly excluding merchants from other 
ports from trading with Asia. It is not as if London does not choose 
to remember some of its past. At the site of East India House, 
for example, a plaque commemorates the founding of the London 
Penny Post by William Dockwood in 1680. But there is nothing 
to mark the fact that the East India Company was headquartered 
here for more than two hundred years.16 Many institutions have 
justifiably disappeared into the anonymity of history. But the erasure 
of the East India Company is highly suspicious. 
Explaining this absence goes to the heart of the contested position 
that the Company holds in history. Outside the world’s universities, 
its legacy is still a living part of collective memories across the world, 
a legacy that is constantly being evoked and re-evoked through 
publications, exhibitions and documentaries. The recall is uneven, 
however, with deeply clashing perspectives in Europe and Asia – 
none more so than in India, where the Company retains a powerful 
symbolic force in contemporary culture.
Robins T02502 01 text   10 30/08/2012   09:22
THE HIddEN WOuNd 11
CONFRONTING THE SYNdROME
From the ruins of the Company’s fort at the pepper port of 
Tellicherrry on the west coast to the grandeur of Chennai’s Fort 
St George on the east, the Company’s physical presence in India 
continues to impress. The mark is greatest in Kolkata, a ‘company 
town’ of immense proportions. Some of the British street-names 
have been changed, but the weight of the Company’s imprint on 
the city is unmistakable. Recent excavations by the Archaeological 
Survey of India have shown that the area around what subsequently 
became Kolkata had been a thriving commercial centre centuries 
before Job Charnock claimed it for the Company in August 1690. 
Known throughout the East as a ‘Paradise on Earth’ for its wealth 
and prosperity, Bengal attracted waves of European merchants for 
the quality of its textiles. Portuguese traders were first to establish 
a presence in 1535, only to be replaced by the Dutch a century 
later. The English Company came relatively late to Bengal, but the 
new base at Calcutta grew quickly. The first battlements of what 
became Fort William were erected in 1696, and two years later, 
the Company acquired lordship (zamindari) rights over the three 
adjacent villages of Sutanuti, Govindpore and Kolikata. By the 
1720s Bengal was contributing over half of the Company’s entire 
imports from Asia, most of this coming via Calcutta. Many Indians 
were attracted by the prosperity the city offered, and by the middle 
of the eighteenth century, Calcutta had over 120,000 inhabitants, 
of which just 250 were Company officials.
Two hundred years on, Fort William still sits squat by the river 
Hugli, a mile south of the original site. The original Fort had been 
besieged and captured by the Bengali army in June 1756. Following 
the recapture of Calcutta and the victory at Plassey, Clive relocated 
it in a more strategic position. Its impregnable defensive walls have 
never been tested, and the Fort continues its military traditions as 
the base for Eastern Command of the Indian Army. Nearby, the 
white-marble Victoria Memorial displays a remarkably balanced 
exhibition on Calcutta’s history and the Company’s formative 
role in the city’s rise. To the north, the Company-era Government 
House maintains a continuity of occupation as Raj Bhavan, the 
residence of the Governor of Bengal. Construction of this huge 
building began almost as soon as the fifth Governor-General of 
Bengal, Richard Wellesley, had arrived in India in 1798. Not to be 
outdone by the grandeur of the new East India House, which was 
nearing completion back in London, Wellesley modelled his future 
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residence on Kedleston Hall, a country mansion in Derbyshire. 
Eager to get even with his employers, whom he dismissively referred 
to as ‘the cheesemongers of Leadenhall Street’, Wellesley spared no 
expense in this monument to vainglory. Close by stands the Writer’s 
Building named after the Company’s clerks, who once filled this 
administrative hub; it still houses the civil servants of the West 
Bengal government. 
These tangible representations of the deep entanglement between 
the Company and Calcutta are accentuated by questions of identity 
that generate conflict centuries on. Only recently, for example, local 
families successfully challenged the claim that Job Charnock was 
the official ‘founder’ of Calcutta, arguing that there were numerous 
Indian settlements in the area long before the Company arrived. 
Plassey also continues to evoke strong emotions among ordinary 
Bengalis. Mir Jafar, the general who sided with Clive in order to seize 
the throne, remains a popular symbol of betrayal. More broadly 
in India, the East India Company continues to be an icon of the 
potential dangers of foreign corporations. This perspective has deep 
roots in India’s independence movement, which eventually expelled 
the British in 1947. In his Economic History of India under British 
Rule (1908), Romesh Chunder Dutt revived and redirected Burke’s 
earlier critique of the East India Company so that it served his cause 
of root-and-branch reform. ‘A change came over India under the 
rule of the East India Company’, concluded Dutt, arguing that the 
Company simply ‘considered India as a vast estate or plantation, 
the profits of which were to be withdrawn from India and deposited 
in Europe’.17 Through Dutt’s works, the ‘drain’ became a powerful 
symbol of the British exploitation of India, first by the Company 
and then by the Raj. 
Forty years later, the Company’s role in India’s oppression 
was taken up by Jawaharlal Nehru as part of his campaign for 
full independence from Britain. In the summer of 1944, India’s 
future prime minister was once again behind bars. Locked away in 
Ahmadnagar Fort, Nehru was serving his ninth – and final – term 
of imprisonment from the British authorities, this time following 
the Congress Party’s ‘Quit India’ campaign of 1942. As in previous 
spells in gaol, Nehru turned his attention to writing in order to make 
sense of his predicament. In the space of just five months, he had 
filled a thousand pages, only stopping, he said, because he almost 
ran out of paper. The result was The Discovery of India, the final 
and perhaps most profound of his ‘prison trilogy’. In it, Nehru 
presents his vision of how India’s rich and complex past related to 
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its struggle for independence. For him, the writing of history was 
not a remote, academic exercise but intimately bound up with taking 
action to change the present. 
Running through the book is Nehru’s conviction that the two 
centuries of British rule had imposed a terrible burden on India that 
needed urgent removal. But it is when he describes the English East 
India Company and its plunder of Bengal following Clive’s victory 
at Plassey that this cool voice of humanist reason boils over in anger. 
‘The corruption, venality, nepotism, violence and greed of money 
of these early generations of British rule in India’, he thunders, ‘is 
something which passes comprehension.’ To underline his distaste 
at the Company’s practices, he then adds, ‘it is significant that one 
of the Hindustani words which has become part of the English 
language is “loot”’.18
Today, after a decade of economic liberalisation in India, this 
critical analysis of the Company’s role in Indian history has 
come to the surface once more. For many Indians – particularly 
in Bengal – the Company’s story has two profound morals: first 
that multinational companies want not just trade, but power; and 
second that division and betrayal among Indians enables foreign 
rule. ‘Every child knows the perfidious story of how Bengal was 
lost at Plassey,’ writes Gurcharan Das, adding, ‘is it surprising that 
we are suspicious of merchants and foreign companies?’.19 The 
human rights abuses and corruption associated with the Enron 
power project at Dabhol brought these fears to a head in the late 
1990s. ‘It’s the second coming of the East India Company,’ argued 
Justice Daud, a retired judge of the Mumbai High Court, who led 
a fact-finding team following a series of violent incidents at Dabhol 
in March 1997.20 For many, what made Enron’s practices at Dabhol 
so unacceptable was the way in which the company had flagrantly 
manipulated the permit process. The result was a contract with the 
Maharashtra State that is regarded as ‘the most massive fraud in the 
country’s history’, according to Arundhati Roy.21 Enron achieved 
this, she argues, by deploying a ‘time-tested strategy’ first used by 
the East India Company, of corrupting decision-making and dividing 
the community.22 Again and again, ‘the return of the East India 
Company’ is used as a catch-phrase to describe the recent influx of 
multinationals into India, whether global mining corporations or 
business more generally.23 
For some, this focus on the ‘creeping acquisition of effective 
control and wealth’ by foreign interests amounts to a full-blown 
‘East India Company Syndrome’.24 In a wide-ranging review of the 
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lessons learned from economic reform, Arvind Virmani identifies a 
generational divide between those brought up before independence 
and those born afterwards. ‘The most important cultural memory 
of the former was about being ruled by the British government for a 
century and (most galling) by the British East India Company for a 
century before that.’ This translated into a fear of foreign capitalists 
and, in its most extreme form, this syndrome ‘encompassed a lack 
of confidence in one’s abilities relative to white foreigners’.25 A 
reaction against this ‘syndrome’ is now in motion, with observers 
arguing that it is time for India to ‘get over’ the East India Company. 
A new sense of national assertiveness also informs real decisions 
about India’s future economic path, whether the issue is tightening 
patent rules for pharmaceuticals or opening up the retail sector to 
foreign companies.26 
aN Old ROMaNCE
If India can sometimes seem to be remembering the East India 
Company too much, then Britain can be easily accused of 
not remembering its lessons at all. The Company’s physical 
disappearance from the streets of London has been matched until 
recently by a blank in the country’s cultural memory. For most of 
the 60 years since Britain left India, John Company was regarded 
as something that could be consigned to the history books, its 
deeds to be squabbled over by competing academics. The onset of 
globalisation changed all this, prompting a resurgence of interest in 
the Company’s contribution to earlier eras of world trade. Indeed, 
for an organisation that has been defunct for more than a century, 
‘John Company’ is undergoing something of a comeback. In the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, exhibitions at the British 
Library, the Victoria and Albert Museum along with a string of 
popular histories, revived the Honourable Company’s reputation. 
Its founders were hailed as swashbuckling adventurers crossing the 
globe in search of spices and its executives profiled as multicultural 
‘white mughals’.
In the business community, the attraction of the Company lies 
in its commercial success, a model for today’s global economy. 
Standard Chartered Bank, for example, was one of the sponsors of 
the British Library’s 2002 ‘Trading Places’ exhibition on the East 
India Company. Its then chief executive drew clear conclusions 
from its history, arguing that the challenge is now to ‘build on the 
courageous, creative and truly international legacy of the East India 
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Company’.27 Rod Eddington, one-time chief executive of British 
Airways, took similar encouragement from the Company’s record, 
seeing it as a case study in how corporations succeed ‘by dint of 
hard work, shrewdness and charm’.28 At the turn of the century, a 
dot-com entrepreneur briefly relaunched the East India Company as 
a web-based ‘virtual factory’ offering a range of branded products. 
According to the site, using the Company’s name ‘gives credibility 
to virtually any product or service’, combining ‘the great strengths 
of British brands – tradition, old-fashioned luxury, impeccable 
class – with the general appeal of exotic countries, seafaring, travel 
and adventure’.29 
Others in Britain are drawn to the Company’s cultural legacy, 
arguing that its encounter with India generated a fusion of lifestyles, 
with English merchants adopting local clothes, and some even 
embracing Hindu and Muslim religion. William Dalrymple in 
particular has praised what he sees as ‘the vibrant multiculturalism 
of the East India Company’.30 Through the tale of an eighteenth-
century love affair between a Company official and a Hyderabadi 
noblewoman, Dalrymple’s White Mughals projects a world where 
English traders not only fell for the women of India, but its culture 
as well. His message for the present day is that this demonstrates 
a ‘clash of civilisations’ is not inevitable, that ‘East and West are 
not irreconcilable’.31 
Both of these romantic interpretations – the entrepreneurial 
and the cultural – fail to confront the costs associated with the 
Company’s business practices. Then, as now, trade can generate 
real wealth, but it can equally create misery and devastation. Yet 
these attitudes are deeply rooted in Britain’s self-created myth of 
an empire organically created by traders rather than tyrants. A 
wonderful Victorian amateurism informs this view, encapsulated 
by John Seeley’s conclusion in 1883 that ‘nothing great that has 
ever been done by Englishmen was done so unintentionally, so 
accidentally as the conquest of India’.32 In the depths of the Second 
World War, a patriotic series of illustrated books, Britain in Pictures, 
revived this version of history with a slim volume on the ‘merchant 
adventurers’ written by Maurice Collis, historian of the opium 
trade. ‘Private enterprise, courage and audacity founded the British 
Empire’, it declared, before going on to profile Clive as ‘one of the 
best known of England’s worthies’ and praise Stamford Raffles’ 
founding of Singapore.33 In their rush to focus on the twin themes 
of celebrity and consumption in the Company’s story, the imperial 
romantics portray a limited and rose-tinted picture of the Company. 
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In particular, by looking at the Company through the lens of culture, 
the underlying purpose of its presence in India is forgotten. Even 
the British Library appeared to fall in this trap when it hosted the 
‘Trading Places’ exhibition in 2002. Bringing together a wealth of 
artefacts, the exhibition focused on the Company’s role in the birth 
of the modern consumer society, exploring how Britain ‘became 
a nation of tea drinkers’ and how ‘words like shampoo, rice and 
bungalow became part of the English language’. The exhibition 
acknowledged the seamier side of the Company’s activities, stating 
that in the years after 1757 became ‘notorious for the plunder of 
India as Company employees amassed personal wealth’, describing 
this as the ‘bleeding of Bengal’. These admissions were, however, 
largely buried among a glorification of the consumption patterns 
that the Company pioneered. The exhibition was certainly keen to 
draw out the contemporary resonance of commodities the Company 
traded. But it shied away from making equally powerful linkages 
between the issues of corporate power, fair trade and human rights 
that affected eighteenth-century merchants as much as twenty-first-
century multinationals.
More serious still, the initial plans for the exhibition had failed 
to contain any mention of the Company’s role in the opium trade 
until the Chinese community protested. A campaigning website, 
The Truth About Trading Places, was established to highlight the 
human suffering caused by the import into China of opium grown 
under first Company and later British imperial monopoly.34 The 
campaign proved successful and an additional panel was added 
to the exhibition, stating that ‘free trade in Asia came to mean the 
lucrative and immoral freedom to deliver cargoes of opium’. The 
Company may be long dead, but its battles live on.
RECKONING WITH JOHN COMpaNY
The East India Company deserves to be looked at as it was – a 
profit-making company that generated great wealth, but one that also 
contributed to immense suffering. The Company’s contemporaries 
from its early days as a spice trader through to its time as a licensed 
administrator of India were deeply conscious of this duality. People 
in both Britain and Asia were drawn by its unparalleled economic 
capacities – whether Indian weavers seeking steady employment or 
British entrepreneurs looking for a prosperous career in the East. 
Equally, however, its role and conduct were continually contested 
by merchants excluded from the Asia trade, by Indian rulers uneasy 
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about its ultimate intentions and by parliamentarians critical of its 
overseas conduct. 
Often the same person would carry within them both admiring and 
hostile perceptions of the Company. The Gentleman’s Magazine, one 
of the leading English journals of the eighteenth century, exemplifies 
the way the Company could stimulate both fear and admiration. 
In March 1767, a year after the news of the Company’s capture 
of the diwani had reached London, the Magazine was proclaiming 
that ‘the prodigious value of these new acquisitions may open to 
this nation such a mine of wealth as not only in a few years to pay 
off the national debt, to take off the land tax, and ease the poor of 
burdensome taxes; but to add to the dividends upon the Company’s 
stock such a proportion of the increased revenue as will astonish 
Europe and exceed the most sanguine expectations’.35 Only a month 
later, however, the same magazine was warning of the potentially 
disastrous consequences of a commercial body gaining such riches, 
arguing that the Company could soon ‘repeat the same cruelties in 
this island which have disgraced humanity and deluged with native 
and innocent blood the plains of India’. For the writer of this article, 
the only solution was to cut the Company down to size, rallying 
his readers with a concluding slogan, ‘down with that rump of 
unconstitutional power, the East India Company!’36
This duality extended to the Company’s own executives, who 
were equally able to show great sensitivity to Indian culture in their 
private lives while carrying out acts of terrible exploitation on their 
employer’s behalf. The career of Warren Hastings, who became the 
Company’s first Governor-General of India in 1773, highlights this 
conflict between the cultural and the commercial. Fluent in local 
languages, he was a great philanthropist, sponsoring the first English 
translation of the Hindu Bhagavad Gita, supporting a new madrasa 
for Muslim students in Calcutta and ordering the construction of a 
Buddhist temple on the banks of the Hugli. Nehru himself argued 
that ‘India owes a deep debt of gratitude’ to Company executives 
such as Hastings and William Jones for helping to rediscover India’s 
heritage.37 Yet, these cultural interventions were always secondary 
to Hastings’s primary role of generating wealth for the Company 
and its shareholders. This was the man who monopolised Bengal’s 
salt and opium production for corporate benefit, and ordered the 
first mission to smuggle opium into China in deliberate defiance of 
the longstanding import ban. And, in spite of well-founded charges 
of extortion, bribery and corruption, Hastings would be declared 
innocent at a marathon impeachment trial by a grateful British 
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House of Lords. By all accounts an ethical individual, Hastings’ 
career provides an early example of the recurrent corporate story 
of upstanding executives compelled into unethical practice by a 
combination of circumstance and institutional necessity.
Just as corporations today should be judged by the impacts of 
their core business rather than their often peripheral donations 
to cultural events, so the East India Company has to be assessed 
on the basis of its underlying activities rather than the occasional 
philanthropy of its executives. The continuing reluctance to 
examine the full scope of the East India Company’s impacts is part 
of a more general amnesia about the historical role of business. It 
remains an oddity that although companies are among the most 
powerful institutions of the modern age, our histories still focus 
on the actions of states and individuals, on politics and culture, 
rather than on corporations, their executives and their impacts. 
If we are to fully understand our corporate present, then we must 
understand our corporate past – and this means grappling with 
the legacy of John Company. Indeed, some of its most vocal critics 
expected future generations to take just such a hard look at the 
Company’s performance as a corporation. ‘Historians of other 
nations (if not our own)’, wrote Richard Clarke in 1773, ‘will do 
justice to the oppressed of India and will hand down the Memory 
of the Oppressors to the latest Posterity.’ In the introduction to 
his long satirical poem entitled ‘The Nabob, or Asiatic Plunders’, 
Clarke urged on his fellow countrymen ‘to perpetuate an honest 
indignation against these enemies of mankind’.38
Far from being a dusty relic, the Company exemplifies the 
constant battle within corporations between the logic of exchange 
and the desire for domination. Two centuries on, it demonstrates 
that the quest for corporate accountability is a perpetual exercise 
in directing the energies of merchants and entrepreneurs so that 
their private passions do not undermine the public interest. The 
continuing clash of perceptions between corporate activists in 
India and imperial romantics in Britain underlines the need for 
some ‘honest indignation’ once more to comprehend the scale of 
the Company’s impacts. To borrow a couplet from the nineteenth-
century Urdu poet Asadullah Khan Ghalib, who saw his beloved 
Delhi destroyed in 1858, zakhm gardab gaya, lahu na thama, 
‘though the wound is hidden, the blood does not cease to flow’. 
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This Imperious Company
For hundreds of years, commodities, peoples and ideas have washed 
in and out of London’s docks. In its time, the East India Company 
was one of the primary engines of this interchange. The docks were 
the place where the Company’s commercial supremacy was felt most 
tangibly, and if you want to assess the Company’s former greatness, 
London’s docks are a good place to start. 
Heading east from London’s financial district lies Poplar, and 
on its High Street stands St Matthias Church. Erected by the East 
India Company as its chapel in 1654, this was where the Company’s 
directors, workers and sailors went to care for their souls. 
Nondescript, even ugly on the outside following nineteenth-century 
renovations, the church is airy and cool within. Eight columns, 
seven of oak and one of stone, define the central space, and high up 
on the ceiling the Company’s crest – or logo – stands out, a shield 
with three merchant ships sailing East. Now deconsecrated, the 
church buildings are run in trust for the diverse communities of the 
area – indigenous English and immigrant Bangladeshi, Caribbean 
and Chinese. Outside, St Matthias stands in the shadow of the new 
financial centre of Canary Wharf, whose huge towers carry the logos 
of some of today’s corporate giants, Barclays, Citigroup and HSBC. 
Less than a mile east of St Matthias is the site of the Company’s 
docks at Blackwall (see Illustration 2.1). The original one and a half 
acre plot was first constructed in 1612, and soon became a thriving 
commercial area. By 1620, the Company was managing a fleet 
of 10,000 tonnes, operated by over 2,500 sailors and maintained 
by 500 ships’ carpenters. It was here that the oceangoing ‘East 
Indiamen’ ships were built and fitted out. After 1637, the Company 
stopped building and owning its own ships, and leased them from 
a variety of ships’ masters. Once completed, the Company’s ships 
would sail down past Deptford, turn into the Channel and head for 
Asia. If successful, the ship would be back in London two or more 
years later. By the end of the eighteenth century, the average length 
of the voyage from India or China back to London was 114 days.1
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On their return, the ships were unloaded in Blackwall Reach, and 
their cargoes taken upriver to the Legal Quays, where they would be 
unloaded and carted through the streets to the Company’s nearby 
warehouses. But as the ships increased in size during the eighteenth 
century, they had to anchor in deeper water at Blackwall. 
To cope with their ever-increasing volumes of commodities, the 
Brunswick Basin was constructed in 1789, covering a full eight 
acres. All around lay a vast industrial complex, supplying the ships 
from nearby timber yards, foundries, rope works, bakeries and 
gunpowder mills. The centrepiece was the 120 foot-high Mast 
House, regarded as one of the technological marvels of the day, 
where the tall masts for the Company’s ships were pieced together. 
Nearby were the pubs and tenements that served the Company’s 
workforce, along with the Poplar chapel and the Company’s 
almshouse to care for poor sailors. Unlike East India House, many 
of whose inhabitants, such as Charles Lamb and John Stuart Mill, 
still retain their identity, the thousands of Company employees who 
operated the East India Docks are for the most part anonymous.
This is particularly true of the Indian sailors, or lascars, who 
by 1700 made up about a quarter of the crews sailing the East 
Indiamen to and from Asia. All sailors of the time faced appalling 
conditions on board ship, enduring rotten food, disease and brutal 
punishments. But the lascars suffered additionally. Once landed 
in London, they were often abandoned by their ships’ masters 
and left to roam destitute through the streets. By the 1780s, many 
in London were outraged by lascar misery, calling it a ‘disgrace 
to humanity’ and ‘the utmost discredit to a country universally 
distinguished for its humanity’.2 One of those affected was John 
Lemon, a 29-year-old hairdresser and cook from Bengal who 
married an Englishwoman, Elizabeth. As the numbers of poor 
lascars grew, the authorities hatched a plan to resettle them in Sierra 
Leone along with African-American loyalists from the American 
War of Independence. We know that Lemon and his wife survived 
the voyage out, and were alive a year later, but after that they are 
lost to history. Lascars continued to live in the East End, however, 
confined to unwholesome barracks in Shoreditch and Shadwell. 
Today, a third of the population of the Docklands area of Tower 
Hamlets is of Bangladeshi origin, the result of late twentieth-century 
immigration from the subcontinent. But through the lascars that 
sailed the Company’s ships, Bengal’s links with London extend far 
deeper into Britain’s past. 
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As is so often the case with monumental architecture, the East 
India Docks reached their most perfect expression just as the 
Company’s commercial rationale was coming to an end. Following 
in the wake of the ambitious West India Dock project, the triumphal 
East India Dock was opened in August 1806, with a massive new 
16-acre Import Dock, which could hold over eighty 800-tonne ships. 
The dock was built like a fortress, with 20-foot high perimeter walls, 
some of which still stand, along with a prison inside for ‘thieves, 
radicals and French agents’, according to a panel at the nearby 
Museum in Docklands. The East India Company also paid for the 
construction of a new highway – the Commercial Road – to take 
its imports into the heart of the City.
Soon afterwards, however, the first blow against the Company’s 
monopoly was struck, with the removal of the Company’s exclusive 
trading rights with India in 1813. Twenty years later, in 1833, 
its treasured monopoly over the tea trade with China was also 
eliminated. In all, between 1600 and 1833, ships sailing under the 
Company’s colours had made about 4,600 voyages from London 
to Asia.3 The docks were sold, but continued in use under different 
ownership until 1943, when the Import Dock was pumped dry and 
filled with bomb rubble to act as a base for building the Mulberry 
Harbours used in the D-Day landings. After the war, the Export 
Dock was finally closed to traffic in 1967. Decades later, the East 
India complex has now become part of the resurgent Docklands, 
covered with apartment buildings and office blocks. The names of 
the new streets that run on top of the old docks – Clove Crescent and 
Nutmeg Lane – reveal something of its former purpose. Part of the 
outer basin still contains water, and has been reconstituted as a bird 
sanctuary where cormorants lazily dry their wings. A few dejected 
signs give descriptions of the size of the dock’s lock-gates: ‘four 
foot longer than any other lock on the Thames’. But nothing tells 
the story of the millions of tonnes of produce that passed through 
these gates, the wealth that was generated and the exploitation that 
so often accompanied it. 
a MOdEl CORpORaTION
The Company that built these docks was the model for the 
multinational enterprise – ‘the greatest corporation in the world’, 
according to Victorian historian, poet and Indian administrator, 
Thomas Babington Macaulay.4 Throughout its long life as a trading 
concern, it confronted and overcame many of the timeless questions 
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facing business enterprise: how to keep employees motivated, 
customers satisfied, shareholders happy and society content. For 
K.N. Chaudhuri, one of its most insightful historians, ‘the East 
India Company was the direct ancestor of the modern giant business 
firm, handling a multitude of trading products and operating in an 
international setting’.5
The East India Company was one of a number of companies 
granted a royal charter by the British state to take advantage of 
the opportunities opened up by the age of European expansion and 
exploration. Some of these directed their attentions eastwards, such 
as the Muscovy (1555) and Levant (1581) Companies. A succession 
of companies – including the Company of Royal Adventurers (1663) 
and the Royal African Company (1672) – were also founded to 
exploit the slave trade. Others focused on settlement and commerce 
in the New World, notably the Virginia (1606) and Hudson Bay 
(1670) Companies. Most of these were wound up centuries ago, 
but the Hudson Bay Company lives on as one of Canada’s largest 
department stores.
Unlike the pioneers of the Asia trade, the Portuguese, who adopted 
a wholly state-led strategy, or the Dutch, who introduced a mixed 
public–private model, the English pushed forward a private sector 
strategy for tapping the wealth of the East. What makes the English 
East India Company special is the way it bridged the medieval 
concept of the corporation as an essentially public body with the 
industrial model of an enterprise acting primarily in the interests of 
its shareholders. In the rising commercial world of sixteenth-century 
England, the chartered company brought together a number of 
institutional ingredients. The Crown had a long tradition of setting 
up corporations as independent bodies to manage public services, 
such as municipalities and universities, like Oxford and Cambridge. 
Indeed, the local government of London’s financial district is still 
managed by the Corporation of London, whose electors include 
businesses as well as citizens. From Italy came the invention of the 
compagnia, a name deriving from the Latin phrase for the act of 
sharing bread, cum panis. This was essentially a family firm, where 
fathers, brothers, sons and other relatives would pool their labour 
and capital.6
In England, the first generation of chartered companies brought 
together a band of merchants who would then buy and sell goods 
under a common umbrella. These regulated companies operated 
more akin to a guild, setting standards for a chosen field of 
endeavour, and collecting fees for shared services, such as docks 
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and warehouses. Where the East India Company differed was in its 
fusion of the institutional structure of the public corporation with 
the financial mechanism of joint stock ownership.7 Unlike earlier 
regulated companies, the East India Company was established as 
‘one body corporate and politick’. This brought a whole series of 
financial and organisational benefits, which were especially valuable 
for the long-distance trade to the East Indies. Capital costs were 
high in terms of both shipping and the bullion required to buy 
homebound goods. In addition, risks were extreme, both natural 
and political, with a high likelihood of the loss of some or all of 
the investment. 
The joint stock mechanism provided a solution to this challenge. 
First, it enabled a separation of investors and managers, thus 
broadening the pool of capital that could be tapped to include 
both City merchants as well as passive investors from elsewhere in 
the moneyed elite. Second, risks were shared widely: if profits were 
made, then dividends could be disbursed, but if losses were incurred, 
investors would only be liable up to the nominal value of their 
paid-in capital. This limited liability endowed the Company with 
a special dynamism, substantially reducing the risks for investors 
compared with the usual partnership model of ownership. Third, 
trading was conducted by the joint stock company on its own 
account, rather than by the members themselves. This gave the 
Company a separate identity and its own legal personality – one that 
could conduct business strategies that went beyond the interests of 
individual merchants. It also gave it a unique institutional structure 
when confronting the merchant partnerships and states of Asia. 
The Company’s basic joint stock model evolved in significant 
ways over successive decades. Initially, the Company constructed 
separate joint stocks for each voyage, whereby investors would 
decide to allocate capital on a case-by-case basis. Only in 1657 
did the Company become a permanent joint stock corporation, a 
‘continuous unlimited investment taking place without reference 
to individual voyages’.8 This provided the basis for shares in 
the Company to be valued and exchanged at its headquarters 
in Leadenhall Street. Later, trading in India stock moved to the 
courtyard of London’s Royal Exchange. When this proved too 
cramped, dealing shifted across Cornhill to the coffee houses of 
the Exchange or ’Change Alley until the formal establishment of 
the London Stock Exchange in 1773. 
Like the modern corporation, the Company’s share price was its 
heart-beat, communicating to the world the market’s estimates of its 
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future prospects. For the jobbers clustered around Exchange Alley, 
the Company’s stock – along with its bonds and annuities – became 
the bellwether for the market as a whole. From the 1690s, its share 
price graph for the next 180 years would be dominated by a series 
of peaks and troughs, reflecting both the state of its commerce and 
the health of its relations with governments at home and abroad. 
Looking at the graph today (Figure 2.1, p. 31), what is striking is 
how it starts out with a significant drop in value. Following the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688, the 1690s was a period of ferocious 
speculation. For the Company, its share price peaked in 1693, and 
then fell for the next five years as successive parliamentary inquiries 
exposed corruption and proposed potentially disastrous remedies. 
The low point was in 1698 when a rival company was established, 
sending the Company’s shares with a nominal value of £100 down 
to a mere £39. By the turn of the century, the threat had been seen 
off, and prices had returned to well over £100 once more, rising 
to over £200 in 1717.
Along with the rest of the market, the Company’s shares then 
became caught up in the market mania that followed the end of 
war in 1713 and subsequently came to be known as the South Sea 
Bubble. The price of Company stock doubled from £200 at the 
end of 1719 to £420 in June 1720, before collapsing to £150 in the 
following summer. Yet while this spike was extreme, the underlying 
vitality of the East India Company can be seen in the way that 
its share price continued a slow, but steady climb once the South 
Sea crisis had abated. But the next surge was all its own making. 
From 1757 to 1769, its shares more than doubled to reach £276. 
But in a crisis that almost cost it its independence, the Company’s 
share price continued on a downward path for the next 15 years, 
ultimately halving in value. 
The big fear that drove markets was that parliament would take 
a savage revenge on the Company, even removing the board of 
directors and replacing it with its own appointees. As we shall see 
in Chapter 7, when this threat was removed in 1784, the Company’s 
financial fortunes recovered, and its shares began to rise once more. 
Deepening state intervention into the Company’s affairs also brought 
some surprising benefits for the Company’s shareholders, with the 
government increasingly guaranteeing a high level of dividends, 
making the stock a truly attractive investment after the mayhem 
of the 1760s. Buoyed by the surge in share prices that followed the 
end of the Napoleonic War in 1815, the Company’s shares reached 
a third peak of £298 in April 1824. From this point on, the value of 
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the Company’s stock rarely slipped below £200, the generous level 
at which the government had agreed to buy out Company stock. 
Finally, on 30 April 1874, the stock was liquidated and Company’s 
financial heart stopped beating.
GOVERNING THE COMpaNY
The Company’s joint stock identity merely provided a platform for 
commercial operations, but gave no guarantee of success. What 
made the Company’s fortune was its management framework, which 
had achieved a distinctive shape by the early eighteenth century.
The English Company borrowed many features with its Dutch 
rival, the VOC. Both aimed to dominate the same markets in the 
East and both had strictly hierarchical systems of administration, 
supported by a small army of clerks – known as writers in England, 
a term derived from the Dutch shcruyvers. But in their structures of 
finance and governance, they were strikingly different. The VOC 
was the result of a state-backed merger. This gave control to a set 
of directors chosen by its six provincial chambers – Amsterdam, 
Middelburg, Hoorn, Enkhuizen, Delft and Rotterdam; in 
Amsterdam’s case, their representatives on the board were nominated 
by the burgomasters and appointed for life. The directors had to 
hold a substantial portion of VOC stock, but there the link with the 
shareholding base ended. As a business, the VOC was based on the 
commenda model of general partnership, which separated function 
and control between active directors and passive shareholders. The 
VOC’s ordinary shareholders (participanten) provided the capital, 
but had no say either in the choice of those who would manage their 
investment or in the direction of policy. The well-developed status 
of the Dutch stock market meant, however, that almost from the 
beginning shares could be publicly traded, something that would 
take a century to establish across the North Sea in London.9 In the 
modern jargon, if unhappy, the participanten had ‘exit’ but no ‘voice’. 
As a result, the VOC might well have been a mighty company, but it 
was not a fully-fledged joint stock corporation. The absence of any 
shareholder rights over the directors who managed their investment 
would explode into open conflict when the VOC’s charter came up 
for renewal in 1622, with its ‘dissenting participants’ citing the EIC 
as a model which united capital with control.10 
By contrast, the English company’s corporate form gave its 
shareholders not only a financial stake, but the franchise, making 
them almost like constituents of an eighteenth-century parliamentary 
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borough. Like the England that gave it birth, the Company operated 
as a limited, property-based democracy, one that was run by and for 
its shareholders. Just as the right to vote in Georgian England was 
restricted to those with property, so the Company’s shareholders 
had to have £500 of nominal stock before they could vote either in 
the quarterly meetings of the Court of Proprietors held in March, 
June, September and December, or at the annual meeting in April. 
This was the high point of the Company’s calendar when over a 
thousand shareholders would gather to elect a slate of 24 directors. 
No matter how large a shareholding, each individual with more than 
£500 in stock only had one vote, a surprising expression of financial 
egalitarianism. In turn, only shareholders with over £2,000 in stock 
– the mercantile aristocracy – could put themselves forward as 
candidates to be a director. This directorial elite would then choose 
from among their number a chairman and deputy chairman. Until 
1709, the chairman went by the name of governor and directors 
were known as committees. 
Power was held within a relatively narrow group of affluent 
merchants on the Court of Directors. But shareholders had the 
right to override executive decisions taken by the directors up until 
1784. Not for nothing were the annual meetings of the shareholders 
described as ‘little parliaments’ by William Pitt the Elder.11 Meeting 
quarterly to hear the directors’ reports and vote on corporate policy, 
the shareholders were particularly vigilant in sustaining high rates 
of dividend payments. Alongside the dividend, shareholding also 
gave investors access to the Company’s vast network of economic 
opportunities, notably jobs. The 24 directors controlled the 
Company’s system of patronage, enabling them to place friends, 
relatives and business partners in key positions, a gift that became 
increasingly valuable in the second half of the eighteenth century. 
Compared with the twentieth-century corporation in the UK, the 
East India Company’s structures of governance gave shareholders 
considerably greater powers (see Table 2.1). The entire Court 
of Directors was elected on an annual basis, and the successful 
directors then guided the business for the year ahead. Importantly, 
following the financial crisis of 2007–08, the UK’s corporate 
governance code was reformed to require the annual election of 
all directors in order to bring greater accountability of the board 
– something that was in place at the East India Company in the 
eighteenth century. Another major difference was the absence 
of a chief executive – although there were a company secretary, 
accountant and auditor. Today’s distinction between executive and 
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non-executive directors also did not exist. In essence, all directors 
became executive upon election. The use of non-executive directors 
to protect the rights of shareholders from management capture had 
yet to be introduced – with the assumption that making directors 
hold a minimum of £2,000 in stock would align their interests with 
the wider investor base. 
Table 2.1 Corporate governance compared
East India Company, c. 1709 Modern UK company, c. 2011










Annual election of entire board Annual election of entire 
board, introduced in 2010
Director 
qualifications




Indirect election, chosen by 
directors
Indirect election, chosen by 
directors
Board composition All part-time executives Majority non-executive, plus 
executive directors 
Board limitations Maximum four consecutive 
years; return after one year out
Three-year term, usually two 
terms
Note: Data for modern company taken from practices of the largest five companies on the 
London Stock Exchange in 2011 and the UK Corporate Governance Code.
The Court of Directors oversaw the operations of a rigorously 
hierarchical administrative system. At the pinnacle sat the chairman, 
who ran the weekly board meetings of the 24 directors, which 
took place each Wednesday. Each director was assigned to one 
of ten committees that looked after different dimensions of the 
Company’s operations. Among these, three committees were 
regarded as supreme: Correspondence, which handled all the 
communications with the Company’s far-flung subsidiaries; Treasury, 
which managed relations with financial markets, buying bullion 
and paying dividends; and Accounts, which aimed to maintain 
financial discipline. In addition, there were committees for buying 
commodities, warehousing, shipping, managing East India House, 
regulating (and preventing) private trade and lawsuits. Alongside 
these was the all-powerful Secret Committee, which defined the 
Company’s political and military strategy in times of war.
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From East India House, the directors would send precise orders 
to their overseas subsidiaries covering the quantity, quality and 
price of goods to be purchased. In the case of textiles, this could 
cover details such as the type of thread, weave, colour, pattern, 
stiffness and packing. These orders were implemented by a system 
of autonomous presidencies, headed by a president (or governor), 
who controlled the operations of his particular port or factory, 
as well as smaller outposts in his zone of operations. Although 
East India House laid down clear parameters on the content of its 
commerce, it gave considerable freedom to local management to 
determine how these goals were to be achieved, including in their 
relations with host governments. As the fortunes of trade fluctuated, 
so different presidencies took the lead. The Mughal Empire’s port 
of Surat on the west coast of India and Bantam in the Spice Islands 
(now Indonesia) were the first to be established. As these declined 
in importance, so Bombay, Madras and Calcutta grew in the latter 
part of the seventeenth century. In 1773, the Bengal Presidency, 
with its capital at Calcutta, was made pre-eminent.
 Below the president lay another hierarchy, with promotion strictly 
by seniority. New recruits would enter the Company’s service as 
‘writers’, where they would stay for five years before progressing to 
the rank of ‘factor’ for a further three years. This would be followed 
by promotion to junior and then senior merchant, and thereafter 
possible selection for their presidency’s council, and even governor. 
In return, the Company’s overseas staff received a minimal salary 
and the right to conduct private trade on their own account within 
Asia. This maintained the Company’s monopoly over exports to 
Europe, while giving employees a strong incentive to stay and make 
their fortune in India.12 For its executives, the purpose of a career 
with the Company was to achieve a ‘competence’, making enough 
money to be able to retire and adopt the conspicuous consumption 
patterns of the British landed gentry. This could not be achieved by 
saving from the salaries received from the Company, which barely 
covered living expenses. As a result, the ambitious Company man 
had to use his position as a platform for patronage and private 
trade. It was the hunger for perquisites (or perks) that drove the 
Company’s executives to adventurism when opportunity allowed. 
The privilege of private trade also exacerbated the inherent tension 
between corporation and employee, making staff both executives 
and entrepreneurs in their own right. Entirely understandable in the 
context it operated in, this system of private trade created a second 
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tier of divided loyalties, which would ultimately spawn an army of 
cuckoo businesses operating in the heart of the corporate machine. 
For the most part, however, the Company’s managerial structures 
and human resources were utilised to drive a highly focused 
business model. The East India Company was essentially a trading 
enterprise in the import–export business. Compared with Dutch 
VOC, the English Company proved more adept at moving into new 
markets, shifting from pepper to textiles and then to tea. From time 
immemorial, merchants had wished to ‘buy cheap and sell dear’, in 
the words of St Augustine. This was a strategy that the East India 
Company sought to apply by minimising the amount of goods – 
notably bullion – sent to the East, keeping the costs of supply as 
low as possible, and then maximising the price of goods sold at 
auction back in England. The Company outsourced as much as it 
could, not least the manufacture of goods in the East, its shipping, 
as well as the ultimate retailing of its products. The value it added 
to the process was in the selection of goods and the efficiency of 
delivery. In a situation characterised by extremely poor information, 
the Company’s strength lay in its ability to achieve an equilibrium 
between supply and demand on opposite sides of the planet.13
a WORld OF dIFFERENCE
Such characteristics make the Company immediately recognisable as 
a close relative of the modern multinational. Yet it is also important 
to acknowledge the considerable differences that separate its world 
from ours, extending from often mundane matters to fundamental 
structural factors. Unlike today’s globalised world of air freight and 
instantaneous communication, for the Company a round trip from 
London to India and back could take up to two years. Not only 
was considerable capital locked up in the voyages of these ‘East 
Indiamen’, but the exchange of information was also woefully slow, 
making planning and management exceptionally tough. The risks 
the Company faced were equally acute, not just from shipwrecks 
and pirates, but also from disease. Over half of its employees posted 
to Asia died while in service.
A more structural difference was the Company’s status as a state-
chartered enterprise. Today, people regard the ability to establish a 
company as a basic right in democratic market economies. In the 
Company’s time, however, this was a special privilege granted by the 
Crown (and later Parliament). Charters would generally be awarded 
only for ventures that mixed private interest with a broader public 
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purpose – which in the Company’s case was to ensure that England 
gained a slice of the lucrative Asia trade. As one commentator put 
it in 1767, the Company was a ‘national object’ and ‘the members 
of it bound to attend to the interest of the public as well as their 
own’.14 This bargain with the state also had a limited life, and the 
Company’s charter had to be renewed at regular, usually 20-year 
intervals. The Crown retained the right to revoke the charter if it 
judged that the Company had broken its terms and conditions. 
One of the few surviving examples of this model of the chartered 
corporation is the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 
whose charter was renewed in 2007.15 Unlike today’s technically 
immortal multinationals, the East India Company was on constant 
life support, repeatedly having to justify its existence to the state, 
pointing to the healthy customs revenues it earned and the plump 
presents it could provide. 
As part of its charter, the Company gained a whole series of 
special rights, including the right to mint coin in its overseas 
subsidiaries, to exercise justice in its settlements and, crucially, the 
right to wage war. Indeed, the Company’s private army evolved from 
a security service to defend its overseas warehouses to being the 
principal tool for territorial acquisition. The most valuable privilege 
of all, however, was the monopoly awarded to this London-based 
corporation of all trade between England and the lands beyond 

















































































































































































































































Figure 2.1 The Company’s share price 1693–1874
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confidence by creating a captive home market for its products. 
In the real-world conditions of global competition, of course, the 
Company was for many years just one player among many, striving 
against the Portuguese, the Dutch and the French. It also faced 
home-grown challenges from so-called interlopers who sought 
to break its exclusivity, along with the more informal bands of 
smugglers. Nevertheless, its monopoly powers were real, keeping 
prices high and ensuring substantial profits for shareholders. 
The final distinction between today’s giant firms and the East 
India Company is also derived from the chartering process. In the 
Company’s age, the reliance on state approval for specific commercial 
privileges meant that it was among a rare breed of corporations, 
usually numbering fewer than 20 in all of England. A rush of 
speculative ventures towards the end of the seventeenth century 
resulted in over 140 joint stock companies by 1695. But most failed 
to survive, and by 1719, there were only 21 left. The explosion in 
stock market listings during the first six months of 1720 brought 
another 174 companies to market. The subsequent failure of the 
South Sea Company prompted the introduction of the Bubble Act, 
which forbade formation of further joint stock companies without 
explicit approval of Parliament, a ban that would remain in force for 
the next 105 years. This exclusivity made the Company all the more 
notable in the Georgian economy of the eighteenth century. The 
Company was a corporate colossus, alone accounting for between 
13 and 15 per cent of all Britain’s imports between 1699 and 
1774.16 Every seventh pound of goods brought into Britain would 
be carried on Company ships, unloaded at Company docks and sold 
in Company auctions, a phenomenal presence in the Enlightenment 
economy. Today, the corporation is the dominant economic form, 
a pervasive feature across the globe. But few, if any, can match the 
individual might of the East India Company.
a BuNdlE OF TENSIONS
Just as the Company pioneered the organisational structures of 
the modern multinational, it also contained the same bundle of 
tensions that are inherent in the corporate form. As a corporation, 
the Company lay at the centre of a web of relationships. Internally, 
the interactions between owners, executives and employees defined 
the fundamental direction and dynamic of the business. Externally, 
fiscal and regulatory relations with states at home and abroad 
defined the Company’s scope for action, while in the marketplace, 
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its standing with customers, competitors and suppliers determined 
its chances of success. Ultimately, however, it was the Company’s 
ability to maintain a basis of trust with society at home and abroad 
that decided its fate – and once this trust was broken, protest, 
rebellion and, ultimately, removal would follow.
Then and now, it is important to recognise that the corporation is 
not a neutral force. In the words of Timothy Alborn, an expert on 
nineteenth-century business, the corporation ‘employs a balance of 
political and economic means to achieve economic ends’.17 As well 
as a constant jostling for a share of the commercial rewards of the 
Company’s operations, a more fundamental struggle was always 
underway to determine positions of power and pre-eminence. 
For much of the first half of its corporate career, the Company 
was bringing steady profits for its shareholders, cheap imports 
for its customers, good prices for its Indian textile suppliers as 
well as substantial customs revenues for both the British and 
Asian exchequers.
But this web of relationships also contained the potential for 
open conflict. In the Company’s case, something went radically 
awry in the 1750s, leading to the violent takeover of Bengal. Its 
shareholders certainly benefited, but only temporarily. Suppliers 
were squeezed as the Company exerted a new-found market power, 
and the struggle with the regulatory authority of host states erupted 
into open warfare. 
Seeking to explain this extraordinary turnaround, many analysts 
have focused on circumstantial factors, notably the constraints 
the Company faced in enforcing its will in India owing to the 
combination of distance and ineffective means of communication. 
Certainly, the Directors could often find it difficult to impose their 
will when it clashed with the interests with local executives on 
the ground. Others highlight the moral failings of key executives, 
both in London and Asia. Critics then and now have been united 
in their condemnation of the greed and rapacity demonstrated 
by Clive and the new class of nabobs that came to control the 
Company’s operations.
Yet circumstance and character are not sufficient explanations of 
the Company’s behaviour. More structural factors were at work. 
Adam Smith’s Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations is well-known for its championing of the free market. But 
it also contains one of the most thoroughgoing investigations into 
the corporate metabolism. Written in the wake of the Company’s 
conquest of Bengal, Smith dissected the corporation as an institution 
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and evaluated the factors that led to the East India Company’s own 
particular crisis. Uniquely, Smith was emphatic in downplaying the 
actions of individuals as the root cause of the problems. ‘I mean 
not to throw any odious imputation upon the general character 
of the servants of the East India Company,’ he wrote, stressing 
that ‘it is the system of government, the situation in which they 
are placed, that I mean to censure.’18 The problem for Smith was 
one of corporate design. Looking across the last five centuries of 
business history, there are four factors which drive the fundamentals 
of corporate behaviour: finance, technology, scale and regulation. 
Each of these factors contain the potential for positive and negative 
social impacts, and each played out in the Company’s tumultuous 
rise and fall (see Table 2.2).
FINaNCE: IMMEdIaTE aNd EXCESSIVE RETuRNS19
As an economic institution, the corporation’s financial structure is its 
primary design feature. The joint stock model enabled the East India 
Company to draw in investors from across Europe to fund its global 
commercial infrastructure of ships, warehouses and commodities. 
This was a distinctively Western institutional innovation and enabled 
the accumulation of capital across time and space.20 The model gave 
the corporation a unifying purpose of promoting the long-term 
financial returns of the joint stockholders. Capital was attracted 
by the protection provided by limited liability, controlling losses 
to the nominal value of the stock. And the separation of owners 
and managers meant that hereditary owners could be replaced with 
professional executives. 
Table 2.2 The four sources of corporate behaviour
Positive Negative
1. Finance Providing capital depth Fostering speculation through 
the separation of owners and 
managers 
2. Technology Enhancing productivity through 
the structured deployment of 
innovation
Exploiting society and the 
environment
3. Scale Enabling mass production and 
exchange forcing down costs
Suppressing economic diversity 
and driving up prices
4. Regulation Ensuring integrity and public 
accountability
Fomenting corruption and 
forging collusion between 
company and state
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But this structure also holds the potential for a triple negligence. 
Together, executives and shareholders can pursue their own 
financial interests to the detriment of others. Limited liability frees 
shareholders from the full consequences of careless investments 
in the pursuit of unlimited lucre. Furthermore, the separation 
of ownership and control creates the potential for executives 
to exploit the corporation for their own ends. In the jargon of 
modern corporate governance, what the corporation creates is 
a fundamental ‘agency problem’. These three financial flaws are 
not fatal, but need to be consciously and continuously controlled 
to ensure that the corporation does not become the plaything of 
shareholders and executives. 
It was the speculative behaviour of corporate insiders and 
short-term investors that emerged as the most powerful factor in 
the Company’s spectacular fall from grace in the middle of the 
eighteenth-century with catastrophic social results in Asia. Financial 
engineering, flimsy managerial controls and inadequate regulation 
all played their part – just as they did in the late 1990s.21 In the wake 
of Enron’s collapse in November 2001, the Company’s much earlier 
boom-and-bust cycle becomes eerily familiar – the same passion for 
aggressive acquisitions, the same obsession with exclusive perks for 
corporate insiders, and the same focus on executive self-preservation 
as ordinary shareholders started to suffer the consequences of 
excess. Standards of corporate governance may well have evolved 
over the past two centuries and systems of private trade eliminated. 
But the underlying financial forces behind corporate action remain 
largely intact. 
TECHNOlOGY: IN TRadE aS alSO IN WaRFaRE22
The structured deployment of technology, both in terms of soft 
technique and tangible hardware, is another distinguishing feature 
of the modern corporation. If finance provides the potential 
for corporate power, technology turns this into reality. For the 
Company, its technological edge was provided by its fleet, perhaps 
the most sophisticated in the world at the time: ‘no finer fleet ever 
sailed the seas than that which was directed from Leadenhall 
Street’, commented one obviously jealous Royal Navy captain.23 
But it was not just the size and number of the fleet that made the 
difference. From the beginning, armed force was essential for the 
Company’s ability to gain and sustain access to Asian markets. It 
was the Company’s demonstration of naval superiority over the 
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Portuguese off Surat in 1612 that paved the way for its first trade 
concessions from the Mughal Emperor Jahangir, and its military 
weakness against the Dutch that forced it from Indonesia’s spice 
islands ten years later. Throughout its existence, the Company’s 
directors maintained an ambivalent attitude to the role of military 
might. A tight concern for limiting overheads meant the directors 
were continually nervous of military expense, particularly on land, 
fearing the sunk costs of forts and castles. But the Company also 
appreciated the value of conducting ‘commerce with sword in your 
hands’, in the words of the Company’s Governor of Bombay, Gerald 
Aungier, in 1677. Indeed, according to Kenneth Pomeranz, ‘where 
eighteenth-century European’s supposedly superior commercial 
organizations had to compete with merchants from other Old World 
regions without using force, their record was mediocre’.24 
Violence was intrinsic to the Company’s success, with its 
superiority at sea matched by an increasingly acquisitive army. The 
direct application of violence by today’s corporations is thankfully 
rare – although private military forces are once more on the rise in 
the shape of companies such as Blackwater. But the links between 
successful trade and military force remain as powerful as ever. As 
Thomas Friedman, the New York Times’s ebullient promoter of 
globalisation, explains, the ‘hidden hand of the market will never 
work without a hidden fist’. In simple terms, ‘McDonald’s cannot 
flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the designer of F-15s’.25 In the 
Company’s time, commerce and violence were necessarily integrated 
into its core technology, the ‘East Indiaman’. More broadly, it is 
technology that defines many of the impacts that corporations have 
on both people and nature, impacts that are invariably magnified 
by financial imperatives and scale.
SCalE: THE MONOpOlISING SpIRIT OF MERCHaNTS26
The Company was famous for its size and its global reach. Scale has a 
multiplier effect – creating the potential for both greater commercial 
rewards as well as greater threats to economic diversity and political 
accountability. One of the main prizes that the Company sought 
from the British state was a market monopoly over trade with the 
East. Like many modern multinationals, the Company was eager 
to avoid the mere interplay of supply and demand. The Company 
jealously guarded its exclusive rights over imports from Asia, 
lobbying and bribing the authorities to retain the barriers to entry 
that defined its charter. It also wanted to eliminate competition in 
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Asia so that it could force down the costs of supply. By controlling 
both ends of the chain, the Company could guarantee high profits 
for its shareholders. Negotiation was the preferred method of 
achieving market dominion. But, if required, it would use both 
force and fraud. 
Outside the state sector, few companies today have similar 
monopoly privileges, except those managing infrastructure utilities, 
such as energy, telecoms, transport and water. But two decades 
of global deregulation has resulted in economically damaging 
and politically dangerous levels of corporate concentration. Over 
60 per cent of international commerce now takes place within 
corporations rather than in the open marketplace, making it idle 
to talk of free markets. 
For all the efforts to liberalise the world economy, the current 
pattern of global commerce is better described as one of corporate 
trade – a situation with great similarities to the Company’s own 
day. Liberalisation has resulted not in open markets, but often in 
corporations that are ‘too big to fail’. In such situations, there is 
no need for the formal grant of monopoly, which the East India 
Company fought so strenuously to secure. 
REGulaTION: SETTING JuSTICE aT dEFIaNCE27
The corporation is a public institution, with the capacity for great 
benefit, but also great harm. Throughout its history, a variety of 
mechanisms have been used to control its behaviour. Self-regulation 
through a corporate culture that gives primacy to integrity is an 
essential first step, and the Company was clear in the expectations it 
had of its employees. Each of its merchants had to sign a covenant 
of good behaviour, backed by a bond and the threat of dismissal 
for malpractice. This was strengthened in 1764, when the Company 
introduced a ban on the receipt of gifts above a certain level, one 
of the first corporate codes of ethics. 
But these internal measures proved wholly insufficient in the 
face of the organised looting that erupted after the acquisition of 
the diwani, with senior executives leading the charge for personal 
benefit. Social regulation can also be delivered through an active civil 
society, exposing corporate failings and promoting best practice. 
As this book will show, the Company was the focus of vigorous 
pressure from pamphleteers and playwrights as well as industrial 
forces seeking to protect their interests from its economic hegemony.
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Yet it is public regulation that is essential to protect the corporation 
from its own worst instincts and deliver public as well as private 
benefit. For the Company, managing this regulatory process was 
essential both in London and in Asia. At home, the English Crown 
and then Parliament possessed the power of corporate life and 
death. The state not only set the boundaries of its commercial 
operations, but laid down the fiscal bargain that would govern 
the distribution of the Company’s surplus. Overseas, the Company 
had to establish first the right to trade and then extract favourable 
terms of trade. Like today’s multinationals, the Company often 
succeeded in winning sizeable trading privileges and tax breaks, 
often placing it at a distinct advantage compared with local traders. 
But the Company also repeatedly probed the limits of these trade 
treaties, promoting illegal private trade in Bengal and arranging 
industrial scale opium smuggling between India and China. 
The Company’s great strength lay in its ability to generate extra 
revenues for the low-income states of the pre-industrial world. 
Sizeable loans to the British Crown and large-scale bullion imports 
into Mughal India made the Company indispensable. For the 
merchants who managed the Company, the arrangement of royal 
charters at home and imperial decrees (firmans) abroad was all 
part of the wider business of buying and selling. The Company’s 
executives viewed these documents as financial transactions that 
established contractual rights that could not be infringed. What 
the Company sought was a zone of commercial sovereignty that 
ensured it free rein to operate as it wished. Giving presents to 
princes and paying bribes to parliamentarians were simply part of 
the fundamental costs of business. 
Curbing the Company’s corruption was a shared task of states in 
East and West. But success was profoundly limited by a powerful 
tendency to collusion. The Company could try to physically buy-off 
its opposition, but more insidious was its ability to convince the 
state that its interests were entwined with those of this cuckoo 
corporation. Faced with this merger of corporate and state interests, 
what infuriated the Company’s contemporaries most through the 
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was its impunity, its 
ability to shrug off the consequences of its actions. For a corollary 
to the Company’s speculative drive for market dominion was its 
willingness to engage in immense crimes, safe in the knowledge that 
domestic and international remedies were not in place. A large part 
of the problem lay in the legal void at the time, with courts in both 
Europe and Asia wholly ill-equipped to bring corporations and 
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their executives to account. This – as we shall see – did not stop 
the Company’s contemporaries from trying. 
Today, the globalisation of markets has still not been matched by 
an equivalent globalisation of justice. Compared with the immense 
political capital that has been expended in recent decades to liberalise 
international trade, precious little has been done to ensure that 
common human rights are respected and enforced. Special tribunals 
have been established to judge some of the more outrageous instances 
of crimes against humanity. Sadly, the courageous initiative to end 
the global impunity of individuals through an international criminal 
court has been hampered by the unilateral opposition of the USA. 
And in the corporate sphere, Union Carbide has yet to be held to 
account for the 1984 toxic release at its Bhopal facility in India, 
which has killed 22,000 and resulted in around 100,000 people still 
suffering chronic and debilitating illnesses. More than a quarter 
of a century on, Union Carbide – along with the governments 
of India and the United States – have failed to comply with their 
obligations to bring the perpetrators to justice or provide adequate 
compensation to the victims.28
THE IMpERIal GENE
These four forces combine to shape corporate behaviour. Like an 
imperial gene, the hunt for economic conquest lies buried deep 
within a corporation’s DNA. For much of the time, this impulse 
may be dormant, with the corporation simply too small to dominate 
others, for example. But when circumstances allow, it will seek 
expression until halted once more, not just risking social harm but 
the long-term interests of the corporation itself. 
This prospect was not lost on the Company’s contemporaries in 
Europe, Asia and the Americas. By the late 1760s, it had become 
a domineering threat to liberty – in the words of the Gentleman’s 
Magazine – the ‘imperious company of East India merchants’.29 And 
yet we know that the apparent supremacy glorified in Spiridione 
Roma’s huge tableau did not last. The Company quickly became 
over-extended financially and operationally, eventually resulting 
in its extinction as a commercial concern. For all its commercial 
sophistication and organisational complexity, the classical 
corporation lacks any intrinsic mechanism to hold it back from 
pursuing its own aggrandisement, nothing to say ‘this is enough’. 
Here lies the fundamental tragedy of the corporate form, the 
absence of an impulse for self-restraint that can temper its inherent 
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drive for power. The very same year that it was being accused 
of imperious conduct, the Company Secretary, Robert James, was 
somewhat disingenuously telling Parliament that ‘we don’t want 
conquest and power; it is commercial interest only we look for’.30 A 
more accurate statement would have been ‘it is commercial interest 
only we seek, for which we are willing to consider conquest’. A 
hundred years later, as he reviewed Parliament’s debates on the 
Company’s final charter in the summer of 1853, Karl Marx put 
his finger on the essence of the Company’s strategy, stating that it 
had ‘conquered India to make money out of it’.31 And, yet to invert 
Marx’s famous quip, the Company’s first attempt at conquest ended 
in farce, only to be followed much later by tragic success in 1757.
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Out of the Shadows 
THE OdOuRS OF THE SpICY ORIENT
Looming above the down-at-heel shops and cafés that line Oude 
Hoogstraat in Amsterdam today stands the mighty Oostindisch 
Huis. This impressive three-storey brick-built edifice was the 
headquarters of the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) 
from 1606 to 1799, and still bears the company’s monogram above 
its entrance. Perhaps it is the long-standing Dutch commitment 
to the environment that explains how the building has now been 
recycled to host a faculty of Amsterdam University. Sociologists 
lecture where the Heren XVII – the Company’s board of directors – 
once met to determine business strategy.1 What is striking about the 
humdrum atmosphere that now hangs over Oostindisch Huis is how 
this and other relics of the Company’s past are still clearly visible 
parts of Amsterdam’s landscape. A replica VOC ship – appropriately 
named The Amsterdam – is even moored beside the city’s maritime 
museum, a far cry from the erasure of memory evidenced over the 
water in London. 
For a hundred years, the VOC was the arbiter of European 
trade relations with Asia, overshadowing the efforts of its English 
namesake in both the scale and scope of its operations. The Dutch 
had been the first of the North European nations to break the 
Portuguese maritime monopoly of the Asian spice trade, with the 
Compagnie van Verre (Company of Distant Lands) sending its fleet 
to the East in 1595. Over the next six years, eight rival companies 
sent 15 fleets to tap the spice islands of Indonesia. Competition 
proved good both for the spice producers, who saw increased 
purchase prices, as well as Dutch consumers, who enjoyed falling 
sale prices. But it was a disaster for investors, and so, on 20 March 
1602, the various companies put their differences aside and merged 
into a single body. The united company received a monopoly over 
all trade with Asia – just like the English Company – and worked 
diligently to channel trade for its own benefit. 
Although England had launched its own East India Company two 
years earlier, the VOC had ten times the capital base, and quickly 
41
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achieved a dominant position. It became the first joint stock to trade 
its shares on an open market, and in its lifetime the VOC would pay 
out 3,600 per cent in dividends based on the initial investment in 
1602.2 It took the lead in displaying its pre-eminence through the 
art it chose to commission for its headquarters, decorating its Great 
Hall with paintings depicting its Asian trading posts from Cochin 
on the Malabar coast of India, to Ayuthya in Thailand, Banda Neira 
in the Moluccas and on to Canton in China. Passers-by could also 
experience the Company’s prestige in other ways as the aroma of 
the commodities stored within filtered into the street. For the poet 
Joost van der Vondel:
The rich East Indies House grows addict, tired and drear
And brings the odours of the spicy Orient near.3
Step by step, combining financial acumen with colonial brutality, the 
VOC achieved mastery of the Asia trade, managing fleets of more 
than a hundred ships and returning a fortune to its six founding 
cities. Jan Pieterszoon Coen, who had established Batavia (modern 
Jakarta) as the VOC’s capital in Asia, symbolised the single-minded 
commercial aggression that brought it such success. Writing back to 
the Heren XVII in 1619, he was adamant that ‘we cannot carry on 
trade without war, nor war without trade’.4 Violence in the East was 
matched by corruption at home. Just 20 years after its foundation 
angry investors forced the directors to publish the accounts and 
introduce a modicum of responsiveness to shareholder concerns. For 
the next century, the VOC outstripped its English rival. But in the 
eighteenth century, it failed to diversify its product range and was 
weakened from within by administrative sclerosis and fraud. By the 
end of the century, its three initials were being used by critics to spell 
out its doom ‘Vergann onder Corruptie’– ‘perished by corruption’. 
Expelled from India by its English namesake, the rest of the VOC’s 
Asian operations became untenable following the last Anglo-Dutch 
war in the 1780s, and, in 1799, the Compagnie ceased to exist. 
COMMERCIal SupplICaNT
Understanding the VOC is essential if the English Company 
is to be seen in context. Indeed, the EIC was just one of many 
competing India companies launched by the nations of Europe in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These ranged from important 
ventures from France and Denmark, as well as lesser operations 
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launched from Genoa, Ostend, Prussia, Russia, Sweden, Spain and 
Trieste. And for the first half of its existence, the English Company 
was the commercial supplicant, its trade with Asia at the mercy of 
both local rulers and rival Europeans.
When the London-based Company was established in 1600, 
Europe continued to live in the economic shadow of Asia, with 
England operating as one of its more marginal kingdoms. Spices 
and other luxury goods had been imported from Asia into Europe 
for thousands of years, carried overland across the Middle East. 
It was a trade dominated by local merchants, with Europeans in a 
dependent position at the end of the chain. The Ottoman capture 
of Constantinople in 1453 exposed this vulnerability, giving the 
Turks control of the Mediterranean and thus the ability to limit 
Europe’s access to pepper and other spices, such as cloves, nutmeg, 
cinnamon and mace. So essential was pepper as a way of making 
preserved meat edible that the race was on to find alternative routes 
to the source of supply. The Spanish headed west across the Atlantic, 
and ‘the Americas were discovered as a by-product in the search 
for pepper’.5 The Portuguese sailed south along the coast of Africa 
and around the Cape of Good Hope. While Columbus presented a 
New World to the King and Queen of Spain, it was the Portuguese 
who successfully fulfilled their mission and found the source of the 
spice trade. Ironically, it would be silver from Spanish mines in the 
New World that would provide the bullion to pay for Europe’s 
maritime imports of spice. In the two centuries after 1600, about 
one-third of the silver produced in America found its way to Asia 
to pay for Europe’s imports.6
The arrival of Vasco da Gama’s Portuguese fleet off Calicut 
(Kozikhode) in May 1498 marked a violent break with longstanding 
tradition of free trade in the Indian Ocean. When asked by an 
Arab trader why he had come, da Gama responded with precision, 
‘we seek Christians and spices’.7 He found both, but focused his 
attention on filling his ships with pepper for the voyage home. 
Not content with being one trading nation among many, da 
Gama and his successors used their naval supremacy to impose a 
commercial monopoly in the Indian Ocean. Only merchants who 
bought Portuguese permits were allowed to do business on pain of 
confiscation and death, a measure justified on the grounds that the 
right to free trade was limited to Christians.8 In a brutal extension 
of the wars of religion that raged between Christianity and Islam in 
the Mediterranean, the Portuguese enforced their monopoly with a 
savagery hitherto unknown in the region. 
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On his second voyage in 1502, da Gama dispensed with any 
attempt at negotiation. A large merchant ship bringing back 700 
pilgrims from Mecca was taken, primed with gunpowder and sunk. 
He then moved on to Calicut, capturing 20 trading vessels and 
butchering their crews. More than 800 prisoners had their hands, 
ears and noses hacked off, the pieces piled into a boat and sent 
to the local ruler, the Zamorin, with a note telling him to make a 
‘curry’ with what he found.9 In light of these and other incidents, 
the economic historian Niels Steengaard has concluded that ‘the 
principal export of pre-industrial Europe to the rest of the world 
was violence’.10 
The Portuguese impact on the economies of the Indian Ocean 
should not be overstated. What is clear, however, is that for decades 
thereafter, Portugal’s Estado do India would dominate European 
imports of pepper, accounting for as much as 75 per cent until the 
1580s.11 This was a state-managed affair, run from Portugal’s Asian 
capital at Goa and a suite of bases across the Indian Ocean from 
Mozambique via Malacca to Macau. Portuguese dominance would, 
however, be ruined by religion – from within by the horrors of the 
Inquisition and from without by the insurgent Protestant Dutch. 
When he died in 1525, Vasco da Gama was buried in St Francis 
Church in Fort Cochin. Today, his grave is empty, but his memory 
lives on with a mural in the lobby of the Indian Government’s Spice 
Board in Cochin, a peculiar choice for someone once described as 
‘a fiend in human form’.12
lOSING THE SpICE RaCE
For a brief moment in the sixteenth century, the kingdoms of 
Spain and Portugal were united, bringing together their immense 
overseas territories in the New World, along with dominion over 
the Netherlands in north-west Europe. But Protestant revolt in the 
Netherlands led to the blockade of Antwerp, and the closure of 
Lisbon and Seville to Dutch traders, cutting off their spice supply. 
The Dutch response was rapid, and the successful return of Dutch 
ships laden with pepper in 1599 sent shockwaves through London’s 
markets. The price of pepper almost tripled, rising from three to 
eight shillings a pound,13 prompting a band of London merchants to 
petition Queen Elizabeth for exclusive trading rights. In many ways, 
the new company was seen as a spin-off of the well-established 
Levant Company, which saw its business threatened by the Dutch 
coup. ‘This trading to the Indies’, warned William Aldrich, ‘have 
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clean overthrown our dealings to Aleppo.’14 Over £30,000 was 
raised to back the venture, which had a strikingly simple mission – 
‘let us be sole masters of the pepper trade’,15 declared the merchants. 
After much haggling the ailing queen eventually relented, awarding 
a charter on the last day of 1600, with the objective of bringing 
back valuable commodities from the East Indies, which should be 
‘bought, bartered, procured, exchanged, or otherwise obtained’. 
Alongside the pursuit of mercantile profit, Elizabeth’s charter 
inserted the public policy goal of the ‘advancement of trade’. In the 
end, the 218 investors who came together under this banner raised a 
total of £68,373 to finance a fleet of four small ships, which set sail 
in February 1601 to find an English niche in this lucrative business. 
Their focus was the spice islands that now form modern Indonesia 
– pepper from Java, cloves from the Moluccas, as well as mace and 
nutmeg from the Banda Islands; India played no part in its early 
commercial strategy. The English Company’s first trading base was 
established at Bantam in 1602, and the Company prospered in its 
first two decades as it struggled to gain a foothold. By taking the 
sea route to Asia, the Company was able to cut the prices of British 
imports of pepper, raw silk, cloves, indigo and mace by almost 
two-thirds compared with the overland route via Aleppo.16 The 
Company’s voyages between 1601 and 1612 generated returns of 
155 per cent on invested capital of £517,784. Cloves sold from the 
Company’s third voyage alone made profits of over 200 per cent. 
The first ‘joint stock’ then raised £420,436 to finance fleets for 
each of the four years between 1613 and 1616. But returns were 
much lower, though still substantial at 87 per cent. As time went 
on, a series of factors – including recession at home, mounting 
competition overseas and a growing glut of spices – meant that 
profits continued on a downward course. The second joint stock 
raised £1.6 million to finance annual voyages between 1617 and 
1622, but could only offer 12 per cent back to investors, a rate of 
less than 1 per cent a year.17
What lives on from these times are tales of piracy and high 
adventure. Pirates have an ambiguous place in English folklore, part 
feared and part celebrated, and the first wave of East India traders 
simply continued an old English tradition: trade where necessary 
and plunder where possible. Though sometimes favoured by local 
people in the East Indies in their battles against the Dutch, the 
Company’s motive was always the same: to secure exclusive control 
of local spice production. But the English Company progressively 
lost the ‘spice race’, outgunned and outclassed by the Dutch. Driven 
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from the Moluccas following the massacre of English traders at 
Ambon (Amboina) in 1623, the Company gave up the prized 
nutmeg island of Run as part of wider negotiations following the 
second Anglo-Dutch war in 1667. In return, New Amsterdam in 
the Americas was transferred to British rule, and quickly renamed 
New York. The English Company would cling on to its residual 
bases in the spice islands, but was finally expelled from Bantam by 
the Dutch in 1682. 
WINNING THE CalICO WaR
Forced from the spice islands, the Company refocused its gaze on 
India. The Company’s ships had initially visited the Gujarat and 
Coromandel coasts of India in search of cotton textiles, which could 
then be bartered for spices in the Indies. A first embassy led by 
William Hawkins arrived at the Mughal port of Surat in 1608. His 
pleas for trade relations failed to interest Mughal Emperor Jahangir, 
who was still heavily influenced by the Portuguese. Persistence and 
military muscle paid off, however, and a naval victory over the 
Portuguese in 1612 resulted in the Company’s first Mughal permit 
(firman) to trade from Surat, and thereafter at Ahmedabad and 
Agra. On the opposite coast, trading started at Masulipatam, the 
principal port of Golconda, in 1614. These early forays were capped 
in 1618, when England’s ambassador Sir Thomas Roe finally won 
an extensive trade treaty from Jahangir. Hoping to distinguish 
the English from the Portuguese and Dutch strategy of conquest 
and fortification, Roe counselled the Company to avoid military 
entanglements. ‘If you will profit,’ he urged, ‘seek it at sea and in 
quiett trade.’ By 1625, 220,000 pieces of cloth were being exported 
by the Company from Surat. 
One of the most memorable artefacts from this time is the 
‘Girdler’s Carpet’. Eight metres long in deep blues and reds, the 
carpet was commissioned by Robert Bell from the Company’s 
‘factory’ in Surat, which then contracted the renowned Mughal 
workshop in Lahore to carry out the weaving. Bell was one of the 
first investors in the East India Company in 1600, and rose steadily 
through its ranks. But along the way he gained a reputation for 
murky accounting, and in 1630 was discovered smuggling wine to 
India. Four years later, things came to a head when he was accused 
of failing to pay for the ‘very faire carpitt’ that he had designed for 
his livery company, the Girdler’s – the medieval guild of belt-makers. 
Bell claimed to have made the payment. But the Company’s agent in 
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Surat was by now dead. Many felt that Bell had cooked the books 
once more. By way of compensation, the Company confiscated 70 
bags of Bell’s pepper, and Bell withdrew from the Company under 
a cloud. His carpet remains on display in London’s Girdler’s Hall, 
and his mansion, Eagle House in Wimbledon, is now the home of 
the Al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation. Bell was not the first 
– and would not be the last – Company executive to be fingered 
for ethical malpractice. 
Maintaining a presence in Mughal India was a constant struggle. 
But, like the Dutch, the English Company succeeded largely by 
carving out a comfortable niche from the existing Portuguese empire, 
capturing its base at Hormuz on the Persian Gulf, for example, in 
1622 and raiding Bombay in 1626. Permanent peace was signed with 
Portugal at Goa in 1635, giving the Company access to the Estado’s 
ring of ports stretching all the way to Macao. It also paved the way 
for the establishment of the new base at Fort St George at Madras 
on the Coromandel coast in 1639. Bombay would follow in 1668, 
a wedding gift to Charles II from his Portuguese wife, Catherine of 
Braganza. The cash-strapped king promptly leased Bombay to the 
Company in return for a sizeable loan and an annual rent. 
Before the benefits of this transfer could be realised, the Company 
almost ceased to exist, undermined by interlopers and civil war. 
For many in the seventeenth century, monopolies were regarded as 
the economic expression of royal despotism, powers to be opposed 
by the rising parliamentary forces. As early as 1604, a bill was 
introduced in Parliament to abolish all exclusive privileges over 
foreign trade. Supporting the bill, Sir Edwyn Sandys spoke out for 
the importance of commercial freedom: ‘it is against the natural 
right and liberty of the subjects of England to restrain [merchandise] 
into the hands of some few’.18 This was a spirit that would be 
echoed throughout the Company’s career, with varying degrees of 
success. In 1604, the free trade bill failed. But the Stuart kings of 
England were always seeking additional sources of finance. As a 
result, the Crown was happy to back rival ventures, such as the 
short-lived Scottish East India Company of 1618 and the Courteen 
Association of 1636. Paradoxically, peace with Portugal became the 
excuse for William Courteen and a rival set of merchants to win 
a charter from the king to trade in the newly opened Portuguese 
zone. Courteen’s venture would last for 15 years, disrupting the 
Company’s monopoly presence. Yet, it would come together with 
the original Company in 1650 under the banner of the ‘United Joint 
Stock’ to found a permanent English factory in Bengal, at Hugli. 
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By then, however, the Company had been hard hit by the 
aftershocks of the British civil wars that raged from 1640 to 1647. 
The Anglo-Dutch struggles during Oliver Cromwell’s protectorate 
in the 1650s also profoundly damaged Company interests. In 
addition, Cromwell refused to renew the Company’s charter in 
1653, allowing its monopoly to lapse. This produced a brief window 
of open commerce, boosting trade and reducing prices, yet crippling 
profits – a result almost exactly the same as the Dutch experience 
before 1602. On 14 January 1657, the situation had grown so bleak 
that the Company’s directors voted to liquidate its affairs. This 
proved to be an effective ploy to force Cromwell’s hand. By October, 
a new charter had been granted, and a permanent joint stock was 
established with capital to the tune of £740,000 – although only 50 
per cent of this was actually subscribed at the time. It would take 
another half-century before the Company could match the invested 
capital of the second joint stock of 1617. 
The Company could finally be called a modern corporation, 
and for the next three decades it experienced an economic boom. 
Between 1658 and 1688, the Company managed to complete 404 
voyages between London and the East Indies, an average of 13 each 
season.19 The return of King Charles II in 1660 secured its position, 
and from established bases at Surat and Madras, the new port of 
Bombay and the emerging trade with Bengal, Company imports 
surged. In 1664, it imported a quarter of a million pieces of cloth, 
almost half from the Coromandel coast, a third from Gujarat and 
less than a fifth from Bengal. By the end of the decade, cotton and 
silk textiles made up 56 per cent of Company imports, pushing 
pepper into second place, followed by raw silk, indigo, saltpetre, 
coffee and tea. Indian textiles hit an all-time peak of 1.76 million 
pieces in 1684, representing 83 per cent of the Company’s total 
trade. This influx of cheap, easily washable clothing created a health 
and lifestyle revolution. By the end of the century, the value of the 
English Company’s trade was fast catching up with the Dutch, with 
Bengal taking an ever-greater share. If the VOC was the commercial 
hare among the north European trading companies, the EIC was 
proving to be the tortoise. 
The 1680s were the peak of the boom, when 200,000 pieces were 
exported from Bengal alone each year. This produced generous 
dividends and capital growth for the Company’s investors. The 
Company’s share price more than quadrupled in the two decades 
following the Restoration, growing from £60–£70 in 1664 to £245 
in 1677 and £300 in 1680. Dividends were also substantial. For 
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most of the 1670s, the Company paid out a 20 per cent dividend. 
But in 1680, fortunes improved and a 50 per cent payout was made, 
to be repeated in 1682, 1689 and 1691. And in 1682, so strong 
were the Company’s finances that each proprietor received matching 
shares as a bonus, taking the Company’s capital stock to £740,000. 
In all, from 1657 to 1691, proprietors received 840 per cent in 
dividends on their original investment. And for India, there was a 
steady influx of bullion, stimulating growth in income, output and 
employment. Between 1681 and 1685 alone, the Company exported 
240 tonnes of silver and 7 tonnes of gold to India.20 Financially, 
these were perhaps the best days of the Company’s life.
a BId FOR dOMINION
It was at this point that the Company’s directors in London made 
a fundamental shift in corporate strategy, a turnaround engineered 
by one of the most influential executives in its history, Sir Josiah 
Child. Born in 1630, Child made his first fortune as a victualler 
(supplier of food) to the navy under Cromwell’s protectorate. His 
career took off in the early 1670s, when he became a member of 
the exclusive victualling syndicate for the Royal Navy, along with 
another rising star, Thomas Papillon. This lucrative venture gave 
Child the resources to become a founding shareholder of the Royal 
African Company, which had been awarded a royal monopoly 
to conduct the slave trade, and was headquartered, like the East 
India Company, on Leadenhall Street. In 1671, Child became 
a shareholder in the EIC for the first time, and only two years 
later he held 2 per cent of the entire stock, becoming the largest 
shareholder in 1679. Shares brought power in the Company, and 
for 17 years, from April 1674 until his death in 1699, Child was 
on the Company’s board. Throughout the 1680s, he was either 
governor (chairman) or deputy-governor.
‘As a practical man of business, he had few equals’, wrote Thomas 
Macaulay in his History of England.21 Child had a firm grasp of 
the essentials of business administration, making his intentions 
absolutely clear at home and abroad. Poor performance was not 
accepted, as the Company’s executives in Madras soon realised 
when they received a severe rebuke in September 1687. ‘The great 
trouble we labour under’, wrote Child, ‘is that you cannot get out 
of your old formes, and your cavilling way of writing or perverting, 
or misconstruing, procrastinating, or neglecting our plain and direct 
orders to you as if you were not subordinate but a coordinate power 
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with us.’22 Child was also a highly effective corporate advocate, 
producing a series of pamphlets under his own name and the 
pseudonym Philopatris, to persuade politicians of the Company’s 
case. Early on in his career, he had also published A New Discourse 
on Trade, expounding the reasons for the Dutch success in trade, 
a model he wished to emulate. 
Child’s influence stretched to London’s embryonic financial 
markets, where he had the reputation as ‘the original of stock-
jobbing’. Known today for his desert island story of Robinson 
Crusoe, Daniel Defoe was also a leading economic analyst of his 
age, and Defoe cast Josiah Child as a pivotal figure in his Anatomy 
of Exchange Alley. Published in 1719 as an investigation into the 
forces that would soon drive the South Sea Bubble, Defoe examined 
the rising markets of the 1680s and 1690s, and made it clear that 
‘every Man’s Eye, when he came to Market, was upon the Brokers, 
who acted for Sir Josiah’, enquiring ‘does Sir Josiah Sell or Buy?’ 
But it was not just Child’s wealth that moved markets, but also his 
skill for manipulating the news from India. According to Defoe, 
there are those who tell us, letters had been order’d by private 
management to be written from the East Indies with an account 
of the loss of ships which have been arrived there, and the arrival 
of ships lost; of war with the Great Mogul, when they have been 
in perfect tranquillity, and of peace with the Great Mogul when 
he has come down against the factory of Bengal with 100,000 
men, just as it was thought proper to call those rumours for 
raising and falling of the stock and when it was for this purpose 
to buy cheap or sell dear.23
Child’s commercial vision was stark. Like many mercantilists, 
he saw wealth as being exclusively drawn from landed property. 
As a result, international trade was a zero-sum game with the 
goal of amassing as much of this wealth as possible for one’s own 
nation.24 Monopoly corporations such as the East India Company 
were therefore an essential part of England’s commercial armoury. 
Child admired the tough-minded way in which the Dutch had 
achieved their supremacy and, echoing Coen, he fervently believed 
‘profit and power must go together’.25 As he rose to prominence in 
the Company, Child put in place a radical plan to implement his 
vision. The first step was to make a new alliance with the Crown 
to guarantee the Company’s privileges at home. Elected governor 
in 1681, Child quickly awarded Charles II 10,000 guineas to help 
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smooth the renewal of the Company’s charter, a payment that 
became an annual gift for the next seven years. Next he broke 
with his former partner Thomas Papillon, who was proposing to 
open up the East India trade to a much wider pool of investors and 
merchants. Papillon was also a leading ‘exclusionist’ who wanted to 
stop Charles’s Catholic brother James from becoming king. Driven 
from his position on the Company’s board and hounded by the 
court, Papillon was forced into exile in 1685. Child rapidly became 
a favourite at court, marrying his daughter to the eldest son of the 
Tory aristocrat, the Duke of Beaufort, and transferring £10,000 of 
Company stock into James’s name. With his position at court secure, 
Child clamped down mercilessly on the growing band of interlopers 
who sought to break the Company’s monopoly. 
Having secured his position in England, Child then implemented 
the second part of his strategy: commercial conquest abroad. Child 
wanted the Company to become a sovereign power in India, forcing 
the Mughal Empire to trade with it on terms of equality. The prize 
was Bengal, where the Company had increasingly important 
trading operations but lacked a fortified stronghold like Goa or 
Batavia. This left it exposed to the fiscal exactions of the provincial 
governor, who, for example, in 1680 introduced a 5 per cent duty 
on imported bullion and a 3.5 per cent duty on exports – in spite of 
the Company’s technical duty-free export status. In January 1686, 
Child gave his blessing to an expeditionary force of ten ships and 
six companies of infantry sent by the Company to force concessions 
from the Mughals in Bengal. Writing to the President of Fort St 
George in Madras on 9 June 1686, Child underlined the imperative 
for the Company to transform itself from ‘a parcel of mere trading 
merchants’ into a ‘formidable martial government in India’.26 The 
same tone filled his visionary call in 12 December 1687 for the new 
President and Council in Madras to ‘establish such a politie of Civil 
and Military power, and create and secure such a large revenue to 
maintain both at that place as may be the foundation of a large, 
well-grounded sure English dominion in India for all time to come’.27
Child had begun what has become known as the Anglo-Mughal 
war – although it would perhaps be better described as first 
Company–Mughal conflict. His strategy was, of course, complete 
madness. The Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb was a military zealot, 
intent on asserting his power throughout the subcontinent. In 1686, 
for example, he took Bijapur, and the following year Hyderabad. 
In Bengal, the local forces of the Mughal’s deputy, or Nawab, 
were equally overwhelming. Three years of skirmishing through 
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the swamps of the delta followed, which ‘only rendered our nation 
ridiculous’, according to Job Charnock, the Company’s chief in the 
region. Over in Gujarat, the Company raided Mughal shipping, 
provoking the capture of Surat and a full-blown siege of Bombay in 
1689. Aurangzeb eventually restored the Company’s trading rights, 
but at the cost of diplomatic humiliation and a fine of Rs150,000, 
plus damages. The conflict had ‘rendered the English in all parts of 
India Odious and Contemptible’.28 Only one piece of consolation 
could be drawn from the whole sorry affair. A new ‘factory’ was 
established among the villages of Kolikata, Govindapore and 
Sutanuti on the Hugli river in 1690, for which fortifications were 
begun in 1696 and zamindari rights purchased two years later. 
Calcutta had been born. 
Yet, by then, Josiah Child’s two-pronged strategy of corruption at 
home and aggression abroad had come crashing down. The Glorious 
Revolution of 1688–89 would not only replace Child’s patron, 
James II, but would threaten the elimination of the Company itself. 
a WHIRlWINd OF dISaSTERS
On Guy Fawkes Day 1688, William of Orange, Stadtholder of 
the Netherlands, landed in England and ousted James II from the 
throne. Many forces were at work in this ‘Glorious Revolution’, 
most notably a convergence of a popular desire in England to be 
rid of a Catholic king with an urgent need in the Netherlands to 
remove James’s pro-French threat. Yet commercial considerations 
were by no means secondary in the minds of the British elite as 
they constructed the unprecedented Bill of Rights that would 
bind the new joint monarchs, William and his English wife Mary, 
daughter of the deposed king. James’s economic strategy, inspired 
by Child’s aggressive mercantilism, had excluded whole swathes 
of the merchant class from the benefits of foreign trade. The result 
was a ‘great grumbling in the City against a certain great East India 
merchant whose first name rhymes with Goliah’.29 
Soon after the coronation in April 1689, the Convention 
Parliament began investigating the mounting complaints against 
the chartered corporations, most notably the African and Indian 
companies. Parliament quickly concluded in favour of establishing 
a new India company. This soon took shape at Dowgate in the City 
of London, with its base in the Skinners Hall. A fierce political battle 
began – ‘the chief weapons of the New Company were libels; the 
chief weapons of the Old Company were bribes’, wrote Macaulay.30 
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Initially aiming for reform, the Dowgate Adventurers pressed for 
the Old Company to double its capital to £1.5 million to let other 
investors have a share of its riches and to limit individual holdings 
to £5,000 to prevent the concentration of power that Child had 
enjoyed. Papillon returned from Utrecht to join the triumphant 
Whigs who were pressing for change. But Child refused to budge, 
and the Commons voted to dissolve the Old Company. Yet, before 
this could be put into effect, while Parliament was in recess, in 
October 1693, the King suddenly granted a new charter to the 
Company for 21 years. 
Parliament was furious, and in January 1694 passed an 
uncompromising resolution stating that ‘all subjects of England 
should have equal right to trade to the East-Indies’.31 This marked 
a profound break with the chartering process. Previously, a charter 
was the personal privilege of the Crown; now it would have to be 
confirmed through an Act of Parliament. Trade with India had been 
freed, and budding merchants chose to move north of the border 
to establish a new Scottish East India Company with £300,000 of 
capital. Child showed his contempt for the will of Parliament in a 
private letter to the Company’s executives in India. ‘Be guided by my 
instructions’, he wrote, ‘and not by the nonsense of a few ignorant 
country gentlemen who have hardly wit enough to manage their 
own private affairs, and who know nothing at all about questions 
of trade.’ 
But this breach of the Company’s monopoly was not the end of 
the matter. Many had been suspicious at the circumstances that 
led to the charter grant in October 1693, and Parliament opened 
corruption investigations in March 1695. Even by the lax standards 
of the day, politicians were genuinely shocked by what they found. A 
team of MPs pored through the Company’s accounts and uncovered 
a complex web of bribes, all emanating from the Governor Sir 
Thomas Cooke, Child’s son-in-law. In the six years since the 
Revolution, £107,013 had been paid out for ‘the special Service of 
the Company’, including a massive £80,468 in 1693 to win a new 
charter. A further £90,000 had been lent to Cooke to buy Company 
shares to ease the chartering process. A crooked saltpetre import 
deal was also discovered that would transfer another £12,000. 
Initially, Cooke refused to explain these transactions. But a short 
spell in the Tower of London and an Act of Indemnity – effectively, 
a plea bargain – freed his tongue. The first slice of £10,000 had 
been delivered to Josiah Child, who passed it on to the King as 
a resumption of the traditional gift he had made in the 1680s. 
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Other payments were made to a host of intermediaries to argue the 
Company’s case at court. In front of a committee of both Houses of 
Parliament, Cooke was frank that ‘the Inducements for giving this 
Money were, Fears of the Interlopers going out and Subscriptions 
for a new Company going on; by which they apprehended the 
Company would be ruined’.32 With Josiah Child in the background, 
Cooke had orchestrated a whole series of intermediaries – a Mr 
Acton, Nathaniel Molineaux, Sir John Chardin, Paul Dockminique 
Esq and Captain John Jermaine – to press its case. The Attorney 
General received £545, and the Solicitor General just £218. Standing 
above all of these was Sir Basil Firebrace, who pocketed £40,000 
in a series of contracts, which were designed to pay out only if the 
charter was won. Firebrace then commissioned others to sway the 
minds of key figures at court. 
After interrogating Cooke, the MPs turned their attention on 
Firebrace. Like so many others broken by their own corruption, 
Firebrace sometimes stumbled in his answers, at one point pleading 
that he might postpone answering a particularly penetrating question 
to ‘some other Time; being not well, not having slept Two or Three 
nights, and much indisposed as to his Health’.33 Eventually, after 
persistent questioning, Parliament discovered that £5,500 had been 
received by Thomas Osborne, Duke of Leeds, and President of 
the King’s Privy Council. The MPs expressed outrage at the ‘dark 
practices in this affair’, and feared that if someone so senior in 
government could take money for a commercial charter, he could 
also take money to betray the country to the French. But there 
was no law against taking money at court, and so a motion was 
prepared to impeach Leeds for abusing his office. A key witness fled 
the country, and before Parliament could start formal proceedings, 
the King commanded that the session be brought to a close, thereby 
ending the impeachment proceedings. 
For John Pollexfen, a member of the parliamentary committee 
investigating the Company’s affairs and a leading critic of its 
monopoly status, the conclusion was clear: ‘companies have bodies, 
but it is said they have no souls; if no souls, no consciences’.34 
But Cooke, Child, Firebrace and Thomas Osborne all escaped 
punishment. As for the Company, its fate became ever more bleak. 
The post-Revolution stock market boom came to a shuddering halt, 
and the growing scandals cost the Company’s shares 35 per cent 
during 1695 and a further 28 per cent in 1696. The situation was 
compounded by the onset of war with France, which disrupted the 
economy, hitting London’s textile industry particularly hard. 
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The Company had long been the target of protests from 
protectionist interests, critical of its growing imports of Indian 
calicoes. ‘When the East India ships come in,’ they argued, ‘half our 
weavers play.’ Others contended that competition from India kept 
wages in the domestic wool and silk industries at starvation levels. 
The poor economic conditions of 1696 inflamed these passions. 
In March, a bill to prohibit the importation of ‘all wrought silks, 
Bengalls, dyed printed or stained calicoes of India’ was passed in 
the Commons. But in November, the Tory-dominated House of 
Lords declined to support the bill. Protesting against the ‘Great 
Goliah’, several hundred weavers marched from Spitalfields in the 
East End of London to Westminster to petition Parliament. The 
pressure was intensified the following January, when 5,000 weavers 
once again marched on Parliament. On their return journey, the 
weavers attacked East India House and broke open its door, forcing 
the intervention of the local militia. But this ‘great insurrection 
of weavers’ was by no means over. In March, rioters ransacked 
the house of the Company’s Deputy-Governor Thomas Bohun in 
Spitalfields. Two days later, the weavers marched to Hackney and 
threatened Child’s mansion in Wanstead. Soldiers fired at the crowds, 
killing one. Next month, the weavers attacked Leadenhall Street 
once more and ‘very near seized the treasure of East India House’.35
The mood of financial crisis prompted the final denouement in 
the Company’s long fall from grace. War had depleted the Crown’s 
coffers, forcing it to turn to the City for cash. The Old Company 
offered the King a loan of £700,000 at 4 per cent interest. But the 
Dowgate Adventurers put forward a massive £2 million, though at 
a cost of 8 per cent interest. The King took the Dowgate offer, and 
in June 1698, the Commons passed an act awarding the monopoly 
of Asian trade to a new General Society. The Old Company’s days 
appeared to be numbered. The next year Josiah Child was dead with 
£200,000 to his name – equivalent to nearly £22 million in 2010 
prices36 – and in 1700, a bill ‘for the effectual employment of the 
poor and encouraging the Manufactures of England’ was passed, 
banning the import of silk or cottons from Asia into England, except 
for domestic printing or re-export. 
The promise of commercial liberty that so many had entertained 
would be dashed, however. Two giant loopholes allowed the Old 
Company to regroup and recover its ascendancy. First of all, it 
was given a three-year period to wind up its affairs, and second, 
it also had the right to invest in the New Company, which it took 
advantage of by buying up £315,000 or 15 per cent of the new 
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stock. The New Company was designed as an old-style regulated 
venture, enabling shareholders to trade under its umbrella up to 
the value of their holding. Shareholders were also able to form 
their own joint stock companies within the General Society, and so 
alongside the new ‘English Company Trading to the East Indies’, 
which accounted for the bulk of the shares, the Old Company 
continued to trade and its merchants in India stayed firmly in place. 
A valiant bunch of independent traders also managed to subscribe 
to £23,000 of stock, creating something of a competitive market 
for the first time since the 1650s. Adam Smith would later observe 
that this window of relatively open trade brought rising prices for 
producers in India, cutting sale prices to consumers in England.37
Neither the Old nor the New Companies, however, had any 
intrinsic interest in competition, and to avoid commercial civil war, 
a scheme of amalgamation was agreed on 27 April 1702, brokered 
by none other than Sir Basil Firebrace. Seven years later, the new 
United Company of Merchants Trading to the East Indies was finally 
launched. In return for an exclusive charter, a further £1.2 million 
was raised and promptly loaned to the Crown at zero interest. This 
took the Company’s invested capital to £3.2 million, all of which 
was lent to the government at 5 per cent. The United Company was 
‘on its way to becoming the prosperous and sound commercial and 
financial corporation which was not only far and away the biggest 
and most complicated trading organisation, but was the centre of 
the financial market rising in London’.38
Yet, not everyone was happy. One of the independent shareholders, 
writing anonymously to an MP in 1708, expressed his disgust at the 
merger, lamenting that there was ‘not a man left that dare bring in a 
muslin neck cloth or a pound of pepper but themselves’.39 The great 
hopes of the Glorious Revolution had come to nothing, he wrote, 
noting that it was ‘strange after all our struggles for liberty that this 
monster, monopoly, should lift up its horns and shake his chains to 
the terror of the honest trading subject’. It was a ‘wretched bargain’ 
and a subject ‘so melancholy, it makes my head ake’.
ON THE IMMENSE OCEaN OF INdIaN COMMERCE40
Once again, the East India Company had escaped extinction at 
the eleventh hour. By the time of the merger in 1709, external 
events had also begun to move in its favour. In India, Child’s great 
adversary the Emperor Aurangzeb died in 1707, leaving behind a 
depleted treasury and a series of ineffective successors. Ten years 
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later, on New Year’s Eve 1716 the Emperor Farrukhsiyar made three 
imperial decrees (firman) granting the Company duty-free trading 
rights in the provinces of Bengal, Hyderabad – which contained 
the Coromandel coast – and Ahmedabad, which oversaw the ports 
of Gujarat. Imperial weakness, persistent negotiating and healthy 
bribes had succeeded where Child’s frontal assault had failed. This 
firman provided the basis for a new era of corporate prosperity – 
as well as the seeds of perennial dispute with local rulers in India 
over its interpretation. 
Perhaps more than any other of the Company’s executives before 
or since, Josiah Child had demonstrated where an appetite for 
corporate power could lead. For contemporaries such as the diarist 
John Evelyn, he was the archetype of the ‘suddenly monied’, the 
new breed of merchant princes who had become both politically 
and economically dominant in the 1680s and 1690s. What makes 
his career so striking is the openness with which Child laid out 
his objective of commercial dominion and the consistency with 
which he sought to achieve it through a despotic alliance at home 
and aggression abroad. Like so many of his successors, he escaped 
unpunished, retiring to the calm of his walnut orchards at Wanstead. 
After Child, no-one either at headquarters or in the field would be 
as explicit in their intentions. But the desire would remain.
Turning its back on Child’s adventurism, the Company’s directors 
aimed to flourish by espousing high standards of corporate practice: 
‘righteousness is at the root of our prosperity’, they urged their 
executives in India. Corruption still remained embedded in the 
Company’s operations, but was kept to a manageable level. As for 
relations with India, the directors instructed its servants to ‘take 
care that neither the broker, nor those under him, nor your own 
servants, use their authority to hurt and injure people’.41 Its string 
of port cities flourished. In the case of Calcutta, Gulam Husain 
Salim, the Persian author of Riyaz-us-Salatin, argued that it was 
‘the liberty and protection afforded by the English’, along with ‘the 
lightness of duties levied’, that explained its rise.42
‘Trade, and trade only, was their business’, and by the 1720s, the 
Company was outstripping its long-standing Dutch rival in terms of 
the Bengal textile trade.43 Overall, it was now starting to match the 
VOC’s share of the entire trade with Europe – a huge turnaround 
from the situation in the 1660s (see Table 3.1). 
This commercial success was felt on the streets of London, where 
its main product line of Indian calicoes had become ubiquitous. 
Writing in January 1708, Daniel Defoe describes how calicoes ‘crept 
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into our houses, our closets and bedchambers’ to such an extent that 
‘everything that used to be made of wool or silk, relating to either 
the dress of women or the furniture of our houses, was supplied by 
the India trade’.44 For the Company, the initial ban on ‘Bengalls’ 
introduced in 1700 proved to be a temporary constraint. In response, 
the Company refocused its efforts towards supplying the British 
calico printing industry with raw materials, and located re-export 
markets for India’s textiles. As part of the fast-growing African 
slave trade, Indian cottons became a vital item of barter for human 
cargoes. This was globalisation Georgian-style – a development 
enthusiastically endorsed by Joseph Addison in the pages of the 
Spectator. Addison gloried in the way that London had become 
an ‘emporium for the whole Earth’. Writing in 1711, he described 
how ‘the single dress of a woman of quality is often a product of 
a hundred climates … the scarf is sent from the torrid zone … the 
brocade petticoat rises out of the mines of Peru and the diamond 
necklace out of the bowels of Indostan’.45 One of the greatest of these 
jewels was the ‘Pitt diamond’ a 410 carat rock, acquired by Thomas 
Pitt, Governor of Madras, for 48,000 pagodas (£24,000) in 1701. 
Brought back to England, the diamond was split, with some stones 
sold to Russia’s Peter the Great, and the central piece purchased by 
France’s regent, Philippe, duke of Orleans in 1717 for £135,000, 
equivalent to £16 million in 2010 money. The extraordinary value 
of the diamond and the suspicious circumstances of its acquisition 
earned it a place in Alexander Pope’s Moral Essays:
‘Asleep and naked, as an Indian lay,
An honest factor stole a gem away;
He pledged it to a Knight; the Knight had wit,
So kept the diamond and the rogue was bit’
A popular alternative to the final line was ‘So robbed the robber 
and was rich as Pitt’.46 It was this fortune that enabled Pitt to 
construct his country mansion at Swallowfield in Berkshire, and 
Table 3.1 dutch and English East India Company exports from asia 1668–1780  
(in million florin)
 1668–70 1698–1700 1738–40 1778–80
English  4.3 13.8 23.0 69.3
Dutch 10.8 15.0 19.25 20.8
Source: Om Prakash, European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-Colonial India, New Delhi: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 115, 121.
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provided the financial foundations for the political careers of his 
grandson and great-grandsons, William Pitt the Elder and Younger.
The relationship with India was not just about extracting 
diamonds. The rapid growth in demand for textiles provided a 
valuable economic stimulus, bringing a flood of bullion into the 
region. Competition for the output of India’s weavers between the 
English and other European companies, and, more importantly, 
with the dominant Asian merchant class, also ensured that this was 
a ‘seller’s market’, boosting returns for local  producers. And that 
eternal indicator of the Company’s fortunes, its share price, reflected 
this recovery. A steady upward curve can be plotted from the low 
point of £39 in June 1698, just as the New Company was receiving 
its new charter, rising to over £100 as arrangements for the great 
merger began in 1702. Given the momentous nature of the deal, it 
was no surprise that the share price passed £200 in December 1717 
as news of the firmans reached the London market. 
In the three years that followed the firman, imports of plain white 
calico almost trebled, spurring a new bout of agitation from the 
weavers. One melodramatic pamphleteer described, ‘Europe like 
a body in a warm bath with its veins opened … and her bullion 
which is the life-blood of her trade flows to India to enrich the Great 
Mogul’s subjects.’47 In March 1720, Robert Walpole’s government 
introduced a fully-fledged piece of protectionism, prohibiting ‘the 
use and wear of all printed, painted, stained or dyed calicoes’ much 
to the dismay of ladies of fashion. Only muslin was exempted. 
Twelve years after the prohibition, John Kay would invent the flying 
shuttle for weaving, paving the way for Britain’s industrial textile 
industry, insulated from the competition of cheap Asian imports. 
Contending with trade wars over cotton was not the Company’s 
only concern in 1720. Its stock got caught up in the South Sea 
Company speculation, soaring from £290 in May to £420 in 
June when the Bubble Act was passed, which banned any more 
joint stock corporations. When the South Sea Bubble duly burst, 
the Company’s shares plummeted by two-thirds. But it survived 
and became the undisputed ‘blue chip’ mercantile stock on the 
London exchange. After the dismal 1690s, when dividends had been 
suspended, payments to shareholders were resumed at 10 per cent 
in 1716, falling to 9 per cent in 1723 in line with declining interest 
rates on the Company’s bonds. 
This apparently healthy equilibrium concealed major tensions, 
however. At home, the Company’s monopoly remained a focus 
of dispute, and in 1730 petitions came in from London, Bristol 
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and Liverpool to open up the Asia trade. In words that Adam 
Smith would echo half a century later, the petitioners argued that 
‘whatever is gained by the monopolising company, in the high prices 
at which it was enabled to sell, or the low prices at which it was 
enabled to buy, was all lost by its dilatory, negligent and wasteful 
management’.48 An intriguing proposal was put forward to replace 
the Company’s joint stock with a regulated company, which would 
manage the common infrastructure of the India trade, in return for a 
commission on all imports and exports; independent traders would 
then operate freely under this umbrella. But the Company had deep 
pockets and cut the rate of interest on its loan to the government 
from 5 to 4 per cent, and presented the state with a free gift of 
£200,000 in cash. In return, the charter was extended to 1769, and 
the Company’s monopoly would last until 1793. 
As well as fending off challenges to its monopoly, the Company 
also had to deal with profound internal problems. Fraud in Asia and 
increasing competition from rival European operations, notably the 
French, were eating into the Company’s returns. In February 1732, 
the Directors dismissed the entire Calcutta Council for corruption, 
and at the annual general meeting, the shareholders reluctantly 
accepted a deep cut to the dividend to 6.5 per cent. During the 
rest of the 1730s and 1740s, the stock fluctuated between £150 
and £200, and dividends were a modest, but predictable 7 to 8 per 
cent. This was a far cry from the huge returns of the 1680s, and 
still lagged those of the VOC, which awarded dividends averaging 
20 per cent in the 1730s. But steadiness was now the key. In all, 
the Company earned a profit of £30,000,000 more from its sale 
of Asian goods in the three decades 1713–43 than it paid out in 
bullion and other goods.49
In India, geopolitical turmoil had become a constant. The 
authority of the Mughals was visibly humbled following the sacking 
of Shahjahanabad (Delhi) in 1739 by the Persian Nadir Shah, who 
took the Peacock Throne back with him to Tehran. Political power 
fragmented, favouring the rise of autonomous regimes, notably 
in Bengal and Hyderabad. In the west, the Maratha confederacy 
asserted its military autonomy, raiding Bengal, for example, for 
the best part of the 1740s. And, although the Dutch no longer 
presented a threat, Britain’s century-long conflict with France 
finally spilled over into India in the 1740s. In the mounting chaos 
of post-Aurangzeb India, the corporate needs of the Company and 
private interests of its executives would fuse together to produce 
the Bengal Revolution.
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The Bengal Revolution
THE RISE aNd Fall OF RaJaH NaBaKRISHNa
Sovabazar in north Kolkata has a distinct and impressive atmosphere, 
the home to many of the city’s oldest commercial families. As the city 
expanded rapidly in the eighteenth century under the Company’s 
protection, a powerful class of Indian merchants came to the fore. 
Called banians by the British – after the bania caste – they performed 
the crucial role of intermediary. These local traders would arrange 
the purchase of key commodities such as textiles, opium and 
saltpetre for the Company, and make loans to provide much-needed 
cash flow. In addition, the banians also went into business with the 
Company’s executives on an individual basis, enabling the English 
to profit from the opportunities for private trade that the hazardous 
posting to Bengal provided. In the words of William Bolts, one of the 
Company’s most successful and controversial traders, ‘a Banyan is a 
person by whom the English gentlemen in general transact all their 
business. He is interpreter, head book-keeper, head secretary, head 
broker, the supplier of cash and cash-keeper, and in general also 
secret-keeper.’1 The importance of this relationship is depicted in 
Thomas Hickey’s late eighteenth-century portrait of John Mowbray 
with his banian. Deep in discussion, Mowbray is seated, listening 
intently as the banian, swathed in cloth, reads from his account 
log, a map of their commercial hunting grounds in north India 
strategically placed on the wall behind them. 
One of the most powerful of these merchants was Rajah 
Nabakrishna Deb, whose palace stills stands on Nabakrishna Street 
in Sovabazar. Two lions guard the gateway, their paws resting on 
red-painted cannonballs. Beyond lies an inner courtyard around 
which rises a two-storey building that contained Nabakrishna’s 
offices, library, living quarters and shrine to the goddess Durga. 
During the lavish parties (nautchs) that he threw for the British, 
the women of the household would retire to their zenana on the 
upper floor to observe the proceedings through wooden grills. 
For almost half a century, Nabakrishna was one of the pillars 
of the Company’s success in Bengal, a key ally in the revolution 
61
Robins T02502 01 text   61 30/08/2012   09:22
62 THE CORpORaTION THaT CHaNGEd THE WORld
that brought them control of India’s richest province. When the 
new Nawab Siraj-ud-Daula confronted the Company in 1756, 
Nabakrishna took the Company’s side, smuggling food into the 
besieged Calcutta before its fall. He then worked as Robert Clive’s 
go-between in the negotiations that led up to Plassey, and, in its 
immediate aftermath, helped to loot the harem at Murshidabad of 
Rs80 million in gold, silver and jewels.
More than this, Clive and Nabakrishna apparently became close 
friends. Such was the depth of the friendship that when Clive was 
looking for a suitable location to celebrate Plassey in place of the 
destroyed church of St Anne’s, Nabakrishna offered his own house 
as a substitute. Clive accepted and made an offering at the feet of 
Durga, Kolkata’s local deity. To this day, ‘the annual Durga Puja 
at 36 Nabakrishna Street is still known as Company Puja’.2 In 
1766, Clive awarded Nabakrishna the title of Maharajah, and a 
salary of Rs2,000 for his services to the Company. Returning home 
from the ceremony, Nabakrishna rode to his palace in Sovabazar 
on an elephant, scattering money in the streets. Ten years later, 
Warren Hastings went one step further and made him the perpetual 
talukdar of Sutanuti, one of the prime areas of Calcutta. So close 
was Nabakrishna to Clive that he would be accused by some of 
Clive’s rivals of trumped-up charges of robbery and rape, charges 
of which he was quickly cleared. 
But Nabakrishna’s relationship with the British eventually soured. 
In 1780, Hastings needed to borrow Rs300,000 to cover a hole 
in his personal finances, and turned to Nabakrishna for help. 
Hastings wanted to transfer the money to the Company’s account, 
and then use this to pay himself for the range of cultural activities 
he had funded out of his own pocket (including a mission to Tibet 
and the new madrasa in Calcutta). Nabakrishna insisted that the 
money should be treated as a gift rather than a loan, and Hastings 
accepted, recording it as a donation to the Company, from which 
he promptly started paying himself. Already murky, what made the 
deal extremely suspicious was that it coincided with Nabakrishna’s 
request to be made one of the Company’s key officials in the district 
of Burdwan in order to enable him to recover arrears from the 
local ruler. The appointment was made and the money changed 
hands. All this became entangled in the wider charges of malpractice 
and corruption that would later assail Hastings on his return to 
England. At his impeachment, the prosecution would argue that 
Nabakrishna’s Rs300,000 was a bribe, and therefore contrary to 
Company rules. 
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Then, in 1792, in the middle of the trial, Nabakrishna changed 
tack and stated that it was a loan after all, for which he had 
never been repaid. Hastings was presented with a bill for £37,500 
plus 12 per cent interest, which he refused to pay, prompting a 
second lawsuit that proceeded in parallel with the impeachment. 
Parliament’s stamina for the marathon impeachment trial was fading 
fast, and in 1795, Hastings was acquitted of all charges, including 
of accepting a bribe from Nabakrishna. This should have put the 
Rajah in a good position in his parallel case; if the money was not a 
gift, then it must be a loan. But such are the vagaries of justice that 
it took a further nine years for the courts in London to conclude 
that Hastings had accepted a gift after all – and therefore had no 
obligation to repay the Rajah. By this time, Nabakrishna was no 
more, dying in 1797 and leaving Rs10 million (£1 million) – a 
fortune that would be worth over £80 million today.3 The British 
mangled many Indian words in their time, but there is a special 
scorn in the anglicised version of Rajah Nabakrishna: Nobkissen.
Nabakrishna’s career symbolises the ending of the mutual 
mercantilism that the Company initially pursued in India. The 
French historian Fernand Braudel concluded that the Company’s 
rise to prominence only came about with the ‘help, collaboration, 
collusion, coexistence, symbiosis’ of the local merchant elite.4 The 
Company simply could not trade without their contacts and their 
capital. And when the Company needed ready cash to resolve the 
liquidity crisis in England caused by the South Sea Bubble in 1720, 
it borrowed the money in India. Yet, beneath this mingling of Indian 
and British trading cultures, a fundamental battle was under way 
between the moral economy of Bengal’s regulated marketplace and 
the Company’s monopoly capitalism. The Company had lost the 
first round to crack the Mughal Empire in the 1680s. But in the 
Bengal of the 1750s, it was pushing every opportunity to advance 
its interests against the regulatory power of the local nawab, the 
commercial supremacy of the Asian merchants and the rising threat 
of the French. What Child had failed to achieve in the 1680s, Robert 
Clive would accomplish through a mixture of sheer audacity, 
military force and exquisite fraud. 
The violence of the Company’s takeover of Bengal – and the use 
of the Company’s own private army to carry out the transaction 
– has meant that the battle of Plassey and all that followed have 
generally been seen as a simple example of colonial conquest. This 
view is given strength by the Company’s subsequent evolution into 
an agent of the British state, administering its Indian territories 
Robins T02502 01 text   63 30/08/2012   09:22
64 THE CORpORaTION THaT CHaNGEd THE WORld
in return for a secure profit for its shareholders. But the sheer 
strangeness of the Company’s absorption of Bengal – and much 
of the rest of the subcontinent – should not blind us to the fact 
that this event is best understood as a business deal, as an extreme 
form of corporate takeover. Two words were used repeatedly by 
contemporaries to explain the peculiar transformation that took 
place. First, the Company had engineered a ‘revolution’ that not 
just replaced one nawab with another who was more amenable, but 
also changed the underlying dynamics of the Bengali state. Second, 
it had made a phenomenal ‘acquisition’ that placed the Company, 
its executives and shareholders on a totally new path to prosperity.5 
Adam Smith would later warn of the tendency of corporations to 
engage in a ‘conspiracy against the public’, using their economic 
muscle to erode the capacity of the state to regulate and tax for 
the common good. This was an age of revolutions, and alongside 
the better known American and French revolutions, the Company 
engineered its own revolution in Bengal. If evidence was needed of 
corporate conspiracy, this was it. 
‘THE RICHEST COuNTRY IN THE WORld’6
For the first half of the eighteenth century, the Company’s attention 
was focused on the prize that was Bengal. The Indian subcontinent 
was then the workshop of the world, accounting for almost a quarter 
of global manufacturing output in 1750, compared with just 1.9 per 
cent for Britain (Map 2).7 Within the Mughal Empire, Bengal was 
the richest province (suba), described by Aurangzeb as ‘the Paradise 
of Nations’. Proximity to good raw materials, a highly productive 
agricultural sector along with a sophisticated division of labour in 
cloth production gave Bengal an unbeatable combination of high 
quality and low prices. Such was the cost advantage that in the late 
eighteenth century Indian cottons could be sold at a profit in Britain, 
at prices 50 to 60 per cent lower than those fabricated domestically. 
Deeply embedded in the traditional village system, hand-woven 
cotton linked agriculture with industry, creating a diversity of 
income and providing goods that could be traded both locally and 
internationally. For millennia, Indian cotton cloths out-competed the 
rest of the world. Even in the first century A.D., the Roman historian 
Pliny was complaining that the extensive importing of cotton fabrics 
from India was draining Rome of gold. Similar complaints came 
from English weavers when Indian cottons once again began to 
enter Europe in bulk in the late seventeenth century.
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Bengal’s production was also distinguished by immense diversity, 
with over 150 different names for the textiles bought by the 
Company, covering muslins, calicoes and silk, along with mixed 
cotton and silk goods. Different production centres would specialise 
in particular styles; for example, Dhaka was renowned for the 
transparency, beauty and delicacy of its muslins. So fine was the 
Map 2 India in the late 1760s
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fabric that a pound of cotton could provide upwards of 250 miles 
of muslin thread. Quality and style varied from the finest mull-mulls 
and allaballee through to shabnam (morning dew) and nayansukh 
(pleasing to the eye). Essential for the feel of the muslin was the 
short-staple phuti cotton grown on the banks of the river Meghna, 
near Dhaka, described by the British Resident as ‘the finest cotton 
in the world’.8 One estimate from 1776 suggests that as many as 
25,000 weavers were based in Dhaka producing some 180,000 
pieces of cloth from thread spun by 80,000 women.9 Along with its 
textiles, Indian names for cloth also entered the English language, 
not least bandana, calico and chintz, dungaree, gingham, seersucker 
and taffeta.
For the Company, the textile craze in Europe created immense 
wealth for its traders and shareholders. Although it had started 
trading textiles from the Gujurat and Coromandel coasts, Bengal 
steadily grew in importance. From just 12 per cent in 1668–70, 
Bengal’s share of total Company imports climbed to 42 per cent in 
1689–90, making it the largest single source of supply; by 1738–40, 
the proportion had climbed to 66 per cent.10 But the Company was 
only one trader among many, and the trade of all the European 
companies put together probably represented only one-third of 
the Bengal’s total exports, the bulk still being conducted by Asian 
merchants.11 Not surprisingly, this immense source of demand 
created a powerful upward pressure on prices.
Access to this market was also tightly controlled, regulated by a 
Mughal trade policy that carefully delineated what could be traded 
and by whom on the basis of both economic functionality and social 
significance. The Mughals made clear distinctions between inland 
and international trade, with foreign companies being awarded the 
privilege of export in exchange for inflows of silver to enrich the 
treasury and lubricate the economy. Within Bengal’s internal market, 
a range of prestige items, such as salt, betel and tobacco, were traded 
on the basis of social rather than market norms. ‘European trading 
groups, people from the “hat-wearing nations” (kulah poshan) were 
admitted into these transactions of privilege and power as long as 
they did not disrupt the material hierarchy of exchange.’12 This 
combination of strong demand and tight regulations meant that the 
terms of trade for the European traders drawn to Bengal were tough. 
Only bullion would do, and between 1708 and 1756 three-quarters 
of the Company’s imports into Bengal were in the form of silver.
The foundations for the Company’s operations in Mughal India 
were laid out in the succession of imperial decrees (firman), which 
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defined the commercial privileges granted by the emperor. From 
the 1650s, the Company had won the ability to export goods from 
Hugli, the main port of Bengal, duty-free in return for an annual 
payment of Rs3,000. But it was only in 1717 that the Company 
managed to win imperial backing for this position through the 
famous firman of Emperor Farrukhsiyar. As part of this decree, the 
Company’s President at Calcutta was given unprecedented authority 
to issue passes (dastaks), which would then exempt shipments 
from paying duty. Like many multinationals operating today, the 
Company had been awarded a tax status that favoured it over 
local traders. But the firman did not specify which goods were to 
be covered, although the general understanding was that it applied 
solely to export goods. 
Almost as soon as the 1717 firman was agreed, the Company 
began to push the boundaries of acceptable business. The Company’s 
president began issuing dastaks to its executives enabling them to 
engage in private trade at duty-free rates. Worse, it also sold the 
passes on to Asian merchants, thereby gaining an income stream 
that legally belonged to the Nawab. For the Bengali authorities, 
the Company’s practices posed a two-fold threat, undermining its 
revenue base and threatening the local economy. In his dispute 
with the Company, Siraj-ud-Daula would claim in 1756 that the 
Company had defrauded the Mughal exchequer of Rs15 million 
since 1717 through the abuse of its dastaks. The Nawab was also 
highly conscious of the destructive effect that the Company’s ability 
to undercut local traders was having on the wider Bengal economy. 
In 1727, for example, the Nawab’s officials stopped the Company 
fleet from Patna and found that it was illegally carrying huge 
stores of salt downriver to Calcutta. Protesting to the Company’s 
president, the Nawab Alivardi Khan stated that if it did not put a 
stop to its ‘encroachments’, it would ‘undersell all others, engross 
the whole trade of the province, and thereby deprive vast numbers of 
the natives of the means of a livelihood’.13 Alivardi Khan repeatedly 
clamped down on dastak abuse, forcing the Company to make 
additional duty payments in 1727, 1731, 1732, 1736, 1740, 1744 
and 1749. 
The dominant position of Asian merchants in the Bengal economy 
also rankled with the Company. Like the Company, local merchants 
were keen to win sole control over vital commodities. The Armenian 
Khwaja Wajid, for example, prospered through his monopoly over 
the salt and saltpetre trades, and had a powerful position in the Patna 
opium trade. More than this, the Company resented its dependence 
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on local merchants for cash and connections. The Company simply 
did not have the skills or capacity to buy goods direct from the 
producers, and so had to commission local brokers to purchase 
textiles and other products on its behalf. In the case of textiles, 
the brokers would pay the weavers an advance (dadni), which was 
used to cover materials and living costs during the production of 
the cloth. This relationship generated considerable bitterness on the 
Company’s part, its executives continually fearing that they were 
either being overcharged or supplied with sub-standard goods by 
the dadni merchants. The Company was also frustrated that these 
brokers were not wholly focused on its interests, but traded on their 
own account. Indeed, Asian trading houses, such as those headed by 
Jagat Seth and Amir Chand (Umichand), were often far richer and 
better connected than the Company. The relationship was further 
complicated by the huge extent of English indebtedness to local 
bankers. In the run-up to Plassey, almost all of Calcutta’s English 
community had loans outstanding with Indian moneylenders.14
If this was not enough, competition from other European trading 
houses was threatening the Company’s position. The English were 
just one of many foreign players in the Bengal market, and in the 
short stretch of the river Hugli north of Calcutta lay first Serampore 
(Denmark), Chandernagore (France), Chinsura (Netherlands) and 
the port of Hugli itself. Calcutta had become the leading port on 
the river in the 1720s, outstripping the long-established Dutch. In 
the 1730s, however, the French Compagnie Perpetuelle des Indes 
began to pose a serious threat. Under the leadership of Joseph 
François Dupleix as Governor of Chandernagore, the French took 
the commercial initiative from the English, most notably in the 
lucrative inland trade exploited by both companies’ executives on 
their own account. Dupleix’s commercial brilliance undermined 
both the corporate and private interests of his English rival, and it 
is with some accuracy that he was later able to claim, ‘I made the 
English tremble for they saw their commerce dwindling and their 
merchants forced to declare themselves bankrupt.’15 By the early 
1750s, Company exports from Bengal were in decline, matched by 
a resurgence of Dutch trade from Chinsura. Back in London, the 
Company’s shares also stumbled, commencing a slow slide from 
£197 in December 1752 to £133 in January 1757. Dividends also 
started to slip, falling from 8.6 per cent in 1752 to 5.8 per cent in 
1756, a pathetic payout that was repeated in the two following years.
Revolutions often occur when a strong run of improving conditions 
comes suddenly to a halt. The shattering of expectations that this 
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brings drives those affected to seek radical solutions. Bengal was 
no different in the early 1750s, where the Company was desperate 
to find a solution to its worsening commercial position. In 1751, 
the Company’s dadni merchants refused to comply with new terms 
and conditions, and the Company suffered a severe procurement 
shortfall the following year. In June 1753, the situation had become 
a crisis, and the Company abolished the entire dadni system, 
introducing paid agents (gomastas) who would purchase goods 
directly from the production outlets (aurungs). By cutting out the 
middleman, the new approach also gave the Company’s executives 
a chance of relaunching their own trading businesses; the road 
to Plassey was paved with the commercial adventurism of private 
trade. Relations with the Nawab continued to sour, and in August 
1752 Robert Orme, one of the Company’s leading merchants in 
Calcutta, wrote in frustration to a friend in Madras, ‘’twould be a 
good deed to swing the old Dog [Alivardi Khan]. I don’t speak at 
random when I say that the Company must think seriously of it 
or it will not be worth their while to trade in Bengal.’16 The friend 
was another Robert, Robert Clive. 
THE SpIRIT OF WaR aNd CONQuEST17
Frustration was one thing, the opportunity to realise these private 
thoughts quite another. What created the conditions for revolution 
to finally take place was the steady implosion of Mughal authority. 
Imperial over-stretch under Aurangzeb had left the Mughals 
vulnerable to repeated assaults from Afghan, Persian and Maratha 
invasions. Perpetual court intrigue and waning military might 
also began to undermine its highly effective system of imperial 
governance. At its heart had been strict control over provincial 
governors ensuring that appointments were made from the centre. 
In addition, the Mughals separated provincial powers between 
a nazim, who administered political and judicial matters, and a 
diwan, who managed tax and financial affairs. In Bengal, this 
elegant system began to break down in 1717 when both offices were 
merged under Murshid Quli, who promptly moved the capital from 
Dhaka to the self-styled Murshidabad. When he died in 1727, he 
was succeeded by his son-in-law, Shujauddin, who ruled until 1739. 
Then in a bloody coup that set the precedent for subsequent events, 
Shujauddin’s son was deposed by his pipe-bearer (hookahburdar), 
Alivardi Khan. Bengal’s economy had considerable strengths. But 
even these began to be shaken by the persistent Maratha raids 
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throughout the 1740s, and the Nawab’s growing use of arbitrary 
measures to raise revenues. And although Alivardi ruled for over 
15 years, the regime he passed on to his grandson, Siraj-ud-Daula, 
was highly personalised and increasingly fragile. A weak ruler would 
leave Bengal exposed to the side-effects of the global war now being 
pursued by France and Britain. 
Since the merger of Anglo-Dutch interests at the Glorious 
Revolution in 1688, France rather than the Netherlands had been 
viewed as Britain’s primary imperial competitor. It would take a 
hundred years of on-and-off warfare to decide the outcome at the 
Battle of Waterloo in 1815. Initially, the countries’ two East India 
companies were able to stand aloof from this geopolitical struggle, 
with both sides agreeing a neutrality pact during the War of the 
Spanish Succession (1701–14). But in the War of the Austrian 
Succession (1740–8), the British state propelled the two companies 
into open hostilities. After his term of office at Chandernagore, 
Dupleix had become Governor of Pondicherry. In 1744, when 
news of war reached India, Dupleix once again offered a neutrality 
pact to his counterpart in the English Company at Madras. The 
Company played for time, but offshore the Royal Navy raided the 
Compagnie’s shipping. Hostilities had begun. 
In the ensuing battles, not only did Madras fall to the French, 
but the French also defeated the Nawab of the Carnatic who had 
understandably forbidden the two Companies from fighting on his 
territory. Although Madras was returned to the Company at the 
Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle that ended the Austrian War, the conflict 
continued, with both firms now backing rival princes for control 
of the Carnatic. It is in these conflicts in South India that Robert 
Clive first showed his military prowess, and the Company saw a 
new source of income emerging from ‘nabob-making’ alongside 
commerce. Like other Company executives, Clive arrived in India 
as a young writer, landing in Madras aged 19 in June 1744. From 
a modest gentry background, Clive was keen to restore his family’s 
social status, and used the proceeds of his first Indian fortune to 
pay off the mortgage for his birthplace, Styche Hall in Shropshire. 
As a boy, he had been known for being ‘out of measure addicted’ 
to fighting, and it was only when war erupted in India that he showed 
any promise for the Company. Untrained as a soldier, Clive had an 
uncanny ability to pull off audacious guerrilla actions, capturing 
Arcot and holding it in the teeth of an overwhelming French force. 
The following year, he forced Trichinopoly to surrender, and in 
the eventual peace treaty, the Company acquired San Thome and 
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Poonamallee, boosting the territorial revenues of Madras. Clive 
returned to England in October 1753 as a popular hero, receiving 
a gold-lined sword studded with diamonds from the Company’s 
grateful directors. 
Dislodged from Parliament in a disputed election contest, Clive 
returned to India in April 1755 as Governor of Fort St David at 
Cuddalore. His mission was to open a new front against the French 
on the west coast, attacking their interests in Hyderabad. By the 
time he reached Bombay, however, peace had been agreed, and 
Clive was en route to Madras when disturbing news arrived that 
the Company had been expelled from Bengal. 
THE ROad TO plaSSEY
Alivardi Khan’s grandson, Siraj-ud-Daula, came to power in 
April 1756 aged 21. Generally portrayed by his opponents as a 
vicious and decadent individual, Siraj-ud-Daula’s stance towards 
the British was perfectly consistent with the core principles of his 
grandfather’s reign. Alivardi Khan had tried to clamp down on 
the Company’s abuse of the dastak, and was highly suspicious of 
the growing military dimension of the Company’s settlement in 
Calcutta. In particular, he objected to the defensive ditch that had 
been constructed to protect the city against the Maratha raids of the 
1740s. ‘You are merchants,’ he told the Company, ‘what need have 
you of a fortress?’18 Both of these factors were also prime drivers of 
Siraj-ud-Daula’s decision to teach the Company a lesson. He was 
particularly concerned by the Company’s decision to strengthen Fort 
William in Calcutta, motivated in part by the threat of a coming 
global war against the French. The new Nawab had the added 
grievance of the Company’s decision to give refuge to one of his 
leading opponents. Even one of the Company’s own executives, 
Richard Becher, recognised that it had given the Nawab ‘sufficient 
cause to be angry with the English’.19
For its part, under the wayward leadership of Calcutta’s President 
Roger Drake, the Company wholly underestimated the determination 
of the new Nawab to curb its misdemeanours. As in previous 
disputes between nawab and Company, negotiation was the first 
option for resolving the conflict. Siraj-ud-Daula sent his ambassador 
Narayan Singh to parley with the Company in Calcutta. But Singh 
was humiliated and unceremoniously expelled. Reporting back in 
Murshidabad, Singh was outraged, saying ‘what honour is left for 
us men when a few traders, who have not yet learnt to wash their 
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bottoms, reply to ruler’s orders by throwing out his messenger?’20 
Yet still Siraj-ud-Daula pressed for a negotiated solution, declaring 
that ‘if the English behave themselves like merchants they may rest 
assured of my favour, protection and assistance’.21 The problem of 
course was that the Company no longer wanted to be just another 
merchant among many. It wanted dominion and refused to accept 
the Nawab’s terms – the demolition of fortifications, the ban on 
the sale of dastaks to Asian traders and an end to harbouring the 
Nawab’s enemies. 
When all else failed, the Nawab sent his forces to capture 
Calcutta. The Company might have been commercially significant, 
but a combination of cowardice and lack of preparations meant that 
Fort William was quickly overwhelmed in June 1756. In an incident 
that became part of British imperial myth, that night anything up 
to a hundred Company prisoners died of asphyxiation in the ‘black 
hole’, a tiny cell in the grounds of Fort William. The President of 
the Bengal Presidency, Roger Drake, had already fled downstream, 
and anchored off Fulta near the mouth of the Hugli. Just as in 1689, 
the Company was on the verge of total expulsion from Bengal, its 
most profitable subsidiary. Articles in the London press estimated 
that the Company lost £2,250,000 on the fall of Calcutta, more 
than half its nominal share capital. Siraj-ud-Daula underscored 
his position of supremacy by renaming Calcutta as Alinagar and 
demanding repayment from the Company of evaded customs 
duty for the past 15 years. In local markets, traders quickly drew 
their own conclusion from the Company’s humiliation, and calico 
prices rose 50 per cent, with the price of European goods falling 
in proportion. ‘This alarmed the Company’s governors so much’, 
commented one observer, ‘that they took immediate measures for 
repossessing the settlements.’22
Unknown to Siraj-ud-Daula, the Company was rapidly 
constructing a counter-offensive deploying the forces sent with Clive 
for the Hyderabad expedition along with Royal Navy ships under 
the command of Admiral Watson. On 11 October 1756, Clive wrote 
back to the Company’s Secret Committee in London that ‘I flatter 
myself that this expedition will not end with the retaking of Calcutta 
only – and that the Company’s estate in these parts will be settled in 
a better and more lasting condition than ever.’23 In the instructions 
it gave to Clive two days later, the Madras Council highlighted the 
importance of winning back Calcutta (with reparations), but added 
that the mission should also ‘effect a junction with any powers in 
Bengal that might be dissatisfied with the violence of the Nawab’s 
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government or that have pretensions to the nawabship’.24 The 
Company was putting its experience in the Carnatic to good use.
Clive’s expedition was small in number, but highly focused, 
ransacking Hugli in January 1757 and retaking Calcutta the 
following month. By the Treaty of Alinagar, the Company was 
empowered to mint its own coin and extend the use of the dastak 
to its private trade. Clive pushed on. Avoiding French overtures 
for a neutrality pact in Bengal and taking advantage of the 
incursion of Afghan marauders in the west of the province, Clive’s 
forces bombarded and captured Chandernagore in March. The 
commercial significance of this victory cannot be underestimated. 
When news of the fall of Chandernagore reached London months 
later, the Company’s share price rose by 12 per cent.25 The first of 
the obstacles to the Company’s domination of the Bengal economy 
had now fallen. 
Intrigue would soon finish off both the Nawab and the Asian 
merchants. The story of the conspiracy that led to Plassey is 
obscured by claims and counter-claims about who was ultimately 
responsible. For one expert, it was the British who ‘engineered and 
encouraged the coup’.26 Clive in his letter to the Company’s directors 
following the victory at Plassey reported that it was disaffected 
Bengalis who had ‘made overtures to us’.27 Whatever the precise 
allocation of responsibility, it is clear that there was a powerful 
convergence of interests between the English Company and sections 
of the Bengal court. If blame is to be attached, the Company was 
obviously guilty of fomenting illegal insurrection, while Mir Jafar, 
Jagat Seth, Amir Chand and the other conspirators were equally 
at fault for high treason. 
All three of the major plotters on the Bengali side were significant 
figures in their own right. Mir Jafar was a leading soldier and Siraj-
ud-Daula’s paymaster-general (bakshi), but had been removed from 
office in the wake of Chandernagore. The Jagat Seths were unrivalled 
in northern India for their financial power. Known as ‘banker of 
the world’ (jagat seth), this marwari family had built up formidable 
economic resources on the back of its control of the imperial mint 
and extensive moneylending. They wielded this financial clout at the 
Bengali court and were judged to be ‘the chief cause of revolutions 
in Bengal’ by a French commentator at the time.28
Originally from Agra, Amir Chand was another of Bengal’s 
leading merchant princes, controlling much of the trade in opium 
and saltpetre. He was also well known to the Company, working 
as one of its dadni merchants from the early 1730s. Relations had 
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not always been harmonious between the two, and in 1735, the 
Company terminated its contract with him on account of fraud. 
Four years later, however, he was reinstated and later managed a 
full third of the Company’s annual investment in Bengal. 
The novelty of the Plassey coup did not lie in the raw fact of intrigue 
and treachery in the Bengal capital of Murshidabad. What was new 
was the willingness of the conspirators against Siraj-ud-Daula to ally 
themselves with what were in effect foreign mercenaries. Like the 
weak and greedy nobles operating in post-Roman Britain, leading 
aristocrats and merchants at the Bengal court believed that they 
could control the foreign barbarians to their own ends. They proved 
to be catastrophically mistaken. Bengal was certainly rich, but its 
governing and merchant elite had little depth, basing their primacy 
on personal contacts and loyalties. Set against this was a robust 
impersonal institution with a highly focused set of priorities. The 
Company’s corporate structure gave it ‘a collective strength and 
unity of purpose [that was] not available’ either to Asian merchants 
or post-Mughal nawabs.29 This single-mindedness would soon be 
on display in Bengal.
During the intense negotiations of the deal that would overthrow 
Siraj-ud-Daula, Amir Chand once again overstepped the mark, in 
the process becoming the original ‘Mr Five Percent’. Threatening to 
expose the plotters, Amir Chand demanded a full one-twentieth of 
the Bengal treasury for his continued support. One hundred and fifty 
years later, in 1914, another more successful corporate intermediary, 
Calouste Gulbenkian, earned the title ‘Mr Five Percent’ for the share 
he received of the Turkish Petroleum Company for arranging the 
deal between an Anglo-Persian syndicate, Shell and Deutsche Bank. 
Back in 1757, both the other Bengali conspirators and the Company 
were outraged by Amir Chand’s audacity. In a sleight of hand that 
would become legendary, Clive drew up two treaties with Mir Jafar. 
In a fake treaty inscribed on red paper, Clive agreed to Amir Chand’s 
demand, forging the signature of Admiral Watson, the leader of the 
expedition. In the real treaty written on white paper, however, no 
mention was made of this transfer. When Amir Chand learned of 
the trick in the aftermath of Plassey, he fainted with shock. He then 
tried to sue both Clive and the Company in the English courts for 
breach of contract. Mr Five Per Cent died a broken man, outwitted 
by someone more venal than himself. 
The conspiracy that culminated at Plassey was a close-run thing 
and almost ended in disaster. Siraj-ud-Daula actually discovered the 
plot. But in a bout of indecision that proved his undoing, the Nawab 
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decided not to crush the conspiracy and sought reconciliation instead. 
In addition, his attention was divided, fearing both incursions of 
Afghan troops in western Bihar and the aggressive Company to the 
south. On 23 June 1757, the Nawab’s larger but poorly organised 
and internally divided forces met the Company’s much smaller yet 
better-disciplined troops near a grove of mango trees at Plassey. 
Perhaps as many as 50,000 Bengalis faced the Company’s forces 
of 3,000 infantry, of which only a third were British. Luck, pluck 
and treachery all came together to bring about the Nawab’s defeat, 
which was swiftly followed by his assassination. The Company 
installed Mir Jafar as its puppet and proceeded to implement the 
terms of its treaty.
The payback began immediately. French factories were eliminated 
from Bengal, substantial damages were paid as compensation to the 
Company, as well as to the English, Indian and Armenian inhabitants 
of Calcutta, and the Company received grants of lands surrounding 
the city, known as the 24 parganas. In an extraordinary deal, Clive 
had won an immediate £2.5 million for the Company to be followed 
by enhanced revenues into the future. Writing in triumph to the 
Company’s directors on 26 July 1757, Clive concluded that ‘this 
great revolution, so happily brought about, seems complete in 
every respect’.30
REapING THE REWaRdS OF REVOluTION
Almost immediately after the Plassey coup, the techniques that 
Clive had deployed were subject to substantial scrutiny, and have 
been the focus of controversy ever since. Many criticised Clive for 
stooping to so-called ‘Oriental’ practices of corruption and deceit. 
Surveying Clive’s career many years later, Thomas Babington 
Macaulay concluded that he had become an ‘Indian intriguer’, and 
his trickery of Amir Chand was ‘not merely a crime, but a blunder’. 
Clive’s most recent English biographer, Robert Harvey, takes a more 
Machiavellian approach and argues that Clive ‘deserves enormous 
credit for his skill in deceit’.31 There can be little real sympathy 
for Amir Chand, outwitted by someone more underhand than 
himself. But Clive’s great deception forms part of the original lie 
that underpinned British rule in India. The ‘black hole’ incident 
would later be blown up as a crime that justified the Company’s 
fullest retribution. But the Company would remain wide open to 
the charge of hypocrisy when it later extolled its ‘plain dealing’ 
(in Clive’s own words) as providing the foundations for its rule.32
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More serious are the charges of corruption levelled at Clive. 
Along with other leaders of the expeditionary force, Clive profited 
enormously from the Plassey Revolution, gaining Rs200,000 as 
a member of the Bengal Select Committee, a further Rs200,000 
as commander-in-chief, and another Rs1,600,000 in the form 
of private donations from the Bengal nobility, in all amounting 
to £234,000 – some £22 million in 2002 values. Aged 33, Clive 
had suddenly become one of the richest men in England. But it 
was not just money that Clive received. Intriguingly, this English 
executive of a trading corporation and lieutenant-colonel in the 
British Army had also become an omrah or Mughal noble, a ‘flower 
of the Empire’. Defending himself in Parliament many years later, 
Clive declared himself innocent of all charges: ‘Mr Chairman, at this 
moment, I stand astounded at my own moderation.’ Unseemly as 
these payments may well have been, Clive was breaking no law in 
accepting them. He was merely setting ‘an evil example’ to others, 
according to Macaulay. Furthermore, his rewards are in many 
ways not that different from the success bonuses awarded to the 
chief executives of 1990s corporations for pulling off high-stakes 
acquisitions. Vodafone’s Christopher Gent, for example, won an 
extra £10 million in 2000 for securing the capture of Germany’s 
Mannesmann, a reward that one shareholder described at the time 
as behaviour akin to ‘the robber barons of old’.33
What Clive had started, others would copy. In the eight years that 
followed Plassey, the Company placed four nawabs on the throne of 
Bengal. Each ‘revolution’ was accompanied by the transfer of more 
land to the Company to reschedule the Nawab’s now-hefty debts, 
along with lavish presents for leading Company executives, totalling 
£2.2 million, along with another £3.8 million in reparations. In 
1760, Mir Jafar was toppled by the Company in favour of his 
son-in-law Mir Kasim, who in turn was overthrown in 1763 when 
he tried to stop the cancer of the Company’s private trade. Mir 
Kasim’s solution was bold – abolishing all internal customs duties, 
thereby negating the value of the Company’s duty-free dastaks. This 
reform could not be allowed to stand, and so the Company went 
to war once more. 
Such was the hatred of the Company that a group of English 
prisoners held in Patna were murdered by Mir Kasim’s troops in 
1763, a deliberate act of vengeance far more brutal than the ‘black 
hole’ incident six years earlier. The once pre-eminent Jagath Seths 
were also beheaded for their complicity with the British. In addition, 
armed bands of holy men (sannyasi) contributed to the turmoil, 
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with one group raiding Dhaka and looting the Company’s factory 
at Baiganbari. Mir Kasim joined forces with the Nawab of Awadh 
and the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II to challenge the Company 
for control of Bengal. In this second ‘Company–Mughal War’, the 
original outcome was reversed. At the battle of Buxar in October 
1764, the Company’s forces triumphed in a victory that was perhaps 
more decisive even than Plassey. Mir Jafar was returned to the throne 
for a pitiful last few months before his son Najim-ud-Daula took 
over in early 1765. Not for nothing has this period been described 
as ‘one of the worst chapters in English history’.34
Beyond the sordid details of the repeated coups that the Company 
inflicted on Bengal lies the fundamental motivation for the deed 
– the establishment of market dominion for the benefit of the 
Company and its executives. As Macaulay acknowledges, Clive 
‘considered himself as the general, not of the Crown, but of the 
Company’.35 And what had the Company gained by this revolution? 
The regulatory authority of the Nawab was broken, enabling the 
Company to achieve its long-desired monopoly over the export 
trade, expand into the internal market and appropriate the public 
revenues of Bengal for its own benefit. One estimate suggests that 
in the decade after Plassey, Bengal lost two-thirds of its revenues 
to this commercial plunder.36 As Luke Scrafton – Clive’s right-hand 
man – would later comment, Plassey allowed the Company ‘to 
carry on the whole trade of India (China excepted) for three years, 
without sending out one ounce of bullion’.37 The reversal of global 
economic eminence had begun. 
Within Bengal, the Nawab’s ability to enforce rules against the 
abuse of dastaks was severely weakened. Exerting his new-found 
power, Clive insisted that the Company’s executives (himself 
included) should have free rein to exploit the internal market. Bengali 
fears that this would mean that the English would ‘engross’ the 
market were soon proved right. By 1762, the Nawab Mir Kasim was 
protesting to the Company in Calcutta that its gomastas ‘forcibly 
take away the goods and commodities of the ryots, merchants etc for 
a fourth part of their value; and by ways of violence and oppression 
they oblige the ryots to give five rupees for goods which are worth 
but one’.38
With the regulatory capacity of the Bengal state eliminated, the 
Company was able to remove the competitive threats posed by 
both the other European trading companies as well as local Asian 
merchants. The French challenge had already been eliminated with 
the capture of Chandernagore in the run-up to Plassey. Although the 
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French returned to the port (and stayed until 1947), the Compagnie 
Perpetuelle was a shadow of its former self, and would be liquidated 
in 1769. As for the VOC, only a few months after Plassey, Company 
traders were using their new position to undermine their Dutch 
rivals. Company agents became infamous for invading the textile 
districts, and ripping away pieces of cloth being woven for the VOC. 
Faced with commercial annihilation, the Dutch staged a desperate 
rearguard action. In June 1759, the VOC sent a fleet from Batavia 
to Bengal. But the expedition was bungled, and the Dutch were 
forced to pledge never to bring troops to Bengal again. The Dutch 
monopoly of the Bengal opium trade – exercised through a private 
company, the Opium Society – was also overturned and replaced by 
the Patna Group of English traders, who quickly became infamous 
for their underhand practices and the wealth they generated. For 
example, Company executives were known to ‘order a peasant to 
plough up a rich field of poppies, and sow it with rice’ to reduce 
supply and thus boost the opium price.39
As for the Asian merchants, Amir Chand’s fate was merely an 
extreme example of what was to strike the Asian merchant class. 
Key areas of the inland economy that had once been controlled by 
Asians were now formally transformed into a Company monopoly. 
In 1758, for example, Mir Jafar gave the Company the rights to the 
valuable saltpetre sector, a business that Amir Chand had himself 
once dominated. In addition, the Company pushed forward with 
the system of salaried gomastas, eliminating the need for Asian 
business partners. 
aN uNREQuITEd TRadE
After Buxar, all of Bengal was at the Company’s mercy. Its 
competitors had been dealt with, and the Nawab was no longer 
any threat. But there was still one final acquisition that would 
complete the revolution: the absorption of Bengal’s treasury into the 
Company’s accounts. The transfer of 24 parganas following Plassey 
had added £58,000 in taxes to the Company’s revenues. Soon Clive 
was being approached by the Mughal Emperor, requesting that the 
Company assume the office of tax management (diwani) in order 
that Bengal’s regular tribute to Delhi could be resumed. Writing to 
the Prime Minister, William Pitt, in January 1759, Clive explained 
that he had declined ‘for the present’. Clive then sailed home with 
a £300,000 fortune – equivalent to nearly £36 million in 2010 – 
and a lifetime award (jagir) from Mir Jafar worth some £30,000.40
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The installation of Mir Kasim in 1760 brought the districts of 
Midnapore, Burdwan and Chittagong under Company control, 
yielding another £650,000. When Clive returned to India for the 
third and final time in May 1765, he threw off his initial caution 
and forced the enfeebled Shah Alam II to formalise the Company’s 
control. On 12 August 1765, the Emperor granted the Company 
the diwani rights for Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, in return for an 
annual tribute of Rs2.6 million, equivalent to £325,000. When all 
the costs of the Nawab’s administration had been deducted, Clive 
calculated that from Bengal’s annual tax revenues of Rs25 million, 
there would still be ‘a clear gain to the Company’ of Rs12 million 
or £1,650,900.41 In twenty-first-century terms, this amounted to 
an annual surplus of over £175 million, a profit margin of some 
49 per cent.
For the cost-conscious directors back in Leadenhall Street, who 
had obsessively managed the export of scarce bullion to Asia for 
over 150 years, Clive painted a wondrous picture of bounty. The 
acquisition of diwani rights would now ‘defray all the expenses of 
the investment, furnish the whole of the China treasure, answer 
the demands of all your other settlements in India, and leave a 
comfortable balance in your treasury besides’.42 Clive cleverly 
maintained the fiction of Mughal authority by ensuring that taxes 
continued to be collected by local officials, ‘a perfect example of 
income without investment’, according to Professor Sirajul Islam of 
Bangladesh’s Asiatic Society.43 In the next six years, the Company 
would collect over £20 million, generating a surplus of £4 million, 
less than initially expected. But this was still a substantial haul at a 
time when the Company’s total exports from Asia before the diwani 
amounted to just £1 million each year.
The corporate state had arrived. Contrary to later rationalisa-
tions by imperial historians, Clive had not acquired the diwani to 
promote the interests of the British Empire. His motivation was 
far more straightforward. ‘Though never inattentive to his own 
interests’, wrote James Mill in his History of British India in 1817, 
Clive was ‘actuated by a sincere desire to promote the prosperity of 
the Company’.44 The directors could not believe their good fortune 
and instructed its officials in Bengal to split the surplus between 
the purchase of Bengal textiles for shipment back to England, 
sending the remainder to Canton to buy tea. This arrangement 
would progressively beggar Bengal in what was known somewhat 
poetically as the ‘unrequited trade’. More prosaically, by the end 
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of the century, 85–90 per cent of Bengal’s external trade was in the 
Company’s hands.45
THE WEaVERS’ THuMBS
It was the wealth of Bengal’s textile industry that had first lured 
the Company to Bengal, and it would be Bengal’s weavers who felt 
the full force of the Company’s new-found market power. Never 
rich, Bengal’s weavers still had a better standard of living than their 
counterparts in contemporary England, largely owing to their ability 
to determine their terms and conditions. According to Prasannan 
Parthasarathi, there is compelling evidence that India’s weavers had 
‘higher earnings than their British counterparts and lived lives of 
greater financial security’.46 Economic tradition in India supported 
the position of the weaver against the merchant. At a time when 
the British state was intervening on the side of the employer – for 
example, to set maximum levels for wages – Indian weavers were 
able to act as a collective body, improving their ability to negotiate 
favourable prices. This bargaining power combined with strong 
European demand for cloth in the first half of the eighteenth century 
created a seller’s market, enabling Indian weavers to enjoy a ‘golden 
age’ of low costs and high prices. 
All this ended following Plassey. From a situation of relative 
economic independence, Bengal’s weavers were forced into a 
position of near slavery, unable to sell to others and obliged to 
accept whatever the Company’s agents (gomastas) would offer 
for their cloth. ‘The Company went to market as Sovereigns and 
Tyrants’, argued a revealing briefing written for Philip Francis in 
the 1770s. ‘Instead of seeking a preference by paying better,’ it 
added, ‘they forced the manufacturers to Work for them and to 
work at an under price, at the same time that they prohibited all 
private merchants from dealing in the Assortments required for their 
Investment.’ The outcome was inevitable: ‘thus a general Monopoly 
was at once rigorously established’.47
The Company employed all kinds of subterfuge to squeeze 
prices ever lower. One practice that was particularly resented was 
the classification of perfectly good quality cloth as sub-standard 
(ferreted). These pieces would then be sold on to the open market 
at a price substantially higher than that given to the weaver, in 
the process making a tidy profit for the Company’s gomasta and 
Resident. As prices fell, weavers became unable to cover the costs of 
production, leaving themselves increasingly unable to earn enough 
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to pay back the advances they had received from the Company. 
Further poverty and indebtedness followed. For Bangladeshi scholar 
Hameeda Hossain, it was ‘the corporate buyer, who had provided 
the weaver with his working capital and access to the market [that] 
became the root cause of his pauperisation and alienation from 
his occupation’.48
Some weavers resisted this abuse of power. For example, in 1767, 
a group from Khirpal sent a delegation to Calcutta with a petition 
requesting an increase in the purchase price of cloth. Remarkably, 
the Company authorities agreed. But the local Company Resident 
not only ignored the order, but threatened to have the troublesome 
weavers arrested if they pursued their case. Yet, this was a rare 
example of resistance, and by the early 1770s, the Company was 
earning impressive returns from its policy of oppressive exchange. 
One estimate suggests that the Company’s gomastas were able to 
pay ‘in all places at least 15 per cent and in some even 40 per cent 
less’ than the weaver would receive in the public bazaar.49
These price cuts were achieved at the cost of a brutality that 
became infamous at the time. According to William Bolts’s celebrated 
account, ‘various and innumerable’ were ‘the methods of oppressing 
the poor weavers, such as by fines, imprisonments, floggings, forcing 
bonds on them etc’.50 For some of the weavers, the reaction to this 
abuse was simply one of despair. Among the winders of raw silk, 
called nagaads, Bolts reported that the Company’s practices led 
to a shocking form of self-mutilation, stating that ‘instances have 
been known of their cutting off their thumbs to prevent their being 
forced to wind silk’.51
It is difficult to imagine the scale of economic violence required 
to force skilled workers to harm themselves in this way. Apart from 
Bolts, however, no other evidence exists for this or similar incidents. 
This has not stopped it achieving apocryphal status as a symbol 
of the physical and psychological pain inflicted by the Company’s 
takeover of Bengal. Indeed, the image remains alive in popular 
memory across the subcontinent, as poet Shahid Ali expressed in 
his 1980s poem, ‘Dacca Gauzes’:
In history, we learned: the hands 
of weavers were amputated,
the looms of Bengal silenced,
and the cotton shipped raw
by the British to England.
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History of little use to her,
my grandmother just says
how the muslins of today
seem so coarse and that only
in autumn, should one wake up 
at dawn to pray, can one feel that same texture again.52
aN OpulENT REVOluTION
When Clive headed for England for the final time in February 
1767, the long-term consequences of Plassey were obscure. Bengal 
was now the Company’s star possession. But Madras remained 
hard-pressed, threatened by French intervention, Maratha incursion 
and the rising force of Mysore; it would take another three decades 
to secure southern India. Clive was confident, however, that his 
actions over the preceding ten years had endowed the Company 
with an unrivalled ‘estate’. In spite of all the ‘envy, malice, faction 
and resentment’ that was now building up against the Company, 
Clive was proud of his accomplishments and believed that the 
Company could justly claim to be ‘the most opulent company in the 
world’.53 In practical terms, this opulence was worth an estimated 
£38,400,000 for the Company between 1757 and 1780 in terms 
of goods transferred back to Britain on an unrequited basis.54 Clive 
took with him a fortune worth approximately £400,000 and left 
behind a beloved mansion four miles north of Calcutta at Dum 
Dum. Currently being restored by the Archaeological Survey of 
India, there is talk of establishing a museum on the site. Two 
hundred and fifty years on, however, disputes still rage over how 
this ‘little Mogul’ should be remembered in his former home. 
For some, Clive was a single-minded genius, for others an 
unethical rogue. Of course, he was both and more. It was his 
guile that enabled the Company first to regain Calcutta and then 
execute the Plassey master-stroke that humbled the authority of 
the Bengal state, smashed the Asian merchant class and eliminated 
the competitive threat from France. All of this can be traced back 
to Clive’s calculated opportunism, a willingness to break any rule 
to achieve his goal. Rather than being somehow ‘sucked in’ by 
an internal crisis within the Bengal elite, Clive and the Company 
executives who worked with him were quite deliberate in their 
efforts to exploit every opportunity for promoting their own and 
their employers’ interests. He was the great ‘revolutionist’, the 
‘nabob-maker’ extraordinaire. 
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But Clive was more than just a powerful individual; he was 
the chief representative of a corporate machine that worked with 
remorseless logic to achieve its ends. It may have seemed luxurious, 
but the nawabi state was distracted by multiple enemies, divided 
internally by intrigue at court and lacking the institutional resilience 
to protect it against external assault from a single-minded opponent. 
Imperial historians have made much of the fact that the Company’s 
directors had not drawn up a prearranged plan for conquest, making 
the Bengal Revolution somehow ‘accidental’. But Clive’s actions 
were entirely consistent with long-standing instructions from 
London to secure its possessions overseas. With the acquisition of 
the diwani rights, he had gained a windfall of immense proportions, 
attracting praise from everyone. 
The Company’s ‘great revolution’ in Bengal deserves to be placed 
alongside other better-known revolutions – the American, French 
and Russian – for the way that it shaped the modern world. In the 
space of less than a decade, the Company had rerouted the flow of 
wealth westwards. Yet, this was a corporate revolution, designed 
to acquire the riches of an entire people for the benefit of a single 
company. It was not patriots, republicans or Bolsheviks who had 
taken power, but a company of merchants answerable to persistent 
shareholders in London. Even its own deputy-chairman, Laurence 
Sulivan, confessed that this was a situation ‘monstrous in reason’. 
No wonder that the house these merchants had built soon came 
crashing down. 
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The Great East Indian Crash
TO THE WaREHOuSE
The question, of course, was where to store all this Indian loot. 
Back in England, the Company jealously guarded its imports from 
the East in warehouses across the City of London. As well as being 
a financial centre, eighteenth-century London was also a site of 
physical exchange, and the warehouse was its archetypal building. 
The Company’s warehouses were situated throughout the City on 
Lime Street, Fenchurch Street – next to where the East India Arms 
still stands – Seething Lane, Still Yard and Crutched Friars. But with 
the boom in imports that followed Plassey, the Company simply 
ran out of space. Shipping the treasure out of Bengal in the form 
of silver bullion was impractical, and so the Company decided 
to return wealth to its shareholders by expanding the scale of its 
purchase of Bengal goods, notably textiles. 
The acquisition of the diwani in 1765 further accentuated 
the pressure to use physical trade as the mechanism to transfer 
Bengal’s taxes back to England. As the Bengal Council wrote to 
the Company’s directors in 1769, ‘Your trade from hence may 
be considered more as a channel for conveying your revenues to 
Britain, than as only a mercantile system.’1 The Company expanded 
its fleet – boosting the profits of its shipping interest’ – and a record 
33 ships were hired for the 1768–9 season. To cope with this surge 
in goods, the Company constructed new warehouses at Brown’s 
Yard near the Tower of London, and in 1771, it opened the Bengal 
Warehouse in Bishopsgate to hold muslins, calicoes and raw silk. 
Word of what lay within soon spread, and the Bengal Warehouse 
became the target for London’s criminal fraternity, eager to get their 
hands on the valuable materials that were stored inside. In January 
1773, for example, three thieves were brought to trial at the Old 
Bailey for the theft of 628 silk handkerchiefs from the warehouse, 
for which they were transported overseas, probably never to return. 
Twenty years later, the Bengal Warehouse became part of the 
massive Cutler Street complex, much of which still stands today. 
Six stories high, the buildings are well-designed and surprisingly 
84
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elegant – with Doric windows and Piranesian staircases – and yet 
tough enough to survive more than two centuries of wear and tear. 
After the East India Company lost its commercial monopoly in 
1833, the warehouses were sold off, but were kept in use right up 
until the 1970s. Redeveloped as office blocks – the warehouses of 
the financial age – the buildings continue to communicate something 
of the power they would have exuded in the wake of Plassey. The 
stairway that winds its way up through the Old Bengal Warehouse 
is still the original, constructed of granite and ironware, eight feet 
wide to allow the easy passage of bales of cloth and chests of tea. 
No goods are on display today. But in the early part of the twentieth 
century, the poet John Masefield toured the complex, and left these 
lines describing the impression it made:
You showed me nutmegs and nutmeg husks
Ostrich feathers and elephant tusks
Hundreds of tons of costly tea
Packed in wood by the Cingalee
And a myriad drugs which disagree
Cinnamon, myrrh, and mace you showed
Golden paradise birds that glowed
And a billion cloves in an odorous mount
And choice port wine from a bright glass fount
You showed, for a most delightful hour
The wealth of the world, and London’s power.2
These solid buildings could also tell another story. When the 
Company commissioned the Bengal Warehouse, it was at the height 
of its powers. For almost ten years following Plassey, East India 
Company shares had become the focus of intense international 
speculative activity, pumped up by successive announcements of 
ever-grander acquisitions in the East. Between February 1758 when 
news of the victory at Plassey reached London and December 1768, 
when the Company bought the land for the Bengal Warehouse, the 
Company’s shares had doubled to stand at £276. But this was to be 
the peak of the boom. Five months later, in May 1769, news reached 
London that not only had a French fleet entered the Indian Ocean, 
but that Hyder Ali, Sultan of Mysore, had invaded the Company’s 
possessions in south India. The share price fell 16 per cent in a 
single month, and would continue a downward course for the next 
15 years, reaching the depths of £122 in July 1784, a fall of 55 per 
cent. Although the Company went ahead with the construction of 
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the Bengal Warehouse, all other plans were put on hold until its 
fortunes had turned in the 1790s. It would only be in 1824, a full 
40 years after prices had reached the bottom, that the Company’s 
shares would regain the heady heights of 1768. The scale of the 
Company’s financial slump can be measured by the fact that it took 
only 30 years for the New York exchange to regain the value it had 
reached on the eve of the Great Crash of 1929. 
ROTTING FROM THE HEad
What brought about this collapse in the Company’s fortunes was the 
convergence of a whole series of forces. Unexpected events and the 
actions of individuals certainly played their part. But much of what 
took place was encoded into the Company’s institutional structure. 
Perhaps the most fundamental challenge that all institutions face is 
to ensure that employees promote the collective rather than their 
individual self-interest. With joint stock companies, this primordial 
tension is accentuated by two additional forces: the separation of 
ownership from executive control, and the speculative potential of 
publicly traded shares. For the East India Company, the challenge 
of control went further still, as its directors needed to maintain 
an uneasy balance between the Company’s own concerns and the 
private trading of its executives. 
Private trade became one of a series of cancers that gnawed at the 
Company’s ethical fibre. The taking of bribes from local merchants 
to secure business was commonplace, and these ‘presents’ would 
influence the quality and costs of the commodities the Company 
purchased. The Company laid down clear rules of behaviour to 
its staff, and made each pledge covenants, backed by sizeable 
bonds. But through both a lack of will and a lack of means the 
Company ‘was very unsuccessful in checking corruption even 
when it was discovered’ and ‘found it hard to punish the guilty’.3 
Nevertheless, these perennial problems could be kept in check when 
the Company was just one of many companies battling to secure 
their slice of the Asia trade, and when local rulers retained a degree 
of regulatory capacity. 
Plassey changed all this, removing all constraints on good 
practice. More than this, the intensification of corrupt practices 
was driven by the Company’s own leaders in both the Calcutta 
Council and the London Directorate. A new catchphrase entered 
the language – ‘a lass and a lakh [a lakh being Rs100,000] a day’ 
– to describe the lifestyle of the Company’s executives in Bengal 
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enjoying voluptuous mistresses (bibis) and their generous presents 
from state officials and Asian merchants. In London, the hot breath 
of Plassey was felt immediately at East India House. For the first 
time since the battle between Child and Papillon, the board was split 
into competing factions. Hitherto, elections to the Company’s board 
had generally been uncontested, with shareholders happy to support 
the slate of house candidates on the back of steady capital gains 
and healthy dividend payments. But the prospects of opulence that 
Plassey presented meant that control of the Company had become 
a valuable source of plunder and patronage. Civil war broke out 
among the shareholders, as rival groups sought to seize the helm. 
Meetings of the Court of Proprietors soon became ‘large, stormy, 
even riotous’, with ‘indecently virulent’ debates.4
On one side stood Laurence Sulivan, and on the other, the rising 
power of the Bengal Squad, led by Robert Clive. Sulivan had made 
his fortune in Bombay and first became a director in 1755 at the 
age of 52. Sulivan was no saint. Yet, by the standards of the day, he 
was generally regarded as competent and relatively clean-handed. 
In April 1758, he was elected chairman for the first time and would 
dominate affairs for the next five years. Almost immediately he 
took steps to rein in Clive and his band of adventurers. In words 
that echo the earlier critique of Alivardi Khan, the directors wrote 
to Clive, ‘you seem so thoroughly possessed with military ideas as 
to forget your employers are merchants and trade their principal 
object’.5 What really enraged Sulivan, however, was Clive’s jagir. 
This had been awarded by Mir Jafar in return for Clive’s assistance 
against yet another invasion of Bengal. Along with a grand-sounding 
Mughal title, the jagir came with an endowment of land that yielded 
annual revenues worth around £30,000. Mischievously, Mir Jafar 
had indicated that the land which would provide these revenues 
was none other than the Company’s own 24 parganas. Not only 
was Clive already far richer than any of the directors back in 
Leadenhall Street, but he was now also the Company’s landlord 
in its Bengal heartland.
Open conflict broke out in 1761 when Sulivan warned Clive 
that his jagir was unjustified. Two years later, Sulivan suspended 
payment. Clive reacted with fury and mobilised his personal fortune 
to overturn the decision. To do this, Clive had to break the rules that 
limited each shareholder to a single vote regardless of the size of their 
holding. By splitting his holding into £500 chunks, Clive was able 
to create an army of over 220 artificial shareholders voting for his 
case. Sulivan followed suit, creating another 160 votes and called on 
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Lord Shelburne’s ministry to use its resources to stem Clive’s bid for 
power. In March 1763, this stock-splitting ensured that the numbers 
of votes cast in the Court of Proprietors was more than triple those 
in 1758, representing an unprecedented 1,400 shareholders.
Sulivan scraped through, and quickly ordered a halt to all 
payments of Clive’s jagir from Company lands. But Sulivan’s reign 
was coming to an end. At the beginning of February, news of Mir 
Kasim’s attempts to quell the anarchy of private trade reached 
London. Sulivan backed the cause of regulation and demanded 
that ‘a final and effectual end be forthwith put to the inland trade 
in salt, betel-nut and tobaccos’. 
The Bengal Squad had other ideas. Clive issued a public manifesto 
to win over the Company’s shareholders, complaining that ‘the 
unjust attack on my character has been followed by an attack 
on my fortune’ with the removal of the jagir. Admitting that ‘the 
Nabob’s generosity had made my fortune easy’, he argued that ‘all 
my actions’ in the service of the Proprietors had been based on 
‘honourable motives’. But he kept the clinching argument to the 
end, asking the shareholders to consider ‘whether they think without 
the battle of Plassey, the East India Company would have been at 
this time existing?’6 When the shareholders gathered in April 1764, 
the answer was a clear ‘no’. Sulivan was overthrown, Clive’s jagir 
reinstated for ten years and the hero of Plassey was made President 
of the Calcutta Council with a mission to restore order in Bengal. 
The proprietors also passed a resolution forbidding Company 
executives from receiving presents. But the ban was ostentatiously 
ignored by the Calcutta Council who engineered a final flurry of 
£114,000 in gifts when Mir Jafar’s son, Najim-ud-Daula, became 
Nawab in February 1765. 
aN EXCluSIVE TRadE
Clive stage-managed his mission to Bengal, piously presenting 
himself as an avenging-angel sent to clean out the ‘Augean stables’ of 
corruption. Writing back to the Company’s directors in September 
1765, he proclaimed that the tyranny and oppression he found 
‘will, I fear, be a lasting reproach to the English name in this 
country’.7 Contrasting his own conduct with the rapacity of his 
fellow executives, Clive would later confess to Parliament in May 
1772 that he did not gain ‘a single shilling’ from his spell in Bengal. 
But his actions told otherwise. 
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Insider trading was the first arena that Clive chose to exploit 
his position. Even before he had fixed the diwani settlement, Clive 
was writing back to one of his attorneys, John Walsh, to buy as 
much Company stock as possible. After the acquisition had been 
made, his instructions became more urgent, pressing his agents and 
friends ‘to lose no time in purchasing all the stock you can, for I 
am persuaded the stock of the Company must be doubled in three 
years by the surplus of the country only’.8 Historian Huw Bowen has 
charted how Clive’s agents back in England acted on his persistent 
urgings, buying stock before the news of the diwani hit London’s 
stock markets. In all, £30,000 of nominal stock worth over £51,000 
was bought for Clive in the months that followed, taking his total 
stake to £75,000. This put him in a fantastic position to benefit 
from the uplift that the shares received when the markets digested 
the implications of the diwani. He would later make a well-timed 
disposal of some of his shares in May 1767, doubling his money 
in the process. 
Clive also turned his hand to private trade, despite the directors’ 
insistent ban on all involvement in Bengal’s internal market. A 
month after his arrival in Calcutta, he formed a syndicate that 
turned a profit of 45 per cent from the trade in salt over the next six 
months. Then in August 1765 came his cunning plan to eliminate 
the anarchy of private trade by installing an exclusive business in its 
place. A peculiar ‘special purpose vehicle’ known as the Society of 
Trade was established with monopoly rights over the trade in betel 
nut, salt and tobacco, with shares allocated free to the Company’s 
leading executives in Calcutta. Out of 56 shares, Clive allocated 
himself five, or just under 10 per cent of this elite enterprise. The 
ten other members of the Council received two shares each, but 
lower down the chaplain only got two-thirds of a share, and the 
poor sub-export warehouse keeper a measly one-third of a share. 
By this measure, a tiny gang of 60 executives simply engrossed the 
whole of the inland trade, excluding not only Asian merchants, but 
also junior executives and independent European traders. In theory, 
the scheme would provide the Company’s elite with sufficiently 
high returns that they would not be tempted by private trade; the 
Company would also receive a guaranteed flow of revenues from 
duty payments. The reality was scandalous, doubling prices for 
salt, defaulting on duty payments and siphoning off profits for a 
select few. Clive alone received £21,000 in profits from the first 
year of trading. 
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When the Company’s directors learned of this novel money-making 
machine in 1766, they protested that it was ‘a determined resolution 
to sacrifice the interests of the Company and the peace of the country 
to lucrative and selfish views’,9 forbidding any executive from 
taking part. Just as with the ban on presents, however, Clive and 
the Calcutta Council studiously ignored the directors’ orders for as 
long as they could, only winding up its affairs in September 1768. 
Public opinion back in London was incensed by Clive’s Society of 
Trade scam. For the Gentleman’s Magazine, Clive’s establishment 
of a monopoly over the necessaries of life had ‘signed the death 
warrant for two millions of his fellow creatures’.10
As Machiavelli would have warned, Clive may have been brilliant 
as a ‘merchant prince’ winning Bengal for the Company, but he 
was precisely the wrong person to establish durable systems of 
governance. Boosting his own interests on one hand, he cracked 
down hard on the perks enjoyed by others, generating a vast store of 
bitterness that would soon transfer back to the Court of Proprietors. 
More serious perhaps was his persistent overestimation of the 
financial value of his acquisitions, creating the expectation back 
in London that ‘a torrent of treasure’ was about to flow into the 
Company’s coffers’.11 If Spiridione took inspiration from anyone in 
his grandiose depiction of Asian wealth it was from Clive.
THE BENGal BuBBlE
It was not just Clive who became entangled in this speculative whirl. 
For London’s investors, the temptation also proved irresistible. 
During the 1750s, the Company’s declining fortunes had propelled 
its share price downwards to just £133 in January 1757. Shares 
rallied 7 per cent when ships reached England with word of Plassey. 
But the dislocation caused by the Seven Years’ War meant that the 
Company’s shares fell back to just £112 in January 1762. The onset 
of peace in 1763 brought renewed confidence to the markets, and 
a slow upward trend (see Figure 5.1).
When news of the diwani reached London on 19 April 1766, the 
Company’s shares stood at £165. Following Clive’s lead, British and 
foreign investors piled into East India stock. Looking back from his 
vantage point 70 years later, Macaulay describes the time as one 
of ‘feverish excitement’, driven by ‘an ungovernable impatience 
to be rich’, and ‘a contempt for slow, sure, and moderate gains’. 
By the middle of June, the price had surged to £187, buoyed up 
by expectations of an enhanced dividend. Initially, the speculators 
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were disappointed when the directors managed to defeat a motion 
increasing the dividend from 6 to 8 per cent at the June quarterly 
meeting. But this hungry force could not be stopped. Speculators 
continued to buy into Company stock over the summer, this time 
determined to form a majority to win returns on their investment. 
At the next meeting in September, these efforts were rewarded when 
the Court of Proprietors voted to increase the dividend from 6 to 
10 per cent against the directors’ wishes. By Christmas, shares were 
trading at £223, a gain of 33 per cent.
Soon all London was obsessed with the wealth that the Company’s 
acquisitions in Bengal would generate. Foreign interest was also 
strong with over a fifth of the Company’s shareholders residing 
in the Netherlands. In May 1767, shareholders met once more to 
take a larger slice of Bengal’s wealth. In one of the longest meetings 
in the Company’s history, shareholders debated from noon on 18 
May to 4 a.m. the following day on the dividend rate, eventually 
voting themselves an increase from 10 to 12.5 per cent. But before 
this could be paid, the government intervened, itself eager to profit 
from the diwani, not least to pay off its massive war debts. The 
Company was forced to make an annual payment of £400,000, and 
Parliament passed an unprecedented Dividend Act in June fixing 
the dividend to 10 per cent. But the Company’s share price barely 






















































































































































































































Figure 5.1 The Company’s share price 1757–1784
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Prices were also being driven by the actions of market 
intermediaries, the ‘bulls’ and ‘bears’, who had had such a hand 
in the South Sea Bubble. The goal of the bulls was to pump up the 
price: ‘today a man appears as a bull and endeavours to magnify 
every circumstance to obtain a momentary rise’. But shifts in market 
sentiment could change the same person into a ‘bear’, aiming to 
push down the shares so that he could later buy cheap, all for 
‘clogging and multiplying every expense of the company and for 
depreciating every advantage she possesses’.12 For market observers, 
it was the innocent who were gulled by these shifting moods. ‘To see 
sheep driven to the butchery’, wrote one, ‘is not more affecting than 
to see those innocent dupes, male and female, hurried into India 
House to vote away the value of the little property they possess.’
April 1769 was the peak of the frenzy. At a cost of continuing the 
£400,000 transfer to the government, Sulivan had managed to win 
back the right to increase the dividend up to a maximum of 12.5 
per cent. The stage was set for the April elections of the directors, 
which surpassed all others in stock-splitting, ‘the most extraordinary 
piece of jockeyship’, when large holdings were split by contending 
factions with ‘Machiavellian finesse’.13 Then on Tuesday 23 May 
1769, the East India ship, the Valentine, was reported safely home. 
But the news it brought of renewed conflict in south India was 
devastating, and share prices plummeted from £273 to £230 in a 
month. Writing to the leading politician Lord Shelburne in July of 
1769, the financier Israel Barre concluded that ‘there never was since 
the South Sea year so great a crush in stock matters’.14
Many of London’s elite were nearly ruined in the crash, not 
least Laurence Sulivan who had increased his holdings to win 
the April elections. He would send his son, Stephen, to Bengal to 
redeem the family fortunes under the watchful eye of his protégé, 
Warren Hastings. The Burkes – brothers Edmund and Richard, 
and namesake William – were also left severely embarrassed by 
the slump. William Burke had been among the first to bull the 
Company’s stock in 1766 in a consortium with the Burkes’ patron, 
Lord Verney. Following the crash, William would seek to regain 
his fortune in India, eventually becoming the agent of the Rajah 
of Tanjore, while Richard would head for the West Indies. Neither 
was able to shake off a reputation for unprincipled share-dealing. 
Edmund, author of The Sublime and the Beautiful, and rising star 
of the Whigs, protested his innocence of all malpractice. But his 
new-bought country estate in Beaconsfield was placed at risk by the 
Company’s reversal of fortunes, and for the next few years, Edmund 
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would be a strong advocate of both Robert Clive and the Company’s 
chartered privileges against the increasing assaults from Parliament. 
THE pERISHING
While the London establishment was contemplating the costs of 
its financial excesses in the summer of 1769, across the world in 
Bengal a drought of unprecedented ferocity was just commencing. 
For six whole months from August 1769 to January 1770, the 
monsoon rains failed to arrive, delivering a chronic water shortage 
that destroyed up to half the crops, particularly in the west and 
north-west of Bengal. With the New Year, drought started to turn 
into famine. Plentiful rain fell in June 1770, but ‘hopes of relief 
were disappointed by the overflowing of the rivers in the eastern 
provinces’, adding flood to famine.15
Famine had been an established part of India’s social reality 
for thousands of years, and was only truly defeated following 
Independence in 1947. Early English travellers had commented 
with horror on the scale of the terrible famine of 1631, which 
had severely disrupted normal trade. Yet, the incidence of famine 
expanded dramatically, first under the Company and then under 
the British Crown. In fact, British control of India started with a 
famine in Bengal in 1770 and ended in a famine – again in Bengal 
– in 1943. Working in the midst of the terrible 1877 famine that 
he estimated had cost another 10 million lives, Cornelius Walford 
calculated that in the 120 years of British rule there had been 34 
famines in India, compared with only 17 recorded famines in the 
entire previous two millennia.16 One of the factors that explained 
this divergence was the Company’s abandonment of the Mughal 
system of public regulation and investment. Not only did the 
Mughals use tax revenues to finance water conservation, thus 
boosting food production, but when famine struck they imposed 
‘embargos on food exports, anti-speculative price regulation, tax 
relief and distribution of free food’.17 More brutally, if merchants 
were found to have short-changed peasants during famines, an 
equivalent weight in human flesh would be taken from them in 
exchange.
Like previous failures of the natural cycle, the inadequate 
monsoon of 1769 in Bengal could have been managed without great 
loss of life. But the Company had significantly increased Bengal’s 
vulnerability to natural disaster. Bengal had been picked clean by 
the Company and its executives in the preceding decade. Revenue 
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collection had increased dramatically from just £606,000 the year 
before the Company took over the diwani to a peak of £2,500,000 
two years later. Flows of bullion into Bengal fell from £345,000 
in 1764 to £54,000 in 1765, and ceased entirely in 1766. Instead, 
silver started leaving Bengal to pay for the Company’s tea trade. By 
1769, Richard Becher, the Company’s Resident at Murshidabad, 
admitted with some shame that ‘the condition of the people of this 
country has been worse than it was before’, arguing that ‘this fine 
country, which flourished under the most despotic and arbitrary 
government, is verging towards its ruin while the English have so 
great a share in the Administration’.18
Throughout 1769, the Company monitored the situation, and 
in November, the Calcutta Council wrote back to London that 
revenues would be reduced in the year ahead. A harrowing letter 
published under the name of J.C. in the Gentleman’s Magazine in 
September 1771 reveals the unrelenting pursuit of self-interest that 
governed the Company’s approach to the crisis. Rather than take 
action to curb price speculation in grain, ‘as soon as the dryness of 
the season foretold the approaching dearness of rice’, wrote J.C., 
‘our Gentlemen in the Company’s service were as early as possible 
in buying up all they could lay hold of’.19 The peasants quickly 
complained to the Nawab that the English had ‘engrossed all the 
rice’. But when these accusations were put before the Company’s 
Calcutta Council, the complaint was met with howls of laughter and 
thrown out. Huge fortunes were made as Company staff cornered 
the market. One junior executive accumulated over £60,000, as 
rice prices soared from 120 seers of rice per rupee at the beginning 
of the famine to just three seers a rupee in June 1770. At the time, 
a seer was equivalent to about 2 lb in weight. The Nawab and 
other Bengali nobles tried to respond in the traditional way and 
distributed rice free of charge. But because of the hoarding by the 
Company’s executives, their stocks were soon depleted. 
As the famine intensified, thousands flocked to Calcutta, many 
dying in the streets. Whoever he was, J.C. clearly had humanitarian 
feelings and would hand out food to the starving who gathered near 
his Calcutta residence. But he was also squeamish. On one occasion, 
he sent his servants to get the starving to move away from his house. 
But one of the near-dead rebelled, and cried out: ‘Baba! Baba!, my 
Father, My Father! This affliction comes from the hands of your 
countrymen, and I am come here to die, if it pleases God, in your 
presence.’20 J.C. concludes his letter by describing Calcutta’s good 
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fortune of having both vultures and dogs to deal with the dead – 
the first to take out the eyes and intestines, and the latter to gnaw 
the feet and the hands. 
With no pictures or photographs to drive home the horror of the 
event, we are left with eye-witness accounts of the living feeding 
off the dead, of the Hugli full of swollen bodies and, in the words 
of Karim Ali, author of Muzaffarnamah, of whole families being 
yielded up to the ‘talons of the wrath of the godless’.21 However, 
the Company’s first concern was to feed its army and then to ensure 
that its taxes were secure. Not only did the Company continue 
to collect its land revenues throughout the famine – instead of 
introducing some form of relief in the Mughal fashion – but it 
actually increased the rate. In February 1771, Calcutta reported 
back to the directors that ‘notwithstanding the great severity of the 
late famine and the great reduction of people thereby, some increase 
has been made’ in revenue collection.22 Many of the Company’s 
leading executives used their position to purchase grain by force – 
even seed for the next year’s planting – and then sold this at famine 
prices in the big cities of Calcutta and Murshidabad. Eventually, 
the Company did act, providing Rs90,000 in relief, a pittance in 
a land of some 30 million people with annual revenues of over 
Rs17 million. Even later imperial historians admitted that the 
Company did not even ‘attempt to cope with the disaster’.23 This 
was a man-made catastrophe. 
The absence of comprehensive records means that it is impossible 
to calculate accurately the numbers of those who died in the famine. 
In 1772, Warren Hastings estimated that 10 million Bengalis had 
starved to death, equating to perhaps a third of the population. 
Hastings also concluded that the famine was caused by an artificial 
shortage of food supplies caused by market manipulation. For 
this, Hastings blamed the local merchants, ignoring the role of 
the Company executives themselves. Mortality was highest among 
low-income groups, the rural artisans and urban poor, neither 
of whom had direct access to food stocks. In Purnea, one of the 
worst-affected districts, the Company’s agent reported that ‘on the 
high and sandy soils, more than half the ryots are dead’.24 Mortality 
in Malda also approached 50 per cent, while in Rajshahi between 
a third and a half of the people died, and in Birbhum up to a 
quarter perished. Re-examining the data, Rajat Datta has recently 
argued that the accepted estimate of 10 million deaths is inflated, 
suggesting a death toll of 1.2 million instead.25 Yet, even if this more 
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conservative figure is taken, the terrible outcome of the famine can 
still be barely understood. This was a time when the population of 
London was well under a million. All of these and more would have 
been wiped out if the famine had hit the Company’s home town, 
instead of far-off Bengal. In effect, London would have been left 
a ghost town. Instead, it was Bengal that was depopulated, with 
one-third of the Company’s territory lying ‘as jungle inhabited only 
by wild beasts’.26 
The sheer barbarity of the Company’s conduct during the 1770 
famine lies in its refusal to temper its demands for taxes with a 
sense of responsibility for the people of Bengal. As Warren Hastings 
acknowledged in a letter to the Company’s directors in November 
1772, ‘it was naturally to be expected that the diminution of the 
revenue should have kept an equal pace with other consequences 
of so great a calamity’. The reason that revenues were maintained 
was ‘owing to its being violently kept up to its former standard’.27 
Tucked away in the engaging autobiography of Dean Mahomet 
is a description of what this violence meant in practice. Better 
known for pioneering Indian cuisine in England and becoming the 
‘Shampooing Surgeon to His Majesty King George IV’, Mahomet 
had initially followed his father in a career with the Company’s 
army. In the opening section of his book, Mahomet describes how 
his father had helped to suppress a rebellion by Rajah Budhmal 
in 1769. Complaining of the ‘great dearth’, the Rajah had argued 
that it was impossible for him to pay his allotted share of taxation. 
The Company rejected this plea, and sent in troops to imprison the 
Rajah. But the violence spiralled out of control, eventually resulting 
in the death of Mahomet’s father.28 The following year Mahomet 
himself joined the Company’s forces, and he describes a series of 
engagements between Bhagalpur and Rajmahal to eliminate the 
Pahareas, who opposed Company rule and robbed travellers. To 
‘strike terror’, the Company suspended some of its captives ‘on 
a kind of gibbet, ignominiously exposed along the mountain’s 
conspicuous brow’. Mahomet’s band of sepoys moved on, and 
‘as we proceeded on our march, we beheld the lifeless bodies of 
these nefarious wretches elevated along the way for a considerable 
distance’.29 For the Pahareas, their fate was equivalent to Spartacus’ 
defeated slaves, crucified and staked along the roads of Rome. But 
the Pahareas were not the only rebels against famine taxation. There 
is some evidence that peasants joined the sufi rebels of Shah Manju 
in his sannyasi revolt against the Company.30
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a CaTaSTROpHIC FaIluRE OF MaNaGEMENT
The Bengal Famine stands out as perhaps one of the worst examples 
of corporate mismanagement in history. Yet, the preconditions for 
such a disaster had been in place for decades. The onrush of easy 
money from coups and corruption extinguished the scrupulous 
concern for trade that had previously characterised the Company’s 
management. While those in England squabbled over how to divide 
the spoils, in India all systems of administrative control broke down, 
allowing abuse to flourish at the expense of both the people of 
Bengal and the Company itself. William Bolts captured this dual 
collapse perfectly when he wrote in 1772, ‘while this nation is gazing 
after the fruit, the Company and their substitutes are suffered to 
be rooting up the tree’.31 Remittances home from the Company’s 
executives stood at just £79,000 in 1756. But following the victory 
at Plassey, they would average an annual £500,000 in the years to 
1784.32 In 1770–71, in the midst of the Bengal Famine, a staggering 
£1,086,255 was transferred home by the Company’s executives – 
equivalent to nearly £120 million in twenty-first-century terms.33
Executives in India lost sight of their commercial purpose, 
and observers in London lamented the declining quality of the 
textiles that were now sent back from Bengal, which exhibited ‘no 
assortment, no taste, nothing new either to furnish variety to the old 
or to engage new markets’.34 Added to this, embezzlement became 
widespread. Writing much later, Warren Hastings would complain 
in 1782 that ‘every article of the investment is provided for the 
Company at 30 or 40 or even 50 per cent beyond its real cost’.35 
All notions of cost control evaporated as military force became a 
vital part of the Company’s operations, and membership of the 
officer corps purchased a share of the plunder following a successful 
military adventure. While the numbers of soldiers under Company 
command grew four times during the 1760s, the numbers of officers 
expanded ten-fold to take advantage of the plunder of war. By 
1770–71, the Company’s military and commercial spending in 
Bengal had reached £3,210,000, 50 per cent more than its revenues. 
Far-sighted observers quickly concluded that the scale of the 
Company’s acquisitions overwhelmed its management capabilities. 
Even before the acquisition of the diwani, Charles Jenkinson was 
writing that ‘the affairs of this Company seem to become much too 
big for the management of a body of merchants’.36 Crucially, the 
boardroom battles in London had made the Company a plaything 
of competing shareholder forces, sending a clear signal to the 
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management of its subsidiaries in the East that the Company was 
now ripe for liquidation from within. In a revealing minute written 
by Clive in September 1766, the hero of Plassey traced the problem 
to ‘the conduct of governors, who, too eager in the pursuit of private 
interest, have involved themselves in affairs which could not be 
reconciled to the strict principles of integrity’ – as ever, excusing 
his own conduct from criticism.37
What had allowed the ‘get rich-quick’ appetites of the Company’s 
executives to take hold so disastrously was the removal of the 
Nawab’s regulatory authority. Just as a great oak or deodar 
provides valuable shade in a forest, so strong regulation provides 
the framework within which the economic ecosystem can flourish; 
weaken or remove it and anarchy and oppression will follow. In so 
many ways, the long-term interests of the Company as a trading 
concern would have been better served through partnership with 
a strong local ruler rather than market domination. By the end of 
the 1760s, the Company’s directors were recognising that Bengal 
had been a hollow acquisition. Instead of the untold riches they 
had expected, the Company had ‘only exchanged a certain profit 
in commerce for a precarious one in revenue’.38
In London, news of the famine generated a genuine sense of 
horror and humanitarian concern. The first inklings of what 
was taking place reached London in December 1770, when the 
Gentleman’s Magazine reported that ‘provisions were so scarce in 
the Company’s new acquisitions that parents brought their children 
to sell them for a morsel of bread’.39 When the full story became 
known, horror turned to outrage at the Company’s negligence. As 
Horace Walpole wrote at the time, ‘we have murdered, deposed, 
plundered, usurped – nay, what think you of the famine in Bengal, 
in which three millions perished, being caused by a monopoly of 
provisions by the servants of the East Indies’.40
dupES FOR a dIVIdENd
But business was business. As the famine intensified, Company 
shareholders were focused on making up for their losses, and in 
December 1769, the Company’s proprietors had taken advantage 
of Sulivan’s deal with the government and raised the dividend to 11 
per cent. In September 1770, this was boosted to 12 per cent. And 
then in March 1771, the same month as the Gentleman’s Magazine 
reported the ‘great miseries to which the inhabitants are reduced 
by famine and pestilence’, the Company’s shareholders voted to 
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raise the dividend to 12.5 per cent.41 The share price started to 
recover, hitting £226 once more in May 1771. But this was a fool’s 
bounce. The Company’s finances were being consumed from within. 
Although the Company’s imports from Bengal certainly appeared 
healthy, they were now being financed in part by loans from its own 
executives in India, who were flush with the gains from private trade 
and plunder. Made out in the form of bills of exchange, these loans 
were then redeemed back in London. Theoretically, the Company 
should have easily been able to afford to honour these bills of 
exchange. But the means at its disposal was being eroded by the 
boycott of its once prosperous tea trade with the American colonies. 
Furthermore, the share price fall of 1769 was still working its way 
like acid through Europe’s financial system. Many speculators had 
bought the Company’s shares on credit, and when the stock price 
fell were left ruined. 
The Company’s political status was also under fire as revelations 
of corporate misconduct started to roll off London’s printing 
presses. In January 1772, William Bolts’s explosive Considerations 
on Indian Affairs was published in London. Bolts had been a rising 
star of the Company’s Bengal operations, but had been expelled 
after clashing with the governing elite. Bolts’s revenge was sweet and 
came in the form of a penetrating assault on the Company’s systems 
of governance. ‘The Company may be compared to a stupendous 
edifice’, he wrote, ‘suddenly built upon a foundation not previously 
well examined or secured, inhabited by momentary proprietors and 
governors, divided by different interests opposed to each other; and 
who, while one set of them is overloading the superstructure, another 
is undermining the foundations.’42 The ‘momentary proprietors’ that 
Bolts scorned so intensely voted themselves another 12.5 per cent 
dividend in March, and then, three months later, the foundations 
started to give way.
On 8 June, a Scottish banker called Alexander Fordyce working 
in London disappeared. Fordyce had been intimately involved in the 
London markets, and had sold the Company’s shares short, expecting 
them to fall further. The fool’s bounce had ruined his plans, and 
he left debts of £550,000. Many of these were owed to Scotland’s 
banking firm, Douglas, Heron & Co., popularly known as the Ayr 
Bank. The Ayr Bank promptly imploded, the start of a financial 
crisis across Europe. Another 30 banks collapsed in less than three 
weeks, creating a huge shortage of ready money, depressing business 
confidence and bringing trade to a standstill. In an unprecedented 
move, the Company postponed its September sale until November 
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in the hope that purchasing power would recover. But it now faced 
a three-fold crisis, with more than £1.5 million in outstanding bills 
of exchange, a long-overdue repayment of a £300,000 short-term 
loan from the Bank of England, along with nearly £1,000,000 in 
unpaid taxes to the government. On 15 July, the directors applied 
to the Bank of England for a loan of £400,000. Two weeks later, 
they were back, asking for another £300,000. This time the Bank 
could only produce £200,000. By August, the directors were secretly 
telling the government that it needed at least £1 million to bail it 
out. A story as big as this couldn’t remain hidden for long, and on 
18 September news of the Company’s financial distress leaked out 
to the market, sending the shares down 10 per cent. 
As accusations flew, the directors, who had kept the true state 
of affairs from their shareholders, announced that the precious 
dividend would have to be delayed. They also begged the government 
to waive the taxes the Company owed, and provide a loan to plug 
the gaping hole in its accounts. The traditional relationship of 
state and corporation was being reversed, with the government 
for once becoming the source of much-needed cash. Parliament was 
recalled early to consider what legislation was needed to prevent 
the situation spiralling out of control like the South Sea disaster 
had half a century before. A mood of vengeance was in the air, 
with parliamentarians in a mood to have ‘hanged both Directors 
and servants’.43 When the directors finally came face to face with 
the Court of Proprietors in December, two days before Christmas, 
all they could offer was a paltry 6 per cent annualised dividend. 
Furious shareholders ‘arraigned the conduct of the Directors’. Six 
days later, facing the reality of empty coffers, the shareholders were 
forced to accept their measly offer. 
How things had changed from the heady days of high prices and 
rich dividends. As one bitter observer concluded, ‘the real dupes 
have been the steady, permanent old proprietors who look to the 
dividend as the means of their subsistence’.44 In less than a decade, 
the Company had charted the classic boom-and-bust cycle, described 
so elegantly by the nineteenth-century economist, Walter Bagehot, 
as ‘quiescence, improvement, confidence, prosperity, excitement, 
overtrading, CONVULSION, pressure, stagnation, ending again in 
quiescence’.45 The tragedy then and now is how quickly memories 
of this cycle are smothered by the next surge, and how the real 
human consequences are sidelined. For the people of Bengal, the 
‘quiescence’ following the East India Crash invariably meant the 
peace of the grave. Thousands lost jobs and savings at the end of 
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the stock market bubble in the late 1990s; in the Great East India 
Crash of the 1770s, millions lost their lives. 
When Cutlers Gardens was redeveloped, a series of ceramic 
plaques were placed around the complex to mark its former use. An 
unnamed ship stood in the centre, and around the rim were marked 
the names of the commodities Masefield had wondered at: silks, 
skins, tea, ivory, carpets, spices, feathers, cotton. The plaques were 
discreet and neatly designed. Nowhere was the Company mentioned 
by name, and no reference was made to the human costs of these 
exotic commodities, nothing of the crash that once shook the world. 
But these plaques also proved ephemeral and were later removed 
as part of an architectural makeover. Once more, the Company’s 
past becomes invisible.
Two hundred and thirty years ago, millions of pounds of 
unsold tea were piled high in the Company’s warehouses across 
the City of London, a consequence of a successful boycott across 
Britain’s American colonies. In the global economy of the late 
eighteenth century, one thing united American patriots, English 
parliamentarians and Indian peasants: it was now time to tame 
the beast.




One of those caught up in the backdraught of the East India crash 
was Adam Smith. Hard at work in the Fife seaport of Kirkcaldy, 
researching the mysteries of the global economy, Smith, along with 
much of the Scottish establishment, was knocked off balance by the 
precipitate collapse of the Ayr Bank. Writing from London, Smith’s 
friend, the philosopher David Hume, enquired in June 1772 after 
the crash, ‘do these events affect your Theory? What say you? Here 
is Food for your speculation.’1 Smith had been close to completing 
what would become his masterpiece, An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations. But the mood of financial chaos 
was so great that he confessed to William Pultenay in September 
that the book had been delayed owing to his efforts to extricate 
some of his friends from this ‘public calamity’. 
Eventually released to the world in March 1776, Smith’s Wealth 
of Nations is one of the few books from the eighteenth century that 
still hold sway over the modern mind. In it, Smith puts forward an 
‘obvious and simple system of natural liberty’, arguing that the open 
market was the most effective way of raising standards of living. 
Smith regarded the pursuit of individual improvement as an eternal 
(and entirely positive) feature of economic life, stating that ‘it is not 
from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that 
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their self-interest’.2 
But Smith’s outlook was far broader than the simply economic, 
and it was critical for him that transactions respected the ‘laws of 
justice’.3 This icon of the Scottish Enlightenment was Professor of 
Moral Philosophy at Glasgow University and viewed his discovery 
of the natural laws of wealth creation not as ends in themselves, 
but as stepping stones to the good society. In Smith’s utopia, the 
relentless pursuit of self-interest is guided by ‘an invisible hand’ to 
produce outcomes that are beneficial for society as a whole.4 By 
setting out an internally consistent model, Smith hoped to overturn 
the theoretical pillars of the prevailing mercantilist order that still 
tightly circumscribed economic life. But two institutions stood in 
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the way: the state and the corporation. The over-mighty state was 
a natural target for Smith, but so was the over-mighty corporation. 
In striking contrast to those who have appropriated The Wealth 
of Nations for their pro-corporate policies, Smith had little place 
for the corporation in his vision of economic liberty. He was deeply 
suspicious of the commercial class as a whole, arguing that they 
‘come from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the 
same with that of the publick, who have generally an interest to 
deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, 
upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it’.5 And while 
he viewed profit as a necessary output from economic activity, he 
argued that it would be ‘naturally low in rich and high in poor 
countries, and it is always highest in the countries which are going 
fastest to ruin’ – something of a slap in the face for those today who 
view high profits as the measure of everything.6 But it was to the 
corporation that Smith was particularly opposed, a stance that was 
founded on a combination of theoretical antipathy, strengthened 
by the evidence of contemporary malpractice.
Here, the East India Company’s fall from grace provided a mass 
of material for Smith’s overall case. The Wealth of Nations had been 
written during the period when the Company’s aggression overseas 
and speculation at home had dominated British public life, and it is 
no surprise that it features extensively in his pages. Smith was also 
well-connected in London’s political circles, and his name was even 
put forward as a potential member of a committee of inquiry into the 
Company’s collapse in 1772. For Smith, the Company’s rise and fall 
held the secret to one of the greatest puzzles of his time: explaining 
the distribution of benefits from the rapidly increasing integration of 
the world economy. ‘The discovery of America, and that of a passage 
to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope’, argued Smith, ‘are the 
two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of 
mankind.’7 Smith’s belief was that the full potential of this dramatic 
opening had not been realised, owing to a combination of colonies 
and corporations. For the natives of both the East and West Indies, 
‘all the commercial benefits have been sunk and lost’ in a series of 
‘dreadful misfortunes’. In Asia, the agents of this pain were the 
Dutch and British East India Companies, monopoly corporations 
that he condemned as ‘always more or less inconvenient to the 
countries in which they are established, and destructive to those 
which have the misfortune to fall under their government.’8
Earlier than most, Smith recognised that commercial success 
often comes not just from meeting consumer demand, but also 
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from building up market power to generate excess profits. ‘To widen 
the market and to narrow the competition is always in the interest 
of the dealers,’ Smith argued. The result of this anti-competitive 
behaviour was to raise profits above the natural level, amounting 
to ‘an absurd tax upon the rest of their fellow citizens’.9 Cartels are 
thus an ever-present danger in a market economy, and in Smith’s 
immortal words, ‘people of the same trade seldom meet together, 
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or in 
some contrivance to raise prices’.10 Here, Smith gave an accurate 
description of the East India Company’s shipping interest, the 
collection of ships’ masters that leased the Company its vessels. 
The power of this ‘confederacy’ was such that the Company ended 
up leasing more ships than it needed at higher prices than were 
justified. This was an outcome explained in part by the fact that 
many of the ships’ masters were also Company directors, a conflict 
of interest prohibited by Company by-laws but wholly ignored.11 
More dangerous still was the establishment of exclusive 
corporations, such as the East India Company, which destroyed any 
pretence at competition. Monopoly corporations defied the logic 
of the market and resisted the ‘reduction of price and consequently 
of wages and profit that free competition would most certainly 
occasion’, according to Smith.12 In this conclusion, Smith was 
drawing on the repeated experience of Asian commerce, when 
those scarce periods of open trading – such as in the Netherlands 
between 1595 and 1601, and in England between 1694 and 1702 
– had resulted in higher prices for producers and lower prices for 
consumers, enhancing general welfare. Smith once again laid out 
the obvious defects of the Company’s market dominance – not 
least the unjust exclusion of other English traders from the East, 
as well as the added expense for European consumers. But not 
only did the inhabitants of England pay ‘for all the extraordinary 
profits which the company may have made upon those goods in 
consequence for their monopoly’, but they also suffered from ‘all 
the extraordinary waste which the fraud and abuse, inseparable 
from the management of the affairs of so great a company, must 
necessarily have occasioned’.13 The Company’s descent into 
malpractice was therefore no accident, but the inevitable and 
necessary product of a faulty institution. Monopoly didn’t just 
create economic injustice, it was also ‘a great enemy to good 
management’.14 In Smith’s vision of an open economy, entrepreneurs 
could not afford to displease their customers as these could easily 
choose alternate sources of supply. A monopoly corporation, like 
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the East India Company, faced none of these pressures for good 
conduct, and would therefore continue to condone practices that 
would otherwise have been stamped out. 
For Smith, the Company was not just flawed as a commercial 
operation. After Plassey, political tyranny was added to the mix 
through the ‘strange absurdity’ of a joint stock corporation holding 
sovereign powers. For Smith, government by merchants was 
‘incurably faulty’, stunting the natural growth of Bengal ‘to what 
is barely sufficient for answering the demands of the company’. 
Sick of the callousness this engendered, Smith described the way in 
which the Company’s executives sought to make a fortune and then 
leave Bengal as quickly as possible, ‘perfectly indifferent though the 
whole country was swallowed up by an earthquake’.15 In the form 
of the Bengal Famine, this earthquake had already struck. 
FREEdOM OR SlaVERY
Smith was not alone in his criticism of the Company. Almost 
immediately after Clive’s acquisition of the diwani, concerns 
arose about the social, political and ethical implications of this 
dramatic change in the Company’s circumstances, concerns that 
would become more acute as evidence of gross mismanagement 
accumulated. After an initial rush of euphoria, real fears emerged 
about the raw political implications of the Company’s rapid growth 
in wealth and power. This was a time of mounting discontent at 
the rottenness of the Georgian state, a struggle epitomised first by 
John Wilkes, the fiery MP for Middlesex, and then the series of 
letters penned by Junius. With its tight financial and political links 
with the ruling establishment, the Company was easily seen as yet 
another manifestation of ‘old corruption’. Well-versed in the history 
of the Roman Republic, politicians and pamphleteers feared that 
just as the proceeds of Rome’s conquest of Asia (western Anatolia) 
had been used to subvert its ancient freedoms, so the Company’s 
takeover of Bengal would bring tyranny in England. ‘The riches 
of Asia have been poured in upon us,’ declared William Pitt the 
Elder, ‘and have brought with them not only Asiatic luxury, but, I 
fear, Asiatic principles of government’, conveniently forgetting the 
origins of his grandfather’s own riches.
For many, the Company had become a monstrous hybrid, 
part Leadenhall Street merchant, part Oriental despot. As the 
Gentleman’s Magazine concluded in April 1767, the issues at stake 
were not just about the wealth that the Company had acquired, 
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but ‘whether the freedom or the slavery of this island shall result’.16 
Apprehension grew that the Company and its nabobs would use 
their wealth to subvert the delicate balance of powers between 
Crown and Parliament, introducing a corporate state. Ethical factors 
were added to the mix, driven by a genuine sense of outrage at the 
human costs of Company rule. Along with these points of political 
principle were a host of other factors, not least the sheer snobbery 
of the ruling aristocracy, who hated the way that mere merchants, 
such as Robert Clive, were able to buy themselves status, seats 
in Parliament and big houses in the country. And in the City, the 
Company’s mercantile opponents were gathering once more under 
the leadership of the famous slave-trader and Lord Mayor, William 
Beckford, who raised the ‘old cry for an open trade’, threatening to 
remove the Company’s charter so that all could have access to India.
Outside politics, the Company’s practices in India became a 
central part of Britain’s cultural landscape, with the corrupt ‘nabob’ 
as one of the stock literary characters of the age. An early example 
was the anonymous satire, Debates in the Asiatic Assembly, which 
mocked the self-serving practices of the Company’s directors and 
shareholders – caricatured as Sir Janus Blubber, Shylock Buffaloe, 
Jaundice Braywell and Sir Judas Venom – along with the rapacity 
of Lord Vulture, a thinly disguised attack on Clive.17 
Five years later, such views had become mainstream, providing 
the basis for Samuel Foote’s play, The Nabob, which opened 
at the Haymarket Theatre in June 1772. This poked fun at the 
plunderers of India in the same way as Caryl Churchill’s Serious 
Money attacked the Yuppies of the 1980s. In the play, Sir Matthew 
Mite is cast as the returning East Indian nabob ‘profusely scattering 
the spoils of ruined provinces’ aiming to use his loot to marry into 
an ancient but bankrupt family and buy election to Parliament for 
the borough of Bribe’em. He offers the Oldhams either ‘five lacks 
of roupees’ or a ‘jaghire’ for life in return for their country estate. 
But Mite is rebuffed, ‘corrupt as you may conceive this country to 
be, there are superior spirits living who would disdain an alliance 
with grandeur obtained at the expense of honour or virtue’.18 In 
the process, the audience is given an explanation of the origins of 
the East India Company’s wealth in a priceless exchange between 
Master Touchit and Mr. Mayor:
Touchit: Oh, Mr. Mayor, I will explain that in a moment: Why, 
here are a body of merchants that beg to be admitted as friends, 
and take possession of a small spot in a country, and carry on a 
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beneficial commerce with the inoffensive and innocent people, to 
which they kindly give their consent.
Mayor: Don’t you think now that is very civil of them?
Touchit: Doubtless. Upon which, Mr Mayor, we cunningly 
encroach, and fortify by little and by little, till at length, we growing 
too strong for the natives, we turn them out of their lands, and take 
possession of their money and jewels.
Mayor: And don’t you think, Master Touchit, that is a little 
uncivil in us?
Touchit: Oh, nothing at all: These people are but little better 
than Tartars or Turks.
Mayor: No, no, Master Touchit; just the reverse; it is they have 
caught the Tartars in us.19
This emotional sympathy with the people of India across race, 
culture and distance enraged Clive who argued that ‘there has not 
been one character found amongst them sufficiently flagitious for 
Mr. Foote to exhibit in the Haymarket’ – when, of course, the 
character of Sir Matthew Mite with his ‘roupees’ and ‘jaghires’ 
was modeled on himself. Not denying that ‘acts of violence and 
oppression’ had been committed, Clive attempted to deflect the 
blame onto ‘the Natives of the Country’ acting as the Company’s 
agents, ‘for the most part without their knowledge’.20
REdRaWING THE CHaRTER
For the East India Company, state intervention was a fact of life. Its 
entire existence was dependent on the regular renewal of its charter. 
For its part, the state viewed the Company as an important source 
of cheap finance and a way of outsourcing the pursuit of British 
interests in Asia. Plassey overturned the assumptions that underlay 
this mutually convenient bargain. Serious questions were raised 
not only about the Company’s right to the plunder Clive had won, 
but also the legality of a mercantile corporation ruling overseas 
territories. The acquisition of the diwani merely accentuated the 
urgency of bringing these issues to some resolution. 
For the next century, state and Company would struggle to find 
a settlement of this extraordinary situation. The practical and legal 
complexities meant that any intervention needed to be multi-dimen-
sional, confronting the flaws in the Company’s governance at home 
and abroad, the allocation of its Indian finances and the management 
of its monopoly. Money, power and principle were all at stake. Con-
stitutionally, the state asserted its right to all conquests made by 
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British subjects overseas. Technically, however, the diwani was not 
a conquest, but a grant from the Mughal emperor who remained 
the nominal sovereign of Bengal. The Company also proclaimed 
that its chartered status gave it autonomy from state intervention 
in its internal affairs. Many were concerned that any attempt to 
restrain the Company would mark a dangerous infringement of 
the property rights of a legally established corporation. More 
importantly, perhaps, was the ever-practical question of who should 
command the immensely lucrative patronage that had been opened 
in the East. An appointment to the Company’s service in India 
seemed a guarantee of rapid riches, and the Company was intent on 
preserving the directors’ right of preferment. Competing factions in 
the establishment feared that if either Crown or Parliament gained 
control of this patronage, then it would become the arbiter of British 
politics. For all these reasons, the efforts that were made to reform 
the Company over successive decades would be designed as much 
to retain the balance of power in Britain as resolve mismanagement 
in India. No wonder that the results were anachronistic and unjust. 
Ultimately, it was the need for hard cash that overshadowed 
constitutional niceties. The Seven Years’ War (1756–63) had left 
Britain victorious, but almost bankrupt, and the Prime Minister, 
William Pitt the Elder, saw the diwani as a godsend to fill a gaping 
hole in the Treasury. To pre-empt the government, the directors 
proposed in November 1766 that all territorial revenues (minus 
expenses) should go to the Crown, in return for extending the 
charter for 37 years and agreeing to an indefinite annual dividend 
of 15 per cent. But the Company’s shareholders protested, rejecting 
the proposal as too generous to the state, and in the following May, 
voted for a 12.5 per cent dividend, thereby foreclosing a substantial 
portion of the diwani. The government was furious, and quickly 
passed the Dividend Bill, limiting payments to 10 per cent while 
negotiations continued. Finally in January 1769, an agreement was 
reached whereby the government received £400,000 a year – in 
effect, a ‘windfall tax’ – and the Company retained the right to raise 
its dividend to a ceiling of 12.5 per cent. Questions of sovereignty 
were shelved for another day – not least in view of the fact that the 
Crown was wary of assuming the responsibilities for ruling India 
that this would entail.
The bursting of the Bengal bubble dramatically changed the 
situation, exposing the Company to charges of mismanagement in 
India. Many Members of Parliament had been shareholders and, as 
the stock price plummeted, a powerful body of aggrieved politicians 
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emerged, their anger inflamed by the reports from Bengal. Seeking 
to forestall further intervention, the Company despatched three 
supervisors to remedy the situation. But their ship, the Aurora, 
was lost with all hands en route to India. When the news reached 
London, the Company’s directors appointed Warren Hastings as 
Governor in Bengal in 1771, and began preparations for a new 
piece of legislation giving the Company additional judicial powers 
to tame its executives abroad. But these last-minute efforts at self-
regulation were hopelessly at odds with the needs of the situation. 
Sulivan’s Judicature Bill was thrown out by Parliament in April 
1772, and in its place a Select Committee formed, chaired by John 
Burgoyne, to investigate the Company’s affairs. As a result, the 
Company was already being scrutinised by Parliament before its 
collapse in September. 
aN ENd TO MERCaNTIlE aVaRICE?
Burgoyne is better known for his role as the general who later lost 
the Battle of Saratoga during the American War of Independence. As 
chair of the Select Committee, he drew a succession of high-profile 
witnesses to explain the Company’s actions all the way back to 
Plassey. Clive haughtily dismissed the committee’s inquiries, arguing 
that he was innocent of any corrupt dealings, and even if he had 
taken presents, he could not understand ‘what good reason could 
be given, after risking his life so often in the Company’s service, if 
he had neglected the only honest opportunity that ever offered the 
acquiring a fortune and had rested intirely [sic] upon the generosity 
of any set of Directors?’21 He then turned on his former employers 
themselves, accusing the directors of failing to rise to the challenge of 
the Bengal acquisition, treating it rather ‘as a South Sea bubble than 
anything solid and substantial’, adding ‘they thought of nothing but 
the present time, regardless of the future’.22
By the time Parliament reconvened in the winter, the Company’s 
financial debacle was common knowledge. Once again the directors 
tried to deal with its affairs by sending out a commission of 
supervisors – the body which Smith had been nominated for. Yet, 
this was all too late and failed to recognise the ‘general odium’ with 
which the Company was now regarded. The Prime Minister, Lord 
North, set up his own Secret Committee, which quickly flexed its 
muscles by proposing legislation stopping the commission from 
setting sail. Advantage had passed decisively to the state, and 
North made clear his intentions when he declared to Parliament 
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the following March, ‘I think, Sir, it is allowed that Parliament have 
a right over the India Company.’ Negotiations on the terms of the 
bail-out started in earnest in the new year. The directors made the 
first move, confidently requesting a loan of £1.5 million from the 
government, with the ability to restart dividends when half of this 
had been repaid. Parliament was having none of this, and proposed 
instead a smaller loan, much tighter caps on dividends, and all 
financial relief being conditional that ‘at the same time due care be 
taken to secure by proper Regulation the future good government 
of the Company’s affairs’.23
In May, Burgoyne wound up his investigations, and presented 
his final report. This concluded that Clive had acquired his Plassey 
fortune illegally. Burgoyne was supported on the floor of the house 
by his committee members, including William Meredith who tore 
into the Company’s tyranny in Bengal. ‘Never did such a system 
exist’, he thundered, ‘where mercantile avarice was the only 
principle and force the only means of carrying on government.’ 
In full flow, Meredith cast aside the Company’s attempt to win 
sympathy by focusing attention at the loss of life in the ‘black 
hole’ affair, declaring: ‘I remember a similar accident in St. Martin’s 
round-house’!24 Speaking to the Commons in May 1773, Burgoyne 
declared that ‘it is the duty of the house, as guardians of the 
nation’s honour to apply a remedy’, arguing that ‘our vindictive 
justice must go back to the origin of the evil’ – in other words, to 
the revolution of 1757.25 Burgoyne isolated Clive as the ‘oldest, 
if not principal delinquent’, who had set ‘an evil example’ to the 
rest of the Company’s executives. Outside Parliament, Burgoyne’s 
invective was matched by magazines and handbills full of caricatures 
condemning Clive for corruption: in one he recoils in horror from 
the ghosts of three Indian merchants who have come to demand 
justice. On 21 May, Burgoyne submitted his resolution to a vote: 
that all territorial conquests belonged to the Crown; that it was 
illegal for individuals to appropriate such public property for 
themselves; and that Clive had indeed done so. But the motion 
was rendered harmless through a set of amendments by Clive’s 
allies, passed and then immediately followed by another motion 
praising Clive’s ‘great and meritorious service’. In a debate that 
had lasted from three o’clock in the afternoon until five o’clock 
the following morning, Clive had eventually escaped censure. But 
his reputation was broken, and he would die 18 months later in 
mysterious circumstances. Many believed he had committed suicide, 
with Dr Johnson observing that Clive had ‘acquired his fortune by 
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such crimes that his consciousness of them impelled him to cut his 
own throat’.26 
Attention turned to the Company itself. North had decided not 
to push the constitutional argument about who owned Bengal, 
and also shied away from touching the Company’s monopoly, 
realising that this was the prime mechanism for returning Indian 
tribute to Britain. Instead of fundamental reform, North guided 
through three acts to relieve the Company’s financial distress and 
reform its practices. The first set out the terms and conditions for 
the government’s loan of £1.4 million, notably a 6 per cent cap 
on dividends until the debt was cleared. In return, the Company 
had to swallow the second of North’s pieces of legislation, the 
Regulating Act of 1773. This amounted to a serious intrusion into 
the Company’s corporate independence both at home and abroad. 
The Company’s democratic system of governance had been regarded 
by many as a major cause of its slide into chaos. To counter this, the 
Regulating Act sharply curbed shareholder rights. The threshold for 
voting at Company meetings was raised from £500 to £1,000. At 
the time of the Act, the Company had 2,153 shareholders, 1,246 of 
whom possessed between £500 and £1,000 worth of stock. These 
were all disenfranchised at a stroke. In addition, those with £3,000 
got two votes, those with £6,000 three votes, and the plutocrats with 
£10,000 received four votes. Naively, North had hoped that cutting 
the numbers of active shareholders would dampen disorder and 
‘integrity of conduct would follow greater property’.27 If anything 
the measures magnified the problems of ‘cabal and corruption’ by 
making it easier for a few rich nabobs returning from India to take 
over the Company. Shareholder control over the Court of Directors 
was curbed as well. Annual elections for the entire board were 
replaced with staggered ballots for a quarter of the 24 directorships 
each year. The aim was to give the Company’s leadership a more 
permanent flavour, but it also cut the directors’ responsiveness to 
their owners, without introducing accountability through other 
measures. Parliament also cracked down on the corrupt system 
of ship chartering, in which many of the leading owners of the 
Company’s ships were major holders of the Company’s stock using 
this position to push freight costs perhaps a third higher than 
necessary. The Company’s Surveyor of Shipping, Gabriel Snodgrass, 
admitted to Parliament that ‘from the great Numbers, Opulence 
and various interests of the Owners of Shipping, due economy was 
prevented’.28 New rules were introduced to reduce the Company’s 
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tonnage, forcing many commanders into early retirement, and in 
the 1773/4 season, only 16 ships were stationed in the East. 
Crucially, the Company’s freedom to manage its own affairs in 
India was curtailed. A new post of Governor-General of India was 
introduced, based in Calcutta and supreme over the Company’s 
other presidencies of Bombay and Madras. The post had an 
impressive annual £25,000 salary – not far from what Clive had 
earned in a year from his exclusive Society of Trade. Awarded to 
the Company’s existing Governor of Bengal, Warren Hastings, this 
new post of overlord would be part of a five-person council, three 
of whose members were nominated by Parliament. Crucially, this 
gave the state a theoretical majority over decision-making in the 
Company’s most important subsidiary. It also laid the seeds for 
constant in-fighting between Parliamentary appointees and the 
Company’s men. In addition, a Supreme Court was introduced 
to Bengal, with the aim of dispensing justice to British subjects 
living there, but with highly ill-defined powers. And the Company’s 
privilege of commercial confidentiality was withdrawn, with the Act 
providing the government with the right of access to all incoming 
correspondence with India; this intrusion was later extended to 
include the right to reject outgoing letters as well.
 Finally, the Act made clear that ‘any governor, or other officer 
who shall accept of any present … shall forfeit double the value, and 
be incapable ever after of serving the Company’. From Leadenhall 
Street, the Company protested that all these innovations amounted 
to the subversion of its charter, a precedent that could be applied 
elsewhere ‘to destroy the independence of the City of London itself’. 
But it was simply in no position to block the changes. For the 
editor of Gentleman’s Magazine, it was clear that the Regulating 
Act ‘will in time (and perhaps not very far removed) be the means of 
transferring the wealth and power of the greatest trading company in 
the world into the hands of government. Sic transit gloria mundi.’29
THaT WORST OF plaGuES, THE dETESTEd TEa30
But the Company’s troubles were not yet over. Lord North’s third 
piece of legislation was the Tea Act. Historians are now agreed that 
‘no bill of such momentous consequences has ever received less 
attention upon passage in Parliament’.31 Bengal’s pre-eminence in the 
Company’s accounts can sometimes mask the growing importance 
of China tea. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, imports 
of this new beverage amounted to just 100,000 lb, accounting for 
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a mere 1 per cent of the Company’s trade. But this had surged to 
2.5 million lb in the late 1740s, reaching over 4 million lb each 
year from 1760 to 1767. By this time, the Company was paying on 
average a shilling for each pound in Canton for tea that would later 
fetch more than four times as much at auction in London. In spite 
of freight costs and the high levels of duty the government imposed, 
tea was easily the Company’s most profitable commodity. Mixed 
with slave-grown sugar from the West Indies, the afternoon cup of 
tea perfectly expressed Britain’s emerging empire of consumption. 
Like the textile trade, a large source of the Company’s demand for 
tea came from outside the British market, notably in the Americas. 
As the Company’s charter only extended to imports from Asia, 
merchants would buy tea at its quarterly auctions for re-export 
across the Atlantic. By 1760, America was consuming over a million 
pounds a year. Only a quarter of this came directly from England, 
however, with the rest smuggled in to avoid Britain’s high tax regime. 
In the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, this important trade became 
embroiled in a new struggle, as the British Crown sought to export 
its powers of taxation to its American colonies. Just as the state’s 
first raid on the Company’s coffers had been driven by post-war 
financial necessity, so the extension of Britain’s existing system of 
stamp duty in 1765 to America was justified by the imperative 
of sharing the cost of military spending with the colonists. The 
response was rapid and furious, with American opponents to the 
measure denying that Parliament had the constitutional authority to 
tax the colonies, and boycotts and riots forcing its prompt removal 
only a year later. 
All this time, the Company was lobbying hard to find ways to 
boost its legitimate trade with the Americas. As part of its first deal 
with the government in 1767 to share the revenues of Bengal, it 
also won a five-year drawback on all of the customs duties on tea 
re-exported to America. Without the taxes, the price of tea was 
now equivalent to that paid by the smugglers in Amsterdam, and 
legal imports into America surged by 42 per cent into New York 
and 100 per cent in Philadelphia over the next 18 months. But 
what the government gave with one hand, it took away with the 
other. Simultaneous with the introduction of the duty drawback, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Charles Townsend, introduced a 
revenue act imposing duties on imports of glass, lead, paper and 
tea into the Americas. Instead of collecting duty on tea in England, 
Townsend had simply transferred the tax across the Atlantic, 
negating the benefits the Company had just received.
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Worse, tea became the focus of the colonists’ opposition to the 
entire Townsend package. A strong anti-tea campaign arose along 
the eastern seaboard, with activists promoting Labradore tea 
from the red-root bush as an alternative. Many pledged to abstain 
totally from tea until the duties were removed. Legal imports of 
the Company’s tea plummeted from a record 869,000 lb in 1768 
to just 108,000 lb in 1770. When British merchants complained to 
the government of the disastrous effects this was having on trade, 
the government had second thoughts, removing all of the Townsend 
duties in 1770. But in spite of the Company’s best efforts, Lord 
North kept the duty on tea. Only 1,000 lb of tea was exported to 
New York and Philadelphia between 1771 and 1773.
For the Company, the damage was done. Fusing with the share 
price crash of 1769 and mounting mismanagement in Bengal, the 
colonists’ boycott left 18,000,000 lb of unsold tea sitting in its 
London warehouses. So, as part of its petition to Parliament, the 
Company’s directors requested the right to export its tea surplus 
across the Atlantic. In a tactically brilliant move, the resulting 
Tea Act enabled the Company to sell its tea direct to America. 
In addition, the Act gave the Company a sizeable tax break by 
removing the duty paid on tea imported into England. Cutting out 
the middlemen and reducing the tax take would bring costs down 
dramatically so that Company tea could be sold cheaper than its 
smuggled rival. The British government thought that lower prices 
would allow the Americans to accept the continuing presence of 
the modest Townsend duty on tea. A handful of MPs protested that 
the government’s plan would fall foul of the continuing resentment 
of the Townsend duty on tea. But the government stood firm. As a 
result, in the summer of 1773, the Company drew up plans to ship 
2,000 chests of tea to four key ports – Boston, Charleston, New 
York and Philadelphia.
Lord North had made a strategic miscalculation. The boycott of 
tea had started to fizzle out in the Americas when the bulk of the 
Townsend duties were lifted. The Tea Act revived the campaign, 
and gave it a new edge – opposing corporate domination as well as 
unjust taxes. The patriots were also substantially aided by English 
merchants who had seen their business ruined by the new privileges 
won by the Company. According to one eye-witness, ‘opposers of 
the measure in England wrote therefore to America, encouraging 
a strenuous resistance’.32 From October onwards, newspapers and 
handbills provided the citizens of the 13 colonies with a barrage 
of analysis and polemic. The Boston Evening Post of 18 October 
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1773, for example, contained a powerful article from ‘Reclusus’ 
exposing the folly of Lord North’s plan. ‘Though the first Teas may 
be sold at a low rate to make a popular entry’, he acknowledged, 
‘yet when this mode of receiving Tea is well-established, they, as 
all other Monopolists do, will meditate a greater profit on their 
Goods, and set them up at what price they please.’33 Knowledge 
of the Company’s malpractice in India provided another powerful 
reason for stopping it gaining a foothold in America. Writing in The 
Alarm newsletter, ‘Rusticus’ underlined how ‘their Conduct in Asia, 
for some years past, has given simple Proof, how little they regard 
the Laws of Nations, the Rights, Liberties, or Lives of Men’. Clive’s 
conquest of Bengal and the ensuing famine were all grist to the mill: 
‘They have levied War, excited Rebellions, dethroned lawful Princes, 
and sacrificed Millions for the Sake of Gain,’ continued ‘Rusticus’, 
adding: ‘fifteen hundred Thousands, it is said, perished by Famine in 
one Year, not because the Earth denied its fruits, but [because] this 
Company and their servants engulfed all the Necessaries of Life, and 
set them at so high a Rate that the poor could not purchase them’.34
Threats of tarring and feathering against the merchants who 
would handle the tea had the desired effect, and in New York and 
Philadelphia they wrote to the Company resigning their commission. 
But in Boston, three ships docked and refused to turn around. And 
so, on the night of 16 December 1773, patriots dressed as Mohawks 
dumped 90,000 lb of tea worth £9,659 into Boston harbour. The 
port of Boston was summarily closed by the British authorities until 
its citizens reimbursed the Company for its goods. The payment 
never came, of course, and the Boston Tea Party led inexorably to 
open rebellion at Lexington in April 1775. A Company that had 
engineered its own revolution in Bengal had unwittingly contributed 
to fomenting another revolution in the Americas. Looking back 
from the early years of the twenty-first century, Jane Anne Morris 
sees powerful resonance in this symbolic act of anti-corporate 
protest: ‘The people who founded this nation didn’t fight a war so 
that they could have a couple of “citizen representatives” sitting in 
on meetings of the British East India Company’, she wrote in 2001. 
‘They carried out a revolution in order to be free of oppression: 
corporate, governmental, or otherwise.’35
RaFaEl’S REVENGE
The upsurge of revulsion against the Company was almost over. But 
there was one final act of reckoning still to come. When William 
Robins T02502 01 text   115 30/08/2012   09:22
116 THE CORpORaTION THaT CHaNGEd THE WORld
Bolts had published his Considerations on Indian Affairs in early 
1772, one of his greatest grievances was the failure to bring the 
Company’s miscreants to justice. ‘We behold the impotency of 
power to be such on this side of the ocean’, he wrote, ‘that not one 
delinquent in India is brought to justice in Europe.’36 Bolts wrote 
from personal experience, feeling himself unjustly expelled from 
Bengal by a compromised judicial system riddled with conflicts of 
interest. Not content with getting rid of Bolts, the Company also 
broke up his joint ventures with a number of prosperous Armenian 
merchants. In a series of co-ordinated strikes, Clive’s successor as 
Governor, Harry Verelst, summarily arrested Gregore Cojamaul 
and Melcomb Philip at Varanasi in March 1768, and a few days 
later imprisoned Johannes Padre Rafael and Wuscan Estephan in 
Faizabad. All four were eventually transferred to Murshidabad, 
and after more than five months in jail, were released without 
charge or explanation. When they regained their freedom, they 
found the commercial situation turned upside down: all Armenian, 
English and Portuguese merchants were prohibited from operating 
in Bengal’s internal markets.
In an extraordinary move, two of the four – Cojamaul and 
Rafael – decided to sail all the way to England to seek redress. The 
arrival of these two prosperous merchants gave substance to the 
widespread complaints against the Company in ways that Bolts’s 
bitter critique never could. But they faced an uphill battle: first of 
all to convince the British courts that they had jurisdiction over the 
case, and then prove Verelst’s guilt thousands of miles away from 
the scene of the crime. It was an epic struggle that took eight years 
to resolve. In September 1769, Cojamaul and Rafael petitioned the 
directors, complaining of the ‘cruel and inhuman manner’ in which 
they had been treated, and then bewailing Verelst’s arbitrary edict, 
which had left them ‘deprived of that freedom of trade which their 
nation had always enjoyed in the times of the worst of the ancient 
Nabobs’.37 When this was brushed aside, the two commenced legal 
proceedings for damages against Verelst in July 1770. Thus began a 
long journey through the labyrinth of British law. But in December 
1774, the case eventually came before a jury at the Guildhall in the 
City, who found Verelst guilty of ‘false imprisonment’ and ordered 
him to pay Rafael £5,000 plus costs. Outraged, Verelst demanded 
a retrial. But all he managed to do was delay the inevitable, and 
reduce the payment by £1,000. The courts also found in favour of 
Cojamaul, awarding him £3,200, and in July 1777, it was all settled 
with another £2,500 in damages for Wuscan Estephan. In all, Verelst 
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had to pay £9,700 – the equivalent to nearly £1 million in today’s 
money – plus the Armenians’ and his own extensive legal costs.38 It 
is a testimony to the British legal system that successive judges and 
juries were willing to put nationality aside and find Verelst guilty 
of ‘oppression, false imprisonment and singular depredations’.39 
Verelst’s career as an opulent Company director was cut short, and 
he would end his days in exile from his creditors.40 
Thousands of miles away from the scene of the crime, the principle 
of extraterritorial liability for corporate malpractice had been 
established in 1770s London. Many in business regard the current 
upsurge of global litigation against corporations as somehow new 
and unjustified. Yet, Verelst’s case provides a powerful precedent, 
demonstrating that 200 years ago one of the senior executives 
of the world’s first multinational was tried and found guilty of 
what we would now consider human rights abuses. The practical 
implications of this breakthrough were, however, muted. Few others 
had the means or the determination to come all the way to England 
for redress.
a MOMENTaRY FIT OF GOOd CONduCT
Adam Smith hated colonies almost as much as he despised 
corporations, viewing them as inherently wasteful for the coloniser 
and usually oppressive for the colonised. He lamented that no 
country had ever voluntarily given up a colony, owing to the sad 
fact that such ‘sacrifices are always mortifying to the pride of every 
nation’.41 For him, the outbreak of war in America represented a 
huge missed opportunity for constructing an enlightened Atlantic 
union based on open trade and representative government. Four 
months after The Wealth of Nations was published the 13 colonies 
issued the Declaration of Independence, and seven years of bitter 
warfare were to follow. By the time Smith was turning his attention 
to the third edition of his masterpiece in 1783, the American war 
was nearing its end. But after a ‘momentary fit of good conduct’ 
immediately following the Regulating Act, the East India Company 
was ‘in greater distress than ever’. 
In a celebrated case, George Pigot, Governor of Madras had 
died in captivity – not at the hands of the Sultan of Mysore, but as 
hostage of a gang of rebellious executives opposing his attempts to 
restore order in the South. Like Clive, Pigot was another example of 
‘poacher turned gamekeeper’, returning to Madras, a decade after 
he had made a fortune of at least £300,000 in the Seven Years War 
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(worth around £32 million today). Pigot’s task was to reverse the 
invasion of neighbouring Tanjore which had been undertaken to pay 
off the nawab of Arcot’s British creditors, led by the engineer turned 
banker, Paul Benfield. When Pigot attempted to ban the use of 
Tanjore’s revenues to repay Benfield and others, the majority on the 
Madras Council arrested Pigot and held him at St Thomas’s Mount, 
where he died in May 1777 ‘from mental stress and the rigours of 
the confinement’. The rebellious executives were eventually tried 
back in England for imprisoning and deposing Pigot, but not for 
manslaughter or murder, winning their liberty at the cost of a £1,000 
fine. This internal corruption was followed by catastrophic defeat 
at the hands of Haider Ali in 1780 at the battle of Pollilur, and the 
arrival of a French expeditionary force the following year as part of 
a global anti-British alliance. The scale of the conflict in the South 
almost bankrupted the Bengal treasury, which had appeared so 
opulent when Clive had acquired the diwani in 1765.
As his contribution to the resurgence of public and political interest 
into the Company’s affairs, Smith wrote to his publisher, William 
Strahan, in May 1783, informing him that he planned to add a new 
section giving ‘a full exposition of the Absurdity and hurtfulness of 
almost all our chartered trading companies’.42 This counter-blast 
appeared in the final book of the new volume, dealing with ‘the 
Public Works and Institutions which are necessary for facilitating 
particular Branches of Commerce’. In Smith’s opinion, however, the 
joint stock corporation was a deeply flawed piece of public policy. 
A particular danger was the impetus for hazardous speculation 
created by the separation of ownership and management in the 
joint stock arrangement. By limiting the liability of shareholders 
to the nominal value of their investments, excessive risks would be 
taken. In the Company’s case, investors were also drawn by the lure 
of patronage, acquiring ‘a share, though not in the plunder, yet in 
the appointment of the plunderers of India’.43 In parallel, corporate 
executives would never look after shareholder funds with the ‘same 
anxious vigilance’ that they would in a partnership where ownership 
and control were in the same hands. As a result, ‘negligence and 
profusion must always prevail, more or less, in the management 
of the affairs of such a company’.44 If this wasn’t bad enough, the 
Company’s monopoly status continued to extract an unjustified 
tax on both consumers and producers. Smith acknowledged that 
a temporary monopoly may well have been necessary in the early 
days of the India trade. But it had long ago outlived its usefulness, 
simply becoming a vehicle for the even more ‘negligence, profusion 
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and malversation’ by its executives.45 Hoping for shareholders to 
act with ‘more dignity and steadiness’ was unlikely to yield results, 
he felt. Instead, Smith’s prescription for these dire ailments was 
simple: recognise that the Company would never be ‘fit to govern’ its 
possessions in India and make the trade between Britain and India 
‘open to all’. More generally, Smith argued that joint stocks should 
be strictly limited to financial services (banking and insurance) and 
utilities (water and canals). 
a STaRK uTOpIa
Reading Smith afresh and delving into his analysis of the East 
India Company, it is shocking how his penetrating critique of the 
corporation has been so comprehensively suppressed. Nothing 
of his scepticism of corporations, their pursuit of monopoly and 
their faulty system of governance, enters the speeches of today’s 
neo-liberal advocates. Promoting his vision of free trade, they 
conveniently ignore that this can only be achieved with steadfast 
curbs on corporate power. Smith may have been a believer in open 
markets, but freeing the world for corporations formed no part of 
his vision. Smith strongly approved of the prevailing restrictions on 
the establishment of joint stock corporations introduced in the 1721 
Bubble Act, and it took almost another century after The Wealth of 
Nations for these constraints to be removed in Britain. Across the 
Atlantic, corporations would also play a highly limited role in the 
newly independent United States. With memories of the East India 
Company vivid in the public imagination, corporations were tightly 
circumscribed in the new republic, with time-bound charters that 
could be revoked for misconduct. Significantly, the writers of the 
US Constitution made no mention of corporations, suggesting the 
limited role that they expected them to play in the new Republic.46 
Future US President, Thomas Jefferson, in particular, worked 
tirelessly to resist concentrations of economic power, writing in 
1816 that ‘I hope we shall crush in its birth the aristocracy of 
our moneyed corporations which dare already to challenge our 
government in a trial of strength, and bid defiance to the laws of 
our country.’ More recently, John Kenneth Galbraith has imagined 
that if Smith were to come back to earth, ‘he would be appalled at 
a world, where, as in the United States, a thousand corporations 
dominate the industrial, commercial and financial landscape and 
are controlled by their hired management’.47 
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Smith was a penetrating analyst of the causes and consequences of 
corporate over-stretch. But his enlightenment faith in the ‘invisible 
hand’ blinded him to the ways in which the rule of the market would 
itself create injustice and instability. Not only did Smith’s vision 
ignore the problem of what modern economists today describe 
as ‘externalities’ – the tendency of the market to deplete public 
goods – but his belief in the providential outcomes of the market 
obscured its tendency to boom and bust. In spite of his trenchant 
criticism of the commercial character, Smith saw no reason to 
temper market freedoms. As the Industrial Revolution unfolded, 
the ‘moral sentiments’ that Smith hoped would curb relentless 
self-interest proved to be wholly inadequate to the task of preventing 
shocking abuse in the workplace or the ruthless exploitation of the 
environment. As Karl Polanyi observed following the collapse of 
the liberal world order in the 1930s, Smith’s self-regulating market 
is a ‘stark utopia’, which could not exist ‘for any length of time 
without annihilating the human and natural substance of society’.48 
Adam Smith died in July 1790, too early to see how some of his 
ideas would be used to justify the progressive elimination of the East 
India Company’s trading monopoly. Rather than ushering in an era 
of liberty and justice, the result was colonial domination. British 
manufacturers were protected by high trade and tariff barriers, 
and the entire Indian economy progressively skewed to service the 
imperial interest. Smith’s vindication of commercial freedom would 
also be used to justify often inhumane imperial policies, particularly 
on famine relief. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith had confidently 
stated that ‘a famine has never arisen from any other cause but the 
violence of government attempting, by improper means, to remedy 
the inconveniences of a dearth’.49 This conclusion was supported 
by his understanding of the terrible Bengal Famine of 1770, when 
‘some improper regulations, some injudicious restraints imposed 
by the servants of the East India Company upon the rice trade, 
contributed, perhaps to turn that dearth into a famine’.50 There is 
a world of difference, however, between the ways that corporations 
manipulate the market for their own ends and the interventions that 
states need to make to ensure the protection of human rights, the 
most important of which is the right to life. Nevertheless, Smith’s 
call for government non-intervention in times of famine would be 
applied with cruel effect by the British in India. As early as 1783, 
some of the Company’s own officials would protest against attempts 
to offer food relief, using Smith’s writings as ammunition. This was 
a position later strongly supported by the East India Company’s own 
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resident political economist, Thomas Malthus, who taught at the 
Company’s College at Haileybury. Famine tested Smith’s benevolent 
market and found it wanting, unable to respond to the imperative 
of ultimate human need.
For the modern corporation – and the East India Company 
in particular – Adam Smith remains one of the most powerful 
enquirers into its flawed metabolism. What his world-view lacked 
was sufficient attention to how the ‘laws of justice’ could be made 
to work in an anarchic global marketplace. This would be the 
obsession of Smith’s friend, Edmund Burke. 
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Justice Will be done
THE TREES OF dESTRuCTION
Due south of Fort William in central Kolkata lies Alipur, a lush 
suburb that still abounds with exclusive clubs and grand mansions 
from the colonial era. One of the most striking of these is Belvedere 
House, now home to the National Library of India. Originally 
a summer house for the Nawab of Bengal, the site was gifted to 
Warren Hastings by Mir Jafar in 1763. And it was here that two of 
the Company’s most senior executives met at dawn on 17 August 
1780 to fight one of the most extraordinary boardroom battles in 
corporate history – a duel to the death. 
On one side stood Warren Hastings, Governor-General of Bengal, 
and an archetypal Company man. Hastings had joined the firm in 
1749 at the age of 17 and had decades of experience in India. He 
had been a prisoner of Siraj-ud-Daula in the build-up to Plassey, 
and had risen through the ranks on the basis of his evident skill and 
dedication. Against a backdrop of the generalised plunder in Bengal, 
Hastings developed a reputation for personal integrity. He was one 
of the very few who had tried to halt the anarchy of private trade 
in the 1760s, seeking a more ethical basis for British commerce. ‘If 
our people, instead of erecting themselves into lords and oppressors 
of the country, confine themselves to an honest and fair trade,’ he 
told Parliament, ‘they will everywhere be respected, and the English 
name, instead of becoming a reproach, will be universally revered.’1 
By 1780, Hastings had been directing the Company’s affairs in 
Bengal for eight years, juggling competing demands of trade, finance, 
justice and defence, often letting pragmatism trump principle. In 
the process, he had become embroiled in endless disputes with the 
Parliamentary majority on the new Bengal Council. 
Opposing him was Philip Francis, the ring-leader on the Council. 
Perhaps the finest propagandist of his day, Francis is now known 
to have been the author of the anonymous ‘Junius’ letters, whose 
powerful critique rocked the corrupt government of George III 
between 1768 and 1771. Prior to his appointment as councillor 
in 1773, Francis had had a fairly unexceptional career as a junior 
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official in the War Office. The only plausible explanation for his 
surprise elevation to the Bengal Council with its impressive salary 
of £10,000 a year was an attempt by the embattled establishment to 
get ‘Junius’ out of the country. And by sending him to Bengal, there 
was the added prospect that he would not come back, succumbing 
to disease like so many of the Company’s employees. Central to 
Francis’s identity was the need for eternal resistance to tyranny, and 
he quickly turned his attention from the corruption of the British 
court to the mismanagement of the Company. In November 1774, 
just one month after his arrival in Bengal, Francis was writing back 
to his friend John Bourke, ‘the corruption is no longer confined 
to the stem of the tree, or to a few principal branches; every twig, 
every leaf is putrified’.2 
Both of the duellists felt right was on their side. Hastings believed 
that Francis’s constant criticisms of his policies had reached an 
intolerable level, challenging his authority as governor. By contrast, 
Francis saw Hastings as the incarnation of the Company’s institu-
tionalised corruption. But if Hastings’s faults lay in his tendency to 
authoritarian high-handedness, Francis was crippled by his sense 
of superiority, mistaking vindictiveness for public virtue. Even 
his friends warned him of his ‘reputation for haughtiness’, and in 
Calcutta he quickly became known as ‘King Francis’. After almost 
six years of non-stop squabbling, Hastings forced the issue on 14 
August 1780, impugning his rival’s character and declaring him 
‘void of truth and honour’. Francis had no option but to challenge 
Hastings to a duel. The long-running battle between principle and 
expedience had finally come to a head. Three days later, between 
5.30 and 6.00 a.m., the two met on the western edge of the Belvedere 
under a clump of trees known as the ‘trees of destruction’. Neither 
had fought a duel before, and Francis had probably never used a 
pistol. The two stood 14 paces apart, and after initial distractions, 
Francis fired and missed. Seconds later, Hastings shot, hitting 
Francis in the shoulder. Francis fell and cried out that he was a 
dead man, prompting Hastings to shout ‘Good God! I hope not.’ 
Thankfully, the wound was not life-threatening. But it did put an 
end to Francis’s feud with Hastings, and he returned to England a 
year later a bitter man, vowing revenge. 
The Belvedere duel was more than just an exotic skirmish between 
two irreconcilable individuals. It epitomised the deep-seated battle 
for control of the Company that was now under way – between the 
long-standing commercial imperatives of a joint stock corporation, 
and the rising interests of the British imperial state. For all to see, 
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it exposed the utter failure of North’s Regulating Act to allocate 
effective responsibility and so bring tranquillity to the Company’s 
operations. Over the next 15 years, a new bargain would be struck 
between state and corporation, constraining and channelling the 
Company’s power and autonomy in unprecedented ways. Running 
through this struggle, however, was the continuation of the ethical 
passion that had driven the first inquiries into the Company in 
the 1770s. Ultimately, the question that Edmund Burke would put 
before the world in his dramatic impeachment of Hastings was: can 
the Company and its executives be brought to justice? 
SENd MORE MONEY
When Hastings took over as Governor of Bengal in 1772, his 
primary concern was to restore order and return the Company’s 
operations to profitability. Corruption and spiralling military 
expenditure had turned the diwani windfall into a liability. Revenue 
from land taxation formed the lion’s share of the diwani, and 
Hastings moved quickly to end the mirage of Clive’s ‘dual system’ 
by moving the treasury from Murshidabad to Calcutta. To maximise 
revenues, Hastings first farmed out the task of revenue collection 
for a five-year period and then replaced this with a series of annual 
auctions. Initially, Hastings’ commercialisation of the tax system 
paid dividends, with revenues rising almost 20 per cent between 
1772 and 1776.3 But thereafter collection tailed off once more, and 
cases of oppressive tax collection mounted. 
In the wider economy, Hastings rigorously enforced the 
long-standing ban on private trade. Learning the lessons of Clive’s 
failed Society of Trade, Hastings decided to establish corporate 
rather than private monopolies over opium, salt and saltpetre as a 
way of further increasing revenues. In the case of opium, Hastings 
argued that such a ‘pernicious article of luxury’ should be carefully 
regulated and only permitted ‘for the purpose of foreign commerce’. 
So, in 1773, Hastings deprived the Company’s Council in Patna 
of its opium privileges. In its place, the Company was given the 
exclusive rights to buy all opium, a function that Hastings farmed 
out to contractors to manage on its behalf. ‘All types of compulsion 
and coercion were used’, writes Chandra Prakash Sinha, ‘to force 
the ryots [peasants] to grow opium against their will, for which 
they received arbitrarily low prices.’4 Before the Company took 
over, opium was selling for about three rupees a seer. Peasants 
were compelled to sell their poppy to the contractor, and the 
Robins T02502 01 text   124 30/08/2012   09:22
JuSTICE WIll BE dONE 125
price they received soon fell to between one and two rupees. The 
average auction price, however, was six rupees a seer, winning the 
Company a substantial profit. When Francis complained that the 
monopoly was producing ‘universal poverty and depopulation’ 
in Bihar, Hastings handed the opium contract to Francis’s friend, 
John Mackenzie, thereby silencing the criticism. But Mackenzie’s 
tenure was no better, and in 1777 a group of peasants complained 
that a large area of corn had been forcibly cut down and replaced 
with opium.5 
Hastings introduced a similar approach for salt, imposing a 
Company monopoly and then farming out the actual production 
to contractors. But mismanagement actually reduced the Company’s 
revenues, and so in 1780 Hastings introduced a system of direct 
Company management. All salt had to be sold to Company agents 
at a fixed price, and the agents then sold it on to wholesalers. By 
keeping the price it paid the producers as low as possible and the 
wholesale price high, the Company raised its revenues to nearly Rs3 
million in the first year alone, taking this total to over Rs6 million 
by 1784.6 The system would remain almost unchanged until the 
end of British rule in 1947. 
A final source of cash for Hastings to satisfy the Company’s 
directors was to look outside Bengal, using the Company’s private 
army as leverage. One of his first acts was to cancel the annual 
tribute of Rs2.6 million to the Mughal emperor. This was followed 
by a series of deals with Bengal’s western neighbour, Awadh. First, 
Hastings transferred the provinces of Allahabad and Kora to Awadh 
for a tidy Rs5 million, and then he hired out the Company’s soldiers 
for a further Rs50 million to help Awadh annex Rohilkhand. All 
in all, Hastings had gained a much-needed £5.5 million from 
territory-swapping and mercenary exchanges. In 1775, Hastings 
took control of Varanasi (Benares) – ‘a valuable acquisition to the 
Company’, he wrote back to the directors – worth another quarter 
of a million pounds a year. When hostilities with France broke 
out in 1778 as part of the wider American War of Independence, 
Hastings exerted further pressure on Varanasi to squeeze out a 
series of extra payments. 
Hastings’s relentless drive for cash had dramatic human 
consequences, many of which were presented at his impeachment. 
He was by no means a cruel ruler, but he was faced by a profound 
dilemma, beautifully laid out by Macaulay in his 1840 essay. In 
essence, the Company’s directors wanted Hastings to simultaneously 
enhance Bengal’s financial performance and improve its ethical 
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standards. ‘Govern leniently and send more money’, the directors 
urged, according to Macaulay, adding ‘practice strict justice and 
moderation towards neighbouring powers, and send more money’.7 
Ever the practical administrator, Hastings recognised that ‘it was 
absolutely necessary for him to disregard either the moral discourses 
or the pecuniary requisitions of his employers’. He chose the safest 
course and decided ‘to neglect the sermons and to find the rupees’.8 
FuNdaMENTal INJuSTICE
Hastings’s financial management had an air of desperation about 
it. What added to the stress was the dramatic change in governance 
brought about by the Regulating Act, all of which came to a head 
at the Belvedere. Traditionally, the Company’s governor of each 
presidency had supreme powers, guided by a largely consensual 
council. The new Act overturned this tradition, introducing a 
five-person council, making decisions by majority vote. Furthermore, 
three of the councillors were appointed by Parliament, ostensibly 
to represent the public interest. Almost as soon as these three 
parliamentary appointees – General John Clavering, Philip Francis 
and George Monson – arrived in Calcutta in October 1774, tensions 
arose. Instead of the 21-gun salute they were expecting, Hastings 
had organised only 17 cannon to fire as they landed. Furthermore, 
Hastings had not bothered to greet them in person, and when he 
did meet them later in the day, he did so without the expected 
formality. ‘Surely, Mr Hastings might have put on a ruffled shirt’, 
wrote Alexander Macrabie, secretary to the new councillor Philip 
Francis. Beneath these seemingly trivial questions of protocol lay a 
monumental struggle for control of the Company in Bengal. 
From the start, Francis along with Clavering and Monson sought 
to overthrow Hastings, believing him to be irretrievably corrupt, 
even stooping to bribe the new councillors to cease their inquiries. 
The first major clash came in 1775, when Francis, Clavering and 
Monson backed the accusations of corruption being levelled at 
Hastings by Rajah Nandakumar. A former Governor of Hugli under 
the Nawabs, Nandakumar was the most powerful local aristocrat 
in 1770s Bengal, and a confirmed enemy of Hastings. The Francis 
faction had, however, underestimated Hastings’s capacity for self-
preservation. Resurrecting a fraud case against Nandakumar made 
many years earlier, Hastings brought Nandakumar to trial at the new 
Supreme Court, where in accordance with English law, Hastings’s 
ally Elijah Impey found him guilty and sentenced him to death. As 
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Hastings’s recent biographer, Jeremy Bernstein, concluded, there 
is ‘no question that the execution of Nandakumar was a judicial 
murder’.9 Beyond the savagery of the act itself lay the unfortunate 
comparison with Clive’s infamous forgery of the treaty with Amir 
Chand back in 1757: Clive was ennobled and applauded for a crime 
that would hang Nandakumar.
Initially cowed, the parliamentary faction next tried to dislodge 
Hastings in June 1777 when news reached Calcutta that Hastings’s 
agent in London had tendered his resignation. Clavering promptly 
declared himself the new Governor-General. Hastings stood firm, 
denying he had resigned and mobilising the Supreme Court, which, 
again, took his side. Hastings had triumphed, and Clavering’s death 
soon afterwards left Francis isolated. Almost in despair, Francis 
wrote to the Prime Minister, Lord North, in September 1777, 
damning the Company’s rule in Bengal as guilty of ‘injustice in 
its fundamental principle’, ‘uniting the character of Sovereign and 
merchant, and exercising the power of the first for the benefit of 
the second’. For Francis, the only solution was to make sure that 
‘the government is not to be continued in the hands of a mercantile 
body’.10 In the Bengal Council, Francis was in the minority, and 
finding his position severely weakened, he came to a truce with 
Hastings when war loomed with the Marathas. But peace between 
these two irreconcilable characters could never last long, and the 
result was the climactic Belvedere duel in the summer of 1780. 
With Francis’s departure back to England, Hastings had carte 
blanche to run affairs as he wished. In March 1781, he awarded the 
opium contract at a knock-down price to Stephen Sulivan, son of the 
Company chairman and Hastings’s patron, Laurence Sulivan. The 
younger Sulivan promptly sold it on to John Benn for Rs350,000 
(£40,000), who then made a further Rs150,000 for himself by 
selling it on once more to William Young.11 Having put in place 
what he saw as the best mechanism for generating profit from opium 
production, Hastings then probed the possibility for making extra 
opium sales in China. Hastings ordered two ships, the Nonsuch 
and the Betsy, to be loaded with 3,450 chests of opium and sent 
undercover to China. When the directors in London heard of the 
escapade, they were horrified, stating categorically to Hastings that 
it was ‘beneath the Company to be engaged in such a clandestine 
trade; we therefore positively forbid any more opium being sent on 
the Company’s account’.12 Then in January 1782 Hastings turned 
on his former ally, Awadh, using the accession of a weak nawab to 
extort treasure said to be worth £2 million from the royal queens’ 
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(begums’) household. After imprisoning the queens for a year and 
allegedly torturing the court eunuchs, Hastings’s troops slunk away 
with a mere £5,500. 
Once more, the Company seemed to be embarking on a downward 
spiral of corruption, conflict and desolation. In 1769, it had been 
news that Haidar Ali, Sultan of Mysore, had attacked Madras that 
pricked the ‘Bengal Bubble’. In July 1780, he invaded the Carnatic, 
smashing the Company’s forces at Polilur. In Bengal, droughts 
struck in 1781 and 1782. And rebellion finally exploded against the 
extortions of the Company’s system of land revenue. In June 1782, 
peasants from Dinajpur travelled to Calcutta with a petition against 
the oppressive behaviour of Debi Singh, the Company’s agent in 
the region. The ryots wanted relief from unpayable levels of tax, 
the removal of unauthorised levies and an end to the forcible sale 
of property to pay tax arrears, as well as redress for the violence of 
the Company’s agents. But the Company rejected the complaint as 
‘frivolous’ and ‘fabricated’. By November, ryots were refusing to pay 
their rents, and in January, full-scale revolt broke out in Dinajpur 
and Rangpur.13 Peasant grievances merged with the holy war of 
the sannyasin led by Shah Munju and Shah Musa. This rebellion 
was, however, quickly suppressed by the Company’s troops. But 
neighbouring Awadh also rose up in revolt against Hastings’s 
mounting demands for tribute, which had resulted in those unable 
to pay being ‘confined in open cages’. Again, the uprising was easily 
crushed, only to be followed by a vicious famine in 1784, thankfully 
not on the scale of the 1770 disaster.
Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyaya would later base his ground-
breaking novel, Anandamath, on the story of sannyasin uprisings 
against the Company during Hastings’s tenure. Central to the story 
of Mahatma Satya, Mahendra, Bhavan and Kalyani is the inclusion 
of the nationalist anthem, ‘Bande Mataram’ (Hail to the Mother) 
as the song of the rebels. What was striking about the novel was 
the emphasis that the main characters placed on armed rebellion 
as the only way to rid India of the British, a strategy that was later 
adopted by Bengal’s revolutionary movement at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. In the novel, the radical Bhavan attempts to 
convince Mahendra of the need for revolt: ‘the British are shipping 
our wealth to their treasuries in Calcutta’, he says, ‘and from there 
that wealth is to be shipped again to England. There is no hope 
for India until we drive the British out ... by sheer force of arms.’14
By the time Hastings left Calcutta in February 1785 to return 
home, peace had been restored with the Marathas, Hyder Ali was 
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dead and Madras regained. But back in England, his reputation 
had been shattered. William Cowper captured the mood in his 
1782 poem, ‘Expostulation’. A one-time school-mate of Hastings, 
Cowper turned on him in a highly personal rebuke:
Hast thou, though suckled at fair freedom’s breast,
Exported slav’ry to the conquer’d East
Pull’d down the tyrants India serv’d with dread,
And rais’d thyself, a greater, in their stead?
Gone thither arm’d and hungry, return’d full,
Fed with the richest veins of the Mogul,
A despot big with pow’r obtain’d by wealth
And that obtain’d by rapine and by stealth?
With Asiatic vices stor’d thy mind,
But left their virtues and thine own behind;
And, having truck’d thy soul, brought home the fee,
To tempt the poor to sell himself to thee?15
NIBBlING aT THE CHaRTER
After the crash of 1772, the overwhelming priority for the Company’s 
directors back in London was to pay off the £1.4 million loan 
from the government and regain financial freedom. Their task was 
hampered by the rumours of civil war in the Bengal Council that 
filtered back to England. Scandalised by Nandakumar’s judicial 
murder and the in-fighting it exposed in the Council, the directors 
had voted to recall Hastings in the summer of 1776, but they were 
overruled at a meeting of the Company’s shareholders. However, 
Hastings’s representative in London had used this occasion to tender 
Hastings’s resignation in an attempt to secure good terms, which the 
directors accepted. Of course, when Hastings himself heard of his 
departure from office the following year, he refused to budge. This 
stubbornness enflamed passions in London even more, exposing the 
failure of the Regulating Act to give the state the right to recall the 
governor-general. King George III demanded that Hastings should 
be dismissed, and some talked of his impeachment. But war in the 
Americas took precedence and events in India were allowed to drift. 
In the meantime the Company successfully paid off its debt in 1776, 
cut its debt and triumphantly raised its dividend from 6 to 8 per cent. 
When news of Haidar Ali’s invasion of the Carnatic reached 
London in April 1781, this happy situation was quickly overturned. 
The Company was already in the middle of negotiations with Lord 
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North’s embattled administration for a renewal of its charter, and 
this powerful reminder of the Company’s incompetence strengthened 
the government’s hand. North demanded that the Company should 
hand over three-quarters of its net profits over what was required 
to pay the annual 8 per cent dividend, amounting to £600,000 a 
year. Speaking for the opposition Whigs, Edmund Burke sprung 
to the Company’s defence, arguing that this was no more than 
‘a violent and shameless attempt to rob the Company in order to 
pursue the purposes of the most lavish waste and the most profligate 
corruption’.16 But the Company was desperate for its charter, and in 
return for another ten years’ monopoly it agreed to pay £400,000 
up front, as well as three-quarters of the surplus going forward. 
This was not the end of the matter. In February, Burke had 
been appointed to a Parliamentary Select Committee investigating 
the administration of justice in Bengal. Two months later, Henry 
Dundas, the 39-year-old rising star of the Scottish elite, was charged 
with leading a parallel Secret Committee into the Carnatic affair. Just 
as in 1773, the Company was facing a two-pronged parliamentary 
assault. Over the next two years, these twin investigations would 
make 17 reports to Parliament, exposing the Company and laying 
the foundations for its subordination to the state. Although they 
were political adversaries, Burke and Dundas shared much of the 
same analysis concerning the roots of the problem. Where they 
differed was over which institution should have the whip-hand. For 
Dundas, the Crown should be in the driving seat, but for Burke, it 
was clear that the Company should be accountable to Parliament. 
What complicated matters even further was the mounting political 
instability at Westminster as the British establishment struggled 
to come to terms with the loss of the Americas. North finally fell 
in March 1782, and there followed three short-lived administra-
tions before Pitt the Younger took office in December 1784, driving 
through Dundas’s vision of reform. 
For Dundas, the problem lay in the chronic inability of the 
Company to act any longer as a commercial concern and avoid the 
lure of military conquest. ‘I wish every servant of the Company’, he 
told Parliament, ‘to consider that it is and ought to be the first aim 
of his life to prove himself a faithful steward of the Company, and 
that he has no right to fancy he is an Alexander or an Aurangzeb 
and prefer frantic military exploits to the trade and commerce of 
the country.’17 To demonstrate Parliament’s authority over the 
Company, Dundas sought to discipline all three of the Company’s 
governors in India – Rumbold in Madras, Hornby in Bombay and 
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Hastings in Calcutta. Rumbold was renowned for corruption, which 
many blamed for the failure of Madras to withstand Hyder Ali’s 
assaults. Rumbold had famously bought the seat of Shaftesbury at 
the 1774 elections at 20 guineas a vote, and then returned to India 
as Governor of Madras, where between 1778 and 1780, he was 
alleged to have diverted £600,000 into his own pockets. 
But Hastings was the main prize, and, in May 1782, Dundas 
presented a resolution that he had ‘acted in a manner repugnant 
to the honour and policy of this nation and thereby brought great 
calamities on India and great expense on the East India Company’. 
Parliament agreed and voted to recall Hastings. But the Company’s 
shareholders vetoed the decision by 428 to 75, just as they had 
overturned the directors’ recall order in 1776. For one leading 
shareholder, this was just another example of a ‘settled design to 
nibble away the charter rights of the Company’.18 Frustrated by the 
shareholders, in the following spring Dundas presented a fully fledged 
bill to force the Company’s shareholders to respect ‘the sense of 
parliament’. But nine days before, the short-lived Shelburne coalition 
that Dundas served had fallen. There followed the extraordinary 
nine-month government of Lord North and Charles James Fox, 
an alliance of inveterate enemies. For the East India Company, the 
parliamentary initiative passed from Dundas to Burke. 
THIS CONTINual dRaIN
Born in Dublin in 1729, Edmund Burke is widely seen as the 
father of modern conservatism for his passionate defence of the 
ancien régime during the French Revolution. His Reflections on the 
Revolution in France quickly became the handbook of reactionaries 
across Europe in their battle for the ‘rights of property’ against the 
‘rights of man’. Yet Burke was by no means a natural supporter 
of unchecked monarchical power. Indeed, for much of his political 
career with the Whigs, Burke sought to check tyranny and uphold 
the balance of powers between Crown and Parliament that had 
been achieved at the Glorious Revolution. In 1779–80, for example, 
he launched a campaign for ‘economical reform’, seeking to curb 
the corrupt use of public money by the royal court. Burke also 
took a resolutely pro-American line in Britain’s struggles with the 
13 colonies, and backed religious toleration for Catholics in his 
native Ireland. His stance towards the East India Company was 
also consistent with his philosophy of respect and duty. As long as 
the Company could demonstrate that it had fulfilled the terms of its 
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charter, Burke would support its independence. But as soon as he 
had concluded that it had become a tool of oppression, he would 
press for root-and-branch remedies. 
Initially, Burke had opposed the efforts taken by Lord North to 
regulate the Company, seeing these as unjustified infringements of 
the Company’s chartered status. This hostility to North’s policies 
towards the Company also chimed with the political expediency of 
the opposition Whigs. But this all changed with the fall of North in 
1782. Burke’s own position was also shifting as the conclusions of 
his intensive Indian investigations became clear. In the south, leading 
Company executives in Madras had abused their position to make a 
series of private loans to local rulers, notably the Nawab of Arcot, 
engineering the invasion of Tanjore to secure repayment. Burke’s 
close friend and kinsman, William Burke, had become the agent 
for the Rajah of Tanjore in 1778, and the two Burkes collaborated 
in a 1779 pamphlet revealing the scandal of these odious debts, 
amounting to more than £3 million. In the east, Burke’s knowledge 
of Bengal had been enhanced by a close collaboration with Philip 
Francis on his return from Calcutta. These two streams came 
together in the summer of 1783 with the publication of the Select 
Committee’s Ninth Report, a masterpiece of political economy, 
largely authored by Burke. 
The reason why the Regulating Act had so catastrophically 
failed, according to Burke, was its inability to ‘follow the Tracks 
of the Abuse’ and apply ‘an appropriate Remedy to a particular 
Distemper’.19 The Bengal Revolution had broken ‘the commercial 
circle’, which had ensured that trade between Britain and India 
had brought mutual benefit. Using his words with precision, Burke 
described this model of exchange as ‘Intercourse – for it is not 
Commerce’, with India suffering ‘what is tantamount to an Annual 
Plunder of its Manufactures and its Produce to the Value of Twelve 
hundred thousand Pounds’. In effect, India was being screwed. 
Not only was Burke indignant at the way in which the Company’s 
revolution had harmed the traditional rights of Indian traders and 
producers, but he also revealed how it had failed in providing any 
long-term benefit for the corporation either. A business model that 
rested on such unequal exchange inevitably reduced the productive 
capacity of Bengal, requiring increasingly ‘casual and extraordinary’ 
measures to extract financial resources. And on the expenditure 
side, the Company’s involvement in ‘an endless Chain of Wars’ 
substantially increased the amount that Hastings needed to raise 
through trade and taxation. In December 1780, Hastings was 
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confidentially telling the directors that the gap was too great and 
there would have to be a ‘total Suspension of their Investment’ in 
the year ahead. The Company’s commercial system lay in ruins. The 
only way it could send back any goods for sale at the Company’s 
quarterly auctions was to let out space on its East Indiamen to 
its own executives, who purchased Bengal goods on their own 
account. This was a trading mirage, with no hope of any profit for 
the Company once costs were deducted. 
By this extraordinary scheme, [Burke wrote] the Company is 
totally overturned, and all its Relations inverted. From being a 
body concerned in Trade on their own account, and employing 
their Servants as Factors, the Servants have at One Stroke taken 
the whole Trade into their own Hands, on their own Capital, 
at their own Risque; and the Company are become Agents 
and Factors to them, to sell by Commission their Goods for 
their Profit.20
The only solution to this crisis was to re-establish the Company 
on ‘a Bottom truly Commercial’,21 ending the pretence that it 
could undertake public responsibilities with any form of justice. 
More than this, the Company’s systems of governance needed 
fundamental restructuring, going beyond the temporary palliatives 
of the Regulating Act. Rather than acting as any restraint on 
executive misconduct in Bengal, ‘the Negligence of the Court of 
Directors has kept pace with, and must naturally have quickened, 
the Growth of the Practices which they have condemned’.22 With the 
formation of the Fox–North coalition, Burke had an opportunity to 
put his conclusions into practice. Here, his hand was considerably 
strengthened by the parlous state of the Company’s finances. 
In March 1783, the directors had sent a grovelling petition to 
Parliament begging for ‘relief and effectual aid’ from the state, and 
by the autumn, it was clear that the Company could no longer 
honour its debts. 
The Company had become financially and institutionally 
bankrupt, breaching the implicit terms of its Georgian ‘licence 
to operate’. Drawing from the rich Whig tradition of legitimate 
resistance to tyrannical government, Charles James Fox argued that 
corporations, like kings, owed duties to the people. The Company’s 
charter was not to be seen as a sacrosanct grant of rights, but rather 
as an expression of a mutual trust between company and people. 
‘If this trust be abused’, argued Fox, and ‘its failure arises from 
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palpable guilt, ignorance or mismanagement, will any man say 
that trust should not be returned and delivered to other hands?’ 
Burke took up the same theme, arguing that ‘every description of 
commercial privilege [is] all in the strictest sense a trust, and it is 
of the very essence of every trust to be rendered accountable’.23 
Burke continued with a rhetorical flourish: ‘to whom then would I 
make the East India Company accountable?’, he mused. ‘Why, to 
Parliament, to be sure.’ The East India Bill framed by Fox aimed to 
enforce this accountability by replacing the Court of Directors with 
a body of seven commissioners appointed by parliament. In effect, 
the Company would be decapitated, its shareholders remaining as 
nominal owners, but disenfranchised of any voice in the management 
of their assets. It is said that when Sir William James, one of the 
Company’s oldest directors, read the bill, he died of shock. The 
Company’s shares also suffered, falling some 13 per cent on the 
news of the bill, reaching a lowly £120 at the end of November. 
Proposing the India Bill before the Commons in December 1783, 
Burke was clear that ‘the remedy is demanded of us by humanity, 
by justice and by every principle of true policy’. The broad-based 
sense of outrage against the Company in the Commons meant that 
sizeable majorities were quickly achieved. But the Company was not 
giving up easily, and counter-attacked with a propaganda assault 
that upheld the sanctity of its chartered privileges, warned the nation 
of the concentration of patronage that the bill would place in Fox’s 
hands, and played on the King’s deep personal hatred of Fox. To 
counter Fox’s apparently unstoppable progress in Parliament, 
James Sayers produced a string of anti-Fox caricatures, the most 
successful of which was published on 5 December, depicting ‘Carlo 
Khan’s Triumphal Entry into Leadenhall Street’. Fox is shown as 
the ‘Great Mogul’, sitting astride an elephant which bears the face 
of the Prime Minister, Lord North. The elephant is led by Edmund 
Burke dressed as a herald with a map of Bengal hanging from his 
trumpet. Crucially, Fox carries a banner stating in Greek, ‘King of 
Kings’. No longer a man of the people, Fox had become a tyrant. 
Reflecting on this dramatic turnaround, Lord North later admitted 
that ‘the idle nonsense about Carlo Khan had misled the weak part 
of the country so strangely’.24
This shift in public mood provided a cloak for King George to 
strike at the coalition. The King despised Fox for meddling in his 
household affairs and saw the India Bill as a perfect opportunity to 
rid himself of a government he resented. In a move that breached 
the constitutional principle that the King should not interfere in the 
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affairs of Parliament, George let it be known that any peer voting for 
the bill in the House of Lords would be regarded as his enemy. The 
ploy worked to perfection, and the bill was defeated. Refusing to 
budge, Fox and North were forced to relinquish their seals of office, 
just days after their apparent triumph in the Commons. William 
Pitt the Younger was made Prime Minister, and Burke would never 
again hold public office. In the game of ‘political football’ over the 
control of East India House, the inexperienced Pitt nicknamed by 
Rowlandson as ‘Billy Lackbeard’ had trumped the grizzled Fox, 
‘Charley Blackbeard’.
dIRECT aNd CONTROl
In place of Burke’s decapitation strategy, Pitt introduced a far 
more subtle plan for exerting state control over the Company. In 
March 1784, Parliament was dissolved, and a new one elected 
that was much more conducive to Pitt’s cause. The Whigs were 
crushed, blaming their defeat on the extensive use of bribery by the 
Company’s nabobs on Pitt’s behalf. 
Pitt’s first priority was to stabilise the Company’s finances. Bailiffs 
had entered East India House a few days after the election was 
called in March to claim the Company’s properties in lieu of over 
£100,000 it owed to the government. New ways had to be found to 
Illustration 7.1 Thomas Rowlandson, Billy Lackbeard and Charley Blackbeard playing at 
Football, 1784
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boost its trading revenues and restore the confidence of the financial 
markets. Just as in 1773, the government turned to tea. But in place 
of the disastrous Tea Act, which had retained an unjust tax, Pitt 
cut the hated taxation on tea from 119 to 12.5 per cent, replacing 
the initial loss of revenue with the peculiar Window Tax. It was a 
brilliant move, reducing the price of legal tea, putting many of the 
smugglers out of business, and driving up the Company’s imports 
of tea from just 5 million lb in 1784 to 13 million lb the following 
year. Pitt then turned his attention to the markets. Once again, the 
Company was financially embarrassed, lacking the wherewithal to 
pay its dividend. In June 1784, the Company’s chairman, Nathaniel 
Smith, pleaded to Parliament for temporary assistance, warning 
that another Europe-wide financial meltdown could take place if 
a bail-out was not forthcoming. If he had ‘to go in to the Court of 
Proprietors and tell them they were to have no dividend’, Smith told 
the Commons, he ‘would not be answerable for the consequences. 
The news would soon reach Holland and the government need 
not be told what would follow.’25 To avoid a run on the stock, Pitt 
pushed through legislation extending the Company’s ability to raise 
debt, and so pay its regular dividend at 8 per cent. Of course, this 
measure made little financial sense as the Company was paying 
dividends out of debt. But it helped to stabilise the situation. 
To crown his achievements, Pitt presented to the house his bill for 
the ‘Better Regulation of the Government’ of India on 6 July 1784. 
Drafted by his firm ally, Henry Dundas, the bill respected the ‘sacred’ 
character of the Company’s charter. But a five-man Board of Control 
appointed by the King was established in Whitehall. The board was 
given full powers to ‘superintend, direct and control’ the civil and 
military affairs of the Company’s territorial possessions. In addition, 
the proprietors’ right to veto decisions taken by the directors was 
removed, and the Crown gained the power to recall any of the 
Company’s executives in India, solving the problem that Hastings 
had posed for London throughout the previous decade. As one wise 
historian observed, ‘it was a clever, dishonest bill, which successfully 
concealed the Ministry’s intention of effectively subordinating the 
Court of Directors’.26 Pitt had managed to take control because he 
understood that the Company’s main concerns were pre-eminently 
financial and not political. By leaving the directors with the power 
of patronage and propping up the dividend, he successfully seduced 
the Company into the state’s embrace. As one government official 
observed with some satisfaction after the Act had been passed, the 
directors had been reduced to ‘mere clerks’.27
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Edmund Burke was not one to call an end to his pursuit of justice 
simply because of a lost election. What depressed Burke most was 
his belief that ‘all the tyranny, robbery and destruction of mankind 
practised by the Company and their servants in the East is popular 
and pleasing to the country’.28 Indeed, even his closest friends were 
baffled at Burke’s concern for the ‘black primates’ of India.29 Burke 
was also fully aware of the futility of pursuing the cause of India 
in the face of Pitt’s supremacy. His passion would first be directed 
at the scandal of the Nabob of Arcot’s debts and then at Hastings’ 
mismanagement of Bengal.
THE MOST INIQuITOuS COMBINaTIONS OF FRaud
Not surprisingly given the result of the 1784 election, Burke was 
incensed by the corrupting influence of East Indian money on the 
politics of England. Fox’s original India bill had explicitly barred the 
mortgaging of land or revenues in India to British subjects, making 
any existing arrangements – such as the nawab of Arcot’s debts – 
‘null and void’. Pitt’s East India Act, by contrast, established a fund 
to pay off the Arcot debts that were ‘justly due’. These amounted 
to some 6,985,570 star pagodas or £2,794,228, equivalent to £267 
million in today’s money. Annual payments of £480,000 were 
scheduled to redeem the debt, all overseen by the new Board of 
Control. In February 1785, Burke savaged ‘the collusion of ministers 
with the corrupt interest of the delinquents in India’, arguing that 
‘it will astonish posterity, when they read our opinions in our 
actions, that, after years of inquiry, we have found out that the 
sole grievance of India consisted in this, that the servants of the 
Company there had not profited enough of their opportunities, 
nor drained it sufficiently of its treasures.’30 Burke’s bitterness was 
directed personally at Benfield, describing him and the rest of the 
gang of creditors as ‘those inexpugnable tape-worms which devour 
the nutriment and eat up the bowels of India’. But four hours of 
high-flown rhetoric failed to move Pitt and Dundas.
The imperial machine moved into action, and by 1804, it had 
paid out £3,658,432, liquidating the original registered debts along 
with sizeable interest payments. But a further £5.7 million in alleged 
debts held by both British and Indian creditors against the Nawab 
were still outstanding, and a panel of commissioners was established 
to sift through a plethora of claims. For Philip Francis, still pursuing 
corporate corruption decades after he had left India, ‘the enormous 
amount of these supposed claims would lead one to conclude that 
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all the wealthy natives of Change-alley and Lombard-street had 
gone to India, for the benevolent purpose of lending their money 
to the princes of that country. I doubt it. I do not believe that 
a single shilling of real English money was ever lent to a nabob 
of the Carnatic. If anything was lent to them, it was out of their 
own property.’31 
Over the next four decades, Burke’s original condemnation would 
hang over the obscure and laborious efforts of the commissioners. 
By the time they finished their enquiries in 1830, the original £5.7 
million had ballooned to over £30.4 million in claims, a staggering 
£2 billion in today’s monetary values. By then, both the Nabob and 
his supposed creditors were long since dead; the Company had 
also absorbed the Carnatic into its mercantile empire. In effect, 
the contest was a battle between a phantom principality and the 
descendents of financial vampires, adjudicated by dry clerks in the 
Carnatic Office. In their final report, the commissioners awarded 
£5,611, five shillings and sixpence to Mary Dendaretegui of Hoxton, 
sister and administratix of Gideon Firth who had once been the 
Import Warehouse Keeper in Madras back in 1781. But they also 
turned down a claim of 1,167 star pagodas, 14 fanams and 30 cash 
for the deceased Koondul Rom, grandson of the Vencunna Pundit 
who had submitted the original debt. In the end, just £2.7 million of 
the debts were judged to be genuine, a tiny fraction of the monstrous 
£30 million in demands. But this was almost half the opening gambit 
of £5.7 million, far above the expectations of contemporaries in 
1806 who’d expected just a tenth to be paid. Ending their ‘intricate 
and extensive investigations into subjects remote in time and place’, 
the Carnatic Commissioners concluded that they had succeeded in 
defeating ‘the most iniquitous combinations of fraud which was 
ever submitted to a legal tribunal’.32 What they had overseen was, 
in effect, the first resolution of a ‘third world’ debt crisis.
GEOGRapHICal MORalITY
Four months after his unsuccessful attack on the Arcot debt, 
Burke turned his attention from Madras to Bengal and shortly 
after Hastings landed at Plymouth, Burke commenced the process 
that would last for another decade in an epic impeachment trial. 
What hampered Burke was the poverty of legal instruments he had 
at his disposal to bring the Company’s executives to account. He 
could try for a vote of censure, as Burgoyne had done in 1773, or 
revive the ancient practice of impeachment. Neither of these could 
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be considered effective judicial procedures. In an impeachment 
proceeding, for example, the House of Commons first had to vote 
on charges to be judged by the House of Lords, which would then 
sit as a court rather than a legislative body. The flaws in such a 
process are obvious. Majority voting rather than evidence or law 
would decide the matter, with party loyalties likely to have greater 
sway than the merits of the case. Furthermore, as Macaulay would 
observe many years later, ‘ordinary criminal justice knows nothing 
of the set-off. The greatest desert cannot be pleaded to a charge of 
the slightest transgression.’33 Yet, in the system of political justice 
represented first by Burgoyne’s motion against Clive and then by 
Burke’s impeachment of Hastings, off-setting is exactly what took 
place. Hastings’s strongest defence was not that he was innocent, but 
that ‘extraordinary means were necessary, and those exerted with 
a strong hand, to preserve the Company’s interests from sinking’.34 
In such a situation, the possibility of a fair trial – for either side – 
vanished almost immediately. 
Yet impeachment was the only tool at Burke’s disposal. Writing 
to his ally, Philip Francis, Burke was clear that ‘my business is not 
to consider what will convict Mr Hastings (a thing we all know to 
be impracticable) but what will acquit and justify myself to those 
few persons and to those distant times, which may take a concern 
in these affairs’.35 It is testament to Burke’s mastery of his brief that 
he not only swung the Commons around to his argument, but also 
managed to sustain the trial long after many had given it up as a 
lost cause. Pitt could easily have blocked the whole proceedings. 
Indeed, when Burke made his first charge against Hastings for his 
complicity in hiring out the Company’s troops to suppress the 
Rohillas, Pitt’s overwhelming majority carried the day. In their 
hearts, however, the government’s leading lights knew that ‘the 
force of evidence’ – in Dundas’s words – meant that Hastings simply 
had to face justice.36 Dundas, of course, had led the parliamentary 
struggle for Hastings’s recall in 1782. And, by backing Burke’s 
motion for impeachment, Pitt and Dundas could free themselves 
of the stain of being mere tools of the nabobs. So, when the charge 
against Hastings’s conduct towards Varanasi came to a vote in June 
1786, Pitt signalled his consent. 
In all, 20 charges were voted through by the Commons. The full 
trial opened on 13 February 1788 in Westminster Hall, with the 
cream of the British establishment looking on. The drama of the 
case and the fabulous Enlightenment language employed by Burke 
and his ally, the playwright/politician Richard Brinsley Sheridan, 
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are enough to give Hastings’s impeachment a prominent place in 
eighteenth-century English history. Bringing the charges against 
Hastings for his abuse of the begums of Awadh, Sheridan compared 
Hastings to ‘the writhing obliquity of the serpent’ and damned him 
for a character that was all ‘shuffling, ambiguous, dark, insidious, 
and little’. And as for the Company, it combined ‘the meanness of 
a pedlar and the profligacy of pirates … wielding a truncheon with 
one hand, and picking a pocket with the other’.37 
This was all good knock-about stuff. But what makes the trial so 
significant for the accountability of corporations are the principles 
upon which Burke based his case. For him, natural law meant that 
all humans should be accorded equal rights to justice, wherever they 
may be. ‘The laws of morality’, he declared on the third day of the 
trial, ‘are the same everywhere, and that there is no action which 
would pass for an act of extortion, of peculation, of bribery, and 
oppression in England, that is not an act of extortion, of peculation, 
of bribery, and oppression in Europe, Asia, Africa and the world 
over.’38 Against the corrosive relativism that was increasingly 
viewing India as an inferior land in which different standards of 
justice should be applied, Burke unfurled the standard of absolute 
values. ‘I must do justice to the East’, he declared, for ‘I assert that 
their morality is equal to ours.’ Full of contempt for what he saw 
as Hastings’s ‘geographical morality’, Burke denounced the view 
that ‘the duties of men are not to be governed by their relations 
to the great governor of the universe, or by their relations to men, 
but by climates, degrees of longitude and latitude, parallels not of 
life but of latitudes’, adding in a wonderful image: ‘as if, when you 
have crossed the equinoctial line, all the virtues die’. For someone 
who would become so opposed to Tom Paine’s Rights of Man in 
the heat of the French Revolution, the peculiar thing is that in his 
contest with Hastings Burke propounded the case for universal 
human rights. 
a SOFT IMpEaCHMENT
For Burke, what best ensured that these ‘laws of morality’ were 
upheld was respect for organic systems of governance. The 
Company, however, had engineered a revolution in India overturning 
an established order for which Burke had an abiding reverence. In 
his Ninth Report, he had even compared the zamindars of Bengal 
to the landed aristocracy of France, whom he would later defend 
with such passion following the fall of the Bastille.39 In the words 
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of the nineteenth-century Liberal politician John Morley, Burke 
demonstrated ‘a reasoned and philosophic veneration for all old 
and settled order, whether in the free Parliament of Great Britain, in 
the ancient absolutism of Versailles, or in the secular pomp of Oudh 
[Awadh]’.40 The puzzle for later generations of radicals opposing the 
British Empire in India was that it was the conservative Burke who 
demonstrated far the greatest sympathy for people cast aside by the 
Company conquest. In comparison, with later generations of liberals 
(notably the father-and-son pair, John and James Stuart Mill), and 
even socialists, such as Karl Marx, Burke was the real champion 
of India’s identity. Rather than viewing history as a civilisational 
contest between primitive and progressive nations, Burke believed 
that each society had its own intrinsic value, which should not 
be sacrificed to the interests of profit or power.41 ‘The first step 
to empire is revolution’, Burke argued as he opened his assault 
on Hastings in February 1788. For him, it was the Company’s 
revolutionary character, the way its pursuit of market dominion 
led it to overturn both prince and peasant that was its most serious 
flaw. Against the arrogance of an England that saw only ‘Oriental 
despotism’ when it looked to the East, Burke presented a picture 
of a complex society of rights and responsibilities, underpinned by 
‘a law interwoven with the wisest, the most learned, and the most 
enlightened jurisprudence that perhaps ever existed in the world’.42 
If the trial demonstrated anything, it was ‘the great lesson that 
Asiatics have rights, and that Europeans have obligations’.43
Burke and Sheridan certainly had rhetoric on their side. Burke’s 
opening speech was four days long, and lashed Hastings with a 
verbal assault:
It is with confidence that, ordered by the Commons, I impeach 
Warren Hastings Esquire, of high crimes and misdemeanours.
I impeach him in the name of the people of India, whose laws, 
rights and liberties, he has subverted, whose properties he has 
destroyed, whose country he has laid waste and desolate.
I impeach him in the name and by virtue of those eternal laws 
of justice which he has violated.
I impeach him in the name of human nature himself, which he 
has cruelly outraged, injured, and oppressed, in both sexes, in 
every age, rank, situation and condition of life.
Women were carried out fainting, and even the Speaker was 
rendered speechless. When Sheridan presented the begums’s charge, 
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he took a whole week to complete his case, with spectators paying 
£50 a seat to soak up his rhetorical extravagance. And, when the 
marathon came to an end in April 1795, Burke completed the 
prosecution case with a nine-day closing address. 
Yet, for all the sophistication of their analysis and the extent of 
their verbal prowess, the prosecution case was a muddle and a mess 
– a ‘soft impeachment’ to use the phraseology of Sheridan’s great 
theatrical character, Mrs Malaprop.44 The articles of impeachment 
were poorly drafted and lacked legal detail. The trial itself was 
interrupted by huge gaps in the proceedings, caused not least by the 
madness of King George III and the onset of the French Revolution. 
Even though the trial lasted a full seven years, the Lords only sat for 
149 days, often for less than a few hours a day. To no-one’s surprise, 
Hastings was acquitted of all charges in April 1795. 
The injustice of the judgment still cries out to be answered. 
Looking across Hastings’s actions as Governor-General, there is 
little doubt that many of the means he employed to promote the 
Company’s interests were dubious to say the least, notably the 
conduct of the Rohilla war and the execution of Nandakumar – 
neither of which were included in the impeachment. His treatment 
of the Rajah of Varanasi and the begums of Awadh were also deeply 
suspect, even by the standards of eighteenth-century foreign policy. 
And his fiscal policies generated real oppression in Bengal and 
Awadh. Hastings certainly needed to be censured for these failures 
of judgement and the suffering they caused. But impeachment 
proved to be a blunt and obsolete tool for reining in such policy 
abuses. Furthermore, the broad-brush prosecution brought by Burke 
meant that Hastings escaped conviction for some clear breaches of 
corporate rules. It is incontestable that Hastings accepted a series 
of ‘presents’, thereby breaking the covenant he had signed with 
the Company. In addition, the charge brought against him for 
corruption in his handling of the opium contract – giving it to the 
son of the Company chairman – is simply ‘unanswerable’.45 The 
tragedy was that these unambiguous crimes were not separated out 
from the unwieldy impeachment case and pursued in the criminal 
courts to their logical conclusion.
THE ROad NOT TaKEN
The epic struggle between Company and Parliament that raged in the 
1770s and 1780s remains on display at London’s National Portrait 
Gallery. Up the stairs to the second floor are the galleries charting 
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Britain’s rise to imperial dominance in the eighteenth century. On 
one side of the room hangs Joshua Reynolds’s joyous portrait of 
1766–68 showing Warren Hastings as a young Company executive, 
a few years away from his appointment as governor-general. On 
the other side, Philip Francis looks down from the wall, his face full 
of disappointment. Painted by James Lonsdale between 1806 and 
1810, Francis had not only failed to overthrow Hastings, but had 
failed to become governor-general himself, winning the Order of the 
Bath as a consolation prize. In an unconscious reconstruction of the 
duel that exploded between these two on the lawns of Belvedere, 
the space that separates these portraits is almost exactly the 14 
paces that divided the two men one dawn in August 1780. Yet the 
captions say nothing about the duel they fought over the future of 
one of the world’s most powerful corporations. 
Perhaps one reason for this depiction of a conflict-free rise to 
imperial pre-eminence is the raw reality that by the middle of the 
1780s, it was clear that in the harsh battle between the imperatives 
of power and principle, justice had been the loser. Fox’s unpopularity 
at court and his apparent attempt to monopolise the Company’s 
patronage shattered the Whig bid for corporate reform in 1783. 
Pitt and Dundas played the system far more effectively, gaining the 
reality of power in all essential matters, without any associated 
responsibility. To the surprise of many, they had supported Burke’s 
impassioned attempt to impeach Hastings. But Pitt and Dundas had 
little to lose, realising that allowing the proceedings to go ahead 
would help them draw a line under the Company’s disreputable 
past. More importantly, they knew that Burke could never succeed. 
By the time the impeachment verdict was given in April 1795, the 
political mood in Britain had been transformed. Instead of restoring 
the nation’s honour in India, defending the country against the 
revolutionary ambitions of France was the order of the day. Burke’s 
effort to overthrow the principle of ‘geographical morality’ had 
ended in glorious failure. 
As Adam Smith had warned in the midst of the American War 
of Independence, pride and patriotism would always interfere in 
efforts to resolve the ethical imperatives of empire. Few, if any, of 
those who challenged the Company’s practices questioned British 
rule in India. Burke, for example, was insistent that Britain had 
been given control of Bengal by ‘the Sovereign Disposer’. For both 
Burke and Francis, the Company’s incompetence was not just an 
ethical disaster, but also risked losing valuable acquisitions in India. 
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Almost alone among his contemporaries, George Dempster 
(1732–1818) argued that Britain should cease ruling India. A friend 
of the poet Robert Burns, Dempster became a shareholder of the 
Company in 1763 and was elected a director in the dark days of 
1769 and 1772. Perturbed by the direction the Company was taking, 
Dempster angered his fellow directors by urging that the Company 
should relinquish its territorial acquisitions and return to its trading 
roots. Unable to make any progress in the Company, Dempster 
resigned and entered Parliament to pursue the case against empire 
by state or corporation. Speaking in the debate on Fox’s India Bill 
in November 1783, Dempster was profound in his critique, arguing 
that the Company’s excesses now meant that its charter ‘ought to 
be destroyed, for the sake of the country, for the sake of India, and 
for the sake of humanity’.46 But dealing with the Company was 
insufficient: Britain as a whole should renounce control. ‘I for my 
part lament that the navigation to India had ever been discovered,’ 
Dempster concluded, adding ‘I now conjure ministers to abandon 
all ideas of sovereignty in that quarter of the world: for it would be 
wiser to make some one of the native princes king of the country, 
and leave India to itself.’ 
Dempster’s pleas fell on deaf ears. The Company’s commercial 
and imperial position was central to the British state’s global struggle 
with revolutionary France. The loss of Britain’s American colonies 
reinforced this process, placing ever-greater emphasis on retaining 
the Company’s Indian possessions. For all the high-flown critique of 
the Company’s behaviour, the deal that emerged was limited, tawdry 
and unworthy of the Enlightenment. One of the great ‘might have 
beens’ of history is to imagine the application of the ideals of the 
American Revolution to that other problem province of the British 
Empire, India. But India was not modern, European or Christian, 
and so was ultimately subjected to a second-class settlement, treated 
as a piece of property rather than a living community of people. 
Instead of the path laid out by Dempster, the Company would 
become a mercantile sovereign, enjoying its commercial swansong 
in China tea – paid for by Bihari opium – before ending its days as 
a dividend-paying administrator of India.




Passing through a fortress-like gateway, the tree-lined courtyard is 
dominated by two imposing statues. In front is a larger than life 
group of terracotta soldiers clustered around a cannon pointing 
out to sea. Around the base, golden panels show Chinese workers 
smashing opium chests, all bearing the corporate logo, UEIC (United 
East India Company). A few metres beyond stands the second statue, 
this time in bronze, depicting a seated Lin Zexu, the high-flying 
commissioner sent by the Qing Emperor Daoguang in 1838 to close 
down the illegal opium trade in Canton (Guangzhou). Compared 
with its near invisibility back home in London, Humen’s Opium War 
Museum is absolutely clear about the Company’s role in China’s 
fall from grace in the early nineteenth century. Inside the museum 
itself, panels declare that ‘the Company was the director of the 
opium trade that corrupted and disgraced the Chinese nation’. 
Prints of the Company’s headquarters on Leadenhall Street are 
displayed alongside maps, artefacts and vivid tableau that show 
how opium smuggling brought China into ‘a world of poisonous 
fog’. Alongside the patriotic efforts of the Chinese themselves to 
suppress the drug, the museum also honours the ‘righteous Western 
people’ who campaigned against the opium trade, such as Britain’s 
great liberal politician, William Ewart Gladstone. 
The raw details of the Company’s involvement in the opium 
trade are well known. From the mid-eighteenth century, European 
merchants such as the East India Company could only do business 
with the Qing Empire through Canton on the southern Pearl River, 
importing silver to pay for the teas, silks and porcelain that were so 
eagerly sought after back in Europe. For half a century, the Company 
endured a persistent balance of payments deficit with China. But 
after repeated efforts to liberalise the trade and expand the flow 
of British manufactured goods, the Company fell back on the one 
product that the Chinese would pay for: opium. Grown under 
Company monopoly in Bihar, opium was auctioned in Calcutta 
to private traders who then smuggled it into China generating the 
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silver needed for the Company’s ‘investment’ in tea and other goods. 
There was never any doubt that this was a contraband trade, but 
financial necessity and the apparent easy corruptibility of the Qing 
bureaucracy overcome any ethical scruples the Company’s directors 
might have had. With Mughal India, the enduring question of how 
the Company could cut the outflow of bullion to pay for its luxury 
goods had been resolved through conquest; with Qing China, it 
was reversed through drug-running. The Opium Wars followed, 
with British forces intervening to enforce their right to free trade, 
prising open the Qing Empire, seizing strategic sites such as Hong 
Kong and forcing through legalization across the country. 
For the Company, China was the making of its third great fortune 
after the initial success in spice and the triumph with Indian textiles. 
Tea flooded into its London warehouses particularly after the 
reforms of 1784, which had slashed import duties so deeply. The 
repeated succession of wars that followed the Plassey revolution 
meant that its military exploits in India attracted the bulk of 
contemporary attention. But it was in China where the Company’s 
original commercial intent lasted longest, and where the deepest 
profits lay up until it lost its trading privileges in 1833. The problem 
was that this most monopolistic of corporations had met its match 
in the Qing Empire of China. It required the full intervention of 
the British state and the guns of the new generation of steamships 
– the first appropriately named Nemesis – to break China’s control 
of its foreign trade. Britain may well have won the sordid conflict 
of the second opium war. But by then the Company was no more, 
its lumbering monopolistic ways replaced by a new generation of 
aggressive free traders such as Jardine Matheson who (initially at 
least) did not seek to hide the narcotic origins of their fortunes. 
aN IMpERIal BEVERaGE
The Company’s predicament was in many respects a problem of 
success. Just as in India, the English Company was a latecomer to 
the China trade, following in the wake of the Portuguese who had 
established their base on the edge of the Pearl River delta at Macao 
in 1557. And it was the Iberian princess, Catherine of Braganza 
who not only brought Bombay in her dowry, but a chest of China 
tea. Legend gives the first drink of ch’a to the Emperor Shen Lung 
in 2737 BC; historical records of tea drinking extend as far back to 
the Han dynasty in the third century AD. But for Britain, it was the 
return of the king in 1660 that started the tea craze. In September 
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of that year, the London diarist Samuel Pepys took a ‘Cupp of Tee 
(a China drink)’. 
The first attempt to open trade between Britain and China had 
nothing to do with tea or indeed the Company, however. The 
interloping Courteen Association had sailed to Canton in 1637, 
but failed to sell any of its English goods, using 80,000 ‘pieces of 
eight’ to buy Chinese luxuries. The visit quickly deteriorated when 
the Portuguese warned the authorities that the newcomers were 
little more than ‘rogues, thieves, and beggars’. Trouble broke out, 
the Chinese attacked Captain Weddell’s fleet, who answered with a 
bombardment, and the demolition of ‘what they could’.1 Following 
the Restoration, the Company tried once more to establish trading 
relations, and in 1664, placed its first token order for 100 lb of tea. 
But trade was sporadic, and it was only from 1699, when 13,082 
lb of tea were purchased, that regular trade was established. Even 
then, it was China’s luxury silk and porcelain that attracted the 
most attention until well into the eighteenth century. Such was 
the demand for china that copy-cat enterprises were established 
in Britain, notably the short-lived ‘New Canton’ factory in Bow, 
established in 1747 to produce imitation soft-paste porcelain a few 
miles away from the Company’s docks on the Thames. 
The Company’s reliance on cheap imports of Indian textiles 
had encountered popular resistance from weavers. But tea had 
no domestic competitor – and indeed offered considerable health 
benefits for a population without access to clean water and a 
fondness for gin. Initially, the combination of high import duties and 
the Company’s monopoly pricing held back British consumption 
of tea. The result was that more tea was probably smuggled into 
Britain than sold legally at the Company’s auctions at East India 
House. But when the tea tax was cut in 1747, imports jumped 
from just 2.9 per cent of the total value of the Company’s imports 
from Asia to over 20 per cent. Slave-grown sugar also sweetened 
the bitter taste of tea, creating a perfect imperial symbiosis between 
the Atlantic and Asian trades. By 1760, when imports stood at 
just over 6 million pounds, the value of tea had climbed to almost 
40 per cent of the Company’s business, vying with the Bengali 
textile trade. Further freeing up the tea trade lay at the heart of 
the twin government rescues of the Company in 1773 and 1784. 
If the first had backfired in the Boston Tea Party, the second was 
a master-stroke. The Commutation Act cut tea duties from 119 
per cent to just 12.5 per cent making smuggling far less attractive, 
driving up the Company’s legal sales from under 10 million pounds 
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in 1784 to almost 15 million pounds in 1785. One estimate suggests 
that of the 189 million pounds of tea consumed in Britain between 
1773 and 1784, only 55 million pounds had come via the East 
India Company; in the decade to 1800, total consumption soared 
to 267million pounds and the Company’s share accounted for more 
than 85 per cent.2 Over the next half-century, the Company’s tea 
sales doubled again from to nearly 33 million pounds in 1833. 
The Company’s quarterly auctions were now dominated by the 
four main black teas (Bohea, Congou, Souchon and Pekoe) along 
with the three key green teas (Singlo, Heyson and Bing). At its 
September 1798 sale, the tea catalogue ran to 635 pages and the 
auction took six days. Each chest was finely graded according to 
its character, all the way from ‘Good Ordinary to But Middling’ 
through ‘But Middling to Middling’ and on to ‘Good Middling 
to Middling Good’. And despite the inevitable squabbles with the 
tea brokers that erupted, the Company enjoyed a reputation for 
consistent high quality. Yet unlike the Indian textile trade, where 
the Company had built up an in-depth, first-hand experience of 
the major weaving centres, not a single British merchant had ever 
visited green tea districts of Zhejiang and Anhui provinces, or the 
black tea heartlands in the Wu Yi mountains where the bo he (red 
tea) originated.
THE GuaNGZHOu GRIp
The Manchu Empire of Da Qing (the Great Brightness) viewed 
itself as the centre of world civilisation, and classed Europeans as 
‘outer barbarians’ who would be generously allowed to export the 
goods they so desperately desired – tea, silk, porcelain, tortoise shell, 
camphor, rhubarb and dragon’s blood – but would have no access 
to the Empire itself. Indeed, trade would be conducted not as a form 
of exchange between equals, but as a mechanism to generate the 
maximum amount of tribute from the foreigners to the Emperor. 
The Qing was a sprawling cosmopolitan conquest empire. They 
were keen to make money from trade at the maritime margin, but 
were even more insistent to maintain a tight control over commerce, 
not least to avoid any security threat to the tranquillity of their rule.3
As the tea trade grew in the first half of the eighteenth century, 
the Company had tried to establish trading relations further north 
at Xiamen, Zhoushan and Ningbo to get closer to the tea producing 
regions. But in February 1757, a few months before the pivotal 
battle at Plassey, the Qianlong Emperor banned all trade except in 
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Canton on the Pearl River, conveniently far away from the northern 
capital in Beijing. A highly restrictive set of trading terms was then 
put in place to govern the Company’s trade in Canton, eventually 
formalized as the ‘Eight Regulations’. The details are instructive of 
the degree of control the Qing sought to exercise over the Company: 
1. No warships were allowed to enter the Pearl River.
2. Europeans were only allowed to live in their ‘factories’ outside 
the city walls during the winter shipping season (September to 
March), and were not permitted to bring wives or weapons.
3. All the pilots, boatmen and agents working for foreigners had 
to be licensed.
4. Only a fixed number of servants could work for the foreigners.
5. The use of sedan chairs and boating for pleasure was forbidden 
along with excursions into Canton itself. Guided visits to the 
public gardens on Honan Island were allowed for groups of less 
than ten as long as they returned before dark and did not get 
drunk.
6. All business had to be carried out through a monopoly guild of 
local merchants, the Kung-Hang (Co-Hong).
7. No smuggling and no credit was allowed, and the Co-Hong had 
to file a declaration that no opium was on board.
8. All ships coming to trade must anchor at Whampoa (Huangpu), 
13 miles below Canton, where loading and unloading would 
proceed under imperial inspection.4
This arrangement was not the result of careful two-way 
negotiation, but simply the expression of the Qing Empire’s unilateral 
will. The Company had no independent legal status in China. It 
clung on to a narrow strip of land on the riverside beyond the city 
walls where it rented its warehouses from the Co-Hong, alongside 
rival Danish, Dutch, French and Swedish companies, as well as 
independent Parsee and American merchants.5 What became known 
as the Canton System was strikingly different from the relatively 
permissive firmans agreed with the Mughals in India. Certainly, 
the Company had been formally excluded from the internal trade 
of India, which the Company and its executives breached in the 
dastak scandal. But in India, the Company’s merchants were able to 
establish (and fortify) its own ports, set up mints and courts, visit and 
haggle directly with producers, as well as learn the local language 
(and marry local women if they so wished). Technological necessity 
and regulatory effectiveness explained much of the difference in 
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bargaining power. After the voyages of Zheng He in the early 
fifteenth century, the Ming had turned inwards, and before 1500 
had banned the construction of seagoing sheets; the war ministry 
even destroyed the records of Zheng He’s voyages.6 The Portuguese 
arrived on the coast of China just a few years later in 1513. By the 
time the Company had come to dominate the China trade in the 
eighteenth century, China had nothing to match the firepower of 
its ‘East Indiaman’. But the Company’s mastery of the sea, which 
had won over the Mughals – who had needed marine protection 
for the haj to Mecca – was of little use to the domestically focused 
Qing. And until the arrival of steamships in the mid-nineteenth 
century, European fleets were insufficient to project their maritime 
force against China’s land-based military. 
For decades, the centralised rigour of the Qing bureaucracy 
defeated the Company’s constant probings for greater freedom of 
access. The Canton trade was arranged as an imperial monopoly 
governed by the superintendent of maritime customs, the Hai Kwan 
Pu, a Manchu appointed from the court in Beijing. This ‘Hoppo’ 
had a dual role: first, to ensure that the barbarian merchants were 
kept in a subservient position; and second, to squeeze as much 
revenue out of them for the direct benefit of the emperor. The 
customs duties collected by the Hoppo were more of an imperial 
perk than a regular tax, and the Company never saw the Emperor’s 
decree that set out the levies – a particular irritant for traders used 
to parliamentary approval of taxation.7 The Hoppo dealt exclusively 
with the foreign traders via the Co-Hong who were expected to 
make a series of annual donations in return. By the nineteenth 
century, the list included presents for the Emperor’s birthday 
(£56,000), the compulsory purchase of ginseng (£46,000), presents 
for the Hai Kwan Pu himself (£14,000), and for flood protection on 
the Yellow River (£10,000), all of which would then be extracted 
from the Company and other traders.8 To bring stability to the 
empire’s revenues, an additional reserve was established in 1780 – 
the Consoo Fund – financed from a special customs levy. 
In the relations between the Co-Hong and the Company, one 
monopoly met another – and did business. The first attempt at 
establishing a local monopoly in Canton was made in 1715, and 
was finalised as the Co-Hong in 1760. For the Qing authorities, 
the Co-Hong acted as a commercial and political buffer. Each of 
the 13 Hong traded on their own account, but together formed the 
sole channel through which the Company was forced to deal. Each 
Company ship was assigned a Hong merchant who would guarantee 
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good behaviour and the payment of customs. The Company would 
then assign its tea contracts in 21 shares among the Hong merchants, 
hoping to barter British and, increasingly, Indian goods in return. 
This barter had to be supplemented by cash purchases made in 
silver, initially supplied by the Company’s own bullion exports and, 
later on, from the proceeds from private trade. As for the Hong, 
they only took British manufactures because they had to, generally 
making a loss when they tried to sell them in China. This was just 
one of many reasons that membership of the Hong was viewed more 
as a burden than a privilege by the Cantonese commercial class. 
Regulatory obligations and commercial risks took their toll, and 
the number of Hong merchants often fell far below the maximum 
of 13 to just four in 1782. But those that survived could become 
fabulously wealthy on the back of the Company’s business. The 
most famous of all, Howqua of the Ewo Hong (1765–1843), was 
apparently worth $26 million Spanish dollars in 1834.9 
For the English, the Canton system was deeply frustrating. But 
it was also strikingly familiar. Indeed, the Company could itself be 
described as a kind of ‘English Co-Hong’: a monopoly of merchants 
from a single city with exclusive rights to trade with a portion of 
the outside world. In addition, the structural corruption of the 
system, with its manifold opportunities for private benefit all the 
way from the Company merchants through the Co-Hong to the 
Hoppo and on to the imperial court far away in Beijing, was not so 
different from the way in which the Stuarts had interacted with the 
Company extracting presents and loans in return for commercial 
favours. What was truly distinctive was the sheer scale of the 
operation, which ballooned as the demand for tea climbed in the 
late eighteenth century. Between 1720 and 1806, the volume of 
trade between Canton and Europe doubled every 18 years.10 The 
reason why the Company put up with all these indignities was 
simple: China was the world’s only source of tea. In spite of all 
the aggravations, the Company prospered, with its operations 
in Canton led by its commercial elite, the Supercargoes. These 
senior merchants superintended the voyages out from Britain, the 
trade in China and the return leg home. These executives would 
come together as the Select Committee – known dismissively as 
‘the Select’ by the up-and-coming private traders. For the Select, 
caution and mutual trust became essential elements of the trade. 
Deals were verbal and honoured in full. Only after the first Opium 
War were written contracts required. The Co-Hong accepted the 
Company’s word when it reported each year the number of chests 
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that had failed London’s quality control. Sub-standard tea was either 
dumped in the Thames and the Co-Hong’s account was debited 
accordingly, or, extraordinarily, sent all the way back to Canton. 
Equally, the directors were quite willing to reimburse a Chinese 
merchant whose goods had been undervalued by the Company’s 
agents, the Supercargoes. ‘In their eyes’, observed two experts on 
the tea trade, ‘long-term considerations were more important than 
temporary profit’.11
The great opportunity of the tea trade lay in the Company’s ability 
to double its money on the purchase cost in Canton when the chests 
were auctioned in London. But to make a profit, the Company first 
had to find the silver bullion to pay for all this tea, which made up 
over 90 per cent of the value of goods sent to Canton each year. 
Without its conquests in India, the Company would simply have 
been unable to find the cash to match the ever-rising imports of tea. 
This was why the acquisition of the diwani had been so rapturously 
received by the Company and its shareholders. But the hope that the 
China investment could be paid for through the taxes from its Indian 
territories proved illusory. A more sustainable method was required 
to mobilise the produce of India via the ‘country trade’. Shipped out 
of Company ports at Calcutta, Bombay and Madras by independent 
British and Asian merchants, Indian cotton, sandalwood, pepper 
and elephant tusks would be sold in Canton: the resulting silver 
would then be deposited in the Company’s treasury in return for 
bills of exchange, which could be cashed in Calcutta or London. 
But even the proceeds of this healthy trade between India and China 
was not sufficient to balance the books. Ultimately, something else 
was required: opium. 
OpERaTION BETSY
The use of opium for medical purposes stretched back in China 
to the Sung Dynasty, but recreational drug-use really started in 
the coastal provinces during the seventeenth century. Opium was 
widely used worldwide: the Indians tended to eat it; Europeans 
mixed it with brandy and drank it as laudanum. But the Chinese 
smoked it, which created a far greater addictive potential and 
also spawned an elaborate sub-culture around the pipe. From 
its base at Macao, the Portuguese imported opium grown in the 
India’s central Malwa region, and British traders joined the fray 
buying opium in south-east Asia. Qing concern at the spread of 
opium smoking led to a ban in 1729 on its sale and consumption, 
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except for medicinal purposes. Punishments were severe. Sellers 
of opium were forced to wear a wooden collar for a month, and 
then banished to the frontier. Shopkeepers were to be punished 
‘in the same way as propagators of depraved doctrine – strangled 
after a few months’.12 The Company was then in one of its ‘quiett’ 
phases, and its traders in Canton respected the imperial decision. 
Access to the Chinese market was exceedingly precarious, and the 
Company’s agents did not want to engage in any practices that 
might threaten their core business. 
It was the desperation of Warren Hastings that led to the first 
organised attempt by the Company to smuggle opium into China. 
Throughout the East, the opium of the Bihar region around Patna 
was famed for its excellence. After Plassey, the British had taken 
over the nawabi monopoly over opium production. When Robert 
Clive left India for the last time in 1767, an estimated 100,000 lb 
of Patna opium was being smuggled into China via Macao. Taking 
over as the first governor-general, Warren Hastings closed down 
the infamous ‘Patna Gang’ of executives who hogged the trade, 
viewing opium as a ‘pernicious article of luxury, which ought not 
to be permitted but for the purpose of foreign commerce only’.13 
The monopoly purchase of opium from the Bihari peasants was 
outsourced to a contractor – Stephen Sulivan, son of the Company 
chairman Laurence Sulivan and Hastings’ patron. There Hastings 
may well have left it, but for the outbreak of war both on land 
against Mysore and at sea against the French and the Dutch who had 
joined the side of the patriots in the American War of Independence. 
By 1781, the smooth flow of trade with China and the East Indies 
had been broken; unsold opium lay in the Company’s warehouses 
in Calcutta and unshipped tea piled up in Canton. 
To break the deadlock, Hastings hired two ships, the Betsy and 
the Nonsuch, to carry 3,460 chests of Company opium directly 
to Canton. Defending himself at his impeachment in London 
many years later, Hastings described his decision as driven by 
‘the critical situation of our affairs’, arguing that his choice was 
‘whether I should take the chance of sending opium to China and 
the Eastern Islands on the Company’s account, in order to furnish 
our Supracargoes at China with a supply of specie, or suffer the 
opium to remain one season in Calcutta and risque the detention 
of the Company’s ships one year at Canton’.14 For his accuser, 
Edmund Burke, Hastings was clearly ‘criminal in his attempt to 
introduce it clandestinely into China’, adding that ‘no profit could 
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compensate for the probable risque to which their trade with China 
was thereby exposed or for the certain dishonour and consequent 
distrust which the East India Company must incur in the eyes of 
the Chinese government by being engaged in a low, clandestine 
traffic prohibited by the laws of the country’.15 The expedition was 
a shambles. First, the Betsy was captured by the Dutch south of 
Malacca. Then the Nonsuch made it through to Macao, but only 
after flying a French flag from Java to the Philippines and a Spanish 
ensign on to China. Once in Canton, the Hong merchants either 
refused to buy the opium or offered derisory prices. Eventually, the 
chests were sold at a loss, with the ‘Supracargoes’ begging Hastings 
that ‘we could wish you would not in future pursue the same method 
of supplying us with funds except in the last necessity’, bemoaning 
the ‘trouble and perplexity of this ill-fated project’.16 The Directors 
in London agreed and admonished Hastings that it was ‘beneath the 
Company to be engaged in such a clandestine trade; we positively 
forbid any more opium being sent on the Company’s account’.17 
But expanding production and export through private traders was 
perfectly fine, and during Hastings tenure the Company’s revenue 
from opium sales doubled. 
Two years after the failure of Hastings’ escapade with the 
opium trade, the Company’s subservient position in China was 
firmly re-emphasised. In November 1784, a salute was fired from 
the Lady Hughes whilst docked in Canton, accidentally killing a 
Chinese boatman. Rather than risk an interruption to its trade, the 
Company handed over the gunner, who was then secretly strangled. 
This inability to be governed by its own set of laws would fester 
in the British memory for decades. In December 1833, after the 
Company’s monopoly had been withdrawn and months before the 
dawn of free trade, the China Repository, published an article signed 
by a ‘British Merchant’ – most likely written by William Jardine: 
‘has not the Chinese commerce of Great Britain been purchased with 
the blood of the gunner of the Lady Hughes?’, it thundered. ‘Has 
not his immolation up to this day remained unavenged? There is a 
smell of blood still.’18 Like the ‘Black Hole’ of Calcutta, this victim 
mentality would inspire and justify future retribution in the minds 
of British merchants and politicians.
A deal needed to be done to reset the relationship on the basis 
of commercial equality. The Company’s solution was to launch 
a trade mission under the banner of the British Crown, which it 
paid for to the tune of £78,000, a £7.4 million budget in today’s 
prices. The 1792–4 embassy was led by Lord George Macartney, 
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a former Governor of Madras, who sought a set of perfectly 
rational European Enlightenment goals: a treaty of commerce and 
friendship; a permanent British ambassador in Beijing; the opening 
up of Zhoushan, Ningbo and Tientsin to foreign commerce; the 
granting of an island base near Zhoushan as a trading base, which 
would be closer to the tea-growing and silk-producing regions; the 
establishment of a warehouse in Beijing (as the Russians had once 
enjoyed); and the abolition of arbitrary customs over and above 
those in the Emperor’s decree. Overall, however, the message of 
the Company’s chairman, Francis Baring, was one of caution: ‘we 
are therefore of the opinion that the first and foremost object is 
neither to impair or injure our present situation.’19 In particular, he 
warned Macartney that ‘you should be on your guard against one 
stipulation which perhaps will be demanded of you, which is the 
exclusion of the trade of Opium as being prohibited by the Laws of 
the Empire’.20 At the time of the embassy, 2,500 chests were being 
imported by private traders, covering around half the Company’s 
commercial deficit.
The mission was doomed. With his presents and entourage, 
Macartney was allowed to visit Beijing and the Manchu capital of 
Jehol, and attended an imperial audience. But there was never any 
hope of real negotiations. For the Chinese, Macartney was simply a 
‘tribute envoy’. Even before Macartney had set foot on Chinese soil, 
the imperial authorities had already written their letter of dismissal. 
Emperor Qianlong’s edict to King George III started badly and got 
worse. For Qianlong, the motivation for Macartney’s visit was clear: 
‘You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless, 
impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our 
civilization, you have dispatched a mission respectfully bearing your 
memorial.’ Rejecting Macartney’s terms as ‘contrary to all usage 
of my dynasty’, the Emperor stated categorically ‘I set no value on 
objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country’s 
manufactures’.21 In a final humiliation, the palace where Macartney 
was accommodated in Canton had been built with revenues from 
the Consoo fund, which, of course, had been financed by the 
Company’s own trade. 
The Macartney mission marked a turning point in British 
perceptions of China. Any previous sense of the superiority of China 
– which had won the admiration of European intellectuals such as 
Voltaire and Goethe – was overturned. The mission had revealed 
that the Qing Empire was lagging Europe in terms of governance, 
economics and technology. Macartney was clear that if the Chinese 
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tried to interfere with foreign trade, then ‘a few frigates could in 
a few weeks destroy all coastal communications from Hainan 
to Beizhili’.22 But he advised against any rash intervention that 
would interrupt the flow of manufactures from Britain, cotton and 
opium from India and tea from China. ‘The Empire of China’, he 
concluded, ‘is an old, crazy first rate Man-of-War’ which overawes 
its neighbours ‘by her bulk and appearance’. Looking ahead, ‘she 
may not perhaps sink outright; she may drift for a time as a wreck 
and then will be dashed to pieces on the shore; but she can never be 
rebuilt’.23 The outbreak of the long war with revolutionary France in 
1793 meant that any notion of a military resolution was delayed well 
into the nineteenth century. Another embassy under Lord Amherst 
was tried in the first year of peace, 1816, with the same results. 
And so the drift continued, with the Company steadily expanding 
its sale of opium to private traders, and corruption corroding the 
regulatory authority of the Chinese state. In 1799, the Qing issued 
a definitive prohibition on opium, complaining of the spread of this 
‘destructive and ensnaring vice’. But down in Canton, local officials 
were receiving a fixed fee per chest to look the other way.24 
THE pOppY aNd THE CaMElIa25
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the commercial nexus 
of opium and tea became a structural part of the British imperial 
establishment. Import duties on tea provided a tenth of Britain’s tax 
base, while sales of opium generated a seventh of the Company’s 
revenues in India. But the dynamics went deeper still: without opium 
exports into China, Britain could not have bought the tea it needed. 
In the words of Michael Greenberg, ‘opium was no hole-in-the-
corner petty smuggling trade, but probably the largest commerce of 
the time in any single commodity’.26 The Company lay at the heart 
of the nexus, playing multiple roles: as agricultural regulator and 
auctioneer of opium, as arranger and banker for its export and sale 
in China, as monopoly exporter of tea into Britain, and as provider 
of military might to control its sources of supply. 
In India, the Company’s original 1773 monopoly of the sale of 
opium in its Bengal territories was supplemented by exclusivity 
over its manufacture from 1797. This market dominance enabled 
the Company to purchase opium at below the cost of production. 
Buying at a cost equating to 50 Spanish dollars, the price at auction 
rose from 470 dollars in 1787–88 to a peak of 2,554 dollars in 
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1813–14, when the entry of Malwa opium drove down the price 
(but drove up the volume). 
The Company was able to maintain this system by providing 
advances to the farmers for opium production, keeping the peasantry 
in a form of debt peonage. On top of this, a large proportion 
of the Company’s land taxes were received in kind from goods 
such as cotton or opium, which could then be sold at a profit 
in Canton. The opium was mixed specially to suit the Chinese 
taste and the chests would be stamped with the Company’s chop 
(name) as a symbol of quality. At auction, the opium was bought by 
private traders licensed by the Company for export to the Chinese 
market. As administrator of India, the Company was assiduous to 
discourage domestic consumption of opium for both health and 
commercial reasons. 

























Sources: Tyler, 1857; Rowntree, 1906.
After Hastings’ debacle, the Company was insistent that none of 
its own ships trading with China should carry opium, leaving it to 
private traders. But its imprint on the private trade was profound, 
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with all private traders requiring a licence from the Company to do 
business with China. After the opium had been successfully smuggled 
into China, the proceeds would be paid into the Company’s Canton 
treasury in return for bills of exchange, payable in Calcutta or 
London. The absence of goods that the private traders could export 
in bulk from China – since tea was still a Company monopoly – 
meant that this banking facility from the Company was the best and 
safest way of remitting profits. Periodically, the imperial authorities 
in Beijing would try to enforce the ban on opium. In 1811, the 
Company was told that it must show special co-operation with the 
authorities’ wishes as opium was known to originate in British India. 
But the Company executives in China were sanguine, writing to the 
Directors that ‘we are perfectly satisfied that it is merely made pro 
forma, and without the least intention of taking any effectual steps 
for the suppression of a trade which the officers of the government 
have so long and so notoriously found it in their interests to connive 
at’.27 Then in 1821, the Chinese authorities successfully managed 
to suppress opium smuggling in Canton itself, only to force it to 
the outer anchorages at Lintin and, later, Hong Kong. Writing 
back to the Directors in London, the supercargoes warned that 
this could result in a ‘serious interruption of this most important 
branch of trade’, adding that ‘we were desirous to avoid the slightest 
implication on the part of the Honourable Company, and at the 
same time not to oppose unnecessary impediments to the trade’.28 
Moving the smuggling offshore to Lintin actually turbocharged the 
trade. Opium overtook cotton imports into China in 1823, and had 
grown three-fold by the end of the decade. 
All these relationships from the Bihari peasant to the Canton 
opium smuggler underpinned the Company’s commercial swansong, 
tea. In spite of all the buffetings of the free trade lobby, the Company 
managed to retain its exclusive monopoly until 1833. A special class 
of ship was chartered by the Company: at 1,200 tons the ships were 
50 per cent larger than the traditional vessels for India. These were 
the ‘aristocrats of the seas’ and in 1826, the China fleet of 34 ships 
brought back 40 million pounds of tea, the pinnacle of the trade. 
But it was opium that provided the essential financial lubricant 
for this last hurrah. At the turn of the century, the Company was 
selling 46 lb of tea in London for every 1 lb of opium smuggled 
into China; by 1833, the ratio had fallen dramatically to 1 lb of 
opium for 10 lb of tea, as tea sales expanded by a third and opium 
grew ten-fold. 
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Back in India, the Company also intervened with military force 
to protect its dominant position as opium producer. In the early 
nineteenth century, increasing volumes of Malwa opium grown in 
the Maratha lands were being exported through Portugal’s residual 
outposts in Goa and Damaun to Macao. This depressed the price 
for the Company’s Bengal brand, prompting Governor-General 
Wellesley to call in 1803 for action to prevent further growth and 
achieve ‘its ultimate annihilation’.29 Many factors contributed to 
the Company’s incessant wars with the Marathas, and controlling 
the opium trade was certainly among them. In essence, ‘the revenue 
from Bengal opium was being used to finance a war to secure the 
revenue from Malwa opium’, observed Brian Inglis in his history 
of the opium wars.30 But the anarchic nature of Malwa production 
meant that the Company was unable to suppress the trade. Instead, 
in 1821 it bought 4,000 chests on its own account and then 
auctioned these to private traders in Bombay. But this flooded the 
market and created a backlash in China against the poor quality of 
Malwa, damaging the Company’s brand. The Company responded 
by increasing production in Bengal, and allowing Malwa to pass 
through Bombay on payment of a modest transit duty, capturing 
90 per cent of the flow by 1831. The net result was that opium 
exports to China had grown from around 4,000 chests at the turn 
of the century to some 23,000 by the time the Company handed 
over its trading rights in 1833. As opium flooded in, so silver 
flowed out. From 1804 onwards, the Company needed to ship 
very little or no silver from Britain to China to pay for its tea. 
Between 1818 and 1833, one-fifth of total exports from China 
was in the form of treasure, and by 1826, the import of silver 
had ceased altogether. 
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THE MOST GENTlEMaNlIKE SpECulaTION
On the surface, it looked like the Company continued to serenely 
rule the Eastern seas. Yet the Company’s ability to manage the 
China trade on a commercial basis was in terminal decline. As 
we will see in the next chapter, it lost its monopoly of trade with 
India in 1813 and only the special circumstances facing trade in 
China delayed the inevitable: how could you have free trade with 
an empire that only allowed business to be conducted for half 
the year in a single city? The trajectory was clear, however. In the 
15 years leading up to the Parliamentary renewal of its charter 
in 1833, the Company’s profits fell from £1.3 million in the first 
five years, to £830,000 for the next five and just £565,000 for 
the last five.31 Along with the expulsion of opium smuggling from 
Canton to Lintin Island in 1821 went the Company’s mastery of 
the commercial initiative. In its stead came the new wave of private 
traders led by William Jardine and James Matheson. Dumfries-born 
William Jardine had been a doctor on the Company’s ships, but left 
to pursue a business career in 1817 at the age of 33. Eight years 
his junior, James Matheson was also from Scotland and had gone 
straight into private trading in 1815. The two brought together a 
winning combination of commercial acumen and political verve, 
which they deployed with great skill as the Company lumbered 
dinosaur-like towards commercial extinction. The Company had 
always co-existed – often uneasily – with the private entrepreneurs 
pursuing the Country Trade within the Asian market. The onrush 
of Malwa opium had boosted supply and crashed the price, so 
in June 1823, Matheson sailed north under Spanish colours to 
sell the drug in the northern ports such as Xiamen; Matheson 
was already the Danish Consul in Canton, quite happy to adopt 
whatever nationality suited his commercial convenience. 
The two came together as business partners in 1828 as Magniac 
& Co; Jardine Matheson only formally emerged in July 1832. The 
partnership became known as ‘The Firm’ with a mission to establish 
‘equitable commerce’ – the end of the Company’s monopoly and the 
opening up of China to all comers. Allying themselves with Britain’s 
rising manufacturing interests who saw the Company as the barrier 
to increased exports to China, the pair brazenly broke the rules of 
the Canton System, operating as if their utopia of unregulated trade 
actually existed. The Firm’s battering ram was opium, ‘the safest 
and most gentlemanlike speculation I am aware of’, wrote Jardine 
urging a friend to invest.32 The Firm knew full well that the import 
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of opium into China was illegal, but it projected a special brand of 
commercial self-righteousness through its newspapers (such as the 
Canton Register) and in briefings to Parliament back in London. The 
pair was equally dismissive of what they saw as China’s antiquated 
constraints on imports and Britain’s obsolete system of Company 
domination. Even before the Company’s monopoly had been legally 
removed, the Firm had made its ‘Jardine tea mixture’ a celebrated 
blend in England, shipping the chests to Europe before re-exporting 
into London, essentially a form of smuggling. 
By then, even the East India Company was following in its 
wake, chartering the Lord Amherst – named after the ill-fated 
ambassador – to scout out trading opportunities for the fast 
approaching post-monopoly era. As this was a Company ship it 
carried no opium, much to the bemusement of the Chinese the 
crew met in Shanghai, Xiamen, Fuzhou and Ningbo. Instead, it 
brought literature in the form of A Brief Account of the English 
Character written by the former President of the Company’s Canton 
Council, Charles Marjoribanks, and translated into rough Chinese. 
The aim was to present the English as solely interested in ‘a pacific 
and amicable intercourse’ through trade with China, an aspiration 
which had been frustrated by the Qing bureaucracy. As for interest 
in territorial conquest – such as in India – ‘no assertion could be 
further from the truth … The Government of so great an empire 
has no Thirst for Conquest’. But with an inkling of things to come, 
the pamphlet underscored the burning victimhood in the English 
mind ‘very jealous to insult and ever ready to avenge oppression 
and injustice’.33
A stench of hypocrisy hung over the Company’s final years 
of trade with China, an exchange that was nominally legal but 
ultimately dependent on structural complicity with drug smuggling. 
In India, the Company protested that opium cultivation was entirely 
normal – indeed, John Crawfurd, one of the Company’s most senior 
executives in the region, would later declare that ‘the poppy may 
be said to take the place of the vine and the olive in southern 
Europe’.34 Extensive parliamentary inquiries into the China trade 
in the early 1830s found few faults in the Company’s conduct; 
most agreed that the imperial benefit of the opium trade justified its 
blatant illegality. When Parliament questioned a former Company 
executive, W.B. Bayley in 1832 about the Company’s involvement 
in the opium trade, the answer was legalistic and straightforward: 
as the opium was no longer its property when it left India, the 
Company ‘could scarcely be said to trade in it’.35 Moral concerns 
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were certainly present. But raw economic logic meant that any curb 
on opium production and export was inconceivable. Although the 
free trade momentum against the Company’s monopoly of trade was 
unstoppable, its monopoly of supply was sacrosanct. The conclusion 
of Parliament’s select committee enquiry was perfunctory: ‘it does 
not seem advisable to abandon so important a source of revenue as 
the East India company’s monopoly of opium in Bengal’.36 As for its 
trading monopoly, this was so perforated by private trade that by 
1830, just over a third of British trade with China was still carried 
on Company ships. No wonder that Charles Grant, speaking for 
the government in Parliamentary debates on 13 June 1833, which 
removed the last vestiges of monopoly, described the Company’s 
position ‘ambiguous and embarrassing, and occasionally, very 
invidious’. When it came to opium, Grant merely stated that ‘the 
decrees of the emperor against it were not less strong than those 
of James 1st against the Virginia weed’. Few challenged this lazy 
establishment acceptance of corporate criminality, and it was left 
to a single MP, James Silk Buckingham, to declare that ‘the whole 
guilt rested with the Company, as it was they who furnished the 
opium from India, and their supercargoes at Canton who licensed 
the smugglers in China, so that the beginning and the end of this 
illicit and contraband trade was theirs’. But others were looking 
ahead. For Marjoribanks, who had retired from the Company and 
had reappeared as a free trade advocate in Parliament, what was 
now needed was ‘a system for firmness’ to ‘make the Europeans 
respected’ in China.37 And when Parliament finally decided to open 
the China trade to all in August 1833, Jardine Matheson was ready, 
shipping out the first consignments of free-trade tea. 
The passing of a commercial era invariably brings financial crisis 
as assets are revalued. In the Company’s case, the end of its trading 
monopoly created an unprecedented credit crunch back in Calcutta. 
The system of private ‘agency houses’ that had grown up under the 
Company’s wings to serve the China trade was now exposed to the 
full glare of competition. Recession back in Britain exacerbated the 
situation and anticipating the end of the Company era, Palmer & 
Co, one of the oldest and largest of the Houses, was the first to fall 
in 1830, precipitating a complete crash. ‘These great houses, which 
had been the principal channel of conducting the export and import 
trade of India for a half a century’, wrote John Crawfurd, ‘fell, one 
after another, in the course of three short years’.38 Traders that had 
thrived by the market were quick to seek a government bail-out, 
appealing to London that ‘the commercial prosperity of England 
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has more than once been shaken to its foundation, and has only 
been saved from utter destruction by the interference of Government 
itself’.39 This time the government stuck to its free market guns. 
Over £15 million was lost in the collapse of the Agency Houses, 
just over £1 billion in today’s prices. The British agency traders, so 
dismissive of the Canton System, would have done well to install 
their own Consoo Fund to repay the creditors.
ENFORCING THE pOISON TRadE
Not everyone was gung-ho about the new era of laissez faire in the 
China seas. The editors of the Quarterly Review certainly feared 
that either ‘the old Chinese goose may not take alarm and cease 
to lay her eggs’ or that ‘the free traders will decide upon cutting 
her up at once to get hold of the supposed treasure within.’40 
From April 1834, the Company was no longer directly involved 
in trade with China, but still administered its opium monopoly 
back in India, earning a 1,000 per cent profit at its auctions. A 
Superintendent of Trade was appointed by the British Government 
with the responsibility to represent its interests in Canton. But he 
had no authority over the free traders or indeed any diplomatic 
status with the Qing authorities. The first Superintendent, Charles 
Napier, broke all the rules of protocol, sailing into Canton in 
July 1834 without permission, in a warship no less. The Chinese 
authorities promptly stopped trade, and the Royal Navy retaliated 
by bombarding the forts that guarded the entrance to Canton. This 
time the British were outmanoeuvred, and climbed down; Napier 
died of fever shortly afterwards. 
Just five years later, full-scale war broke out between Britain and 
China. In the Atlantic, the Royal Navy was proudly suppressing the 
slave trade; in the China seas, it would be deployed to enforce the 
rights of British traders to deal in opium. And behind the traders 
stood their supplier, the Company. Just months before hostilities 
broke out, William Jardine, the trader with the largest market share 
in the illicit drug, tried to shrug off the constant criticisms of his 
involvement by telling his fellow merchants in Canton, ‘we are not 
smugglers, gentlemen! It is the Chinese government, it is the Chinese 
officers who smuggle, and who connive at and encourage smuggling; 
not we: and then look at the East India Company – why, the father 
of all smuggling and smugglers is the East India Company’.41
The break came in March 1839 with the arrival in Canton of Lin 
Zexu, sent as the emperor’s special Commissioner to suppress the 
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opium trade. By then, there were an estimated 12.5 million opium 
smokers in China, draining the health and wealth of the nation. The 
Imperial Edict appointing Commissioner Lin had made clear the 
vital necessity of his task: ‘if steps be not taken for our defence … the 
useful wealth of China will be poured into the fathomless abyss of 
transmarine regions.’42 Looking back at previous efforts to curb the 
trade, Lin expected the British to back down once more, accepting 
the logic of the argument that this was an illegal and noxious trade. 
In a draft letter to Queen Victoria that was ultimately never sent, 
Lin laid out what for him was an obvious truth about opium: ‘so 
long as you continue to make it and tempt the people of China to 
buy it, you will be showing yourselves careful of your own lives, 
but careless of the lives of other people, indifferent in your greed 
for gain to the harm you do to others; such conduct is repugnant 
to human feeling and at variance with the Way of Heaven’.43 After 
surrounding the foreign trading quarters in Canton, Lin confiscated 
20,283 chests of opium – 7,000 of which belonged to the Firm. After 
making a sacrifice to the Sea Spirit for what was about to happen, 
Commissioner Lin ordered that the opium be mixed with lime and 
washed into the ocean – an act of national resistance celebrated in 
the Humen museum. But this was not the last of Lin’s demands: 
he also wanted the British to sign a bond pledging not to bring 
any more opium on pain of death. The Superintendent of Trade, 
Charles Elliott, privately deplored the opium trade, but could not 
swallow this acceptance of Chinese sovereignty. In May, unable to 
sign the bond, a humiliated Elliott withdrew the British merchant 
community from Canton. For the second time in a century, the 
calculated abuse of trade rules had forced Asian empires to crack 
down on British merchants. Just like Roger Drake, the Company’s 
president for Bengal anchored at Fulta in 1756 after the fall of 
Calcutta to Siraj-ud-Daula, Elliott was forced to languish offshore 
at nearby Hong Kong. 
The reaction of the free traders was one of somewhat staged 
fury, bitterly denouncing this assault on property when everyone 
knew that the opium was contraband. Moreover, without any 
authorisation from London, Elliott had promised the merchants 
that the British state would provide compensation, potentially 
totalling £2 million, equivalent to some £137 million in today’s 
prices. Jardine’s concern was that Parliament would do nothing, 
‘pocketing the insult and refusing to pay for the opium’.44 A sustained 
lobbying campaign followed, with Jardine persuading the Prime 
Minister, Lord Palmerston, that intervention was needed to uphold 
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British honour – and recover the £2 million compensation from the 
Chinese. The onset of the first Opium War was not plain sailing for 
the Firm, however. In Parliament, the future Prime Minister William 
Ewart Gladstone denounced the opium trade as unjust, a crime 
that would bring ‘permanent disgrace’ on Britain. Translating the 
situation into imagery that the British could understand, Williams 
Storr Fry, a leading Quaker and cocoa magnate, suggested that the 
situation was comparable to Britain deciding to ban the import of 
wine for health reasons, and the French responding by bribing the 
British customs authorities to smuggle in contraband wine, and 
when intercepted, employing armed vessels to fight their way in.45 
The expeditionary force included the iron-clad steamer 
appropriately named the Nemesis, which destroyed the Chinese 
war-fleet with its Congreve rockets. After two years of coastal 
warfare, the Chinese were bombarded into submission. In August 
1842, the Treaty of Nanjing forced China to hand over Hong Kong 
island ‘in perpetuity’, and open the five ports of Canton, Xiamen, 
Fuzhou, Ningbo and Shanghai to British trade. These traders were 
to be subject to British law, and the ancient co-hong monopoly was 
abolished. Finally, an indemnity of 21 million dollars was paid: 6 
million for the opium, 3 million to pay off co-hong debts and 12 
million to cover the cost of the war.46
The Company had taken a backseat role in the whole affair: 
enforcing the monopoly production of opium in India, and providing 
military support, sending four armed steamers, the 49th Bengal 
Volunteers, a corps of Bengal engineers and a corps of Madras 
sappers to join the British forces. Its one concern had been to ensure 
that it didn’t have to pick up the tab for the war. Jardines, however, 
had been pivotal, supplying vital intelligence and also leasing their 
well-armed but idle opium ships to the Royal Navy to bolster the 
invasion force. When the war was won, a grateful Palmerston wrote 
to Jardine’s agent, John Abel Smith, that ‘it was mainly owing’ to 
the ‘assistance that you and Mr Jardine so handsomely afforded us’ 
that ‘these satisfactory results’ were achieved, bringing ‘the most 
important advantages to the commercial interests of England’.47 
Others were less fulsome, including the up-and-coming writer 
and future Conservative Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli, who 
lampooned Jardine in his 1845 novel, Sybil, as ‘a dreadful man! A 
Scotchman richer than Croesus, one McDruggy fresh from Canton, 
with a million of opium in each pocket, denouncing corruption and 
bellowing free trade.’48
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The Company may have been stripped of its rights to trade, but 
it maintained its covetous approach towards opium. The Chinese 
had refused to legalise opium as part of the Treaty of Nanjing, and 
the British authorities temporarily banned its traffic at Hong Kong. 
Matheson was unmoved, however, viewing the proclamation as 
‘meaning nothing’, while the Company’s Governor-General in India, 
Lord Ellenborough, remonstrated that ‘Her Majesty’s Government 
should do nothing to place in peril our Opium Revenue.’49 Back in 
India, in spite of its control over the Maratha lands, non-Company 
opium was still reaching China via the ports of Sind. Following 
the humiliating retreat from Afghanistan in 1841, Ellenborough 
sought to restore the reputation of the Company Bahadur (‘Brave 
Company’) through a more convenient invasion. The conquest of 
Sind in 1843 went ahead on the flimsiest of grounds, an act of 
aggression described by the social reformer Lord Ashley as a ‘foul 
stain’ on the nation’s honour.50 Punch magazine tried to satirise 
the crime with its conqueror Major-General Sir Charles Napier 
exclaiming, ‘Peccavi’ – Latin for ‘I have sinned’. To this day, Napier’s 
triumphant statue stands in London’s Trafalgar Square. With Sind in 
its possession, the Company had complete control of India’s opium 
outlets, and could have decided to retrench and cut production. 
Instead it used its dominance to raise the duty on opium exports 
from Bombay from £12 to £40 in 1847. 
As for tea, the Company had long aspired to break China’s 
monopoly by encouraging production in its Indian acquisitions. 
One of the consolation prizes of Macartney’s ill-fated expedition 
was a gift of some tea seeds, which were successfully germinated at 
the Company’s botanical gardens in Calcutta. But it was not until 
the loss of the monopoly in 1834 that the Company moved from 
gentlemanly collecting to aggressive development. A Tea Committee 
was established to import seeds from China and find appropriate 
land in India for cultivation. In the recently annexed territory of 
Assam in the north-east, the Committee located some indigenous 
tea plants, and declared that ‘we have no hesitation in declaring 
this discovery to be by far the most important and valuable that 
has ever been made on matters connected with the agricultural 
or commercial resources of this empire’.51 On 10 January 1839, 
two days after Commissioner Lin had set out from Beijing to close 
down Canton’s drug trade, the Company’s first batch of Indian 
tea was auctioned in London. A new joint stock corporation, the 
Assam Company, was soon launched with capital of £500,000. 
But the Company still needed the seeds and expertise of China if 
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production was to flourish. The opening up of the five new treaty 
ports gave it a base in China from which to acquire the materials 
it needed. In what would today be described as bio-piracy, the 
Company commissioned Robert Fortune to bring back thousands 
of plants and seeds for its budding Indian plantations. Knowing 
that the Emperor ‘prevented foreigners from visiting any of the 
districts where tea is cultivated’, Fortune disguised himself as a 
local, getting the distinctive male queue sewn into his hair.52 No 
Company employee had ever reached the tea gardens and factories, 
and before Fortune, the Company had believed that green and black 
teas came from different plants. By getting inside a tea factory for 
the first time, Fortune was able to reveal that the difference lay in 
the fact that black tea was fermented. He also exposed the reality 
that half a pound of plaster and cyanide was included in every 100 
lb of tea – not to poison the foreign barbarians but to dye the tea a 
more distinctive green. But Fortune’s real triumph was the successful 
transportation of thousands of germinating black tea seeds from 
Bohea back to Calcutta. Replanted in the Company’s Himalayan 
territories, these seedlings provided the basis for a new industry 
that would soon ‘outstrip China’s in quality, volume and price’, 
according to Sarah Rose who has retraced Fortune’s journey. For 
her, what the Company had engineered was ‘the greatest theft of 
trade secrets in the history of mankind.’53
The first Opium War may have opened the door wider into China 
– letting in adventurers such as Robert Fortune – but it solved 
nothing. Expectations of increasing British exports into China had 
failed to materialise, and the Qing refused to revise the provisions 
of the 1842 treaty. Its attention was diverted by the anti-Manchu 
Taiping rebellion that had broken out in 1850; over the next 15 
years tens of millions would be killed in the revolt. With China 
convulsed by civil war, the British found an opportunity to reopen 
hostilities and resolve the issues left open at Nanjing. Gunboats 
were sent in once more, and the British government despatched 
another punitive force. But when it reached Singapore in June 1857, 
terrible news was waiting: the Company’s sepoys had mutinied 
across northern India. The bulk of the force heading for China was 
diverted immediately to Calcutta to help defeat the mutineers. In a 
powerful symbol of the end of a commercial era, as the Company 
fought for its survival in India, the factories that had housed foreign 
merchants for over a century in Canton were burnt to the ground 
in December 1857. By the time the second opium war was over in 
October 1860, opium legalised and Beijing’s Summer Palace looted 
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of its treasures, the Company’s presence in Asia was no more. For 
Marx, writing in the New York Daily Tribune, the second opium 
war was driven by an exceptional struggle between ‘the Celestial 
Emperor, [who] in order to check the suicide of his people prohibited 
at once the import of the poison by the foreigner’ and ‘the East India 
Company [who] was rapidly converting the cultivation of opium 
in India and its contraband sale to China into internal parts of its 
own financial system’.54 With his characteristic knack for getting 
to the nub, Marx revealed the hypocrisy at the heart of British 
strategy. ‘While openly preaching free trade in poison’, he wrote, 
‘it secretly defends the monopoly of its manufacture. Whenever we 
look closely into the nature of British free trade, monopoly is pretty 
generally found to lie at the bottom of its “freedom”.’55 Queen 
Victoria was amongst those who welcomed the victorious troops on 
their return to Britain in December 1860, and was delighted with 
her own trophy of the Summer Palace, a Pekinese dog, promptly 
nicknamed ‘Looty’, confirming Nehru’s much later prison-bound 




The Firm had got its way. Like so many nabobs before them, the 
duo quickly shook off the murky origins of their wealth and became 
pillars of the British establishment. Jardine had become a Whig 
MP in July 1841 in the midst of the first Opium War and bought 
a country estate at Lanrick in Perthshire. But he died less than a 
year after the successful conclusion of his masterpiece, the Treaty 
of Nanjing. Matheson promptly took over Jardine’s parliamentary 
seat at Ashburton, later transferring to represent Ross and Cromarty 
in Scotland, a more convenient constituency after his purchase of 
the Hebridean island of Lewis for over half a million pounds in 
1844. With no children of his own, James Matheson’s interest in 
the Firm fell to his nephew, Donald. But this second generation 
Matheson was wracked with doubts over the morality of the opium 
trade. Donald resigned as a partner in 1849, and for the next half 
century waged war through his active membership of the Society 
for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, becoming chairman of the 
Society in 1892. The Firm itself was also diversifying out of opium. 
But as Robert Blake, the biographer of Jardine Matheson observes: 
‘the reason for the Firm’s withdrawal from the trade had nothing 
to do with ethical considerations’ rather it was the emergence of 
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the more formidable competitor in the form of the Bombay-based, 
David Sassoon.56 Throughout the nineteenth century, China’s 
addiction to opium deepened, with domestic production adding 
to the steadily increasing inflows from British India. The pinnacle 
of the trade was reached in 1879–80, with shipments of 105,000 
chests, four times the size at the end of the Company’s China trade 
in 1833. But revenues had already peaked in 1871–2, and then fell 
by three-quarters by the end of the century. Opium had served its 
purpose in terms of being the vanguard of Britain’s commercial 
interests, and in 1895, 80 per cent of the external trade of China 
was with the British Empire.57 Only in 1907 did Britain finally agree 
to stop the export of Indian opium, and in 1911, its cultivation 
was abandoned in Bihar as a result of the ‘loss of the Chinese 
market’. But the government monopoly of opium production for 
medicinal purposes continues unbroken in independent India, with 
the state-run Opium and Alkaloid Works occupying the same site 
in Ghazipur established by the East India Company almost two 
centuries ago in 1820. 
For China’s modern authorities, the opium saga has a two-edged 
meaning, marking both the beginning of ‘a century of national 
humiliation’ at the hands of foreign imperialists, and also the first 
example of the Chinese people’s patriotic resistance, culminating 
in the Communist revolution of 1949. Amidst the capitalist success 
of today’s Pearl River delta, the Opium Wars are powerfully 
memorialised in a string of state-sanctioned monuments and 
museums. In Humen, a huge opium pipe stands broken in two in 
the town’s central square. Further on stands the Sea Battle Museum 
and the old fortress of Shajio Paotai where children scramble on the 
ancient cannon in the shade of the sprawling banyan trees. After the 
huge displays depicting Commissioner Lin directing the destruction 
of the Company’s opium in 1839, the Humen Opium War Museum 
concludes that this act of defiance ‘dispelled Chinese humiliation’ 
and ‘unveiled Chinese modern history’. This is state-directed 
messaging, and the museum is managed by an ‘advanced unit in 
National Patriotic Education’ part of the publicity department of the 
Communist Party’s Central Committee.58 For historian Julia Lovell, 
‘one of the reasons that the regime draws so much attention to the 
‘century of humiliation’ is that it dreads the Chinese remembering 
the man-made disasters of the Maoist period’.59
While the opium wars are actively deployed to fight modern 
political battles in China, elsewhere they remain almost invisible. 
Celebrating its 175-year history in 2007, Jardines praised the way 
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the two founders ‘built strong relationships in business that set 
the standards which subsequent generations were to follow’. But 
only one passive reference was made to the drug on which the 
business was built: ‘during the mid 1800s, tea, silks, cotton and 
opium were traded through different firms along the vast trade 
routes between China, India and Britain … The times were tough 
and the competition was fierce’.60 Opium might have disappeared 
from Jardine Matheson’s contemporary public image, but the Firm 
remains one of the clearest corporate links with the dying days of 
the East India Company.
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TaMING THE TIGER 
The whitewashed ramparts of Fort St George now serve a purely 
symbolic purpose, vainly keeping out the twenty-first century from 
the military and government offices that lie within its walls. The 
bastion of the main entrance resembles the prow of some enormous 
ocean-going vessel, with its 150-foot flagstaff imitating the original 
mast that had been erected by Elihu Yale in the 1680s to fly the 
St George’s Cross. As the location of the Company’s first major 
trading hub in India, Madras was the site for a century of largely 
consensual commerce with local rulers. It was here that Elihu Yale 
made the fortune that would endow his college back in New Haven, 
Connecticut, and here that Thomas Pitt acquired the diamond that 
would finance his political dynasty.
This all changed in the 1740s with the irruption of world war onto 
Indian soil. The first battles between British and French interests 
were fought up and down the short stretch of Coromandel coastline 
that separates Madras from Pondicherry. In the first exchange, 
during the Austrian War of Succession, French forces breached the 
walls in 1746 and occupied Fort St George for three years, pushing 
the Company’s traders (including Robert Clive) south to Fort St 
David in Cuddalore. But Madras was restored to the Company 
when the war ended in Europe. A decade later, in 1761, it was the 
Company’s turn to conquer Pondicherry, but it also had to hand 
it back two years later as part of the Treaty of Paris which ended 
the Seven Years War. What remained, however, was the Company’s 
total domination over the neighbouring nawab of Arcot. Along with 
commerce and conquest, the Company’s executives discovered a 
third route to personal riches: credit. Under the cover of Company 
control, ever-more grandiose loans at usurious rates were provided 
to the ‘nabob’ to sustain ‘a large undisciplined army for the mere 
indulgence of idle parade’ in the words of his chief creditor, Paul 
Benfield.1 As we have seen, for the next half century, the ‘nabob 
of Arcot’s debts’ became an enduring symbol of the Company’s 
corruption. Privately contracted but publicly enforced, these debts 
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could only be collected through a combination of extortionate taxes 
on the people of Arcot and aggression against local states. In March 
1769, the Directors in London wrote to the Council in Madras 
expressing ‘great surprize’ that the Company had been ‘plunged into 
a war to put him [the nawab of Arcot] in possession of the Mysore 
revenues for the discharge of the debt’.2 The strategy backfired 
and Sultan Hyder Ali’s forces came to the walls of Madras, news 
of which precipitated the bursting of the ‘Bengal bubble’ on the 
London markets. This was just the first of four wars between the 
Company and Mysore, defining much of the Company’s imperial 
strategy following the acquisition of Bengal’s diwani in 1765. 
A new set of global factors in the form of the American War of 
Independence prompted the second conflict in 1780, when Hyder 
Ali supported the French as part of the anti-British coalition. Hyder 
Ali once more invaded the Madras Presidency and at Pollilur in 
September 1780, Mysore smashed the Company’s forces. For Britain, 
Pollilur was just the beginning of a year of military reverses, with 
the pivotal surrender of Yorktown by Lord Cornwallis following 
in October 1781. But as far as the Company was concerned, defeat 
in America ultimately brought relief in India, though only 1,300 
of the 10,000 troops captured at Pollilur would survive to be 
handed over in 1784. With insufficient naval forces of his own and 
unreliable support from the French, Hyder Ali was unable to drive 
the Company out of Madras, lamenting that ‘I can defeat them on 
land, but I cannot swallow the sea’.3
It was Hyder’s son, Tipu, known as the Tiger, who became 
the real ‘terror of Leadenhall Street’. Fondly seen by subsequent 
nationalists as a modernising Indian ruler, Tipu sought to match the 
Company’s institutional and technological advantages by investing 
heavily in agricultural improvement and naval expansion. He also 
built on his father’s diplomatic connections to construct an alliance 
with revolutionary France, earning the title of ‘Citizen Tipu’ in 
the process. But in 1792, Tipu was forced to surrender half his 
kingdom to the one-time failure of Yorktown, Charles Cornwallis, 
who had become Governor-General of India in 1785. Once more, 
Tipu allied himself with France, trusting that Napoleon’s invasion of 
Egypt in 1798 would open the way for the expulsion of the British 
from India. Nelson’s victory at the Battle of the Nile dashed these 
hopes, and in May 1799, Tipu died in his capital of Seringapatam as 
the Company’s troops under Richard Wellesley, Lord Mornington, 
overwhelmed the city. Madras was finally safe from external threats. 
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The Company’s victory over Mysore in 1799 marked more than 
just the defeat of another local rival. It also marked the passing of 
the age of merchants. The Company’s outward appearance might 
have looked mightier than ever, with unprecedented trade, revenues 
and military might. Yet as a free-standing commercial corporation, 
the Company’s trajectory was remorselessly downhill, so that it 
became little more than an implementing agency for imperial 
expansion, its commercial character peeled away until it traded 
in little but paper. 
puRGING THE STaIN OF IMMORalITY
Military victory alone was insufficient to restore British fortunes in 
India. A new regime had to be introduced to confront the extreme 
oddities created by a shareholder-owned corporation ruling over 
tens of millions of people. The reforms of the 1770s and 1780s had 
punctured the Company’s autonomy as a business, and the 1784 
India Act had introduced a two-tier system – a ‘double government’ 
– with the Company maintaining a façade of authority, behind 
which the state pulled the strings through the Board of Control. 
Where Burke was all passion and principle, the Tory duo of Pitt 
and Dundas were single-minded in their utterly pragmatic pursuit of 
power. The fish was now hooked, and successive Whitehall ministers 
would reel in the Company’s remaining privileges one by one until 
it was a mere corporate husk. 
Dundas dominated the new Board and the tool he deployed to 
engineer this regime-change was Charles, Lord Cornwallis, who 
took over as Governor-General of Bengal in 1786. Having been 
a part of the loss of the American colonies across the Atlantic, 
Cornwallis’s task was to secure the empire in the East. He could 
not have been more different from his predecessor, Hastings. 
Educated at Eton and Cambridge, he had made his career as an 
imperial warrior, fighting in Europe before his defeat in America 
at Yorktown. By class, Cornwallis was a landed aristocrat with 
extensive estates in Suffolk. He had no experience of commerce, 
and harboured an entrenched distaste for trade, describing the 
Company’s establishment in India as ‘a system of the dirtiest 
jobbing’.4 What he found when he arrived in Bengal was an empty 
treasury and an economy scarred by famine and rebellion. Over the 
next decade, Cornwallis’ response would be to insulate Company 
rule from the corrupting influences of trade and indeed from India 
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itself in the vain hope that this would restore financial health for 
both the British state and the Company’s shareholders.
One of Cornwallis’s key decisions was to separate the Company’s 
civil and commercial branches to put a stop to the structural 
embezzlement of corporate revenues. In Madras, Paul Benfield 
was finally dismissed from the Company’s service and expelled 
from India. More profoundly still, Cornwallis decided to banish 
Indians from the Company’s administrative machine. Unlike 
generations of Company merchants who had intermingled with 
local society, Cornwallis declared that ‘every native of India, I verily 
believe, is corrupt’.5 In 1791, he ordered that ‘no person, the son 
of a Native Indian, shall henceforward be appointed by this Court 
to Employment in the Civil, Military, or Marine Service of the 
Company’. As part of this, Cornwallis abolished the historic Mughal 
office of qanungu, the ‘speaker of regulations’, who oversaw the 
administration of land revenues, to be replaced by a network of 
British district collectors.
Equally profound was Cornwallis’s ‘permanent settlement’ of tax 
collection in Bengal, introduced to resolve the Company’s continuing 
financial crisis once and for all. Taxes had certainly risen under 
Company rule in Bengal. One estimate suggests that the annual 
taxes collected in Bengal during Mir Kasim’s reign in the early 1760s 
amounted to about £646,000 growing to £1,470,000 in the first 
year of the Company’s diwani. During the 1770s, the collection had 
advanced to £2,577,000 and by 1790–1 to £2,680,000, a four-fold 
increase in 30 years.6 But the Company was constantly adjusting 
the tax system as it struggled to understand the conditions on the 
ground. Starting with Philip Francis, a growing number within the 
Company believed that the only way to resolve the situation was 
to fix the system of tax collection in perpetuity. In a case of tragic 
misperception, the Company’s analysts came to see the zamindari 
class of Mughal tax-farmers as equivalent to the propertied landed 
gentry of England, with the ryots as their tenants. But self-interest 
was at work as well. The Company wanted to build up a political 
class of landholders who would support their presence. In place of 
complex systems of ownership, with intersecting rights and respon-
sibilities, Cornwallis introduced an essentially English model of 
landholding, the system from which he had benefitted handsomely 
back home. 
For Cornwallis, this ‘permanent settlement’ was ‘the only effectual 
mode to render the proprietors of the lands economical landlords 
and the prudent trustees of the public interest’.7 And so on 22 
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March 1793, a proclamation was made fixing the jumma at £3 
million ‘for ever’. For this, Bengal’s peasantry were sacrificed in the 
same way as the rights of England’s commoners had been crushed 
by the enclosure movement.8 The zamindars were given exclusive 
rights over their lands and, in Ranajit Guha’s phrase, a ‘rule of 
property’ was introduced.9 According to John Capper, writing in 
the 1850s, the result was that ‘20 million small landholders were 
dispossessed of their rights, and handed over, bound hand and foot 
to the tender mercies of a set of exacting rack-renters’.10 From an 
imperial perspective, this was Cornwallis’s greatest achievement 
– absorbing the Company’s territories in Bengal into a legal and 
administrative system that was fully aligned to the wider needs of 
the British Empire. Almost a century later, the one-time Company 
executive, John Stuart Mill, would write that this blind application 
of a foreign system of economic management had resulted in ‘one 
of the greatest social revolutions ever effected in a country’ turning 
peasant proprietors into mere tenants.11 The great paradox of 
Cornwallis’s ultimately doomed attempt to fix a dynamic economic 
system in stone was that nine out of Bengal’s 12 ‘great zamindaris’ 
were dismembered as lands were ruthlessly auctioned off to satisfy 
the Company’s inflexible tax demands.12 Over 163,000 lawsuits 
over arrears remained outstanding in 1812. 
On his return to England in 1793, the grateful merchants of 
London made Cornwallis an honorary freeman of the City, awarding 
him a gold medal in a gilded box. After the chaos of Clive and the 
half-measures of Hastings, Cornwallis’s rule as Governor-General 
became the foundation stone for a new imperial mythology of 
dispassionate and incorruptible service. At the heart of Cornwallis’s 
place in the imperial pantheon was his role in suppressing one of the 
last spasms of Madras’s ‘old corruption’: the case of Avadhanum 
Paupiah. Paupiah was a Telugu brahmin who had become a dubash 
(translator/agent, it literally means ‘two languages’) to two rising 
stars of the Madras Presidency, John and Edward J. Holland in the 
1780s. Under Cornwallis, John Holland became Governor for a 
year in 1789, followed by his brother for just a week in February 
1790, and both became notorious for their corruption. One person 
stood in their way, David Haliburton, a senior merchant of 20 
years standing, the Company’s Persian translator and, crucially, a 
member of the board of revenue, giving him a position to thwart 
the Hollands’s plans to manipulate the tax system for their private 
benefit. To get him out of the way, the Hollands and Paupiah 
fabricated an elaborate plot to charge Haliburton with bribery and 
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formenting rebellion. But Haliburton did not go quietly, and when 
the plot was discovered, the Hollands fled back to England. For 
Cornwallis, the case was just another example of the rotten model 
of governance he had been sent to cleanse. Writing to Dundas on 
the last day of 1790, Cornwallis argued that ‘the whole system of 
this Presidency is founded on the good old principles of Leadenhall-
street economy – small salaries and immense perquisites, and if the 
Directors alone could be ruined by it, everybody would say they 
deserved it, but unfortunately it is not the Court of Directors but 
the British nation who must be the sufferers.’13 Paupiah, however, 
was arrested with his accomplices and charged with conspiracy. An 
all British jury convicted him in July 1792 and the judge sentenced 
Paupiah to jail for three years along with a fine of £2,000; until the 
fine was paid he was to stand in the pillory for an hour. 
Haliburton did not let the matter rest there. With the help of his 
relative, the young and then unpublished novelist, Walter Scott, 
Haliburton printed The Trial of Avadaunum Paupiah, in order ‘to 
guard all persons who may hereafter hold high and responsible 
situations under the honourable company against the wily wickedness 
of dubashes’ and, more broadly, against ‘the unprincipled audacity 
of the natives of India’.14 Two decades later, Scott would recycle 
the material and immortalise Paupiah in his book, The Surgeon’s 
Daughter, as ‘the master counselor of dark projects, an Oriental 
Machiavel, whose premature wrinkles were the result of many an 
intrigue without scruples, to attain political or private advantage’.15 
In nineteenth-century Britain, Scott’s characterisation of Paupiah 
exemplified the inherently untrustworthy Asiatic who needed to 
be distanced – as Cornwallis had done – if sound government was 
ever to be achieved. Cornwallis died on duty in Ghazipur in 1805 
during his second tour as Governor-General, and a handsome 
monument was placed at the heart of St Paul’s Cathedral, depicting 
the imperial warrior with a stern armed Britannia by his side, and 
a grieving Indian widow and downcast Hindu sadhu at his feet. 
Speaking at the monument’s blessing, Dean Milman of St Paul’s 
lauded how Cornwallis ‘strove to rule India not as a conquered 
country but for the benefit of our subjects’, labouring all the time 
‘with primitive wisdom to repress the dominant grasping rapacity 
and insolent contempt of our native subjects’.16 By the time that 
the great imperial historian, John Seeley, was writing in 1883, the 
mythology of Cornwallis was complete. For Seeley, Burke had 
achieved ‘immortal glory’ for revealing the dangers of the Company 
system under Hastings. But it was under the rule of Cornwallis 
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that ‘the stain of immorality did pass away as if by magic from the 
administration of the Company’.17
While Cornwallis was overturning Bengal’s landed structure, 
in the imperial metropolis Henry Dundas was focusing on the 
Company’s trading operations. From the dire days of bailiffs 
and plummeting share prices, its finances showed strong signs of 
recovery in the 1780s and 1790s. The Company’s capital stock 
was increased for the first time since 1709, first with an injection 
of £800,000 at £155 in 1786 and then another £1,000,000 at 
£174 in 1789. This took the paid-in capital to £5 million. And, 
in February 1792, the Company shares hit £200 for the first time 
since 1770. When its charter came up for renewal in 1793, the 
Company came under attack from Britain’s rising industrial interest, 
who saw its monopoly as a major barrier to successful export to 
Asia. Ever the pragmatist, Dundas recognised that the Company’s 
import monopoly was still essential as a means of returning tribute. 
But its right of exclusive export no longer served the national 
interest. Sweetening the pill for the Company and its shareholders 
by supporting an increase of its guaranteed dividend from 8 to 
10 per cent, Dundas breached its monopoly by requiring the 
Company to offer at least 3,000 tonnes a year to private exporters, 
around one-third of the total. ‘My plan is to engraft an open trade 
upon the exclusive privilege of the Company,’ he told the House 
of Commons.18 By the end of the decade, private trade would 
represent over 40 per cent of Bengal’s total imports and exports, 
perforating the Company’s monopoly. The 1793 Charter Act also 
underscored the profound shift in both financial power between 
state and corporation since the 1770s. Where once the Crown had 
relied on capital from the Company, now it was the Company who 
could not survive without government support for its increasingly 
expensive military-corporate complex in India. Technically, the 
government still owed the Company £4.2 million in loans incurred 
since the previous century. These were written off in 1793 and the 
Company was authorised to increase its capital stock by another 
£1,000,000, taking it to £6 million. Dundas’s behind-the-scenes 
role was formalised with the creation of a new post of President of 
the Board of Control, and he would match the freeing up of trade 
in Asian commodities with the insertion of open competition into 
the chartering of the Company’s fleet.
War had broken out with France, and the 1793 Act passed through 
Parliament almost unnoticed. From the back-benches, Philip Francis 
was one of the few MPs either to bother with the proceedings or to 
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recognise their importance, accusing his old foe Dundas of ‘holding 
up the name of the Company as a mask and a stalking horse to 
shelter the operation of a real power which skulks behind it’.19 
With the dividend secure, the Company turned its attentions to the 
important task of building a new headquarters on Leadenhall Street 
that matched its undisputed role as the mercantile ruler of India.
THE MalaBaR ITCH
Cornwallis was the first in a succession of soldier aristocrats who 
drove the Company’s operations in India. Clive and Hastings had 
shown how the successful deployment of the Company’s private 
army could reap corporate and private benefits – additional taxes 
for the Company’s exchequer and the spoils of war for the officer 
class. Between 1763 and 1805, the Company’s army had grown 
almost ten-fold from 18,000 to 154,500, far beyond the needs of 
self-defence. This created a powerful dynamic in favour of further 
aggression. Indeed, with the end of the private trade era, military 
adventurism was the only avenue left open for aspiring individuals 
to make their fortune in India. Nominally, this was at odds with the 
legal requirements of the 1784 East India Act which had ruled that 
‘to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India 
are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour and policy of this 
nation’. But after Cornwallis’s relatively restrained administration, 
Illustration 9.1 unknown, East India House, constructed 1796–1799
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the reopening of conflict with France gave a perfect cover for a new 
phase of aggression under Richard Wellesley, the Governor-General 
from 1798 to 1805. 
In south-west India, Wellesley brought the 30-year conflict with 
Mysore to a crushing close. In May 1799, Seringapatam was finally 
sacked and Tipu killed. Writing in triumph to Dundas at the Board 
of Control, Wellesley hoped that his conquest would ‘enable me to 
gratify your voracious appetite for lands and fortresses’.20 The booty 
for the victorious Company forces was immense, and Seringapatam’s 
treasures were scattered across the museums and country houses of 
England. The loot included Tipu’s infamous ‘Man-Tyger-Organ’, 
a life-size model of a tiger chewing out the neck of a Company 
soldier, which growled when wound up. This was shipped back 
to the Company’s own in-house museum of oriental curiosities on 
Leadenhall Street, and later transferred across London to where it 
now stands on display at the Victoria and Albert Museum. 
Conquest also provided the Company with the opportunity to 
deploy its well-tried techniques of monopoly extraction in new 
territories. Malabar’s experience highlights the economic trauma 
so often brought by Company rule. Land taxes were tightened, 
and monopolies introduced over the production and sale of salt, 
tobacco and timber – the latter to secure a vital supply of teak for 
the Royal Navy in the war against Napoleon.21 The Company also 
established a massive 1,000-acre spice plantation at Anjarakandi 
to produce cinnamon, coffee, pepper and nutmeg. But the land for 
the plantation was usurped, and its labourers effectively kidnapped 
to work as little more than slaves. Children were taken from their 
families in the middle of the night, with clothes stuffed in their 
mouths to keep them quiet and all caste marks removed.22 Not 
surprisingly, perhaps, the local people refused to sell pepper vines 
to the new plantation manager, Murdoch Brown, to stock his spice 
garden. But this was only the beginning of the backlash. 
In the first decade of Company rule, Malabar rose up twice 
in rebellion, led by a local nobleman, the Pazhassi Rajah. The 
Anjarakandi plantation was a particular focus of hatred and was 
laid waste by the rebels. Avoiding open combat with the Company’s 
troops, the Pazhassi Rajah took to the Wynad jungles and waged 
guerrilla war. The younger brother of the Governor-General, 
Arthur Wellesley, commanded the Company’s troops in the area 
and responded with terror. ‘The more deserted villages you burn and 
the more cattle and other property that are carried off the better’, 
Wellesley wrote to one of his officers, adding to another that ‘the 
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people of Malabar are not to be coaxed into submission: terror, 
however, will induce them to give up their arms’.23 The Company’s 
remorseless tactics bore fruit and in 1805, the Pazhassi Rajah was 
eventually surrounded in the hills. Local tradition tells that he then 
committed suicide by swallowing an immense diamond. 
As Company rule became entrenched, the situation of the 
local people deteriorated sharply. In 1819, the inhabitants of 
Kadatanad petitioned the Company to relieve the burden of tax 
and other oppressions. 
Instances have occurred [they wrote] of some respectable persons 
having put a voluntary end to their life, so as not to survive the 
cruel necessity of not being able to afford relief to their dying 
children. Neither in the time of the Rajahs nor Tippoo, have 
our ancestors and ourselves experienced such grievances and 
been reduced to such cruel necessities. We are no longer able to 
endure them.24
In the hills, low-level conflict continued for decades as the 
Kurichiar tribals resisted Company attempts to stop their practices of 
shifting cultivation. For his pains, Wellesley picked up the ‘Malabar 
itch’, a virulent skin infection that proved resistant to the normal 
lard and sulphur treatment, and could only be removed by frequent 
baths in diluted nitric acid.25 Wellesley would later be known as the 
‘sepoy general’ for his Indian exploits, winning the title Duke of 
Wellington for his wars against Napoleon. The Anjarakandi estate 
still operates more than 200 years on, a prototype for the plantation 
economy that came to dominate the hills of Kerala in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. 
Governor-General Wellesley would next turn his attention to the 
Marathas, winning Agra, Delhi and Gujarat in 1803; conflict with 
the confederation would only be conclusively resolved in 1818. In 
the process, however, he consumed £2.5 million in bullion shipped 
to India by the Company to pay for its trading operations, and 
plunged the Company once more into chronic deficit. Wellesley also 
resorted to local bond issues at between 5 and 12 per cent to pay for 
his wars: in this way his conquests relied not just on Indian soliders, 
but also on Indian capital. The Company’s debts soared from just 
£9 million in 1792 to £30 million in 1809, adding the extra burden 
of interest repayment to the load that the Indian taxpayer had to 
support. But Wellesley outlasted both Dundas and Pitt, returning 
to Britain as a hero in 1805, escaping Parliamentary censure as 
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Clive had before him. The facts spoke for themselves. At the end of 
Cornwallis’s first administration, the Company was still essentially a 
coastal power, controlling just 388,500 km2 of land out of a possible 
4.17 million. To this, Wellesley had added another 50,000 km2 in 
each of his seven years in office.26 This impulse for invasion would 
remain primary throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Military action had become ‘the master, not the servant of business 
opportunity’.27 Not only did this breach the terms of the 1784 
Act, but broke just about every treaty with Indian rulers, causing 
immense human suffering in the process. Unable and unwilling to 
stop the slide, the directors were simply guilty of ‘cant and whining 
about the accession of territory’, wrote Randle Jackson and Joseph 
Hume in February 1819, adding that ‘the regular system for the 
last thirty to forty years has been to lament deeply over the act and 
to pocket the income’.28 Wars large and small continued to be the 
focus of attention for the next 40 years from Afghanistan, Punjab 
and Sind in the west to Nepal and Burma in the north and east. 
THE dHaKa EaRTHQuaKE
The decade-long war with France that followed the 1793 charter 
severely disrupted the Company’s operations, depressing trade and 
playing havoc with its finances. In the City of London, its share price 
languished long after the Battle of Waterloo had decided the contest, 
and only exceeded £200 with any confidence from 1817 onwards. 
By then, the Company’s 200-year monopoly of trade with India 
had been broken. Industrial interests had forced the initial breach 
in 1793, and by the time the Company’s 20-year charter came up 
for review once more in 1813, they had gathered sufficient strength 
to open the Indian trade to all.
Throughout the eighteenth century, the competitiveness of Indian 
textiles had prompted the introduction of extensive protectionist 
barriers in England to protect domestic producers. It was behind 
these walls that Britain’s infant textile sector could grow, responding 
to India’s entrenched labour cost advantage with mechanisation. This 
early modern strategy of import-substitution proved remarkably 
successful. Imitation ‘calicoes’ were manufactured in Britain from 
the early 1770s, and in 1781, mass production of British ‘muslins’ 
commenced. Only five years later, the first Lancashire cottons were 
being exported to India, a small fraction of the 500,000 pieces of 
industrial muslin being churned out annually. Industrial muscle had 
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done the job: by 1793, a Lancashire mill operative had become 400 
times more productive than the average Indian weaver. 
In the run-up to the 1793 charter renewal, Manchester cotton 
manufacturers had petitioned the government that their goods 
should be received duty-free in India, while the wearing of Indian 
cottons should be banned in Britain. The government sensibly 
rejected this self-serving nonsense – for the time being. Underneath 
the surface, however, the Company’s well-established import–export 
business was being eaten away. Mill-made cottons took increasing 
slices of the Company’s market share of textiles in both Britain and 
its key re-export markets in Africa. Simultaneously, Napoleon’s 
‘continental system’ had eliminated the important re-export trade 
with the rest of Europe. From £3 million worth of Indian textiles 
brought back to England in 1798, the Company imported just 
£433,000 in 1807. Worse still, the goods it did import could no 
longer be sold at a profit, resulting in over £7 million of unwanted 
Bengal cottons piling up in the Company’s London warehouses. 
This time the government could not ignore the mass of petitions 
that flooded into Westminster calling for an end to the Company’s 
exclusive position. In addition, mounting Indian debts forced the 
Company to request a loan of £2,500,000 from the government in 
April 1812. This combination of industrial lobbying and financial 
distress left the Company in no position to resist the push for greater 
liberalisation. As a result, its commercial monopoly was removed for 
all except the China trade, which was extended for another 20 years. 
For many, notably the evangelical William Wilberforce, trade was 
no longer the main issue where the Company was concerned, but 
rather the promotion of Christianity. After years of campaigning, 
Wilberforce and others managed to include in the 1813 Charter Act 
provisions for the establishment of a Church of England bishopric 
in India, as well as the removal of the Company’s longstanding ban 
on missionary activity. 
As Smith had predicted, the Company was soon unable to 
compete against the surge of new entrepreneurs, and it ceased 
exporting merchandise to India in 1824, largely because there was 
little it could buy in India for sale back in Britain. The loss of 
the India trade marked the pinnacle of the Company’s commercial 
operations, with sales at auction yielding over £8 million in 1814, 
four times the level in 1757. Thereafter, sales steadily declined to 
less than £4 million in 1833.29 For India’s producers, this so-called 
opening of trade brought little relief. In the wake of the Bengal 
Revolution, the East India Company had used its political position 
Robins T02502 01 text   182 30/08/2012   09:22
a SKulKING pOWER 183
to establish monopoly control over Bengal’s weavers. Its hunger for 
the weavers’ output was still as strong, if not stronger, than ever 
before as it looked for new ways of returning the wealth of Bengal 
to Britain through increased exports of cloth. Exploitation certainly 
followed in the most cruel form, and for the weavers the result was 
dislocation and impoverishment. Paradoxically, however, it was the 
end of the Company’s trading monopoly in 1813 that would turn 
this terrible situation into one of complete destitution. A 20 per cent 
increase in import duties on Indian goods was added in 1813 to 
ensure that open competition did not challenge the British producer. 
This took the tariff wall to a huge 78 per cent on calicoes and 31 
per cent on muslins. ‘Had not such prohibitory duties and decrees 
existed,’ wrote Henry Wilson in 1858, ‘the mills of Paisley and 
Manchester would have stopped in their outset and could scarcely 
have been set in motion, even by the powers of steam.’30 In place 
of its earlier position as the monopoly purchaser of Indian cloth, 
the Company’s new role was simply to prevent the introduction of 
any countervailing measures to ‘level the playing field’. 
The earthquake that struck Dhaka in 1812 – demolishing the 
Company’s agency building in Tejgaon – was only a portent of 
a far more savage economic disaster that was about to strike. In 
1753, just before Plassey, Dhaka exported Rs2,850,000 in textiles 
to Britain; by the end of the century, this had already fallen to 
Rs1,362,000. But it took only four years following the removal 
of the Company’s monopoly for exports to cease altogether, and 
in 1818, the Company’s cloth ‘factory’ at Dhaka was wound up. 
The city imploded upon itself, and by 1840, its population had 
fallen from 150,000 to just 20,000, with jungle and malaria ‘fast 
encroaching upon the town’. Once again, horrific acts of mutilation 
are said to have accompanied this upheaval. In a grisly repeat of 
earlier cruelties, when machine-made yarns were first introduced 
into Dhaka in 1821, the ‘thumb and index finger of some of the 
renowned artisans began to be chopped off in order to disable them 
from twisting finer yarns’, according to Syed Muhammed Taifoor.31 
Taifoor adds that some reputed artisans also ‘chopped off their 
own finger-ends in order to avoid the tyranny of the middlemen’.
Until 1813, India had a strongly positive balance of trade, 
operating as it had done for centuries as ‘the great workshop of 
cotton manufacture for the world’.32 But in the next 20 years, 
exports to India of British cotton rose more than fifty-fold, while 
textile imports from India fell by three-quarters. The deliberate 
manipulation of trade and industrial policy resulted in the 
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elimination of India’s handloom weavers; English weavers were 
also being driven to extinction by the same remorseless forces. In 
India, the Company’s role was simply passive – to observe, but to 
do nothing. By 1834, the Governor-General, William Bentinck, 
was reporting that ‘the misery hardly finds parallel in the history 
of commerce’, adding that ‘the bones of the cotton-weavers are 
bleaching the plains of India’.33
This was not the free trade that Adam Smith had called for – even 
though his name was invoked repeatedly by the mill-owners in 
their quest to dominate India’s markets. Indeed, the Company itself 
recognised in 1840 that it had ‘in various ways, encouraged and 
assisted by our great manufacturing ingenuity and skill, succeeded 
in converting India from a manufacturing country into a country 
exporting raw produce’.34 Observing what Britain did rather than 
what its philosophers wrote, the German economist Friedrich 
List cited the cotton trade as a case study of the successful use of 
protectionism to build up national industrial strength.35
a CORpORaTE aNOMalY
By the early 1830s, it had become a foregone conclusion that the 
Company would be stripped of its remaining monopoly privileges 
in China: in 1829–30, 257 free trade petitions were presented to 
Parliament, almost double the amount during the 1813 charter 
debates. Sensing that the end was near, the Company decided in 
1825 to award only short-term shipping contracts. The real issue 
was whether the Company should retain its status as the licensed 
administrator of India. More and more, its position seemed out of 
step with the spirit of the age. Somewhat unwisely, the Company 
confirmed its reputation as a leftover of the past by joining a petition 
of merchants and bankers opposed to the Reform Bill of 1832, 
which was designed to increase the proportion of the population 
entitled to vote. Company supporters had usually entered Parliament 
by purchasing seats in the country’s ‘rotten boroughs’, many of 
which had now been eliminated in the reforms. When the first 
general election under new rules took place in December 1832, the 
representation of Company interests in the House of Commons was 
cut by half. The risk for the Company was that it would be seen as 
a ‘rotten corporation’ that would be abolished just like the ‘rotten 
boroughs’ of Parliament. For its shareholders, uncertainty over the 
Company’s future earnings had translated in a precipitate fall in 
value, from almost £300 in April 1824 to £194 at the beginning of 
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1832. A resolution to the crisis was needed if for no other reason 
than to calm the market. 
When the debate started on the Company’s charter in June 
1833, Charles Grant, President of the Board of Control, exuded 
complacency, asserting ‘that the natives of India were in a better 
situation now than ever they were, with the exception of a single 
period, under the sway of one Mogul Emperor, whose happy reign 
was yet a theme of grateful praise’.36 With a nod to the Company’s 
critics, Grant acknowledged that its rule was ‘sluggish, and not 
calculated to make any great or rapid strides’, but quickly added 
that ‘it was such a government as the people required’. Proposing 
to abolish the Company’s China monopoly to enable free trade to 
flourish, Grant praised the Company as a necessary ‘interposition’ 
between Britain and India, and recommended extending the 
outsourcing of authority from Crown to corporation for a further 
20 years. 
Few MPs were interested in the debate. But James Silk 
Buckingham saw through the government’s humbug. A well-known 
travel writer, Buckingham eventually settled in India and established 
the Calcutta Journal in 1818. But his criticisms of the Company’s 
arbitrary rule prompted the Governor-General to close the paper, 
using the Company’s ancient monopoly privileges to expel him 
as an ‘interloper’ in 1823. Entering the reformed Parliament as a 
radical MP for Sheffield in 1832, Buckingham used his first-hand 
experience to challenge the Company’s record. Like William Bolts 
before him in the 1770s, Buckingham accused the Company of ‘a 
sort of passive resistance to innovation ... when improvement or 
benefit was to be conferred’. However, Buckingham added, ‘if war, 
or conquest, or spoliation, or plunder, was to be the pursuit, their 
dormant energies were soon quickened into life – they were not 
apathetic then; their love of repose and their hostility to change, 
each disappeared, and they were among the foremost in the activity 
of their career’. Going to the heart of the matter, Buckingham 
attacked the ‘preposterous’ idea that the 100 million inhabitants 
of the Company’s territories should be consigned ‘bound hand 
and foot, to the tender mercies of these Joint-Stock rulers’ whose 
‘only care or anxiety would be to get the dividends on their stock 
punctually paid’. For him, the solution was clear: ‘Let the Company 
trade if it will, and compete with the private merchant if it likes. 
Take from it its political character, and leave it to deal with its 
mercantile affairs, divested of its monopoly, as it should see fit.’ And 
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in an echo of George Dempster’s earlier plea for disengagement, 
Buckingham concluded by suggesting that if the government proved 
‘incompetent to govern India, or unwilling to incur the trouble, let 
the possession be given back to its rightful owners’.
The Secretary of the Board of Control, Thomas Babington 
Macaulay, acknowledged the peculiarity of a situation where a 
commercial body was ‘exercising sovereignty over more people, 
with a larger revenue and a larger army’ than the British state. 
For him, there was little doubt that ‘the Company is an anomaly’ 
and ‘part of a system where everything is anomaly’. Ignoring 
Buckingham’s ethical assault, Grant and Macaulay persisted with 
Dundas’s long-standing strategy of operating under the cloak of 
Company rule, giving the state control without responsibility. Won 
over by the government’s decision to raise the guaranteed dividend 
from 10 to 10.5 per cent, the Company’s shareholders had voted 
overwhelmingly in favour of commercial surrender on 3 May 1833 
by 477 votes to 52. Importantly, both the annual dividend and 
the interest on the Company’s by now extensive debts were to be 
paid out of the tax revenues of India. In return for surrendering 
its extensive commercial assets to the state, Parliament pledged to 
extend the Company’s charter for another 20 years and guarantee 
the dividend for a further 20. Thereafter, each £100 of Company 
stock would receive a £200 pay-off. With no risk to their earnings, 
the shareholders of a Company stripped of all commercial purpose 
would receive a secure annuity for the next four decades. 
The Charter Act was passed in August, stating in stark terms 
that ‘the said Company shall, with all convenient speed close their 
commercial business, and make sale of all their merchandize, stores 
and effects at home and abroad’. Parliament and not the lingering 
Mughal empire would henceforth be the basis for British rule in 
India, with the Company its chosen agent. During the debates, the 
Company had claimed that its commercial assets were worth £19 
million. But set against this were at least £40 million in political, 
territorial and commercial debts at home and abroad. Establishing 
the Company’s true worth was a nightmarish exercise and, according 
to the Board of Control, ‘the accounts of the Company were of a 
most complicated and difficult nature, involved in considerable 
embarrassment’. A forensic analysis by a City accountant found a 
total deficit of nearly £25 million, leaving ‘a balance of legitimate 
claims which there is nothing whatever in the shape of property to 
meet’, in the words of James Mill, the Company’s chief spokesman. 
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The Blackwell docks were sold off, and the Company’s warehouses 
put up for auction. Two hundred and thirty-three years after starting 
trading operations, the Company had moved into a twilight existence 
as the profit-making agent of the British state in India, an early form 
of public–private partnership. For its shareholders, the decision to 
exchange its commercial gene for what amounted to a state-backed 
pension was the right one: shares rose some 30 per cent from the 
beginning of 1833 to the end of 1834. Buckingham had failed to 
halt the course of imperial aggrandisement. But later in 1834 he 
finally won compensation from the Company for his heavy-handed 
expulsion back in 1823, earning a £500 a year pension for his pains. 
aN EMpIRE OF SCORN
The Company had been fortunate that its case before Parliament had 
been handled by one of the leading intellectuals of the day. James 
Mill, the Scottish utilitarian activist, had joined the Company in 
1819 as an assistant examiner, charged with preparing directives for 
India. The previous year, Mill had published his immense History 
of British India, whose arguments would come to dominate the 
Company’s thinking, not least as a set text at its in-house training 
establishment, East India College at Haileybury. Mill had never 
visited India – indeed, he took some pride in his detachment from 
his subject-matter. And his analysis took few prisoners. He tore 
into the corruption and criminality that had underpinned so much 
of the Company’s operations from Clive to Wellesley. He savaged 
the Company’s monopoly status, impatient for the benefits of 
free trade to be introduced. And he attacked the inequity of the 
‘permanent settlement’, exposing instead the ‘permanent deficit’ 
that the Company was running in India. 
Most importantly, Mill launched an all-out assault on Hindu 
civilisation, criticising earlier observers, such as William Jones, for 
believing that it had a value equal to ancient Greece and Rome. 
Mill introduced a fundamentally modern perspective, arguing that 
societies could be graded along a spectrum of social progress. For 
Mill, there was no doubt that Hindustan languished in a state of 
utter barbarism. Its history was mere fable, its government despotic, 
its religion superstition and its caste system fundamentally degraded. 
According to Mill, Hindus were ‘the most enslaved portion of the 
human race’, with a ‘general disposition to deceit and perfidy’.37 
In Mill’s progressive view of history, Hindu dominance had been 
replaced by a more advanced Muslim rule and then by modern 
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British administration. Crucially, Mill argued that Hindu society 
was incapable of achieving social progress on its own, requiring the 
helping hand of imperial rule to achieve the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number. In an earlier review article for the Edinburgh Review 
published in 1810, Mill made his views crystal clear: ‘whatever may 
be our sense of the difficulties into which we have brought ourselves 
by the improvident assumption of such a dominion, we earnestly 
hope, for the sake of the natives, that it will not be found necessary 
to leave them to their own direction’.38
Perhaps in an unconscious bid for employment, Mill’s views of 
early nineteenth-century Company were more favourable. ‘I know 
of no government,’ he wrote, ‘either in past or present times, that 
can be placed equally high with that of the East India Company’, 
concluding that it deserved ‘the highest applause.’39 In the crisis of 
the early 1830s, Mill amply repaid the trust that the Company’s 
directors had placed on him, appearing before Parliament on 
numerous occasions to fight its case. Putting his free trade beliefs 
to one side, Mill argued that only the principle of caveat emptor 
(‘buyer beware’) should apply to the opium trade, urging the 
retention of the Company’s monopoly in Bengal as the financial 
burden fell primarily upon foreign – Chinese – consumers. And 
when he was questioned by MPs in the newly reformed Parliament 
about his views on whether some form of democracy should be 
applied to India as well, he responded firmly that this was ‘utterly 
out of the question’, not least because of the ‘total absence of moral 
feeling’ in the country.40
Through his History and his career at East India House, Mill 
profoundly shaped British views towards India. His intellectual 
assertion of the superiority of Western modernity was a perfect match 
for the arrogance of power that the Company increasingly displayed 
in India. In a warning full of foresight, one of the Company’s leading 
executives, Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras, protested in 1817 
against the Company’s refusal to employ Indians in all but the most 
menial positions, arguing that ‘there is perhaps no example of any 
country in which the natives have been so completely excluded from 
all share of the government of their country as in British India’. For 
Munro, ‘the consequence of the conquest of India by British arms 
would be, in place of raising, to debase the whole people’.41 But 
like Burke’s views before him, Munro’s concerns were cast aside 
by those who asserted that Anglo-Saxon values and institutions 
should prevail. Certainly, there were many aspects of Indian society 
that needed to be changed, as home-grown reformers such as Ram 
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Mohun Roy would argue, not least the caste system and practices 
such as sati (widow-burning).
In 1823, James Mill was joined at East India House by his son, 
James Stuart on the day after his seventeenth birthday. The younger 
Mill would stay in the Company’s service for 35 years as a loyal, 
if somewhat unconventional, employee. One account describes 
how ‘when particularly inspired, he used, before sitting down to 
his desk, to not only strip himself of his coat and waistcoat, but 
of his trousers, and so set to work, alternately striding up and 
down the room and writing at great speed’.42 For Mill, the great 
advantage of a Company career was that it gave him the financial 
security and the time to pursue his passion for philosophy. Indeed 
his working day generally lasted from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m., and in 
his autobiography, Mill described his office duties as ‘an actual 
rest from the other mental occupations which I have carried on 
simultaneously with them’. As a public intellectual, Mill wrote 
widely on political and economic issues, but very little about India. 
What he did express suggests that he saw the Company’s rule in India 
as ‘a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians’.43 
Mill is remembered today for his two liberal masterpieces, On 
Liberty and The Subjection of Women, both published after his 
retirement from Company business. A great apostle of liberty in 
Britain, he upheld the Company’s position in India largely because 
it provided a bulwark against the populism of Parliament. Like a 
child, India needed to be guided with ‘leading strings’ by a paternal, 
but authoritarian British parent.44 Mill’s version of tolerant tyranny 
came into conflict with the increasingly contemptuous views of the 
imperial elite. This attitude was perhaps most forcefully expressed 
by Macaulay in his 1835 Minute on Education, where he held that ‘a 
single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native 
literature of India and Arabia’.45 Macaulay wanted to produce a 
new class of ‘brown sahibs’, Indians inculcated with British values, 
and proposed the abolition of Company subsidies for education in 
Persian and Sanskrit, and the introduction in their place of English 
as the language of instruction. Mill, by contrast, favoured the use 
of local languages, as this would help win the loyalty of the local 
elite. Overruled by Macaulay, Mill fumed in his third floor office at 
East India House, furious that his ‘cautious and deliberate measures’ 
were upset by ‘a coxcombical dilettante litterateur who never did a 
thing for a practical object in his life’.46
Trade had necessitated exchange and interaction, and the removal 
of the Company’s commercial operations contributed to an ever-
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increasing distancing until the British had become ‘strangers in the 
land’ according to Governor-General William Bentinck (1833–35).47 
The disruption that followed the end of monopoly, coupled with 
cutbacks to its military expenditure, produced considerable deflation 
in the north Indian economy. Rule by the doctrine of laissez-faire 
might be logical for the enlightened Company administrator. But it 
dashed the expectations that the local population had of its rulers: 
‘Company kea mal men kuchh rozgar nahin’ (‘under Company rule, 
there is no employment’).48 Domination was increasingly reflected 
in verbal abuse, with ‘nigger’ becoming a common expression for 
Indians in the 1840s and 1850s. Social uplift might well have been 
paraded as the rationale for the Company’s continued presence in 
India. But the twin pillars of late Company rule remained constant: 
commercial and military conquest. Technology and trade barriers 
had transformed India into a vital market for Britain’s industrial 
output, taking 23 per cent of its cotton exports in 1850, by far the 
biggest share. In return, de-industrialisation had transformed India 
into a producer of agricultural inputs for the imperial economy. 
Before the opening of trade in 1811, textiles had formed the largest 
part of India’s exports at 33 per cent, followed by opium (24 per 
cent), indigo (19 per cent), raw silk (8 per cent) and raw cotton (5 
per cent). By 1850, however, textile exports had been eliminated, 
and opium had surged to 30 per cent, followed by cotton (19 per 
cent), indigo (11 per cent) and sugar (10 per cent).49 Alongside this, 
the Company’s ‘permanent deficit’ provided another valuable source 
of income for imperial Britain as tax revenues were diverted to pay 
the interest on the ballooning Indian debt, growing from £27 million 
in 1836 to an immense £51 million in 1857. The Company’s army 
also played its part, taking the area under British control from just 
over 7 per cent of the subcontinent at the time of the 1784 East 
India Act with its nominal ban on expansion to 62 per cent in 1856.
THE laST CHaRTER
When the Company’s charter came up for renewal once more in 
June 1853, the coalition government of William Gladstone and John 
Russell aimed to make a few administrative changes and extend a 
largely satisfactory arrangement for a further 20 years. Presenting 
his case to Parliament, the President of the Board of Control, Charles 
Wood, urged his listeners to understand the difficulties Britain faced. 
‘In India’, he declared, ‘you have a race of people slow to change, 
bound up by religious prejudices and antiquated customs. There are 
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in fact, all obstacles to rapid progress.’50 To address these obstacles, 
Wood proposed to cut the number of directors from 24 to 18 and 
simultaneously raise the director’s salary from £300 to £500. For 
the Young India campaign led by Liberal MPs Richard Cobden and 
John Bright, the Company’s anachronistic position cried out for 
resolution. The time had come to abolish the Company and refocus 
British rule from plunder to public works. 
Outside Parliament, the charter debates caught the eye of the 
European correspondent of the New York Daily Tribune, then the 
world’s best-selling newspaper. In the autumn of 1851, the paper 
had chosen the émigré German communist, Karl Marx, to provide 
twice-weekly reports from the capital of the world’s imperial 
superpower. Marx had fled to London in 1849 following the defeat 
of the 1848 revolutions across the continent, and journalism gave 
him a much-needed source of income. Under its founding editor, 
Horace Greeley, the Tribune took a strong reforming line, giving 
Marx a platform for his emerging critique of capitalism. Over the 
summer of 1853, Marx produced a string of articles that dissected 
the Company’s affairs for his American readers. In his eyes, the 
Company’s charter could be boiled down to five simple points: ‘a 
permanent financial deficit, a regular over-supply of wars, and no 
supply at all of public works, an abominable system of taxation, and 
a no less abominable system of justice and law’.51 Digging beneath 
the façade of Company rule, Marx argued that it ‘no longer existed 
but in name and on sufferance’. He mocked the Court of Directors, 
only one of whom had been to India, and this was by accident. He 
lampooned the Company’s famed administrative system, arguing 
that ‘there exists no government by which so much is written and so 
little done’. For Marx, ‘we have thus a Corporation ruling over an 
immense Empire, not formed, as in Venice, by eminent patricians, 
but by old obstinate clerks and the like odd fellows’.52
Marx’s interest in the Company went deeper than biting 
commentary. Drawing on his analysis of class society, Marx 
positioned the Company as a tool of Britain’s elite interests in India: 
‘the aristocracy wanted to conquer it, the moneyocracy to plunder 
it and the millocracy to undersell it’.53 Like Burke before him, Marx 
argued that the Company had brought about a revolution in India. 
But where Burke protested against the disruption of Indian culture, 
Marx’s almost mystical view of the logic of history led him to believe 
that this destruction would ultimately yield positive results. Sharing 
many of the same beliefs in the march of progress as James Mill 
before him, Marx saw Asia as burdened by an unchanging reign 
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of oriental despotism. India was thus sunk in a state of stagnant, 
vegetative barbarism characterised by caste and superstition. Marx 
was certainly sickened by the way in which the Company had first 
plundered India, and then dismantled its economy, destroying the 
textile industry in the process. There was no doubt in his mind that 
‘the misery inflicted by the British on Hindostan is of an essentially 
different and infinitely more intensive kind than all of Hindostan 
had to suffer before’.54 Yet Marx believed that Western intervention 
was essential if India was to achieve any form of regeneration. 
Motivated by the ‘vilest interests’ it may have been, but Marx saw 
British domination producing all the conditions for modernisation: 
political unification, a well-equipped army, a free press and rapid 
communications, along with the creation of a new class ‘imbued 
with European science’.55
Two things are remarkable about Marx’s analysis of the 
Company. The first is how little he is interested in the Company 
as a corporation. Unlike Smith, Marx had no time for evaluating 
the comparative merits of partnerships and joint stock companies. 
Marx’s fascination was with large-scale, factory-based, industrial 
production. As a result, the great trading companies would later be 
relegated, in the first volume of Capital, to the zone of ‘primitive 
accumulation’. Readers look in vain for Marx’s insights into the 
speculative dynamics of the shareholder-owned company or how the 
corporation’s drive for monopoly fits with the wider concentration 
of capital. The other notable aspect of his attitudes to India is their 
underlying alignment with those of his friend, John Stuart Mill. 
Mill was one of Marx’s few friends in London in the early 1850s, 
and the two shared a passion for economic theory.56 Mill had 
published his own Principles of Political Economy in 1848, the 
same year as the Communist Manifesto and a decade before Marx’s 
first volume of Capital appeared. It is an extraordinary pairing. On 
one side, we have John Stuart Mill, the intellectual insider, earning 
his living as a corporate executive managing an overseas empire, 
while retaining an eye to a utopian future beyond the office. On the 
other, there is Karl Marx, the outsider in exile, divining the seeds of 
revolution in the ruins of imperial rule, and paradoxically admiring 
the capacity of capitalism to overthrow the old order. Mill’s great 
failure was to accept the deceptive rationalisation of the Company’s 
role in India as an educative force. As Edward Said remarked in 
Culture and Imperialism, ‘it is genuinely troubling to see how little 
Britain’s great humanistic ideas, institutions and monuments, which 
we still celebrate as having the power ahistorically to command 
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our approval, how little they stand in the way of the accelerating 
imperial process’.57 It is no surprise that James and John Stuart 
Mill’s works have been approvingly referenced as the model for 
‘democratic imperialism’ in the aftermath of the twenty-first century 
invasion of Iraq.58
In August 1853, Parliament passed an extension to the Company’s 
charter after some perfunctory debates. One of the last areas of 
corporate privilege – the right of patronage over appointments 
in India – was replaced by selection by competitive exams; the 
proposed increase in director salaries was clawed back. But this 
historical anachronism was given another 20 years to rule India in 
return for a guaranteed dividend.
a REBEllION FORETOld
The Great Rebellion of 1857 is often seen as a one-off event, a revolt 
that came out of the blue against the backdrop of an otherwise 
peaceful acceptance of Company rule. But powerful warning 
signs had been ignored. Many explanations have been given for 
this uprising against the Company, but its increasing racial and 
administrative arrogance lay at the root. The seeds of racism 
had always been there. As long before as the Company’s botched 
evacuation of Calcutta in 1756, Maria Carey, the Anglo-Indian 
wife of an English soldier, had been refused entry on one of the 
departing ships because of her mixed race. But it was from the 
beginning of the nineteenth century that the slide into separatism 
became unstoppable. One by one the traditional ties between the 
army and local communities were cut. Hindu and Muslim holy men 
were barred from blessing sepoy regimental colours, and troops 
were stopped from participating in festival parades. As missionary 
presence grew, fears mounted that the Company was planning a 
wholesale forcible conversion to Christianity.
The first sign of what was to follow came as early as July 1806, 
when sepoys belonging to the army of the Madras Presidency 
mutinied against new rules that introduced a uniform dress code. 
The rules removed many of the distinguishing marks of caste and 
religion that defined the sepoys’ identity. Egged on by the exiled 
family of the Tipu Sultan, the sepoys in Vellore rose up and killed 
or wounded over 200 of the 370-strong British garrison. Although 
the mutiny was quickly suppressed, an investigation into the affair 
pointed to the increasing distance between the Company’s officials 
and the people. A commission of Indians was proposed as a way 
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of channelling popular complaints, along with a recommendation 
to send additional British troops as a precautionary measure. 
Neither step was taken, however. The warnings were intensified 
in the debates over missionary activity in 1813. In his last public 
engagement, Warren Hastings came out of retirement to testify 
for three hours before a parliamentary committee examining the 
Company’s charter. His advice was clear: ‘a Surmise had gone 
abroad that there was an intention of forcing our Religion on the 
Natives. Such an Opinion, propagated among the Native Infantry 
might be attended by dangerous consequences’, indeed it ‘might 
create a religious war’.59
All these sleights and apprehensions came to a head in 1857 
when sepoys in the Company’s Bengal Army rejected a new type 
of rifle cartridge said to be greased with cow and/or pig fat. Yet as 
the conservative politician, Benjamin Disraeli, observed at the time 
‘the rise and fall of empires are not affairs of greased cartridges’, 
adding that ‘such results are occasioned by adequate causes, and by 
the accumulation of adequate causes’. For Disraeli, the Company’s 
administration had ‘alienated or alarmed almost every influential 
class in the country’.60 One group that had been profoundly 
‘alienated’ were the local rulers in Awadh, Kanpur and Jhansi, who 
had been seen their lands annexed under the Company’s policy of 
lapse. All turned against the Company when the soldiers mutinied, 
giving much-needed status to a military uprising to oust the British, 
regarded by many as ‘trespassers’. Symbolically, the first act of the 
mutineers at Meerut was to march the 36 miles to Delhi to claim 
the puppet Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar as their leader. 
Zafar celebrated by slaughtering sheep on the festival of Eid, and 
composed some lines of poetry, hoping that ‘all the enemies of the 
faith [may] be killed today, the Feringhis (foreigners) be destroyed 
root and branch!61
The uprising was never a unified movement, and it was only in 
1909 that the Hindu propagandist Veer Savarkar adopted it into 
the nationalist canon as the ‘First War of Indian Independence’. 
It was certainly a war of independence in Awadh, which had just 
been occupied by the Company’s troops in 1856, and whose capital, 
Lucknow, would be one of the centres of conflict. The violence was 
largely geographically limited to the Hindustan of north India, and 
within this area ‘no community, caste or class was entirely for or 
against the rebellion’, writes Biswamoy Pati.62 Clearly something far 
greater than a mutiny, it was simultaneously a restorative revolt of 
feudal rulers ousted by the British as well as a popular uprising of 
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peasants and tribals against Company rule. The patriotic glue which 
brought coherence was the protection of the religions of Hindustan 
– Hindu and Muslim – against the oppressive innovations of the 
foreigners. For Rajat Kanta Roy, the best term for it is the one used 
by the mutineers themselves: the ‘war’ of ‘the Hindoostanis’ to 
protect their dharma and deen and to ‘save the country’.63 
The war lasted for almost two years, and was characterised by 
extreme savagery on both sides. When the Company retook Kanpur 
(Cawnpore), where rebel troops had slaughtered European women 
and children, captured sepoys were made to lick the blood from the 
floors before being hanged. Summary executions became the norm. 
According to one officer, ‘we hold court-martials on horseback, 
and every nigger we meet with we either string up or shoot’.64 The 
Company’s recapture of Delhi was followed by systematic sacking, 
and the surviving inhabitants were turned out of its gates to starve. 
At the end of this third and final Company–Mughal war, Bahadur 
Shah Zafar’s two sons and grandson were killed in cold blood, and 
the old emperor sent into exile in Rangoon. 
The Company that had flourished in a symbiotic relationship 
with the Mughal Empire for 250 years could not long survive 
its passing. The rebellion had generated a ferocious bloodlust in 
British society, and the anomalous Company was an easy scapegoat 
for the nation’s fury. Punch magazine summed up the feelings of 
many when it published its cartoon of the ‘Execution of the East 
India Company’ on 15 August 1857 (see Illustration 9.2, p. 197). 
Mimicking the Company’s practice of blasting captured rebels from 
the mouths of its cannon, the cartoon shows the ‘blowing up (there 
ought to be) in Leadenhall Street’, with the classical grandeur of 
East India House flying through the air with all charges of ‘avarice’, 
‘blundering’, ‘nepotism’, ‘misgovernment’ and ‘supineness’. Even 
the mild-mannered Charles Dickens wished that he was the 
commander-in-chief in India so that he would able to ‘do my utmost 
to exterminate the Race upon whom the stain of the late cruelties 
rested’ – a chilling foretaste of Kurtz’s crazed call to ‘exterminate 
the brutes’ in Joseph Conrad’s novella Heart of Darkness.65
Like failed corporations before and since, the only solution 
was nationalisation. But the Company put up a last-ditch fight 
to forestall the inevitable. Promoted to chief examiner in March 
1858, John Stuart Mill presented a lengthy petition to Parliament. 
In perhaps the longest corporate whinge in history, Mill first of all 
argued that the Company had at its ‘own expense, and by the agency 
of their own civil and military servants, originally acquired for this 
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country its magnificent empire in the East’ – as if it was doing the 
nation a favour. The language became richer still, with Mill claiming 
that it was ‘the most beneficent [government] ever known among 
mankind’. In the debates that followed, George Cornewall Lewis 
MP exposed the vacuity of Mill’s claims, asserting that ‘no civilised 
government ever existed on the face of this earth which was more 
corrupt, more perfidious, and more rapacious’ than the East India 
Company between 1757 and 1784. For Lewis, the Company had 
become an ‘accidental body’ of shareholders with no relation to 
the affairs of India. The rest of Parliament agreed, and legislation 
was passed stripping the Company of all its administrative powers 
in India, and transferring these to the Crown. On 1 November 
1858, a proclamation was read from every military cantonment in 
India: the East India Company was abolished and direct rule by 
Queen and Parliament was introduced. Firework displays followed 
the proclamation. 
The Company is often regarded as an inevitable stepping-stone 
to the British Raj. Instead, the British Empire in India is better 
thought of as the product of the Company’s failure. Observing the 
Company’s fall with some glee, Marx told his American readers 
that the directors ‘do not die like heroes, it must be confessed’: 
‘they have bartered away their power, as they came into it, bit by 
bit, in a business like way’. For Marx, ‘they commenced by buying 
sovereignty and they have ended by selling it’.66
THE laST lauGH
Yet the Company was not quite dead. Many histories of the 
Company stop either with the removal of commercial privileges 
in 1833 or in 1858 with its expulsion from Indian affairs. But the 
Company continued on for another 16 years, a corporate zombie, 
reduced to the most basic corporate task of all: the distribution of 
the annual dividend. With all its administrative functions transferred 
across town to the India Office in Whitehall, the Company sold its 
impressive headquarters on Leadenhall Street, and pensioned off 
most of its employees: John Stuart Mill received an annual £1,500, 
along with a gold-inlaid inkstand. The Company kept a clerk and 
its directors continued to meet, first in the boardroom of the Red 
Sea Telegraph Company at 62 Moorgate, and then at 11 Pancras 
Lane, north of the City. 
The Company’s archives stretch for miles at the British Library. 
But the account of its activities after 1858 is contained in a single 
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volume, the Treasury Court Minutes. With the Company’s crest 
stamped on the back, this leather-bound book is only half-full. 
It describes a desultory existence of empty meetings and routine 
payments. The cycle started to come to a close in the summer 
of 1873. In May, Parliament rubber-stamped the government’s 
proposals for redeeming the remaining £6 million of Company 
stock. The Act of 1833 had not only guaranteed investors a 10.5 
per cent dividend until 1874, but it had also laid down generous 
terms for any eventual buy-out. In the East India Stock Redemption 
Illustration 9.2 Punch, Execution of ‘John Company’, 1857
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Act, the government offered shareholders either £200 of 3 per cent 
government annuities, £200 of 4 per cent India debt or £200 in cash 
for every £100 of Company stock. In effect, another £12 million 
of debt was added to the India account, its interest to be covered 
by the Indian taxpayer, some £869 million in today’s money.67 
After the transfer of the stock, shareholders met for the last time 
in December, and the final dividend was paid on 30 April 1874. 
Among their number were Corpus Christi College, Oxford, holding 
£145, Richard Benyon de Beauvoir with some £4,000, Deeble Boger 
at £10,000 and Joseph Dobree with £11,700 in shares. 
A final clear-out of the Company’s affairs was now required, 
and on 13 May 1874, the clerk sent a rather pathetic letter to 
the Secretary of State for India asking whether he would ‘take 
charge of the Charters, Seals, Documents etc’. On Wednesday 20 
May at 1.30 p.m., the Company’s Court of Directors gathered for 
the last time. There was some £32,000 in the accounts, matching 
almost exactly the £30,000 raised by investors back in 1599, a 
nice piece of historical symmetry. After paying the directors’ fees, 
the housekeeper, clerk and accountant, the chairman ‘ordered the 
Court adjourn’. It never met again, and the Company was officially 
dissolved on 1 June 1874. 
The Company’s financial footprint extended deep into the 
twentieth century. Writing in 1908, Romesh Chander Dutt was 
outraged at the way in which the people of India had not only 
supplied the troops for their own conquest, financed the Company’s 
acquisition of the subcontinent through heavy taxation, but had 
also paid for the Company’s nationalisation. ‘And the Indian people 
are virtually paying dividends to this day’, he wrote, ‘on the stock 
on an extinct Company in the shape of interest on Debt!’68 This 
ghostly drain eventually ended in the depths of the Second World 
War when Britain’s massive expenditure in India finally extinguished 
the historic debts of both Company and Raj. Long after its demise, 
the Company continued to shape the economies and societies it 
had left behind. 
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unfinished Business
aT THE HEaRT OF all THINGS
The crossroads at Bank marks the centre-point of London’s financial 
world. To the north lies the Bank of England, the ‘Old Lady of 
Threadneedle Street’, who once vied with the East India Company 
for the position as the most influential corporation of the eighteenth 
century, and was only nationalised by the Labour government of 
1945. On the eastern edge stands the Royal Exchange in whose 
cellars the Company often stored pepper. Outside stands a rather 
forlorn sky-blue water pump erected in 1799 by the Bank, the 
Company and the local insurance companies, decorated with 
images of Britannia, the Exchange, the Sun and a Phoenix. Just 
across the road to the south is Change Alley where the Bank’s and 
the Company’s shares were traded in the coffee shops with such 
exquisite zeal. In neighboring Birchin Lane stood the Jerusalem 
Coffee House ‘the general resort of those who had anything to do 
with India’ and a favourite of the commanders of the Company’s 
ships.1 Further east along Cornhill lies Leadenhall Street, the site 
of East India House. And under a modest archway to the south 
is 3 Lombard Street, the offices of Matheson & Co., the London 
outpost of the Firm that finally defeated the Company. 
The East India Company is forever entangled in London’s 
emergence as an imperial metropolis and Britain’s rise to global 
supremacy. Its business not only physically shaped the docks in the 
East through which the riches of Asia passed, but its stocks and 
bonds were central to the City’s rapidly evolving financial markets. 
The Company’s wealth and tendency to crisis determined the fate of 
governments and the outcome of elections, with the caucus of East 
Indian MPs fighting vigorously for their own and the Company’s 
interests. Like General Motors in twentieth-century America, 
the Company stood at the heart of Georgian Britain, prompting 
Edmund Burke to comment, ‘that to say the Company was in a 
state of distress was neither more nor less than saying the Country 
was in a state of distress’.2 As a business, its immense import–
199
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export network created not one but two lifestyle revolutions in 
Britain – first in textiles and then in tea. This was no ordinary civil 
corporation, but a hybrid institution that used the projection of 
military might on sea and on land to advance the interests of its 
executives, shareholders and the empire as a whole. Taken together, 
the sheer size and scale of the Company’s operations mean that its 
fingerprints can be found in some of the pivotal turning points of 
the modern age: the independence of the United States, the fall of 
Mughal India and the implosion of Qing China. The eternal quest 
for dominance produced catastrophic negligence, revealed in both 
the Bengal famine and the growth of its opium business to become 
the largest trade of its age. 
The Company’s demise in 1858 ended the era of the chartered 
corporation. These leviathans of mercantilism were no longer suited 
to the new empire of free trade that Britain was establishing across 
the globe. Where the Company and other chartered companies had 
once married the functions of overseas sovereign and trader, these 
were now prised apart, with the Royal Navy taking up the role of 
commercial enforcer, as it had done in the opium wars. The decline of 
the slave trade had brought the end of the Royal Africa Company in 
1821 and, two years later, the ancient Levant Company was wound 
up. Strangely enough, the South Sea Company that had caused such 
panic in 1721 had lingered on for another century, and was only 
closed in 1853. The Hudson Bay Company continues to this day, 
but surrendered its territorial rights in 1869 for a future in retail. 
In parallel, the long-standing restrictions on corporate expansion 
were progressively removed, with the repeal of the 1721 Bubble Act 
in 1825, and the passing of the Joint Stock Act in 1844 allowing 
companies to be set up through simple registration. Finally, in 1862, 
a year after the demolition of East India House, the comprehensive 
Company Act was placed on the statute book, swiftly followed by 
a stock market bubble and the collapse of Overend & Gurney, a 
major bank in 1866.3 
Much has changed in the one and a half centuries since the 
Company’s fall from grace. Looking back at its extraordinary career, 
it’s clear that there was not one Company, but many. In institutional 
terms, the original corporation with its joint stock limited to a single 
voyage was an entirely different beast from the global ‘blue chip’ 
multinational of the 1750s, let alone the administrative agent of 
empire in the 1850s. Its progress was also anything but smooth. It 
was almost wound up in 1657, and 30 years later, its arrogance and 
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adventurism cost the company its trading privileges, which it only 
won back by exploiting legal loopholes and forging a merger with its 
enemies to form the United Company in 1709. And then when the 
Bengal Revolution turned the world upside down, the Company’s 
status as an autonomous business enterprise was progressively 
stripped away – first, the independence of its governance systems, 
then its trading privileges and finally all of its remaining functions, 
until all that was left was a financial shell, paying out dividends. 
Indeed a certain duality courses throughout its corporate career. 
This was clearest in Clive’s nawabocracy where the Company 
acted through a series of puppet rulers to drain Bengal’s wealth. 
In turn, this was replaced by Pitt’s own ‘dual system’ where the 
British state progressively directed operations behind a façade of 
Company control. Beyond this, the Company emerges not so much 
as a corporation with hard and fast boundaries but a commercial 
network often prey to competing interests, not least its own 
executives, its shareholders, the powerful shipping interest as well 
as politicians in Westminster. This blurring of the divisions that are 
supposed to separate the public and private sectors often resulted 
in a form of collusion that enabled the Company’s executives to 
escape accountability for their actions. 
If there is one clear lesson that the Company’s history can bring to 
the twenty-first century, it is that the corporate form is not fixed, but 
eternally mutable. From this continual metamorphosis, four facets 
emerge most clearly for our times: the Company as entrepreneur, its 
role as a revolutionary force in world affairs, its tendency to imperial 
dominion and the struggle to make it accountable for its actions. 
And across 400 years of modern corporate history, a trinity of design 
flaws unite the Company with contemporary global corporations: 
the speculative temptations of executives and investors, the drive 
for monopoly control, and the absence of automatic remedy for 
corporate abuse.
aN aGENT OF ENTERpRISE
The precise legal form embodied by the East India Company may 
well have died, but its systems of administration and governance live 
on in the modern multinational. Indeed, the Company’s management 
of information – through its countless writers and clerks – makes 
it one of the pioneers of the knowledge-based corporation.4 Its 
success at matching supply and demand along lengthy supply 
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chains whether for textiles or tea proved to be one of the secrets of 
its enduring commercial success. In its twin ‘golden ages’, first in 
the 1670s and early 1680s, and then in the 1720s and 1730s, the 
Company demonstrated a sophisticated and focused approach to 
sourcing, marketing and finance that brought the consumer quality 
goods, earned the investor regular dividends and yielded healthy tax 
revenues. Yet, in each case, boom was not just followed by bust, 
but by a deliberate attempt to achieve unwarranted wealth and 
power. For Philip Francis, newly arrived as the public’s champion in 
Bengal in the 1770s, instead of securing a ‘moderate but permanent 
profit’, the Company seemed hell-bent on producing ‘immediate 
and excessive returns’.5
Part of the problem lay in the way monopoly formed an essential 
part of the Company’s commercial identity, driving it to achieve 
dominion at both ends of the chain. More fundamental, according 
to Adam Smith, was the way in which the design of the joint-stock 
company created a predisposition to ‘negligence and profusion’ on 
behalf of both executives and investors. For Smith, this separation 
of ownership and management brought a dual danger, of executives 
turning the corporation to their own ends, and of shareholders 
investing with an absence of responsibility that direct involvement 
brings. Perhaps not as spectacular as the South Sea Bubble of 
1720, the Company’s own Bengal Bubble still bears witness to the 
inherent propensity of the joint stock corporation to managerial 
capture, insider trading, over-optimistic projections of future 
earnings and the irrational exuberance of financial markets. The 
crash and share price implosion that followed revealed to a stunned 
English establishment both the financial and human consequences 
of allowing corporations free rein. 
John Company’s example shows us that open markets and 
corporations do not necessarily mix – that economic diversity 
and enterprise often flourish best where corporations are kept in 
check. From Smith’s contemporary analysis of the rising commercial 
economy of eighteenth-century Britain, it emerges that the truly 
entrepreneurial company is likely to be locally rooted, limited in 
size and liable for the costs it imposes on others. Although he is 
frequently cited as the theoretical inspiration for globalisation, 
Smith would be horrified at the way that the unlimited corporation 
now dominates economic and political life, seeing dangers not just 
for the achievement of world prosperity, but also for ethical practice 
in society at large. 
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THE CORpORaTE REVOluTIONaRY
The acquisition of trading preferences and commercial property was 
second nature to the Company. What set it apart is the way that it 
acquired whole regions, and then managed them as profit-making 
estates. The British Company was not alone in this. Much earlier, 
the Dutch VOC had showed how to establish corporate rule in 
its conquest of Indonesia. And it was in southern India that the 
French had pioneered the practice of ‘nabob-making’, which Clive 
would transfer so successfully to Bengal. Where John Company’s 
revolution differed was in the way it overturned the world’s existing 
commercial order. 
Bengal was the richest province of one of the two great Asian 
economies – India and China – and had become central to the 
Company’s trading strategy from the late seventeenth century. But 
the Company’s quest for personal and corporate profit was not 
satisfied by the confirmation of its duty-free status in the famous 
firman of 1717. Almost immediately, its officers in Bengal began 
to use it as a cover for their own private trade. Not only did this 
break the letter of a legally binding agreement, but it represented tax 
evasion on a huge scale, depriving the Bengal treasury of revenues. 
The road to Plassey would be marked by repeated efforts by the 
local nawab to make the Company obey the terms of its trade 
agreement. For years, the Company’s executives on the spot as well 
as its directors in London recognised that this constituted a ‘gross 
abuse’, yet did nothing to root out the problem.6 The contempt of 
local law was just too profitable and too deeply embedded. 
Clive’s triumphant takeover effectively enabled the Company to 
divert Bengal’s surplus from the courts of the Mughal emperor and 
the provincial nawab to the mansions and country estates of Britain. 
In addition, the acquisition provided the Company with the platform 
for its next round of adventurism in China. Hesitantly at first, and 
then increasingly insistent, the Company brought Bihar’s opium 
production under its monopoly control and actively encouraged 
its smuggling into China as a way of funding the burgeoning trade 
in tea. Once again, the Company at home and abroad were fully 
conscious of the illegality of its actions. But the prize was simply 
too great. When the Chinese authorities eventually intervened to 
suppress the trade, gunboat diplomacy was the joint response of 
Company and Crown. 
It was the Company’s persistence in the use of both political and 
economic means to achieve its financial ends that lay behind the 
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breaking of these world empires. The Mughal Empire was already 
in decline by the 1750s. The European companies still played a 
marginal role, their territories confined to the coastal edges, and 
their trade accounted for only a fraction of the empire’s external 
commerce. Following Plassey and thereafter the transfer of the 
diwani in 1765, a profit-making institution was established at 
the heart of the tottering Mughal regime, progressively draining 
its resources and influence. The bid to control China’s markets 
took much longer to achieve, and the Company’s role is certainly 
secondary to the wider imperial impetus of the British state. But 
its remorseless promotion of opium provided the lever with which 
to prise open the self-sustaining Qing economy. It was the British 
East India Company that broke the regulatory authority of first the 
Mughals and then the Qing; the industrial production of Manchester 
merely delivered the economic coup de grâce.
There was no doubt in the minds of Robert Clive, Edmund Burke 
or much later Karl Marx that what the Company had achieved 
was revolutionary. Clive’s reaction was one of sheer delight, seeing 
an endless flow of treasure from East to West. Initially, Burke also 
revelled in Clive’s early successes. But as he learned more, and 
delved deeper into the Company’s practices, he became increasingly 
horrified at the way this commercial body had illegitimately 
overturned the established order in India. And for Marx, ever the 
dialectician, the revolution engineered by the Company was both a 
human disaster and the spur to modernisation. Even Burke’s great 
empathy with the people of India, however, would not allow him 
to touch the reality of imperial rule.
THE IMpERIal CORpORaTION
For the last 20 years of its operational life, the Company ruled 
purely as an agent of the British Empire. Going further back, it 
is possible to see in the momentous India Act of 1784 its steady 
transformation from a purely commercial body into an imperial 
administrator. The business of empire – to use Huw Bowen’s 
phrase – was therefore central to the Company’s identity for at 
least the final third of its existence. Yet, it is possible to identify this 
‘imperial gene’ influencing the Company’s actions far earlier, most 
notably in the disastrous bid for power under Josiah Child in the 
1680s. The constant jostling with the state over who should benefit 
from regulatory and fiscal regimes was inherent in the corporate 
form. What made this tension imperial was the peculiar nature 
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of the Company’s chartered existence whereby it took on certain 
attributes of a sovereign state in its dealing with foreign powers. 
More fundamental than this, however, was the perpetual corporate 
drive for maximising returns for its executives and its investors. This 
could be achieved most effectively by placing both state and society 
in a subordinate role, extracting wealth without accountability – the 
operating style of empires through the ages. 
The result was, of course, the great drain of India, a subject 
of heated controversy ever since Burke first coined the phrase 
back in the 1780s. Two problems have bedevilled analysis of the 
Company’s economic impacts on India: statistics and implications. 
The fragmentary nature of corporate and national accounting in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries makes any estimate of 
the Company’s financial impact open to critique. Considerable 
judgement is also required in defining what should be incorporated 
in the drain, which at its broadest would encompass the value of 
the Company’s unrequited trade with India and the value of its 
executives’ private trade. Despite their incessant squabbling over 
the issue, the estimates of modern academics do not differ greatly 
from the annual £1.2 million that Burke calculated in 1783. In 
the 1960s, Professor N.K. Sinha derived a somewhat higher figure 
of £1.6 million averaged between 1757 and 1780, while Rajat 
Datta more recently cut the amount drained to £1 million in the 
years between Plassey and 1794.7 These are likely to be significant 
underestimates as they fail to account for the significant value the 
Company’s monopoly position gave it in extracting below-market 
rates for commodities such as textiles and opium, and the resulting 
subsidy this provided to the China trade. The drain, of course, 
changed its character radically in the nineteenth century, when the 
Company ceased trading. For Montgomery Martin, writing in 1838, 
the average transfer of the previous 30 years had amounted to some 
£3 million, which he calculated as equivalent to £723,997,917 at 
a 12 per cent compound rate of interest.8 In terms of twenty-first-
century purchasing power, this represents a tribute of well over 
£50 billion.9
The more substantive issue is what difference these flows made to 
the rise of Britain and the decline of India and, subsequently, China. 
Contemporaries were clear. ‘We may date the commencement of the 
decline’, wrote Alexander Dow in 1772, ‘from the day on which 
Bengal fell under the domination of the foreigners.’10 Turning to 
Britain, controversy rages over the links between the Company’s 
conquest of India in the financing of the Industrial Revolution. For 
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Brooks Adams, writing at the end of the nineteenth century, the 
coincidence of the influx of Bengal plunder with the deployment of 
new industrial technologies was compelling. Without the resources 
provided by the Indian drain, Adams argued that the spinning 
jenny, Crompton’s mule and Watts’s steam engine would have 
lain dormant. ‘Possibly since the world began,’ Adams concluded, 
‘no investment has ever yielded the profit reaped from the Indian 
plunder.’11 Adams’s conclusions were deployed extensively by Indian 
nationalists in the struggle for independence. But modern Indian 
historians have been more cautious, arguing, for example, that ‘it 
is highly unlikely that these private fortunes constituted an element 
of any importance in the financing of the Industrial Revolution’.12
To get to the heart of the matter, a more granular analysis is 
required. Markets move at the margin, and the key to the drain 
lies in its impact on relative patterns of consumption and capital 
formation. In India, the drain depressed consumption and diverted 
its already small savings rate, while enabling Britain to live beyond 
its means, to consume, trade and invest at a greater rate than its 
own internal economy would allow. The great secret of the drain 
lay in its capacity not to support the extravagant lifestyles of a few 
hundred nabobs, but to furnish the commodities for an extensive 
re-export trade of Asian goods to Europe, the Americas and beyond. 
The Company’s unrequited import surplus with Asia was already 
£1.4 million by 1770 and surged to £4.8 million in 1800. This raw 
statistic hides the true significance of the shift, however. Drawing on 
recent analysis carried out by Utsa Patnaik, the Asian drain grew as 
a proportion of Britain’s gross domestic product from 1.7 per cent 
in 1770 to 3.5 per cent in 1800.13 Crucially, from 1800 onwards 
the Asian drain began to match the enormous extraction of wealth 
that Britain had historically achieved from the slave-based sugar 
plantations of the West Indies. Together, the combined surplus in 
1801 was equivalent to over 86 per cent of Britain’s entire capital 
formation from domestic savings.14
For Jawarhalal Nehru, the most powerful indicator of the harm 
done by the combined impact of the Company and British Raj was 
that ‘those parts of India which have been longest under British rule 
are the poorest today’, picking out Bengal, Bihar and Orissa for 
particular mention.15 More fundamentally, expert estimates suggest 
that India’s already waning per capita income levels fell from $540 
in the year of Plassey to $520 on the outbreak of the Great Rebellion 
in 1857; over the same period, Britain’s per capita income leapt 
from $1,424 to $2,717.16
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MaKING THE COMpaNY aCCOuNTaBlE
As Edmund Burke observed at first hand, corporations are not 
self-correcting. There is nothing in their design to call a halt to 
further market expansion, or desist from political interventions 
that rig the market in their favour. In Burke’s age and ours, the 
need for external mechanisms to bring corporate malpractice to 
account is therefore essential. But when the Company’s extensive 
network of bribes came to light in the 1690s, and Parliament tried 
to impeach the President of the Privy Council, the King simply 
dismissed Parliament. When Clive’s crimes of the ‘blackest dye’ 
were presented to the Commons 70 years later, his misdeeds were 
offset against his contribution to imperial expansion, and he escaped 
without censure. And when Burke used the impeachment process 
once more to make Hastings accountable for his actions in Bengal, 
the House of Lords found him not guilty. In the face of Hastings’s 
evident malpractice, Burke’s mismanagement of the case makes the 
outcome even more frustrating. 
The Company did have in place a series of rules and covenants 
to direct the behaviour of its employees. After the corruption of 
the 1690s, the Company managed to operate a reasonably ethical 
standard of conduct. But when presented with the windfall profits 
generated by its acquisitions in India, these controls simply crumbled 
in a frenzy of greed. The introduction of a ban on the receipt of 
bribes in 1764 was simply too little, too late. Lawrence Sulivan did 
try to rein in the more extreme aspects of Clive’s adventurism. But 
when he was in dire need of cash in the 1770s, Sulivan was only 
too happy to send his son, Stephen, to Bengal to regain the family 
fortune in opium and contracting. Monopoly power, Adam Smith 
warned, does not just damage the market, but it also gives licence to 
managerial negligence. The Company’s practices did not just result 
in economic losses for English consumers and Indian producers, 
but in social dislocation and the corrosion of the public realm. The 
Bengal Famine of 1770 continues to stare down the centuries as a 
shocking reminder of where corporate negligence can lead. Writing 
over a hundred years after the event, George Chesney, a civil servant 
at the India Office in London, was forced to admit in 1877 that 
the Bengal Famine had caused a ‘desolation … the marks of which 
have not wholly ceased’.17
For Burke, the only way to confront this impunity was to recast 
the Company’s charter so that it became accountable once more. 
Speaking to Parliament in defence of his India Bill in December 
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1783, Burke made a clear distinction between political and 
commercial rights. The ‘Magna Charta is a charter to restrain power 
and to destroy monopoly’; but ‘the East India charter is a charter 
to establish monopoly and to create power’. Burke believed that 
he had a strong case for making the Company and its executives 
accountable for their actions: ‘they themselves are responsible – 
their body as a corporate body, themselves as individuals – and 
the whole body and train of their servants are responsible to the 
high justice of this kingdom’. The grant of a corporate charter 
carried with it intrinsic duties, according to Burke, since ‘this nation 
never did give a power without imposing a proportionable degree 
of responsibility’.18 Yet Burke’s passionate rhetoric was insufficient 
to make these principles of natural law overturn the vested interests 
and imperial pride that dominated eighteenth-century Britain.
For centuries, states pursued the imperial interests of monarchs 
against their own and other peoples. Reform and revolution have 
ensured that most states are bounded by constitutions at home 
and international law abroad, and charged with promoting the 
wider public interest within the community of nations. When 
states still act in an imperial manner – pursuing their self-interest 
to the disregard of others – it is now transparent that this breaks 
established norms of behaviour. The international opposition to the 
US and British invasion of Iraq in 2003 drew much of its passion 
from this powerful sense that well-established standards of law and 
ethics were being flagrantly violated. 
This process of democratisation has, however, largely passed by 
the gates of the corporation. Just as the state was tamed through 
democracy and law, so corporations need to be retuned so that 
they work in harmony with the rest of society. ‘It wasn’t necessary 
to throw out government to do away with monarchy,’ argues 
business ethics writer Marjorie Kelly, ‘instead we changed the basis 
of sovereignty on which government rested’.19 For this exercise, 
the Company’s history offers fragments of hope, principles that 
can be used in our own times – most notably Smith’s analysis of 
the corporation’s agency problem and its monopolising tendencies, 
as well as Burke’s dual recognition that all people, whatever their 
culture, have equal rights to justice, and that corporations are public 
institutions accountable to Parliament. 
This means that the four forces that drive corporate behaviour 
– finance, technology, scale and regulation – need to be recast to 
ensure protection of the public interest. First of all, stringent rules 
are needed to ensure that management and investors do not use the 
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corporation as a tool for their short-term interests at the expense 
of others. Next, its market power and political influence must be 
limited. If its sway in the marketplace grows too great, it will deny 
choice and invariably use its position to narrow the opportunities 
for others, squeezing suppliers and gouging consumers. And if the 
corporation becomes a powerful political force then it can rig the 
rules of regulation so that it enjoys unjustified public subsidy or 
protection. Clear and enforceable systems of justice have to be in 
place to hold the corporation to account for damage to society 
and the environment. The road to legal remedy must be accessible 
and with effective measures to level the playing field between the 
individual and the institution. And, finally, economic diversity needs 
to be realised, putting the joint stock corporation in its rightful place.
INSERTING THE ETHICS GENE
The corporation’s financial design provides the basic genetic code for 
a historically novel and fundamentally strange form of person. With 
a discreet legal identify, the corporation is theoretically immortal – a 
distinct advantage in the turbulent times of the eighteenth century 
in that ‘it was not liable to be killed in battle or die of a fever’.20 Of 
course this advantage of eternal life was constrained by the fact that 
the Company had to renew its charter, making it face the prospect 
of corporate death every 20 years. The Company’s contemporaries 
struggled to understand just what type of person the corporation 
would be. At a time when belief in religion was near universal, Justice 
Pollexfen’s argued in the 1690s that the Company was simply ‘an 
invisible body without soul or conscience’, with the implication that 
ethical acts would unlikely to flow from such an institution.21 In our 
more secular age, it is argued that psychology provides some clues as 
to the nature of corporate identity, with Joel Bakan highlighting how 
corporations exhibit many of the characteristics of psychopaths: 
irresponsible, manipulative, grandiose, lacking empathy, inability to 
feel remorse and superficiality in relationships.22 And, of course, the 
joint stock corporation has a split personality, with its component 
parts – the shareholders – having unlimited rights to returns, but 
limited liability for debts and damage. 
We know that corporations can be immensely useful economic 
institutions and can deliver this with a positive impact on wider 
well-being. What makes this happen is the presence of ethical 
individuals, internal codes of self-regulation and external vigilence 
and control. Yet, as successive corporate and financial crises have 
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shown, these mitigating factors are not intrinsic to the corporate 
form. Ultimately, to prevent this potentially soul-less, psychopathic 
corporate personality wreaking havoc what is needed is the deliberate 
insertion of characteristics that force it to be human in the fullest 
sense. This means encoding ethical conduct into corporate design. 
Advocates of corporate reform have generally focused on introducing 
regulations to tackle specific issues, such as workplace safety, equal 
opportunities or environmental management. Others have seen state 
ownership as the solution to the corporate abuse of power, a process 
now being reversed worldwide through privatisation. Yet, the 
in-built pursuit of institutional and individual self-interest – which 
forms the foundation of the British and American model of the 
firm – has been left untouched in company law. As if blinded with 
awe at the imperial might of the corporation, politicians have not 
only extended the legal rights of the modern firm, but deliberately 
disarmed the state of its countervailing powers. In many ways, 
the global economy is currently living through the worst of both 
worlds: the removal of government restraints on economic activity 
without the introduction of compensating restraints on the power 
of corporations. 
Historically, the sole duty of company directors has been to the 
company’s shareholders. In spite of the best intentions of many 
corporate executives, this legal imperative has a deeply corrosive 
effect on the way in which companies approach their social respon-
sibilities. In most cases, corporate responsibility becomes another 
term for enlightened self-interest – that good conduct towards 
customers, regulators and communities helps to generate a ‘licence 
to operate’. The problem comes, of course, when the interests of 
company and society conflict. At this point, corporate responsibility 
slips into the shadows and the supremacy of shareholder value 
reasserts itself. Equally, there have been no codes or regulations 
to ensure that shareholders place their demands for returns within 
a broader framework of respect for the long-term interests of the 
corporation or the rights of others. In the fine words of Adam Smith, 
special measures are required to bring more ‘dignity and steadiness’ 
to the conduct of both executives and investors. 
Central to this effort is a rebalancing of corporate rights and 
privileges, so that the current protection of limited liability does 
not screen executives and investors from the consequences of their 
actions. For one of the pioneers of socially responsible investment in 
the UK, the argument is clear: ‘society gives companies the privilege 
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of limited liability; such a privilege should have social responsibility 
associated with it’.23 For this to happen, an ‘ethics gene’ needs to 
be inserted into company law. The first rule of ethics is to ‘do no 
harm’. To realise this in the corporate context, company directors 
need to be given a legal duty of care to ensure that their actions do 
not damage society or the environment; investors equally need to 
have a parallel duty to ensure that their demand for financial returns 
does no harm. Generate a profit by all means, but this cannot be at 
the expense of others.
Tentative moves in this direction have been made. In the first major 
reform of UK corporate law for over 150 years, the 2006 Companies 
Act modified the duties of directors. Directors must still pursue the 
success of the company for the benefit of its shareholders. But these 
actions must be taken with ‘regard to’ long-term consequences, 
employee interests, relationships with suppliers and customers, 
community and environmental impacts and reputational factors. 
This is a ‘duty to think’, but not a ‘duty to act’ to actually reduce and 
eliminate negative costs for others.24 Establishing a legal requirement 
would just be the first step. Companies would need to review their 
operations to check for compliance. Transition periods could be 
considered to manage the shift from harmful industries to those 
that truly added value through their products and processes. And 
ultimately, these statutory duties would need to be matched by 
sanctions that were visible and dissuasive, including the removal of 
a company’s licence for gross misconduct. As Burke declared more 
than two hundred years ago, ‘if the abuse is proved, the contract 
is broken’.
Through this simple, yet profound, alteration in the corporation’s 
genetic code, its inner dynamics would be reshaped to match its 
social obligations. The limited liability of shareholders also needs to 
be matched by an equivalent ethical obligation to ‘do no harm’ in 
the stewardship of their assets and, ideally, hand them on in a better 
condition. For the think-tank Tomorrow’s Company, the ancient 
duty of stewardship should now involve ‘shareholders, directors or 
others seeking to influence companies in the direction of long-term, 
sustainable performance that derives from contributing to human 
progress and the well-being of environment and society’.25 These 
noble aspirations have yet to be embodied in investor law. But their 
inclusion remains a realistic prospect, and when they are, not just 
corporations, but capital itself would start becoming accountable. 
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dOWNSIZING THE CORpORaTION26
Corporate scale serves to magnify an underlying problem of 
behaviour. When it was small, the damage that the Company could 
inflict was relatively limited. When it grew in size to dominate 
whole markets and territories, its potential for harm grew cor-
respondingly large. Twenty-first-century corporations rarely enjoy 
the chartered monopolies that the East India Company fought so 
hard to sustain. But there is little doubt that the corporation’s dual 
focus on ‘widening the market and narrowing the competition’ that 
Smith observed continues to prevail. Tragically, global deregulation 
has not been accompanied by assertive antitrust and competition 
policies, and so concentration in key markets has climbed to 
economically destructive and politically dangerous levels. In this 
drive for monopoly, the contemporary corporation is rewarded by 
its investors, who favour those who can demonstrate strong ‘barriers 
to entry’ and extensive ‘pricing power’ since these will generate 
excess profits for shareholders. 
In sector after sector – banking, energy, food processing and 
retail, media and telecoms – the remorseless search for profits is 
leading companies to close down competition through mergers and 
acquisitions. The global media industry is a case in point. In the 
early 1980s, the US market was dominated by 50 firms; by the 
turn of the millennium, this had fallen to fewer than ten. Speaking 
on World Press Freedom Day 2002, then Czech President Vaclav 
Havel declared that ‘fifty years from now, the globalisation process 
may be the biggest threat to freedom of expression’.27 Privatisation 
and deregulation have, perversely, contributed to this trend. In the 
European power sector, a recent study concluded that ‘market 
concentration in the field of power generation has to be seen as 
endangering fair, competitive and sustainable energy markets’.28 
Just as the East India Company monopolised the textile production 
of India to force down prices and exert greater control, so many of 
today’s major commodity chains have become highly concentrated, 
generating powerful downward pressure on the prices of goods 
exported by developing countries. Three companies control 45 per 
cent of all of the world’s coffee roasting, for example, while four 
companies account for 40 per cent of cocoa grinding.29 Diversity 
in global retailing has also shrunk dramatically in recent years, 
with the top 30 companies accounting for around one-third of 
all grocery sales. This retail concentration helps to explain why 
successive rounds of trade liberalisation have not led to improved 
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prosperity for poor nations. As Jean Ziegler concluded for the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, ‘global commodity markets are 
increasingly dominated by fewer global transnational corporations 
that have the power to demand low producer prices, while keeping 
consumer prices high, thus, increasing their profit margins’.30 The 
great drain is being repeated once more, with supermarkets able 
to deploy their market power to ‘drain the wealth from farming 
communities and marginalised small-scale producers’.31 And, as the 
Company showed in its relations with European and Asian states, 
corporate power is as much a political as an economic problem. 
Whether it is trade agreements that bias development towards 
business interests, or successive reductions in the share of tax levied 
from corporations (a proportion that has halved in the USA since 
the 1950s), the East India Company casts a long shadow over a 
process of globalisation that so many of its supporters claim is new 
to the world.32
Antitrust and competition policies are supposedly designed to deal 
with these threats to market diversity. But these have largely failed 
to ‘have much bearing on the concentration of economic activity’.33 
Although market dominance by a few key firms (oligopoly) breaches 
the tenets of neo-classical theory, it has been increasingly accepted 
in practice across the world. Writing in the 1970s, John Kenneth 
Galbraith acknowledged somewhat despairingly that ‘King Canute 
looks down on those who administer our antitrust laws with the 
utmost understanding and sympathy’.34 Since then, 30 years of 
privatisation, deregulation and trade liberalisation have undone 
many of these modest gains, and created new global combinations 
to replace the national champions of an earlier age. The result is a 
crisis of control that demands a similarly robust approach to global 
antitrust as inspired reformers in the last century. Not only is such 
a global antitrust approach economically urgent, but it also offers 
the prospect of a powerful new alliance between those supporting 
open markets and those aiming to curb corporate power. 
In Adam Smith’s economic vision, monopoly corporations were 
simply ‘nuisances in every respect’. Urgent action is needed to reverse 
the process of corporate concentration. Targeted global antitrust 
investigations are needed to redress the balance, for example, 
in highly concentrated commodity chains on which developing 
countries are dependent. These investigations could help to build 
the mandate for the establishment of a global competition authority 
that would be charged with breaking up the most damaging 
cartels and combinations of corporate power. Importantly, this 
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authority would need to be wholly independent of the World Trade 
Organisation. Alongside this, national action has to be intensified, 
first by implementing the ‘standstill’ principle to prevent any further 
corporate concentration, and then introducing the ‘rollback’ 
principle to break open markets to enable economic diversity to 
flourish once more. In Britain, Parliament’s vote in 2010 to block 
Rupert Murdoch’s bid for BSkyB showed that continual growth 
in corporate power was not an inevitability, with The Economist 
magazine commenting that ‘not since the East India Company was 
finally brought to heel in the 19th century has political power over an 
influential private enterprise in Britain been so brutally enforced.’35
RaFaEl’S laW
The absence of a world competition authority is certainly a major 
gap in the architecture of global governance. But it is not the only 
thing that is missing. As Burke’s struggle to remove the impunity 
of Hastings and others demonstrated, the legal accountability of 
corporations and their executives is equally an essential element 
of an effective international order. Then, as now, human rights 
are universal entitlements, subject to the rule of law in spite of 
convenient appeals to special circumstances or ‘geographical 
morality’. Legal victories for human rights abuse were rare in the 
age of Enlightenment – as they are, sadly, still today. But Gregore 
Cojamaul and Johannes Rafael’s stunning victory in winning 
damages from the Company’s Governor of Bengal, Harry Verelst, 
demonstrates that the principle of extraterritorial liability has been 
long established in British law at least. 
By and large, the Company’s abuses stemmed from its ability to 
deploy military technology to enforce its interests. A technology 
of quite a different type lies at the root of many contemporary 
human rights and environmental abuses: the extraction of fossil 
fuels, particularly in the petrochemical industry. But from the age of 
the East India Company, a tool has endured that is now being used 
to enable today’s victims of corporate abuse to seek civil redress. In 
1789, the new American Republic passed the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(ATCA) to allow foreigners to bring violations of international law 
to trial in US courts.36 Originally designed to combat the scourge 
of piracy, in the late 1970s legal experts revived ATCA to bring 
those accused of international human rights abuses to justice in 
the USA. In 1979, Dolly Filartiga won a landmark judgment in 
New York against the police inspector who had supervised the 
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torture and killing of her brother in her native Paraguay. Summing 
up the sentence, Justice Irving Kaufman concluded that ‘the 
torturer has become – like the pirate and slave trader before him 
– hostis humanis generis, ‘an enemy of mankind’. Subsequently, 
both Ferdinand Marcos, the former dictator of the Philippines, 
and Radovan Karadzic of the breakaway Serb republic in Bosnia 
have been charged under ATCA. From the mid-1990s, the use of 
ATCA has been expanded to address the complicity of US and 
other corporations in human rights abuses across the developing 
world. From Chevron and Shell in Nigeria to Exxon and Freeport 
in Indonesia and Unocal in Burma, about two dozen cases have 
been filed in US courts on behalf of individuals and communities 
alleging killing, torture, arbitrary arrest and forced labour. 
Just as Cojamaul and Rafael faced huge legal obstacles to achieving 
justice in the 1770s, so today’s victims have faced an uphill struggle 
to gain recognition in the courts. About half of the ATCA cases 
against corporations have been dismissed. But in December 2004, 
a major breakthrough was achieved when Unocal reached an out- 
of-court settlement with 15 Burmese plaintiffs in an eight-year-long 
ATCA case. The lawsuit had alleged that California-based energy 
company Unocal was complicit in forced labour, rape and murder 
committed by the Burmese military during the construction of the 
Yadana gas pipeline from Burma to Thailand. Even though the final 
settlement was out of court, a number of powerful legal precedents 
had already been set demonstrating that corporations can be held 
liable for civil damages in the US for aiding and abetting human 
rights abuse by oppressive regimes overseas.37 But the Unocal case 
also highlights the limits of existing international mechanisms for 
corporate accountability. Just as the Armenians in 1770s London 
could only win financial damages for Verelst’s actions, so ACTA 
only involves civil law, leaving aside the frequent need to bring 
criminal prosecutions for corporate abuse. Even this modest relief 
is under threat from lobbyists seeking to free business of any form 
of redress for their actions overseas. 
In this latest attempt to make corporations above the rule of law, 
inspiration can be drawn from the case of Cojamaul and Rafael. 
Instruments of justice need to be as international as business. The 
liability of corporations for harm they do needs to be clarified 
and access to justice facilitated. All countries, Britain and India 
included, need to ensure that effective legal remedies are in place 
to enable those affected by corporations to bring legal action in the 
country of operation, the company’s place of registration or in an 
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international court. The realistic prospect of judicial intervention to 
penalise malpractice – wherever it may occur – would be a powerful 
deterrent, further encouraging business to adopt responsible 
practices that prevent problems in the first place. 
ITS RIGHTFul plaCE
In the pre-industrial age, the corporation was used as a tool to 
mobilise capital for Europe’s efforts at long-distance trade and 
colonisation. The political and economic risks of letting corporations 
loose in the domestic environment were well understood, particularly 
in England following the South Sea Bubble. It was only when 
long-term capital was once again required for the railways that 
the corporate form was reinvented for use at home.38 For all the 
differences between the Company’s day and our own, the modern 
corporation remains primarily designed for economic conquest, 
deploying all the financial, human and technological tools at its 
disposal to achieve its ends. Regulatory reform to insert ethical 
duties on corporations and their shareholders, to scale back those 
whose size constrains economic diversity and to ensure effective 
remedies for abuse are all essential steps to accountability. But 
equally important is reminding ourselves of specific niches in 
which the corporation can and should flourish. For Adam Smith, 
the joint stock model needed to be confined to just a few sectors 
such as banking and utilities. For our time, it is critical that other 
commercial models – partnerships, mutuals, cooperatives, private, 
social or public enterprises – grow in importance, delivering the 
institutional diversity that long-term economic success requires. 
In the twenty-first century, ‘the emerging new economy may have 
fewer eminent leviathans’, according to David Boyle and Andrew 
Simms, ‘but like a rugged vibrant ecosystem compared to a vast 
and vulnerable monoculture, it will certainly be healthier, happier, 
more interesting and more resilient’.39
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a STaTuE TO a SHEEp-STEalER
For more than a decade I have been tracking the East India Company, 
examining its historical record as well as its contemporary legacy. 
Walking through the cities it impacted in Europe and Asia helps to 
contextualise its impacts, placing its actions in precise locations. 
For me, the London leg of these journeys ends in Whitehall. If 
you walk to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London 
from St James’s Park, you will climb up ‘Clive’s steps’, named after 
the larger-than-life statue of Robert Clive that stands outside the 
old India Office building (see Illustration E.1). It was here that 
the governance of India passed after the Company’s demise in 
1858. But it took another 60 years for this monument to the great 
‘nabob-maker’ to be erected. The reasons for this delay say much 
about his contested record. From the early 1750s, his triumph at 
Arcot had made Clive Britain’s ‘heaven-born general’ in the eyes 
of Prime Minister William Pitt the Elder. The Plassey Revolution 
brought him even greater fame as a much-needed national hero 
during the bitter Seven Years’ War. For this, Clive was made Baron 
of Plassey – a title that carried a sting, however, as it was only an 
Irish baronetcy, with a distinctly second-class status. Praise soon 
turned to loathing when the size of his fortune and the means by 
which he had acquired it became known. Even King George III 
protested at Clive’s ‘fleecing’ of India. Hauled before Parliament to 
explain his actions, Clive declared his resentment at being treated 
like ‘a common sheep-stealer’. Cleared he may have been in the 
vote that followed, but his reputation was ruined. At the time of 
his death, there is little doubt that he had become ‘the most hated 
man in England’, according to a recent biographer.1
For decades thereafter, Clive’s military exploits would be praised 
in imperial literature, but his corruption would be equally denounced 
as somehow un-British, not least by Macaulay in his celebrated 
essay of 1840. It was only in the run-up to the 150th anniversary 
of Plassey in 1906–7 that a former Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, 
proposed rehabilitating Clive’s memory in the twin imperial cities 
of London and Calcutta. The reception was frosty. In India, the 
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British authorities feared that such a celebration might exacerbate 
the rising nationalist tension in Bengal. Back in London, the Liberal 
Secretary of State for India, John Morley, retorted that it would 
have been better for Britain if Clive had lost the battle. Instead of 
a statue to Clive, Morley suggested erecting a monument to the 
Illustration E.1 Statue of Robert Clive, london
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Italian nationalist, Garibaldi. But Curzon’s idea tapped into the 
rising mood of imperial jingoism, and drawing subscriptions from 
the public – as well as some reluctant Indian princes – two rather 
bombastic statues of Clive were installed in 1911, the year of the 
British imperial durbar in Delhi. 
In Kolkata, Curzon’s white marble statue of Clive still stands in 
the lobby of the Victoria Memorial, passed by thousands of visitors 
who come each day to look at the historical curiosities contained 
within. Across the world in London, Clive’s statue has a more formal 
and elevated place in the heart of Westminster (see Map 3). His left 
hand rests on the pommel of his sword, underlining the critical role 
of military force in the Company’s rise to power. In his right hand, 
he clasps a bundle of documents, perhaps the forged agreement with 
Amir Chand that paved the way for the takeover of Bengal. Panels 
around the base of the statue tell how Clive made his name at the 
siege of Arcot, portray him poised for victory on the eve of Plassey, 
and show him enjoying the fruits of his acquisition of the diwani. 
Facing west, the statue looks towards the numerous properties 
that Clive acquired with his Indian loot. Less than a mile away in 
Berkeley Square is the house where he died in November 1774, with 
a plaque commemorating him as ‘soldier and administrator’ – not 
businessman. Outside London in Surrey’s stockbroker belt stands 
Claremont, which Clive had bought from the penniless Duke of 
Newcastle. Clive was not able to implement his grand plans he had 
for the place before his untimely death, but Macaulay describes 
how ‘the peasantry of Surrey looked with mysterious horror on the 
stately house which was rising at Claremont, and whispered that 
the great wicked lord had ordered the walls to be made so thick 
in order to keep out the devil’. Clive’s former mansion has been 
converted into a private boys’ school, while its landscaped gardens 
are owned by the National Trust, where green parrots fly between 
the beech trees, as if they were among the gumbads of Delhi’s Lodi 
Gardens. Further west still, Clive’s mansion at Walcot Hall in his 
native Shropshire today boasts a number of holiday apartments, 
bearing such evocative names as ‘Arcot’ and ‘Plassey’, while his 
Plassey estate outside Limerick in Ireland has been recycled as the 
home for the town’s university. 
Public statues reflect the values of the ruling elite. In many 
countries, not least India, the heroes of previous regimes have been 
removed from their places of honour to mark changing perspectives 
on the past. The fact that one of Britain’s greatest corporate 
rogues continues to have pride of place at the heart of government 
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suggests that the British elite has not yet confronted its corporate 
and imperial past. Equally curious is the fact that the statue is in 
Whitehall rather than the City. Clive was a ‘company man’ and 
made his acquisitions to promote the Company’s (as well as his 
own) interests. If a memorial is needed at all, it should be outside 
Leadenhall Street where East India House once stood. But, as we 
have seen, the City is curiously evasive about its corporate history. 
Crucially, Clive’s elevation is strikingly at odds with how many 
of the Company’s contemporaries wished its leading executives to 
be remembered. Throughout its career, the East India Company 
generated a mix of emotions from admiration through fear to 
outright hatred. This clash of perspectives was brought out with 
particular clarity during the heated parliamentary debates over 
Robert Clive’s conduct in Bengal on 10 May 1773. Opinion was 
divided even within the government of the day, with the Solicitor 
General Alexander Wedderburn coming out strongly in favour of 
the Company, arguing that 
the recording pen of a candid historian will relate these 
transactions as they were – and he will not fail to hold forth for 
the admiration of posterity that in a revolution which acquired 
to the Company a dominion larger, wealthier and more populous 
than ever Athens possessed or than Rome itself … so few actions 
are to be discovered by the most inquisitive examiner, so few 
that reflect dishonour on individuals, none that tarnish the 
British name.
Almost immediately, the Attorney General Edward Thurlow 
stood to contradict his learned friend, remonstrating that ‘to what 
but the rapacity of the Company’s servants is it owing that Bengal 
under its own government so flourishing, under ours be brought to 
the brink of ruin?’2 Fifty years later, the leading utilitarian thinker, 
Jeremy Bentham proposed in 1822 that the Company’s directors and 
shareholders should commission a statue to Warren Hastings with 
the following inscription: ‘Let it but put money into our pockets, 
no tyranny too flagitious to be worshipped by us.’ Bentham added 
that the statue should be twinned with ‘a long-robed accomplice ... 
lodging the bribe in the hand of the other’.3 A memorial to Hastings 
was eventually erected, but with a very different inscription. 
Installed by his widow just inside the north transept of nearby 
Westminster Abbey, the sculpture is modest, stating that Hastings 
had been ‘selected for his eminent talents and integrity’. Across 
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the aisle, in what could be called the Abbey’s ‘Company Corner’ 
are eye-catching monuments to two of the chief protagonists at 
Plassey: Admiral Charles Watson and Eyre Coote, then a captain, 
but eventually a general. Mixing the classical with the oriental, like 
Spiridione’s The Offering, the monuments speak of pure corporate 
supremacy. Under a palm tree, Watson’s celebration has a naked 
Indian slumped at the bottom with his head in his hands, while Eyre 
Coote’s tableau displays another Indian, this time with his hands 
tied behind his back. Similar statues litter imperial buildings from 
Cornwallis’s monument St Paul’s Cathedral to Josiah Webbe’s in St 
Mary’s church inside Fort St George, Madras. 
CORpORaTE KARMA
In the closing pages of his The Discovery of India, Nehru examined 
the consequences of 200 years of domination of India by England 
in terms of karma, the Hindu law of cause and effect. ‘Entangled 
in its meshes’, he wrote from his cell in Ahmadnagar Fort in 
1944, ‘we have thus struggled in vain to rid ourselves of this past 
inheritance and start afresh on a different basis.’4 Independence 
of course was a necessary starting point for release, but one that 
needed to be supplemented by further action to deal with the bitter 
lessons of empire. For Edward Thompson, friend of Nehru and 
supporter of independence, England needed to make atonement 
(prayaschitta) – particularly for the barbarities that followed the 
rebellion of 1857–58 – if relations between the two countries were 
to flourish.5 At the time, this was a step too far. But with greater 
distance from events, an honest cultural reckoning can enable both 
societies to ‘start afresh’; in fact, the beginnings of this rethink is 
already underway.
The first step in atonement is acknowledgement. In Britain, 
the romantic vision of the Company still prevails, buttressed by 
a faith in English amateurism and imperial redemption. Famously, 
the nineteenth-century historian, John Seeley, concluded that ‘our 
acquisition of India was made blindly’ adding that ‘nothing great 
that has ever been done by Englishmen was done so unintentionally, 
so accidentally, as the conquest of India’.6 This wonderful myth is 
matched by the equally alluring fable that the evident wrongs of 
the Company were redeemed by the Raj, with ‘the use of imputed 
barbarism to justify, and even ennoble, imperial ambition’, perhaps 
what could be called the ‘Paupiah Syndrome’.7 This belief in the 
merits of the ‘Anglobalisation’ that followed in the wake of the 
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Company’s excesses has been most assiduously promoted by Niall 
Ferguson.8 By contrast, I believe that the Company’s practices, 
its legacy and historical debt need to be brought into the open. 
Its physical remains can become the starting point for a vigorous 
programme of challenge and interpretation. More than a century 
has passed since Curzon decided to rehabilitate Clive’s reputation 
with the statue outside the India Office. Since then, the world has 
been transformed, with the end of empire, the fall of communism 
and the rise of globalisation. Yet Clive’s monument still stands in 
the same place. Some argue that the statues of the past should 
remain to retain a continuity of historical records, asking that 
if Clive was taken down, where would the process stop: would 
Churchill also be carted off from his plinth in Parliament Square 
for his involvement in the 1943 Bengal famine?9 Others suggest 
that adding new statues to black and Asian historical figures would 
help to redress the balance. Yet some reckoning with the physical 
representation of the Company is certainly required – and for me, 
removing Clive to a museum would help to finally mark an end to 
one part of the culture of empire. And if it stays, perhaps placing 
a statue of Commissioner Lin facing Clive could communicate the 
long-run consequences of Clive’s adventurism in Bengal far beyond 
Britain and India’s borders. 
A more important question is how the Company’s remains can 
become living symbols of renewal. In Kolkata, the Belvedere, 
Hastings’s mansion and scene of his duel with Francis, is now home 
to India’s National Library, while in London, the mansion of a 
former Company director in Wimbledon has been transformed into 
a Muslim educational foundation.
Over recent years, I have been working with the London-based arts 
and environmental group, Platform, on a programme of activities 
to reveal the Company’s hidden history and make the links with 
contemporary corporate activities. It has hosted a series of guided 
walks around the site of the Company’s headquarters, warehouses 
and docks, which have stimulated broad public discussion and 
debate. Out of this came a project to establish the Museum of the 
Corporation, which would provide a focal point for public reflection 
on this most powerful institution of our time.10 Aiming to inform 
and intrigue, the museum could combine exhibitions, education 
and other activities to engage the public on the role of corporations 
in their lives, the strengths and the weaknesses. The museum 
would range through the history of the corporation, showing the 
commonalities and discontinuities between contemporary business 
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and forerunners such as the East India Company. The museum 
would also balance physical artefacts and the best of electronic 
media, acting in a network with like-minded institutions across 
the globe. In London, the museum could be hosted in one of the 
East India Company’s former warehouses, for example, at Cutlers 
Gardens, one part of which was set aside for public use as part of 
the redevelopment exercise in the 1970s. In Kolkata, Clive’s former 
house at Dum-Dum would be an equally symbolic site for such a 
place of reflection in India. Already the Company’s former chapel in 
Poplar has now become a centre of community efforts to reconcile 
the diverse communities in London’s  Docklands, while the Brick 
Lane Circle has led efforts to grapple with the Company’s legacy 
for London’s youth.11 
The partial view of the Company in existing museums is also 
getting addressed. Wonderful artefacts remain, but often lie mute 
in their glass display cabinets. The need for new ways of revealing 
the Company’s past was highlighted in the ‘Encounters’ exhibition 
hosted by London’s Victoria and Albert Museum in 2004. Examining 
the economic and aesthetic exchanges between Europe and Asia in 
the 300 years up to 1800, the exhibition portrayed the interaction as 
generally one of mutual benefit and fascination. Yet there appeared 
to be little attempt to look at the human realities that lay behind 
luxury goods on display, to examine how trade was conducted, as 
well as what was exchanged. A simple, neo-classical gown on show 
in the exhibition, for example, could have told a deeper and more 
tragic story. Woven of Bengali muslin, most probably in Dhaka, 
around 1800, the gown at first glance was just a thing of beauty. 
No reference was made, however, to the fact that this gown was 
part of a dying generation, coming from an industry that was just 
about to be eliminated through industrial technology, tariff walls 
and the Company’s imperial management. A mere 18 years after 
the gown was woven, the Company had shut its factory in Dhaka 
and ceased all imports of Indian muslin. Simply looking at this and 
other artefacts through the lens of culture fails to tell the whole 
story. A different approach was taken by the National Maritime 
Museum when it opened the first permanent gallery on the East 
India Company in 2011. The exhibition manages to place the 
extensive artefacts of maritime adventure into a refreshing display 
that acknowledges the human impacts of the Company’s expansion 
into both India and China. 
Yet the most profound reappraisal of the Company’s place in 
history is underway in Asia, part of the much wider re-orientation 
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of the global economy. A striking example is contained in a TV 
advertisement for Rajnigandha paan masala. Set in London, the 
advert shows an Indian tycoon stopping his car in front of the 
East India Company’s headquarters and telling his secretary that 
he wants to buy the firm: ‘they ruled us for 200 years, and now it’s 
our turn to rule’. And perhaps it is. In 2010, the right to use the 
East India Company trademarks was bought by Sanjiv Mehta, an 
Indian entrepreneur. The first expression of the new Company is a 
shop selling luxury goods – teas, coffees, chocolates – in London’s 
West End, including the ‘Queen Victoria Empire’ trunk, costing 
some £2,000. For Mehta, ‘as an Indian, I had this huge feeling of 
redemption – this indescribable feeling of owning a company that 
once owned us’.12 As an entrepreneur, Mehta believes that ‘the East 
India Company is one of the most recognised brands in the world: 
over two billion people know of its history’, seeing his role as the 
‘custodian of this great brand’. A new romanticism of the East India 
Company is being born, this time coming out of India.
FuTuRE FlOWERINGS
If there is to be hope of creating a positive future, the Company’s 
role in the shared pasts of Europe and Asia need to be confronted. 
For the writer Ben Okri, ‘nations and peoples are largely the stories 
they feed themselves’, and ‘if they tell themselves lies, they will suffer 
the future consequences of those lies’. But, continues Okri, ‘if they 
tell themselves stories that face their own truths, they will free their 
histories for future flowerings’.13 It is with a view to these ‘future 
flowerings’ that the East India Company has to be examined in the 
twenty-first century. 
The East India Company’s story is ultimately a tragedy, the 
tale of an institution that generated great wealth, but also great 
harm, an institution that was ultimately doomed by the flaws in 
its corporate design. This story has much to teach the twenty-first 
century about the dangers of unchecked corporate power and the 
enduring capacity of people to press for justice. As interest in the 
Company’s relevance for today’s world grows, a full reckoning is 
long overdue. An honest confrontation with the corporate origins 
of the modern age can help to illuminate both our history and 
stimulate renewed action to align corporations with the wider 
public interest. 
Knowing the Company’s story, the obligation is to remember and 
then to act. This is what motivated those like Edmund Burke who 
Robins T02502 01 text   225 30/08/2012   09:22
226 THE CORpORaTION THaT CHaNGEd THE WORld
championed the cause of justice in the eighteenth century, without 
hope of either personal reward or, indeed, of success. At the end 
of his life, Burke wrote to his young friend and literary executor, 
French Laurence, to communicate what he still valued in his long 
political and literary career. Known today for his conservative 
defence of social hierarchy during the French Revolution, Burke 
told Laurence that everything apart from his work to bring 
justice to India should be forgotten. His outrage burning once 
more, Burke damned the way that the Company had turned its 
relations with India into ‘nothing more than an opportunity of 
gratifying the lowest of their purposes, the lowest of their passions’. 
Unlike Macaulay, with his bitter scorn for all things Asian, Burke 
continued to argue for an ethical equality between East and West. 
But this had been violated through the Company’s acquisition and 
subsequent oppression of India. In the process, Europe had incurred 
an enormous moral deficit. ‘If ever Europe recovers its civilisation’, 
Burke concluded, then his ‘work will be useful’. And summoning 
his own generation and those to come to face the full reality of the 
East India Company, Burke calls out from the eighteenth century, 
‘Remember! Remember! Remember!14
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